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Foreword
For some developing countries natural resource wealth has turned out to be a
curse rather than a blessing. Economic growth based exclusively on natural
resources—such as oil, gas, and minerals—is often of a very narrow kind,
failing to provide opportunities for much of the population. The wealth
from a nation’s extractive industries needs to be carefully managed if inclusive
and sustainable growth is to be achieved. Resource wealth has often been
associated with political instability, corruption and the non-transparent use
of the revenues for private gain instead of national development. Many low-
and middle-income countries continue to struggle with their resource wealth,
with conflict and civil war being the unfortunate outcome for some.
This natural resource curse, and all that it brings, is a motivation for UNU-
WIDER’s Extractives for Development project—launched in early 2016 and
led by Tony Addison and Alan Roe—bringing together a network of
researchers, practitioners, and policy makers, international and local, govern-
ment and corporate, to share their accumulated learning. By comparing
experiences of the extractive industries across countries—opportunities and
challenges, successes and failures—the project has built a comprehensive
body of knowledge, potentially transferable between countries when suitably
adapted to local circumstances. This book will help national policy makers
and their international partners in the task of creating development strategies
that use resource revenues for inclusive and sustainable development, better
manage the macroeconomic risks, and prepare their societies for the impact
on the extractive sectors of the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy
and other low-carbon technologies.
I sincerely thank the contributors for their studies which share with us their
individual expertise within the field, and the editors, Tony Addison and Alan
Roe, for bringing this academic work to full fruition and particularly for their
analytical and authorship skills, evidenced so clearly in this fascinating book.
UNU-WIDER gratefully acknowledges the support and financial contribu-
tions to its research programme by the governments of Finland, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom. Without this vital funding our research and policy
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Preface
This book is an output of the UNU-WIDER 2014–18work programme, entitled
‘Transformation, Inclusion and Sustainability: Creating and Sharing Know-
ledge for Development’. The topic of extractives and development touches
almost every aspect of development, and is relevant to each of the three
themes of the UNU-WIDER programme. It is also highly relevant to the
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and especially to
UN member states which are looking to strengthen the contribution that
the extractive sectors can make to national development.
Transforming the structure of economies to achieve higher rates of eco-
nomic growth and greater resilience to shocks has proven to be more difficult
in resource-rich countries than was expected in the early years of development
thinking and practice from the 1950s onwards. Many such countries are today
more dependent on the extractive industries despite, in many cases, having
achieved higher levels of per capita income. Other countries have seen their
living standards slide as political instability and conflict have taken hold.
While some countries have managed to use the revenues from extractive
resources to advance social inclusion by investing in education, healthcare,
and development infrastructure, many resource-rich countries have seen
social exclusion rather than greater inclusion.
Today there is an additional challenge. Extractives sectors in all countries
need to reduce both their own environmental footprints and especially their
greenhouse gas emissions. Countries and extractive companies (both minerals
and oil and gas) need to prepare for the accelerating shift now underway from
fossil fuels to renewable energy, and for the multiple revenue and other eco-
nomic consequences of a global transition to low-carbon pathways for econ-
omies and societies. In sum, the subject of extractives and development has an
undoubted and increasing relevance for the goals of transformation, inclusion,
and sustainability—the three pillars of UNU-WIDER’s work programme.
In addition to this book, the extractives for development project at UNU-
WIDER has many other outputs, and we plan to add further to these in the
coming years. Over more than thirty years, UNU-WIDER’s research projects
and conferences have generated a very large amount of knowledge on a wide
range of development policy issues. This knowledge is shared via our website
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www.wider.unu.edu. There you can also find links to many other research
papers, policy briefs, and blogs, as well as to the videos that UNU-WIDER
increasingly produces. These include interviews with many of the contribu-
tors to this book, giving readers the opportunity to learnmore about the topic.
The website also provides users with ample opportunities to engage with
UNU-WIDER through our social media outlets and to keep up-to-date with
our work, including that on extractives and development.
In its more than thirty years of existence, UNU-WIDER has engaged with a
very large number of researchers and practitioners. This book has enlarged and
deepened our network further. It has been excellent to work with Alan Roe as
the project’s co-leader, and the book’s co-editor. He brings long-standing
expertise on the subject, very clear insight into the ways that development
policy works, and has been central to the design, construction, and process of
preparing this UNU-WIDER book.
There are few subjects as important as development policy—getting it right
can lift millions from poverty. At the same time, development in all its
dimensions is the subject of a continual conversation with many actors across
our world, offering many different perspectives and experiences. We at UNU-
WIDER believe that this book offers a useful contribution to that debate,
drawing as it does on a large amount of expertise and experience.
Tony Addison
Chief Economist-Deputy Director, UNU-WIDER
Helsinki, June 2018




Many people, the UNU-WIDER team and beyond, have been engaged in
designing, developing and bringing this book to its successful conclusion.
Finn Tarp, UNU-WIDER’s director, provided encouragement as well as valu-
able guidance throughout our endeavour. Support from UNU-WIDER staff
was outstanding. Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen, UNU-WIDER’s publications
‘maestro’, drew on years of publications experience to guide this large book
through to its successful completion, especially in the final pre-publication
stage. Thorunn Sigurdardottir and Ann-Mari Sundsten ably handled the prac-
tical management of the project in its earlier and later stages. Anna-Mari
Vesterinen and later Ans Vehmaanperä did great work in helping to prepare
many of the studies for early exposure in WIDERWorking Papers. Our thanks
are also due to the UNU-WIDER support teams, including: Lay Poh Allonen,
Mayra Da Silva De Gouveia, Dominik Etienne, Amanda Hajnal, Tuuli Levit,
Anne Ruohonen, Sherry Ruuskanen, Paul Silfvenius, and Marian Vo. The
project website, developed soon after a first project meeting, has benefitted
from excellent editing and production from the UNU-WIDER communica-
tions and IT teams, including Kennedy Ambang, Anu Laakso, Bruck Tadesse,
and Annett Victorero. The website will continue to be a source of much
valuable supplementary information.
A project meeting was held in Helsinki on 11–12 April 2016, to share and
discuss initial ideas and early drafts of papers. Roger Williamson chaired that
meeting with great skill combined with his usual aplomb. Participants at the
meeting (many of whom later contributed chapters to this book) included:
Dede Adzovi, Wisdom Akpalu, Sheila Agyemang, Benjamin Anang, Hernan
Araneda, Toni Aubynn, Millicent Awuku, Mahamudu Bawumia, Mark
Beare, Ruth Greenspan Bell, Joanna Buckley, Jim Cust, Evelyn Dietsche, Lasse
Djahlin, Samantha Dodd, Mark Essex, Liesel Mack Filgueiras, Holger Grundel,
Patrick Heller, Tony Hodge, Jussi Huopaniemi, Malik Iddrisu, Maja Jakobsen,
Anton Löf, Neil McCulloch, Catherine Macdonald, Kathryn McPhail, Angel
Mondoloka, Senia Nhamo, Robert Osei, Richard Osei, Olle Östensson, James
Otto, Nadia Ouedraogo, Caroline Schimanski, Jeffery Round, Paul Stevens,
Adam Swallow, Kathryn Tomlinson, Nick Travis, Rick van der Ploeg, and
Sophie Witter. Bob Denham and his team from Econ Films conducted video
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interviews with many of the meeting participants for the UNU-WIDER video
series on Extractives and Development.
Adam Swallow and Katie Bishop from Oxford University Press gave us very
useful advice in planning and organizing the book for publication. The con-
structive suggestions of OUP’s anonymous peer reviewers also helped to
improve the book in several ways. We are delighted that the book is included
in the UNU-WIDER series with OUP.
Our contributing authors dealt with our numerous editorial—and no doubt
occasionally irritating—interventions with great patience and have provided
us with excellent co-operation throughout the process. Together they consti-
tute an immense and very diverse source of wisdom and insight. We have
been very fortunate to have been able to draw on such a team and we thank
them most sincerely for all for their hard work and assistance in bringing this
study to publication.
Finally, we would like to thank Lynda Addison and Susan Roe for their great
encouragement and support, and of course for their patience over the many
hours when they lost us to the labours involved. This book is dedicated
to them.
Tony Addison and Alan Roe
June 2018
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Extractives for Development
Introduction and Ten Main Messages
Tony Addison and Alan Roe
1.1 Introduction
This book is about the challenges and opportunities that countries face in
using their extractive industries to achieve inclusive development. Its focus is
on the developing world, both low-income countries (LICs) and middle-
income countries (MICs), drawing upon the experiences of high-income
countries (HICs) when relevant. Extractive industries have shaped the econ-
omies, societies, and politics of nations—for good and bad. Today’s richest
nations owe at least part of their high living standards to the extractive
industries. Yet while a large national income can result from resource wealth,
it can also be associated with acute social inequality and deep poverty—the
very opposites of inclusive development. Many LICs and MICs struggle to
diversify their economies, and create redistributive fiscal systems, in ways that
reduce poverty, inequality, and social division. The very worst cases see
violent conflict and civil war.
The phrase ‘resource curse’ became common coin by the turn of the millen-
nium. Crises and resource-wars were important catalysts in a new determin-
ation to improve the sector’s governance. Global civil society, notably Global
Witness and Oxfam America, together with the Natural Resources Governance
Institute (NRGI) and industry bodies such as the International Council on
Mining and Metals (ICMM) have led efforts to achieve improved outcomes
for the extractives sector. One of the most notable manifestations of this was
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) launched in 2002. These
all recognize, in different ways, that natural resources can provide a means,
when properly used, for poorer nations to decisively break with poverty.
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National ambitions for the extractives sector were given amajor boost in the
years after the millennium by an upswing in the prices of metals and fuels,
following low prices in the 1980s and 1990s. China’s economic boom resulted
in a seemingly insatiable demand for commodities of all kinds and this,
together with limited supplies after years of low investment, created a ‘com-
modities super-cycle’. Growth elsewhere in the global economy added to
demand. Euphoria returned during the super-cycle years from 2002 with
buoyant export earnings and public revenues, as well as higher economic
growth (though often of a narrow and undiversified kind). Very large invest-
ments were made in mining as well as in oil and gas after many years of
moderating capacity; much of this was in the LICs and MICs.1 Producers
rode the super-cycle, including a sharp dip during the 2008–9 financial crisis,
for more than a decade until it finally stalled in 2011–12.
However, the price slump did remind companies and governments of the
commercial and economic risks associated with the extractives sector. Com-
panies cut production and scaled back many of the investment plans made
during the super-cycle years. Host countries initiated macroeconomic adjust-
ments in response to lower revenues, their options limited in many cases by a
failure to build fiscal buffers and diversify their economies during the good
times. Painful adjustments are still ongoing in countries that over-
accumulated debt.
Prices are now (January 2018) above their lowest levels, though for oil and
gas, as well as many metals, they are still far from their super-cycle peak.
Nevertheless, prices in real terms remain above their long-term trend levels
in the case of most metals as well as oil (see Stevens, Chapter 4, this volume).
Some metals required in the manufacture of batteries for electric vehicles and
in renewable energy technologies, notably cobalt and lithium, experienced
spectacular price increases in 2017/18 because of significant supply–demand
imbalances.
The size and direction of future price changes are inherently uncertain.
A myriad of forces will determine the future of each extractives sector, favour-
ing some fuels, minerals, and metals at the expense of others. The forces
driving the future include: the pace and pattern of global economic growth
(with India perhaps nudging China’s position as the leading driver of Asian
commodities demand); the speed of the shift from fossil fuels to renewables in
the overall energy mix (in turn a product of technical change as well as
national and international climate action); and changes in the industry itself,
1 Oil and gas exploration and production spending globally rose over fourfold between 2000 and
2012 and the global exploration spend of mining companies was almost US$30 billion in 2012 as
compared to less than US$3 billion in 2000 (World Bank 2015).
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including the pace of technical change that makes it easier to develop new
deposits in more difficult locations, as well as the adoption of ‘green mining’
in order to minimize the sector’s own environmental footprint. Developing
countries need a strong understanding of these trends as they play out. LICs
and MICs have become significantly more important as producers of extrac-
tives in recent years (see Roe and Dodd, and Ericsson and Löf—Chapters 2 and
3, respectively, in this volume). Since this tendency will almost certainly
continue, their prospects for growth and poverty reduction significantly
depend upon their extractives sectors and how these are managed. Although
‘keep it in the ground’ is a theoretical policy option, it is not an option that is
likely to be widely adopted in practice (see Lahn and Stevens, Chapter 5).
1.1.1 This Book
This book aims to provide a comprehensive contribution to a lively and
ongoing debate, in which many stakeholders now participate: governments
and their international partners (bilateral and multilateral development agen-
cies); the industry itself (the companies together with industrial associations
such as ICMM and IPIECA);2 community-based organizations (and their NGO
and INGO partners); the national and international media; and the research
community in universities and think tanks. This debate centres on achieving
practical action to deliver inclusive development using resource wealth, protect
often fragile environments from damage, enhance the rights of affected com-
munities (and the benefits to them), and support climate change action.
Central to these tasks is the creation of a set of effective and accountable
institutions to manage the extractives sector and maximize its potential for
development impact. In addition to capturing the flavour of current debate on
extractives and development, this book offers ideas and some recommenda-
tions in most of the main policy areas.
Since no single person has expertise on every facet of extractives and
development, this book brings together a range of international experts
from many disciplines and organizations; it therefore represents a large
amount of collective insight and experience. The book is a major output of
UNU-WIDER’s latest research project on extractives and development which
began in 2015. The book is accompanied by a website which makes available
additional materials.3 The book does not seek to define a single formula for
2 IPIECA is the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues.
3 http://www.wider.unu.edu/project/extractives-development-e4d. The website makes available
further papers, including more country case studies and papers that discuss topics not covered in
this book. It also links to video interviews with the authors of the chapters in this volume, as well as
other experts, which are located on UNU-WIDER’s YouTube site.
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‘success’. Instead it offers a comprehensive but integrated account of the
multiple ingredients that are needed to turn the undoubted potential of
extractives wealth into the reality of sustained improvements in living stand-
ards and social well-being. Section 1.2 presents ten of the most important
messages of this book. The chapter concludes with a restatement of what we
believe this book offers to ongoing debate and action on this most vital of
development issues.
1.2 The Main Messages of This Book
The book covers a large amount of ground and many messages emerge from
the individual chapters and their authors. Here we focus on ten key overarch-
ing, but inter-connected messages, emerging from the detailed analysis of the
individual chapters.
1.2.1 Message 1: Extractive Industries Are Important in
Developing Economies and Will Remain Important
Extractive industries have become more important to export revenues and
government revenues in many LICs and MICs, over the last twenty years. Of
the seventy-two LICs and MICs that we identify as most dependent at least in
terms of extractives exports, sixty-three have increased their dependence on
extractives resources over the past fifteen to twenty years (see Roe and Dodd,
Chapter 2). While development economics emphasizes the desirability of
structural transformation to diversify economies away from dependence on
primary products including extractives, dependence is increasing in many
developing countries.
Why is this? The main reason is that many of the newer extractive invest-
ments have been so large relative to the size of national economies. A second
reason is of course the highly favourable prices for extractive commodities
over an extended period. However, a failure to prioritize diversification is
often an important further reason. Resource wealth is notorious for stymieing
policy action, when non-renewable resources are viewed as perpetual gener-
ators of wealth, and not as finite (time-limited) opportunities. Sometimes
diversification is attempted, but when the new investments to achieve this
are badly selected, the economy’s vigour is reduced rather than enhanced—
leading to more, not less, dependence on extractive exports and revenues.
Although it is the case that the shares of extractives in the national economy,
export earnings, and public revenues have risen partly because prices have
risen, levels of extractives dependence in LICs andMICs remain at historically
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high levels even after the adjustments provoked by the price falls of 2011 and
2012 (Roe and Dodd, Chapter 2).
Box 1.1 provides a summary of some of the main factors that lie behind the
recent observed trends.
Box 1.1 GLOBAL MARKET TRENDS: SELECTED INFLUENCES
China has been, and continues to be, easily the biggest driver in this story. Chinese
demand for commodities grew through the 1990s, but really took off after 2000, with its
WTO accession in December 2001 super-charging its exports, and consequently its
imports of essential inputs (Erten and Ocampo 2013). China is a net importer of most
metals as well as oil and gas, with an especially strong appetite for bauxite, copper, iron
ore, nickel, and uranium (Pigato and Tang 2015). In the period 2001–6, when world
prices of metals almost tripled, China accounted for more than 50 per cent of the rise in
demand (Francis 2007: 20). China’s sustained demand was also one reason why prices
rebounded following their dip during the 2008–9 financial crisis.
Commodity prices move in cycles along with the global business cycle. The fall in the
oil price from 2011, and especially from 2014–16, was dramatic and many metals
prices—especially iron ore—saw similar sharp falls. Market analysts have been calling
the end of the ‘commodity super-cycle’ for the past two to three years, though fore-
casting is notoriously difficult—some would say impossible—in this area. Although these
falls have disturbed the markets, it is also significant that in real terms, commodity prices
are mostly higher than was the case twenty years ago, and some of the forces driving up
prices over the longer term are still in play.4 These include China’s continued economic
growth. Although this has slowed to around 6.5 per cent annually, China’s economy is
now some four times its size at the turn of the millennium when growth was much
higher (at around 9 per cent). More generally, the past twenty years have seen the
physical demand for metals growing significantly faster than global GDP and this high
elasticity seems well established (ICMM 2016). The demand for energy and metals
continues to be robust as MICs that currently consume fewer extractives products
(per capita) than richer countries accelerate their economic growth.
Whereas the market outlook for commodities remains positive overall, there will be
plenty of change in relative prices within the commodities category, as well as winners
and losers amongst nations (and companies). The fossil fuels (oil, gas, and coal) illustrate
both points; they will see sustained demand assuming continued global economic
growth, but their market share in global energy production will decline as climate-
change actions accelerate (see Message 10) and OPEC remains under pressure from
US shale production (with the United States likely to become the world’s largest exporter
of liquified natural gas (LNG) in coming years).5 The prospects for metals are generally
good, as renewables gain market share in energy production (see Message 10).
4 ICMM (2016) provides some analysis of these forces as they apply to metals.
5 There is an intense sparring match between Saudi Arabia and US shale producers. To date the
lower oil price has failed to drive US shale oil producers out of business. Every time the oil price
looks set to move out of its present US$40–70 a barrel range, shale production comes back into the
market.
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1.2.2 Message 2: Developing Economies Have Great Potential
to Develop their Extractive Resources Further
Extractive industries have increased, rather than decreased, in importance for
many LICs and MICs (Message 1). Additionally, it is anticipated that many,
though not all, extractives sectors will see considerable further investment in
the future; this is certainly so for most sectors and especially for metals (see
analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI 2013)), notwithstanding the
adjustments associated with climate change policies (see also Addison,
Chapter 22). The second main message is that the LICs and MICs are in
many cases very well positioned to take advantage of this expected growth
in commodities demand—should they choose to do so.
Many of these countries have huge unexploited reserves of resources. Data
fromMGI (2013) reproduced as Figure 1.1 indicates the scale of that potential.
In many of the LICs and MICs shown in the figure, reserves are a huge
multiple of prevailing per capita income levels (remembering that the vertical
scale is logarithmic). In some country cases the calculus of future potential
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Figure 1.1. Known reserves (2012) and per capita incomes (2011)
Source: MGI (2013: 30: Exhibit 3); reproduced here with permission.
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thought to have one quarter of the world’s total reserves of bauxite—most
high grade and unexploited. But it produces only at the level of production in
China and India, which have only one tenth Guinea’s reserves. Furthermore,
these data significantly underestimate the developing world’s full potential
because in relative terms so little geological exploration has taken place in
LICs (as well as many MICs), and this is only now changing.6
The reason why we enter the caveat above, ‘should they choose to do so’, is
clear. In the past many LICs and MICs endowed with large extractives
resources have not seen significant growth or broader development benefits
from exploiting these. Data from the MGI (2013) study suggests that in the
period 1995 through 2011, there were slightly more resource-dependent
countries with below average per capita incomes that fell further behind (in
terms of per capita income) than the number that caught up or surpassed the
average growth of per capita income (MGI 2013: 34).
This relationship between per capita income, resource wealth, and subse-
quent economic growth can also be interpreted as highlighting the dangers
that resource wealth poses to a country’s chances of raising its average living
standard. A very risk-averse development strategy might conclude: ‘leave the
resources in the ground’. But that carries a high opportunity cost as the
revenues (which can far exceed any alternative source, including foreign aid)
can fundmajor pro-poor spending and development infrastructure (including
that needed to diversify the economy itself). Moreover, while the risks are
indeed high, development disaster is not a foregone conclusion: there are
countries like Botswana that have achieved upper-middle-income status
(Leith 2005). More generally, the MGI study also shows that if the record of
the more successful resource-driven countries could be replicated by LICs and
lower-middle-income countries then there is the potential to lift more than
500 million more people out of poverty by 2030 (MGI 2013: 23). This is a
tantalizing prize and it is easy to see why developing countries are unlikely to
be persuaded by arguments that they should forgo the use of their resource
endowments.
A key task of development advisers and analysts (as well as this book) is to
explore all possible ways to deliver the best possible outcomes for sustainable
and inclusive development. This includes efforts to improve governance of
the extractives sector, as poor governance—implying high risks for potential
investors, both domestic and foreign—is a major reason why many LICs have
huge unexploited reserves (seeMessage 6). That said, themarket for fossil fuels
faces strong headwinds from climate change action and the rapidly declining
6 For example, non-ferrousmetal exploration in Africa increased from less than US$17 per sq km
in 2000 to US$189 per sq km in 2012. Similar statistics can be cited in relation to oil and gas (MGI
2013: 32).
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cost of renewable energy. Reserves of fossil fuels will eventually constitute
‘stranded assets’ (see Message 10).
1.2.3 Message 3: Strategies Should Be Guided by Realism:
Neither Euphoria Nor Despair Is Helpful
Many have dreamt, and many still do, of striking it rich by discovering a
valuable mineral or, better still, oil. Thriving mine towns had a powerful
hold on the imagination of nineteenth-century America. The soaring archi-
tecture of the Gulf states, built on oil wealth, captivates the modern imagin-
ation. The scale of the potential rewards inspires explorers, miners, and
investors, while politicians dream of fast-tracks to national prosperity. But
alongside such euphoria sit dismal images of the ghost towns left behind once
mines closed, worthless infrastructure and industries erected during the good
times, and environments and communities devastated by mine tailings and
oil spills. For many, the phrase ‘boom and bust’ sums up the extractives sector.
The watchword of this volume is ‘realism’. In crafting strategies to deliver
prosperity from resource wealth, countries need to thoroughly understand the
risks—drawing on the many available lessons—while putting in place policies
and investments that realize the development rewards. Extractive industries,
when reasonably well managed for the good of the nation, are one of the few
means available to poor countries to escape poverty: above all they avoid
many of the economic preconditions required to attract large-scale invest-
ment in other productive areas such as manufacturing. However, their good
management requires realism about the likely level and duration of the asso-
ciated government revenues, close attention to price volatility (and the con-
sequent revenue risks), and the creation of fiscal buffers to accumulate savings
in good times in order to protect essential development spending in bad times
(see van der Ploeg and Venables, Chapter 9). Good management also entails
avoiding ill-judged investments that carry high risks of failure (see Östensson
and Löf, Chapter 25) while investing in human capital and sectors, existing
and new, with a good potential.
Discussion and practice on extractives and development in the past few
decades has been marked by both optimism and pessimism, with one or the
other being in the ascendant at any particular time, but neither being dom-
inant across time. The thesis of the resource curse (and ‘Dutch Disease’)
prevailed for many years from the mid-1980s onwards (see Lahn and Stevens,
Chapter 5). However, something of a turning point on the need for change
was reached around the start of the newmillennium as pressures for improve-
ment converged from different directions. One pressure came from the pain of
macroeconomic adjustment, in response to low commodity prices in much of
the 1980s and 1990s.Wars in which combatants fought for control of valuable
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resources had left catastrophic human and economic damage, not least in
West Africa, in the last years of the twentieth century. Themedia, community-
based organizations, and NGOs had exposed abuses of communities around
mining sites (especially of indigenous communities), environmental damage
(sometimes catastrophic), and extensive corruption and the appropriation of
revenues for private gain. High-profile reports and campaigns by Global Wit-
ness, Human Rights Watch, and other NGOs put pressure on the industry to
start paying greater attention to its social and environmental impacts.
Another catalyst for change arose in the World Bank which, given its
prominence, is often a lightning rod when development crises erupt. Amid
mounting and well-organized criticism by the NGOs of the mining industry,
World Bank President James Wolfensohn commissioned a review of World
Bank operations in the sector, namely the Extractive Industries Review (EIR)
(World Bank 2003). Led by Emil Salim, a former Indonesian environmental
minister, the EIR process listened hard to all stakeholders. By asking whether
extractives projects were compatible with the Bank’s goals of poverty reduc-
tion and sustainable development, the EIR’s initial recommendations placed a
serious question mark over the Bank’s future work in the sector. The review
concluded that the Bank should only continue to support investments in the
extractives sector if its interventions could be shown to contribute to poverty
alleviation through sustainable development. And this was only possible
if three enabling conditions were met: (i) pro-poor public and corporate
governance; (ii) much more effective social and environmental policies; and
(iii) greater respect for human rights (World Bank 2003). The review con-
cluded that the Bank should stay out of further investments in the industry
until the sector’s ‘governance’ was significantly improved.7
The EIR process together with the NGO campaigns also strengthened the
forces for change within the mining industry. These were in any case gather-
ing momentum by the new millennium. The Global Mining Initiative (GMI)
was created by a group of mining company CEOs and building on this nine of
the world’s largest mining companies commissioned a major new initiative,
theMining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD), to exam-
ine how minerals and mining could best contribute to global sustainable
development (MMSD 2002). As it proceeded more companies joined the
MMSD process as did a number of donor agencies. The mining companies
driving the MMSD process eventually constituted themselves as the Inter-
national Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), and the MMSD germinated
ICMM’s ten existing sustainability principles. In contrast to the mining
7 Given that the term ‘governance’ was at that stage only loosely defined, this recommendation
encouraged significant work to try to pin down exactly what it meant: an issue summarized in
Dietsche (Chapter 6).
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industry, the oil and gas industry did not undertake a comprehensive sustain-
able development review, let alone one led by company CEOs, and responses
to campaigns were not coordinated at the industry level; any initiatives
tended to come from individual companies, notably Shell and BP (during
John Brown’s tenure as BP’s CEO over 1995–2007) (Tomlinson, Chapter 20).8
Several new international initiatives also emerged which aimed to encour-
age more transparency in natural resources management. George Soros estab-
lished the ‘Revenue Watch’ programme under his Open Society Initiative to
investigate the flow of funds from oil companies to governments in the
Caspian region. International initiatives culminated in the Extractive Indus-
tries Transparency Initiative (EITI). At an international conference convened
in London by the Department for International Development (DFID) in June
2003, a Statement of 12 Principles to increase transparency of payments and
revenues in the extractives sector was agreed; EITI was then founded to give
effect to these (Cust, Chapter 19).
In summary, while some observers remain deeply pessimistic about the
developmental benefits of the extractives sector, in the past two decades a
great deal of national and international effort has been devoted to trying to
avoid this becoming a foregone conclusion. (Hodge, Chapter 18, provides a
fuller listing of the very many post-2000 initiatives.) During the super-cycle
period an ‘extractives for growth’ agenda had become accepted by some donor
agencies in an era of much greater optimism. But as explained in detail in
Lahn and Stevens (Chapter 5), excessive optimism is scarcely justified. Instead
what is needed is a well-grounded realism that involves, above all, trying to
learn from, and then avoid, the mistakes of the past, being cautious and
avoiding over-optimism, while recognizing that extractive industries (EIs) if
well managed can certainly support sustainable development.
1.2.4 Message 4: Diversifying Economies Is Critical, But Hard to Achieve
The academic literature has become somewhat fixated on the phenomenon
of ‘Dutch Disease’ and the ‘resource curse’ more broadly. Lahn and Stevens
(Chapter 5) argue persuasively that the resource curse propositions offer no
real guide to practical policy. They suggest that these propositions should be
stood on their head to ask the following question: why, inmany countries, has
the (often large) extractives sector failed to become the leading sector for the
rest of the economy?
Such an approach suggests that much greater focus and attention than is
common should be given to the role of the sector over time in a country’s
8 A global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues, IPIECA, was
established in 1974.
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overall and long-term development strategy. Bearing in mind that extractives
are always depletable resources (even though the time horizon for depletion
can be very long in some cases), other productive activities will in time need to
replace them if any initial growth and development is to be sustained. This
approach leads naturally to a fuller assessment than is normal of the manner
in which an extractives activity might function over a long time-period and
during that time might catalyse other non-extractive activities: what actions
are needed to promote and maximize such effects? Similarly, it draws atten-
tion to pitfalls that could undermine the catalysing influence coming from
extractives: are these impediments purely macroeconomic in nature (see
chapters in this volume by van der Ploeg and Venables (Chapter 9), Solimano
and Guajardo (Chapter 10), and Bawumia and Halland (Chapter 11)) or might
sectoral policies and issues be equally or more significant?What services, jobs,
and business opportunities can realistically be generated from the extractives
operations, including opportunities to provide more and cheaper domestic
energy linked to possible oil and gas resources? These and some related
questions are addressed using specific country examples in Chapter 24 by
Östensson, and in Chapter 25 by Östensson and Löf.
The literature review by Stevens and Lahn and the focus it brings to bear on
economic diversification provides a natural lead in to a sequence of other chap-
ters in the book—by respectively Roe and Round (Chapter 23); Östensson
(Chapter 24); Östensson and Löf (Chapter 25); and Witter and Jakobsen
(Chapter 26)—that analyse several distinct aspects of the linkage effects of
extractives and the policies needed to achieve these in much greater detail,
and to the further chapter by McPhail (Chapter 17) that looks at an ‘all of
government’ approach to policies for extractives sectors. Because of its atten-
tion to broader development strategies it also brings into the limelight the
controversial suggestion that some countries might be well advised to hold
back from developing certain extractives reserves or to develop them at an
appropriate pace against the inevitable pressures from popular, political,
investor (shareholder) interests to ramp up production as quickly as possible.
1.2.5 Message 5: Better Institutions Are Vital to Success
But Technocratic Institution-building Has its Limitations
Creating effective institutions is vital to success both in a technocratic sense
(personnel, processes, etc.) and in the politics around these processes (whether
they are open to capture by personal political interests etc.). This is hardly a
new message—development debate has been replete with references to insti-
tutional development for the last two decades at least—but it remains espe-
cially relevant to resource-rich countries where progress has often been
especially difficult. Many of the chapters in this book refer to the role and
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importance of institutions. Those chapters addressmany different aspects of the
institutional and governance challenge including: government management of
macroeconomicpolicy (all of Part IVof this volume); taxation (Otto,Chapter 14)
and public expenditure policies; the use of quasi-government agencies such as
state oil companies (Heller, Chapter 15) and sovereign wealth funds (van der
Ploeg andVenables, Chapter 9); gender inequality (Macdonald, Chapter 21); the
sectoral management issues around local content (Östensson, Chapter 24) and
the stimulation of downstream activity (Östensson and Löf, Chapter 25); envir-
onmental regulation (Greenspan Bell, Chapter 16) and the management of
community relations (all of Part VIII of this volume). Across the chapters, the
political economy realities and difficulties are taken full account of, and so too is
the pre-eminent desirability of a high level of coordination across these many
different aspects of governance: a requirement that is often lacking in practice.
Using a framework originally advanced by Oliver Williamson (2000),
Dietsche (Chapter 6) relates extractives issues to four levels of institutions:
 Level 1: social embeddedness (customs, tradition, norms, religion). These
affect the way that people, through their social networks, see their rights
with respect to resource revenues, jobs, and other benefits.9 These are
often subject to considerable inertia.
 Level 2: the institutional environment (formal rules of the game)—that is,
constitutional rules regarding ownership of primary resources (and how
the different levels of government engage with extractives). This includes
the state’s capacity (at all levels, from central to state/provincial to local) to
provide public goods and services that can maximize the benefit of the
extractives sector.
 Level 3: governance or ‘play of the game’ (how specific rules are set up
between companies and governments) including written contracts, safety
rules (balancing costs versus safety), and whether countries have manda-
tory obligations to communities, or only voluntary codes of conduct.
 Level 4: resource allocation and employment: the set of commercial deci-
sions for selecting and implementing projects, how much labour to use
versus labour-saving technologies and so forth.
Policies to enhance the contribution of extractive industries to inclusive and
sustainable development most commonly focus on Levels 2 and 3—through
such measures as revising legal frameworks, the drafting of fairer contracts etc.
These are typically the levels at which international action seeks improvements,
and at which most aid donors concentrate their support to governments.
9 Economic sociology, notably the work of Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]), emphasizes how
economic systems are embedded in social networks and their relationships.
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However, it can be difficult to make progress when social networks (Level 1) are
resistant andwell organized.This is especially sowhen theyexercise controlof the
state, or have a high degree of influence upon it. TheChad–CameroonPetroleum
Development and Pipeline Project makes this point painfully well. It was a
model of its kindwhen approved (i.e. a good outcome at Level 2), butwas unable
to deal adequately with a governing elite that grabbedmost of the resource rents
to fund the military and defend itself (Level 1). Powerful family networks and
their allies may constitute ‘deep states’, enabling them to control public money,
including resource taxes, and to allocate mining rights, as well as oil and gas
concessions, in favour of businesses controlled by the network itself and to the
detriment of Levels 2 and 3. Such networks are especially prevalent in nations
with histories of extended violent conflict (Addison 2003). In a worst-case scen-
ario, such as South Sudan, competing networks will disregard any formal rules
designed to peacefully manage competing pressures, and will instead go to war.
The democratic electoral cycle, which provides an essential means for voters
to express their preferences over the use of natural resource wealth, also
interacts with Level 1. Long-standing networks provide an instrument for
political incumbents and challengers to mobilize support, and build winning
coalitions. In doing so, the temptation is to spend and borrow to win elec-
tions, perhaps overriding Level 2 institutional limitations that are designed to
preserve macroeconomic stability.
Ghana’s recent experience makes this point. A decade ago, as Ghana looked
to its future as an oil economy, policymakers examined carefully the lessons of
oil-rich Nigeria. They were determined to avoid Nigeria’s mistakes, and created
what were thought to be effective institutional checks and balances on over-
spending and over-borrowing. Nevertheless, the government over-spent and
over-borrowed in the lead-up to the 2012 elections. In terms of OliverWilliam-
son’s fourfold institutional typology, the second level was organized to a high
standard, notably through the 2015 Petroleum Revenue Management Act
(PRMA) which created a sovereign wealth fund (SWF). But its effectiveness
was then overwhelmed by Level 1 pressures, in part expressed through elect-
oral politics: a point strongly endorsed by Bawumia andHalland inChapter 11.
The widespread transition from authoritarianism to multiparty democracy
over the last thirty years must be celebrated. But both old and new democra-
cies face the challenge of building and maintaining formal institutional sys-
tems, including the checks and balances (as well as transparency) necessary
to manage competing demands on the public purse. This frequently has a
regional dimension as well, where systems for the distribution of resource
rents are often associated with tensions between the centre and local political
levels (Nigeria being one example).
In sum, ‘institutions’ are vital and many of the contributions to this book
drill down into their various meanings in the context of many specific
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aspects of extractive industry management. In this manner, the book gives
substance to the proposition that it is not enough merely to assert that ‘good
governance’ and ‘good institutions’ are important. These complex topics need
to be unpicked and assessed in all their multiple aspects. This book seeks to do
this based on the underlying view frommost of its contributions that positive
change based on extractive industries is possible, but also that the institu-
tional ingredients of such success are by no means assured.
1.2.6 Message 6: Effective and Inclusive Government Working with
Enlightened Companies Is the Ideal Combination. Ineffective and Divisive
Government Combined with Rogue Companies Is the Worst
Figure 1.2 below sets out a simplified taxonomy of the different situations that
we find in extractives-dependent economies around the world. It illustrates a
spectrum of governance and institutions from effective and inclusive through to
ineffective and divisive (on the vertical axis). By effective, we mean a state
capable of formulating and delivering a development strategy, and by inclu-





















Figure 1.2. A simple taxonomy of governance and company behaviours
Source: authors’ illustration.
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society, but especially for the poor (and one that protects and sustains the
environment on which inclusive development is ultimately based). Figure 1.2
also shows a spectrum of company behaviours from highly enlightened (work-
ing with communities and states to deliver inclusive and sustainable develop-
ment) to ‘rogue’ (no concern whatsoever for the company’s social, political,
and environmental impact) on the horizontal axis.
Zone B is the one in which there is likely to be the greatest prospect of
outcomes that are inclusive and sustainable as an enlightened company works
collaboratively with a relatively well-organized and inclusive government.
Both parties may have technical limitations but the necessary conditions are
in place for cooperation to evolve in ways that deliver successful outcomes for
both parties. The numerous post-2000 initiatives discussed earlier (and in
more detail in Hodge, Chapter 18) can be thought of as actions that together
aim to help more countries and companies move into the Zone B space.
Zone C is the exact opposite of Zone B. Governments in Zone C are neither
interested nor capable of delivering inclusive sustainable development: in the
worst cases the state (at either the central and/or local levels) is controlled by
self-serving warlords.10 In this zone mining or oil companies that are ‘rogues’
focus narrowly on extracting a resource for the greatest possible profit, with-
out concern for community, development, or environmental impacts. Such
governments and companies both work to survive and to defend their own
self-serving interests, and civil society is likely to be both weak and repressed.
Accordingly, we should not expect external interventions such as the EITI or
those proposed by the NRGI to achieve any significant early improvement in
Zone C situations. Nevertheless, helping strengthen progressive civil society
organizations together with robust international action on transparency, cor-
ruption, and money laundering—to begin to nudge the behaviour of com-
panies and state actors towards improvement—might over time increase the
prospects of a more inclusive development path.
The other two zones A and D are inferior to Zone B but offer more hope of
progress than Zone C, since at least one of the two sets of actors favours reform
and can work, with international assistance and initiatives, to try and alter the
behaviour of the other. In Zone A an effective and development-orientated
government can build institutions (at Levels 2 and 3) to rein in any rogue
company, at the limit, withdrawing its licence to operate (and if there are
competing extractives companies, this should be at low cost). Support from
EITI, NRGI, and other international initiatives, as well as civil society and the
10 At its worst, warlords act as ‘roving bandits’—using the terminology of Olson (2000)—treating
natural resources as only somuch loot, and possessing little if any incentive to develop the territory
which they (often temporarily) control. Predation rules, discouragingmost investment, driving the
economy downward, and thereby further tightening the resource constraint—with the excluded
populace bearing the cost (Addison and Murshed 2005). This is inherently unstable politically.
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media, should be helpful here. International companies increasingly take
heed of reputation and most are cognizant of their need to obtain and retain
a social licence to operate; as well as the need to respect ever more demanding
international standards. We now discuss issues arising especially in Zones
A and D in more detail in our Messages 7 and 8.
1.2.7 Message 7: Delivering Effective and Inclusive Governance
Is Vital to Improving Outcomes in the Extractives Sector
Looking again along the vertical axis of our framework diagram (Figure 1.2),
countries will lie along a spectrum. At the worst end, exclusion is imposed by
mass violence (warlordism) and, at the best end, inclusion is supported and
achieved by good policy.
In between are a variety of positions, including: (i) countries with systems
involving exclusion (perhaps of indigenous communities) but tempered by an
otherwise politically stable and prosperous society, and (ii) countries with
governments that seek to improve inclusion but do so by driving public
spending and debt up to unsustainable levels (an eventually self-defeating
form of populism).
Nations and their governments canmove up and down this spectrum: some
may, via bad policy and bad politics, find themselves in the C or D zones and
at risk of civil conflict (Venezuela today). Somemay nevertheless have enough
institutional robustness to pull back and recover (Zambia from the 1990s on;
Zimbabwe, perhaps in the future). Others descend into civil war, which is
difficult both to halt, and to recover from (presently: Libya, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Syria). Some can recover but remain vulnerable and fail to reach
the excluded, with the politics around their resource wealth being a key
obstacle (Algeria and Angola). Others pull themselves out of deep crisis (some-
times war), with help from the international community: Ghana starting in
1983, Mozambique in 1992, and Indonesia after 1998 (but may then run into
economic difficulty years later: both Ghana and Mozambique today). Some
make remarkable political transitions, but then stall (South Africa today).
Some are written off as hopeless cases but then make surprising transitions
back towards democracy (Nigeria and perhaps Myanmar).
This movement up and down the scale from exclusion to inclusion can be
driven by exogenous economic shocks (price shocks especially). Resource booms,
if handled well, provide new revenues and economic opportunities for strategies
of inclusive development. Price collapses threaten inclusion if the resulting
macroeconomic adjustment is unduly borne by the poor; this risk is reduced if
the country has saved some of the windfall in good years, giving it more fiscal
room tomanoeuvre (as Chile has done; see Solimano andGuajardo, Chapter 10).
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In discussing economic policy, states are often described as monoliths:
acting with a single set of objectives, a single set of views, and a homogeneous
voice. However, real-world states combine a wide variety of actors, with
different interests: those benefitting from the status quo (from exclusion, for
example) may be dominant for a while, but reformist elements can come to
the fore within a government and the public administration. Anti-reformers
can change their stripes when they recognize that their own political base is
under threat from a sagging economy, rising grievances among the excluded,
or a threat from another state that requires the government to mobilize the
nation around a more inclusive agenda.
Smart reformers will craft broad coalitions, working with the ‘grain of
society’ (especially its Level 1 social norms and culture) in ways that may not
be fully understandable to outsiders (hence donors should bewary of imposing
themselves: there are plenty of examples of externally induced reforms that
have stalled). Community-based organizations and NGOs can successfully
widen the space of the political debate, leading to political openings that
transform the possibilities for public action—around the rights of indigenous
communities in mining areas, for example. In these ways, actions at Levels 2
to 4 to create institutions for more inclusive development can very occasion-
ally make headway, sometimes overcoming the powerful inertia at Level 1. If
successful, countries will move up the vertical plane in our Figure 1.2.
For analytical purposes, some helpful positioning of individual countries
in the vertical plane of our framework diagram is possible using the metrics
produced by the NRGI and its NRGI Index. For example, in the 2017 version
of this Index the NRGI has ranked eighty-nine ‘countries’ (including double
counting of countries with both minerals and oil and gas) that have a signifi-
cant engagement with extractives in terms of the quality of their governance
systems. It employs a scoring system that is used to classify these countries into
five categories according to the assessed quality of their governance.11 These
categories are good, fair, satisfactory, poor, and failing. The ‘good’ performing
country is defined as one that ‘has established laws and practices that are likely
to result in extractive resource wealth benefitting citizens, although there may
be some costs to society’. A ‘failing’ country is described as one that ‘has almost
no governance framework to ensure resource extraction benefits society. It is
highly likely that benefits flow only to some companies and elites.’ These two
extremes could reasonably be thought of as indicating the highest and lowest
points respectively on the vertical axis of our stylized diagram (Figure 1.2).
11 The methodology is based around 149 questions and scores and subsequent expert review of
three main areas of governance, namely the enabling environment, revenue management, and
value realization. Within each of these three areas there are a total of fourteen sub-categories. See
NRGI (2017: 7).
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In the 2017 results only one MIC (but no LICs) are classified in the ‘good’
categories, namely Chile. But a number of mostly MICs are classified as
satisfactory including (in order of their index scores) Brazil, Columbia, India,
Indonesia, andGhana. Overall thirty-nine of the eighty-nine country cases are
rated as ‘poor’ or ‘failing’ and these include a large number of other MICs and
LICs. The ten failing countries include, not surprisingly, Zimbabwe, Maurita-
nia, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial
Guinea, Sudan, Libya, and Eritrea—mostly poor African economies. So there
is a long way to go with so many countries closer to Zones C and D than to
Zone B before the aspiration ofMessage 7 can be said to be achieved. However,
even in difficult environments, politically sensitized interventions have been
able to achieve some progress as explained by Buckley, McCulloch and Travis
in Chapter 27.
1.2.8 Message 8: Improving the Practices of Companies Can Now
Draw upon a Great Deal of Accumulated Experience
In the horizontal plane of our framework diagram (Figure 1.2), companies
range along a continuum from those that care nothing for social and envir-
onmental obligations (andmay even deny that any such obligations exist: the
only purpose being to turn a profit) to those that fully incorporate social and
environmental objectives into their strategies and day-to-day operations. We
term the former ‘rogues’ and the latter ‘enlightened’.
ICMMwould claim, with some justification, that its twenty-five large multi-
national company members are in the socially responsible (‘enlightened’)
category (as ICMM applies stringent membership criteria for corporate mem-
bers, involving a rigorous admissions process followed by regular monitoring
after admission).12 Companies with a long history tend to improve their
practices (environmental impact, workers’ rights, etc.) relative to the norms
of some thirty to forty years ago; in part because they learn from past mistakes.
Newmont, a founding member of ICMM, is one example.13
Many companies have responded to NGO campaigns, international public
opinion, international initiatives—and their own self-analysis of the benefits
of a ‘social licence to operate’—by creating in-house sustainability depart-
ments, responsible for advising on the social and environmental impact of
12 Additionally, ICMM has membership from thirty-four national and regional mining
associations and global commodity associations. Through these associations it also connects to
another 1,500 companies in the sector. http://www.icmm.com/en-gb/members.
13 Newmont had a relatively poor record of corporate social and environmental achievement in
its mines in Papua New Guinea. However, when sustainability managers familiar with that record
moved to work at a new Newmont mine in Ghana they resolved to establish very high standards.
They achieved this, as evidenced by the mine’s early receipt of IFC capital funding, implying its
compliance with the IFC’s rigorous standards.
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operations. The formation of the extractive industry associations, ICMM and
IPIECA, is merely one aspect of this tendency. Today, the major mining and
oil and gas companies that are ICMM or IPIECA members would claim to be
socially and environmentally responsible. Since the turn of the millennium
there has been a clear trend for more enlightened corporate behaviours to
emerge and this is well documented for the oil and gas industry by Kathryn
Tomlinson in Chapter 20. Some of the large Chinese mining companies
operating outside China are also seeking to adopt very similar practices to
those recommended by Western industry associations.14
In short, it has become harder to be a ‘rogue’ company in the extractives
business. Over the last two decades, INGOs and civil society have pushed to
increase awareness of irresponsible company behaviour (details of some of
these pressures are discussed in Chapter 16 by Greenspan Bell). Before the
Internet age, it was much easier for companies to get away with environmen-
tal and social damage, especially in the world’s remoter areas (including
conflicts between miners and indigenous communities). Moreover, the goals
of environmental sustainability and social responsibility are increasingly cen-
tral to a growing class of financial institutions which provide ethical invest-
ment instruments to an increasing number of pension funds and private
individuals. These investors are now highly influential in reshaping the
extractives industry, notably via disinvestments in fossil fuels (especially
coal), and in requiring manufacturers to source materials and metals from
ethical supply chains that avoid environmental damage and human rights
abuses such as child labour (Addison, Chapter 22).
The sector has come a long way in recent years and many companies are
probably now positioned somewhere to the right of the vertical dividing line
in Figure 1.2. Nevertheless, even as a reputation for environmental and social
responsibility becomes an increasingly important determinant of company
valuations over the long run, some individuals down the chain of corporate
management may still face pressures to downplay the environmental and
social footprint of their companies. At the highest levels of management,
the drive to maximize shareholder value on an annual basis (exacerbated by
linking CEO remuneration to the company’s share price, combined with a
rapid turnover in topmanagement) can lead some companies into behaviours
that dilute their standards (thereby risking bothminor andmajor catastrophic
events), neglect the quality of their supply chains, and even use corrupt
methods to secure access to mining and drilling rights on favourable terms.
14 In October 2014, the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals
Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) launched the Chinese Guidelines for Social Responsibility in
OutboundMining Investment at the China Exploration Exchange in Beijing. This has drawn some
of its inspiration from the earlier ICMM arrangements.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Introduction and Ten Main Messages
21
Periods of price weakness, such as those after 2011, when companies looked
to cut costs, can also weaken corporate commitments to their sustainability
and social impact agendas (especially when the responsible departments have
been downsized). In such times, marginal mines are likely to be mothballed,
shut down or sold (perhaps to companies having weaker environmental and
social commitments than the previous owners) and tax and royalty payments
are likely to be reduced.15 A big question therefore remains on the table: how
to build robust mechanisms and company cultures that keep sustainability
and social impact agendas to the fore—and irrespective of management turn-
over and market fluctuations.
The toughest challenges face companies working in Zones C and D of
Figure 1.2 (countries characterized by ineffective and divisive government).
Autocracy and national resource wealth often go together, given the large
personal fortunes to be made via control of the state. Some autocracies have
capable states, but many have states incapable of delivering even the most
basic of services (note the NRGI definition of ‘failing’ given earlier). This poses
a dilemma for any socially responsible company. It may decide to live with the
situation, perhaps providing some benefits to local communities when the
central and/or local governments are disinterested, or incapable of, doing so.
There are now many examples in which communities see extractives com-
panies as quasi-government agencies, expecting them to provide public goods
that are otherwise unavailable from their own governments. This can have
significant financial implications for the companies. When autocratic govern-
ments commit human rights abuses, extractives companies risk their reputa-
tions by continuing to operate in the country; examples have included
Indonesia’s Aceh province and Nigeria’s Niger Delta (Coll 2013).
An enlightened company might nonetheless achieve localized benefits
(increased local employment and infrastructure provision for communities
around themine site, for example). If an otherwise self-interested government
and public administration contains at least a few progressive elements, then
there is scope for an enlightened company to work with those progressive
elements and also with community groups, with NGOs, and perhaps with
like-minded donors to achieve at least a modicum of localized improvement.
This can increase the country’s chances of reaching a better future (Zone B).
The worst dilemmas occur when the country is in civil conflict and war.
Access to rights for the exploration and export of valuableminerals and oil can
then be highly personalized. Some international companies may decide to
avoid the country entirely (even if international sanctions do not actually
15 For some metals, the statistical data suggest that lower royalty payments as well as lower wage
bills were indeed one important element in the cost-cutting that companies managed to achieve:
see ICMM (2016).
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prohibit their engagement). Others may face the moral dilemma of either
abandoning well-established mines and loyal workers or staying the course
despite the reputational and other problems this may pose for them. Some less
enlightened companies (i.e. in Zone C) may find the riches too tempting, and
so cut deals with the government, its officials, or warlords who control the
relevant territory. State officials and warlords often create their own domestic
businesses to profit in this way. Still others profit from offering protection
to miners. Some of Africa’s alluvial mining is linked to networks of
organized crime.
Statements about the potential for progress from Zones C and D to Zone
B are necessarily speculative and highly contingent, but they should be a
crucial part of the overall improvements for extractives and development
that most people seek. Such progress in the resource sectors depends on shifts
in the broader political and economic climate of the country. Game-changers
include: a move from authoritarianism to democracy (and whether stability is
maintained); the nature of the political settlement that ends a violent conflict;
the creation of multiparty democracies that are not simply covers for old (or
new) authoritarian elites; and whether new governments take firm action to
reduce the ‘horizontal’ and regional inequalities that feed grievances, includ-
ing conflict over the distribution of resource wealth (Addison 2009, 2012;
Stewart 2009). The hand of both enlightened companies and donors will be
strengthened if the self-interested elite, or elements within it, become con-
vinced that a more inclusive development path can secure their futures. But
there is no one lever that can be pulled to yield such success. And promising
transitions can stall (Myanmar today).
1.2.9 Message 9: There Are Now Many More Ways in Which Interventions
by External Stakeholders, Especially Aid Donors, Can Improve Outcomes
With the increase in attention by the international community (donors and
NGOs) to the extractive industries since the millennium, there has been a
veritable sea change in the quality and breadth of understanding of the
challenge of turning resource wealth into inclusive and sustainable develop-
ment. This has encouraged a vast array of new initiatives—many of them
international but others purely local. As already noted, Hodge (Chapter 18)
identifies at least forty-six specific initiatives—nearly all initiated since the
millennium—and additional to the many reforms in the formal legal and
regulatory systems of individual national governments. This remarkable
change in the situation warrants far more comment than it has received
thus far.
Most of the new international and local initiatives relating to mandatory
or voluntary improvements in the industry’s regulation involve donors as
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significant players, and have potential traction over one or both dimensions—
government and corporate—of our framework diagram (Figure 1.2). The Nat-
ural Resource Charter, for example, provides a coherent set of protocols to
help governments understand better the various component tasks that they
face. The benchmarking framework now managed by the NRGI is an espe-
cially powerful diagnostics tool that helps assess where institutional and other
improvements in public policy are most needed. Companies can also draw on
a substantial body of external guidance, provided by the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) (with its detailed Environmental and Social Performance
Standards), together with the ICMM and China’s CCCMC. Some of these
standards have serious teeth: they can grant or deny access to loan and equity
finance in the case of the IFC standards. The EITI for its part gives guidance to
both companies and governments about the better custodianship of the fiscal
revenues and royalties from extractives activity. Although these initiatives
have come in for criticism, there seems little doubt that their collective influ-
ence has been considerable, at least in the most conducive country situations
(those represented as Zone B of our framework diagram). Finally, the powerful
voices of some NGOs are also exerting a significant influence on some policy
decisions (see Slack, Chapter 31).
At the level of national governments there is often a need for greater recogni-
tion of the very broad range of mainly new international initiatives that these
host governments can draw on to boost their own regulatory efforts should
they choose to do so: from aid donors, companies, and NGOs. In combining
their sovereign right to regulate their own extractives sector with some of
these external supports, there is also a case for adopting a coordinated ‘all of
government approach’. The objective of using extractives to stimulate even-
tual diversification of the economymust recognize the broad range of govern-
ment ministries and agencies that are needed to attain that long-term
objective. So, the interfaces with the external players that are of relevance to
the extractive industries should not be narrowly construed to involve only the
ministries of mines and petroleum, but should also include those of labour,
health, education, etc. (Witter and Jakobsen, Chapter 26).
The initiatives and standards originated by extractives companies are increas-
ingly being refined and applied more broadly and these can also be of great
assistance to a receptive host country government. However, there are still
some important further steps to be taken by most companies to embed their
work into a comprehensive framework of ‘contribution to host societies’ that
embraces broad concepts of both sustainability and sustainable development
and that can also be challenged by becoming more amenable to rigorous
comparison (across companies and countries), as well as to monitoring and
evaluation (see, e.g., Chapter 29 by Mondoloka, Chapter 28 by Macdonald,
and Chapter 18 by Hodge).
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Many extractives companies now address their responsibilities to local com-
munities in which they operate by reference to coherent frameworks of ‘good
practice’. However, there is room for major improvements in the specifics and
consistency of actual practice on the ground. There is also a rising call for a
greater reliance on formal legislation, regarding the duties of extractive com-
panies to local communities, rather than the voluntary approaches that have
so far been more common (Otto, Chapter 32).
Donor agencies were slow off the mark but are now beginning to support
innovative newways to address governance weaknesses of relevance to extrac-
tives, including in the less propitious ‘failing’ environments identified in our
framework diagram (e.g. those in areas lower than Zone B. See also Chapter 27
by Buckley, McCulloch and Travis). Donors have collectively come up with
many innovative ideas. These have increasingly been supported in various
ways by the corporate players and by various NGOs. As one example: for some
years mining companies led by ICMMhave suggested that donor agencies can
have a significant role to play in a variety of partnerships involving host
governments, local communities, NGOs, and also the extractive companies
themselves. ICMM (2010) identified and discussed five16 main sets of partner-
ship arrangements, all involving some combination of these various partners,
and documented the success factors and other elements in some thirty specific
cases.17 These five sets were:
 Mining and Poverty Reduction: with six specific documented examples
for countries such as Indonesia, Peru, and South Africa. The Indonesian
example involved a partnership between Freeport Indonesia, USAID, and
PADA,18 with the Catholic Church also playing a role.
 Mining and Revenue Management: with examples from three countries,
one of which is Ghana: a good example of the multiple partners involved
in an EITI implementation.
 Mining and Regional Development: with examples from three countries
including Madagascar where Rio Tinto partnered in projects with the
World Bank.
 Mining and Local Content: with examples from seven countries includ-
ing Mozambique where BHP Billiton partnered in various ways with
the IFC.
16 A sixth set described in that publication, namely dispute resolution, is not discussed here
because the identified examples did not involve specific roles for donors.
17 Subsequent to the 2010 publication ICMMalso refined and re-issued its ‘Mining Partnership for
Development Toolkit’ which offers many general principles as well as further country-specific
examples that continue to be added to through new in-depth country case studies (ICMM2011).
18 Papuan Agribusiness Development Alliance.
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 Mining and Social Investment: with examples from six countries includ-
ing South Africa where Anglo American partnered with PEPFAR19 and a
number of local NGOs.
In addition to a role in some or all of these areas, a few donors have started
to engage more explicitly with the difficult political economy issues that are
involved with policies for extractive industries, and in the process have
experimented with novel tools and modes of engagement. The United King-
dom’s DFID can claim a leadership role in this area with its innovative projects
in Nigeria (FOSTER)20 and Ghana (GOGIG)21 andmore recently in Kenya. The
assessment of the FOSTER example in Buckley et al. (Chapter 27) demon-
strates: (i) how a regularly updated political assessment is essential to under-
standing the underlying incentives of key actors and whether possible new
interventions may work; (ii) how interventions need to be ‘locally led’—not
necessarily led by government but instead by relevant parts of civil society—in
order to provide sufficient legitimacy to the reform effort; and (iii) how any
interventions need to be flexible and adaptive in order to deal with a context
that can change quickly. Additionally, their analysis illustrates that to take on
any explicit role involving political economy, donors must be prepared to
accept a certain degree of risk since the connection between inputs of effort
and outcomes cannot be assured.
Finally, in reviewing the underpinnings and some of the main messages of
this book we need to confront arguably the most challenging issue that today
confronts the extractive industries and the countries that host them: climate
change.
1.2.10 Message 10: Climate Action Will Create New Winners
and New Losers among the Extractives Sectors
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide are now at levels last experi-
enced on earth some 800,000 years ago when the temperature was 2–3C
warmer, and the sea level was 10–20 metres higher, than it is today (WMO
2017). Meeting the international target of avoiding a more than 2C global
temperature rise requires emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and other
greenhouse gases to peak within the next few decades, and the world must
then achieve zero net emissions (IPCC 2015). Whether the world can meet
this challenge while simultaneously ensuring the continued growth of global
prosperity, and the reduction of poverty, will define much of the character
19 The US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
20 The Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform.
21 Ghana Oil and Gas for Inclusive Growth.
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of the rest of this century. Failure puts the planet at risk of catastrophic climate
change and rising levels of poverty.
The extractives sector is central to this unprecedented challenge. In the
history of humanity’s search for new sources of energy, the long era of fossil
fuels is entering its last stages, and a new era—that of renewable energy—is
beginning (IPCC 2015; Stern 2015; Addison, Chapter 22). This new era is
already seeing increasing demands for those metals and materials needed
for renewable energy systems, as well as zero-carbon buildings and new
forms of transportation. Some of this increase can be met by increased rates
of recycling, but much will have to come from new supplies. The challenge for
themining sector, and for nations endowedwith the resources in question, is to
increase mining while ensuring that the sector’s own emissions are contained
(including switching to renewable energy for its power needs), protecting the
local environment (especially the renewable resources of waters, forests, soils,
and other components of the ecosystems that underlie sustainable develop-
ment), and managing the other social impacts. Achieving all of this will be an
important determinant ofwhether commitments to reduce emissions (the 2015
UN Paris Climate Agreement), together with commitments to the United
Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UN-SDG), are fully realized.
Countries with reserves of metals have a bright future. Thus, while copper
and nickel experienced significant price falls after 2012 (and a partial price
recovery since then), the need for such metals is set to grow, largely irrespect-
ive of the exact mix of renewable energy and transportation technologies that
evolves. Recent price forecasts indicate a 20 per cent increase in the copper
price in real terms over the next ten years (World Bank 2016). Battery storage,
to overcome the intermittency of supplies of electricity from renewable energy
sources and to replace the internal combustion engine in vehicles, will be
important to the demand for nickel, but especially important for the rarer
metals of cobalt and lithium (the prices of which rose strongly over 2017/18
as supply lagged demand, especially from manufacturers of electric vehicles).
The most thorough study to date of the implications of the low-carbon future
forminerals andmetals concludes that: ‘the technologies assumed to populate
the clean energy shift—wind, solar, hydrogen, and electricity systems—are in
fact significantly more material intensive in their composition than current
traditional fossil-fuel-based energy supply systems’ (World Bank 2017: xii).
Africa is especially mineral-rich, and can expect high and rising demand as
the technologies of the low-carbon future are highly materials-intensive.
So, making the link with our Message 2, there is clearly a major opportunity
for some LICs and MICs to use extractives more fully than in the past, and
thereby to achieve the accelerated development in the ways discussed in this
book. But there are also serious concerns, as discussedmore fully in Chapter 22
by Addison. Countries and companies expecting to meet increasing demands
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for both base and rarer metals by raising their extraction and production levels
may find it difficult to do so while at the same time reducing their own
emissions (especially when ore grades are low). Large investments in mining
together with supporting infrastructure are required to achieve this balancing
act. However, many countries with large reserves of minerals also have very
weak governance which holds back investment; thus constraining their abil-
ity to participate in any future mineral boom associated with the accelerating
uptake of low-carbon technologies. Consequently, it is an open question
whether most citizens of such countries will benefit from any boom; the
history of extractives sectors in fragile states (e.g. Zone C and D countries)
has largely been one in which the ruling elites are able to capture a dispropor-
tionate share of the gains. The supply chains for some of the minerals are
characterized by human rights abuses (such as the use of child labour), notably
that of unregulated artisanal mining of cobalt in the DRC (which has the
world’s largest reserves). Those supply chains need to be embedded in much
better frameworks of governance and transparency.
While the cost of renewables is falling at a faster rate than expected, fossil
fuels will still be necessary to energy production for many years to come (and
overall fossil fuels still enjoy subsidies that exceed the level of support to
renewables). Natural gas is taking over from coal as efficient gas-fired power
stations have less than half the carbon emissions of coal (and coal is respon-
sible for much of the drastic deterioration of air quality, especially in China
and India’s big cities). At the same time, there are still big environmental
concerns around natural gas (notably shale gas). Yet many energy decision-
makers do see it as an energy ‘bridge’ to a renewables future, albeit one that
must end in less than two decades if international emissions targets are to be
met. Many countries with large oil and gas reserves still cling to the hope that
prices will recover their all-time highs of recent years, but the headwinds
against oil and gas are strong, not least from international action on climate
change. With the notable exception of the Trump administration, signatories
to the Paris Agreement remain committed (indeed China sees a vast commer-
cial opportunity in the technologies of the low-carbon future). However,
countries with reserves of fossil fuels run the risk that they will be unusable,
and they must surely reduce the vulnerability of their public finances by
expanding their tax bases, and doing more to develop new economic sectors.
1.3 Conclusions
This volume has emerged from a large body of research on the extractive
industries conducted at UNU-WIDER over the last two to three years. It is part
of the ‘transformation’ theme which has been a major pillar of UNU-WIDER’s
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
28
overall research programme, and is also of great relevance to the other two
pillars of UNU-WIDER’s work, namely ‘inclusion’ and ‘sustainability’. A major
concern of the Institute is to focus on the questions of most relevance to policy
makers in the developing world, and to their development partners. How to
manage a nation’s resource wealth is without question one of the biggest issues
that policymaking in the LICs and MICs faces. Getting it right can yield
enormous benefits, both for the public finances—and therefore for the expan-
sion of public services and infrastructure provision—but also in enabling struc-
tural transformation of economies in ways that increase employment and
livelihoods, thereby reducing poverty. But getting it wrong can lead to serious
economic, social, and environmental impacts that can be difficult to reverse.
The contributors to this volume discuss the many lessons that have been
learned in the past few decades, the traps to be avoided, the ways forward,
and the new opportunities. It is to be hoped that their collective insights will
together make a valuable contribution to improved outcomes in the future.
There are many challenges for resource-rich countries. It is not just govern-
ments and their international partners that drive the process of change, but
also the extractive industry itself, communities, and their NGO and INGO
partners. This book recognizes the severe difficulties of achieving positive
change that are often encountered in resource-wealthy nations; we are ‘real-
istic optimists’. The book focuses on recommendations that might (but are
certainly not guaranteed to) work in delivering inclusive and sustainable
development. We are keen to identify actions, policies, and institutions that
are potentially transferable across countries, with suitable adaption to local
circumstances. Overall, our expectation is that strategies and practices around
the extractives sector can improve—but not without a struggle.
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Dependence on Extractive Industries
in Lower-income Countries
The Statistical Tendencies
Alan Roe and Samantha Dodd
2.1 Introduction
The central proposition of this chapter is that extractive industries—minerals
(metals and other minerals) plus oil and gas1—today play a highly significant
role in the economic situations of many low- and middle-income developing
economies. This being the case, it is important to understand better the
various dimensions of that role; to design approaches and policies that can
enhance the positive contributions of extractives; to improve the approaches
that can mitigate the potential negative impacts; and generally to embrace
the extractives sector as a key contributor to long-run economic and social
development. In adopting such an approach, this chapter does not seek to
deny the multiple arguments that together constitute the so-called resource
curse paradigm. Nor does it take an excessively rose-tinted view of the poten-
tial developmental benefits of extractives. Rather, it asserts the core fact that
extractives are important and therefore need to be embraced more fully (than
is commonly the case) in debates about broader economic and social
development.
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize some statistical and other
relevant facts to evidence the central proposition that extractive industries
1 It is readily accepted that some of the analysis of the book might also be applied to other
natural resource industries such as forestry.
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are indeed of great significance in many low- and middle-income developing
economies. There are four sub-components of this central proposition that are
addressed in the subsequent sections of the chapter, namely:
 Section 2.2: How great today is the statistical dependence on extractive
industries in low- and middle-income developing countries?
 Section 2.3: Has that level of statistical dependence changed over time—
in fact, over the past two decades, since 1996?
 Section 2.4: Has the level of dependence changed as a result of the sharp
drop in the prices of extracted commodities in the past three to four
years—that is, since the end of the so-called super-cycle?
 Section 2.5: What can we say about the likely future implications of
extractives dependence given both the recent softness of prices and
some obvious global structural changes such as the phasing down of
global dependence on fossil fuels?2
2.2 Current Levels of Dependence on Extractives
2.2.1 Minerals
The ICMM publication The Role of Mining in National Economies (ICMM 2014)
provides data on various measurable aspects of the contribution of mining
(but not oil and gas) for every economy in the world (214 countries in total) for
the year 2012.3 By combining the data for three key indicators, that publica-
tion provided an updated version of what it terms the Mining Contribution
Index (MCI).4 The ranking of the MCI results for all 214 countries shows
that among the top fifty countries, no fewer than thirty-one are either low-
income (fourteen countries) or lower-middle-income (seventeen countries) as
2 The answers to these questions that we are able to provide at this stage rely a great deal on work
that has previously been done by ourselves and others under the auspices of the International
Council of Mining and Metals (ICMM)—see ICMM (2012, 2014). For this present chapter we have
produced only partial updates to that published work.
3 ICMM has published the third edition of this publication (ICMM 2016), which updates the
statistical results on the MCI to the year 2014. These results would marginally alter some of the
findings in this section of this chapter (which are based on the MCI data for 2012) but do not
change the basic propositions presented here, or the analysis of the later sections, which,
consistently with the later ICMM publication, uses export data up to 2014.
4 The three indicators were: (i) exports of minerals including coal as a share of total merchandise
exports in 2012; (ii) the percentage point change in that same indicator measured between 2007
and 2012; and (iii) the total production of metallic minerals including coal expressed as a
percentage of GDP. The revised version published in 2016 now uses four indicators rather
than three.
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classified by theWorld Bank.5 There are also four higher-middle-income coun-
tries (Botswana, Suriname, Mongolia, and Namibia) among the fifty countries
recording the highest levels of overall mineral dependence. So, even if we were
to focus only on minerals and ignore oil and gas, there are some thirty-five
relatively low-income countries where extractive activity is of very great
significance.
The decomposition of the MCI data into two of its three component parts
(exports and production) reveals a further important point: that the most
important countries in terms of production (both US$ value and shares of total
world production) are almost all high-income countries (notably Australia, Chile,
Russia, the United States, and Canada) or higher-middle-income countries
(notably Brazil, China, and South Africa). Although a few lower-income coun-
tries, such as Mauritania, Guyana, Guinea, and Zimbabwe, have production
levels that are high relative to their levels of GDP, their absolute levels of
production are small relative to those of the richer economies. By contrast,
the list of the most significant countries in terms of export contribution (mineral
exports as a percentage of total exports) is dominated by low- or lower-middle-
income countries. For example, in 2012, Botswana, Zambia, Eritrea, and Guinea
had particularly high mineral export shares of 91.6 per cent, 69.2 per cent,
60.5 per cent, and 60.1 per cent, respectively. Only three of the top twenty
countries on this indicator were classified as high-income.6 Table 2.1 lists all
thirty-seven countries that had amineral export share greater than 30 per cent.
All but five of these countries (shaded rows)—so thirty-two countries in total—
were in the low- or middle-income categories.
2.2.2 Oil and Gas
For oil and gas dependence we can assess the situation (also for 2012) by using
the detailed UNCTAD data on exports that are available for 215 countries.
Those data show that no fewer than forty-eight countries had oil and gas
exports in that year greater than 30 per cent of their total merchandise
exports.7 These countries are listed in Table 2.2, which again also shows
their World Bank classification (low-income, lower- or upper-middle-income,
or high-income).
It should be noted that nineteen of the countries listed are classified as high-
income (shaded rows), whichmeans that the remaining twenty-nine8 countries
are either low- or middle-income.
5 We here use the Bank’s most recent classification, which differs slightly from the one that
would have applied in 2012—the year to which the MCI data relate.
6 ICMM (2014: Table 2). 7 This compares with forty-seven countries in 2011.
8 This compares with thirty in 2011.
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It is noteworthy also that only three countries appear in both Table 2.1
(minerals) and Table 2.2 (oil and gas). These are the Democratic Republic of
Korea, Mozambique, and Sudan.9 Thus the combining of the two tables would
show that in 2012 there were no fewer than fifty-eight low- and middle-
income countries (thirty-two plus twenty-nine minus three) that could be
Table 2.1. Mineral export dependence in 2012
Country classification Minerals incl. coal as % of total
1 Nauru Small Island State 95.9
2 Botswana Upper MY 91.7
3 Mongolia Upper MY 83.1
4 DRC Low 81.5
5 Suriname Upper MY 75.7
6 Zambia Low MY 69.2
7 French Polynesia High 64.6
8 Mauritania Low MY 62.9
9 Chile High 61.6
10 Eritrea Low 60.5
11 Peru Upper MY 60.1
12 Guinea Low 60.1
13 Guyana Low MY 58.8
14 Tajikistan Low MY 58.5
15 Australia High 57.3
16 Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. Low 54.4
17 Namibia Upper MY 53.4
18 Papua New Guinea Low MY 51.3
19 Sierra Leone Low 50.6
20 Mozambique Low 47.5
21 Burkina Faso Low 46.3
22 Sudan Low 45.8
23 Montserrat ? 45.7
24 Montenegro Upper MY 44.7
25 Armenia Low MY 44.5
26 Lesotho Low MY 44.5
27 Central African Republic Low 44.4
28 Mali Low 42.3
29 Lao People’s Dem. Rep. Low MY 39.6
30 Rwanda Low 39.1
31 Jamaica Upper MY 39.1
32 South Africa Upper MY 38.8
33 New Caledonia High 37.8
34 Zimbabwe Low 37.8
35 Iceland High 37.7
36 United Republic of Tanzania Low 35.3
37 Lebanon Upper MY 32.5
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from UN (available at: https://comtrade.un.org/data/).
9 Interestingly, there were also three (different) overlap countries in 2011: Bahrain, Bolivia, and
Guinea.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
36
Table 2.2. Oil and gas export dependence in 2012
Country classification Oil and gas % of total
1 Iraq Upper MY 98.8
2 Algeria Upper MY 98.4
3 Angola Upper MY 98.3
4 Libya Upper MY 97.3
5 Timor-Leste Low MY 97.1
6 Brunei Darussalam High Y 96.2
7 Equatorial Guinea High Y 95.0
8 Chad Low 93.7
9 Nigeria Low MY 93.5
10 Azerbaijan Upper MY 93.4
11 Qatar High Y 91.4
12 Kuwait High Y 90.9
13 Congo Low 88.2
14 Yemen Low MY 85.9
15 Saudi Arabia High Y 85.2
16 Aruba High Y 81.9
17 Venezuela High Y 81.2
18 Gabon Upper MY 78.7
19 Gibraltar High Y 73.7
20 Oman High Y 71.2
21 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Upper MY 70.4
22 Russian Federation High Y 70.3
23 Kazakhstan Upper MY 69.9
24 Norway High Y 69.8
25 Bahamas High Y 66.0
26 Colombia Upper MY 65.7
27 Trinidad and Tobago High Y 64.9
28 Turkmenistan Upper MY 62.6
29 Ecuador Upper MY 57.8
30 United Arab Emirates High Y 57.4
31 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Low MY 50.9
32 Cameroon Low MY 50.4
33 Bahrain High Y 41.5
34 Malta High Y 41.2
35 Korea, Dem. People’s Rep. of Low 40.1
36 Myanmar Low MY 39.3
37 Cyprus High Y 38.1
38 Greece High Y 37.0
39 American Samoa Upper MY 36.7
40 Egypt Low MY 36.0
41 Mozambique Low 35.8
42 Niger Low 35.6
43 Belarus Upper MY 35.6
44 Sudan Low 34.2
45 Indonesia Low MY 33.3
46 Guam High Y 32.9
47 Saint Lucia Upper MY 31.8
48 Ghana Low MY 30.5
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from UN (available at: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/).
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Table 2.3. Changes in extractives export dependence since 1996
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said to be highly dependent on extractive industries—at least in the dimension
of their export trade.
2.3 Changes in Extractives Dependence since 1996
Unfortunately, the full MCI data have been produced only for the years back
to 2012. So, in order to examine changes in dependence over an extended
period, we once again need to rely mainly on the UNCTAD export trade data.
Changes over time were assessed by looking first at just the 58 low- and
middle-income countries identified in Tables 2.1 and 2.210 and comparing
their levels of export dependence on extractives in 1996, 2012, and 2014
(the latest year for which UNCTAD data were available at the time of writing).
The rows of Table 2.3 show the results of this over-time comparison, with the
percentage point changes (1996–2012 and 1996–2014) given in the last two
columns. We have supplemented the list of countries identified above with
data for a further nine countries, where the joint contribution of minerals
and oil and gas exports brings the 2014 level of export dependence above the
30 per cent cut-off that was used for both Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. These
additional countries are Liberia, Madagascar, Togo, India, Kyrgyzstan, Senegal,
Uzbekistan, Fiji, and Panama. Finally, we have included a few countries that
have large exports of extractives but do not quite attain the 30 per cent cut-off
point. The results are shown both for metals and for the total of metals and
oil and gas.
The results of the comparisons are clear and unambiguous. The final two
columns of Table 2.3 show that for most of the countries listed there was a
strong and positive increase in their levels of dependence on the export of
extractives from 1996 onwards. Between 1996 and 2012, no fewer than sixty-
two of the seventy-two countries listed saw increases in their export depend-
ence ratios,11 the percentage point increases being as high as 94 per cent
(Chad), 76 per cent (Sudan), 64 per cent (Mozambique), and 54 per cent
(Lao). Only ten countries saw a decline in the ratio in that period (marked
by shading in the penultimate column). The simple average increase over that
sixteen-year period was 18 percentage points.
For the longer period, from 1996 to 2014, the changes were still predomin-
antly upwards but slightly smaller in magnitude: the simple average increase
across all the countries was 17 percentage points. In that period, eleven of the
10 For some of these countries the over-time comparison was not possible because of missing
data in the earlier year.
11 When the comparison is run from 1996 to 2011 (rather than 2012), fifty-eight of the total of
sixty-eight countries saw increases.
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seventy-two countries listed saw falls in their levels of extractives dependence
(markedby shading in thefinal column), but sixty-one countries saw increases.12
Among the eighteen low-income countries that are listed, fifteen saw an
increase in the dependence ratio up to 2012 and fourteen saw an increase
up to 2014. Of the twenty-five lower-middle-income countries, twenty saw an
increase and one no change (Nigeria) to 2012, and the same twenty-one
countries saw an increase to 2014.
The conclusion from this set of simple over-time comparisons is quite clear:
dependence on the extractive industries has increased in the eighteen-year
period between 1996 and 2014 in low- and middle-income countries, which
are the main concern of this chapter. The high level of dependence that we
identified in Section 2.2 for the year 2012 was largely sustained until 2014 and
has been the result of an extended period of change from 1996 onwards,
during which the general tendency has been for greater, rather than reduced,
dependence.
However, we need to be aware of certain limitations of this analysis: in
particular, it is for the moment based predominantly on export trade data
and it extends only to 2014. Correction for these limitations would be likely to
strengthen the main conclusions for several reasons. First, there are a number
of newer extractive countries, such as Afghanistan, Kenya, and Uganda, for
which the 2014 UNCTAD data do not yet capture the increases in dependence
ratios that seem likely to occur in the next few years. By 2014, Afghanistan and
Kenya, for example, had export dependence ratios of 19per cent and12per cent,
respectively, and these seem certain to rise in future years. Second, there are
some very important extractives producers that are not statistically important in
the export markets. These include principally China (15.8 per cent of world
metal production in 2012), Brazil (8.5 per cent), and India (3.4 per cent). The
inclusion of these large producers in the datasets would obviously strengthen
our main conclusion.
2.4 The Impact of the End of the Commodity Price Cycle
It is difficult to date precisely the point at which the so-called super-cycle of
commodity prices ended. As shown in Figure 2.1, the prices of different metal
commodities headed south around 2011, but did so at various dates and with
various degrees of associated volatility. But it is clear, in the case of metals at
least, that the downward tendency of prices was well established by 2012. The
same is true of the crude oil price (Brent oil prices hit a high of US$127 a barrel
12 For the comparisons from 1996 to 2011, these numbers change to eleven countries seeing falls
and fifty-seven countries seeing increases.
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in April 2011 as the conflict in Libya shut down its supplies). It is too early to
say what longer-term effect the price falls of the past four years will have on
the levels of extractives dependence in the countries we have identified.
Although significant extractives capacity has been mothballed, it is not clear
how much may eventually be closed or how much planned new investment
will eventually have to be cancelled. For some metals, including copper, the
price falls to date have arguably been offset by lower production costs and
have affected only the very highest-cost producers.13
Data such as those shown in Table 2.3 enable us to tell merely an initial and
partial story about the impact of the price collapse on the levels of extractive
industry dependence. We have used 2011 as the assumed start date of the
commodity price collapse, although in reality the actual start date was some-
where between 2011 and 2012. Data comparable to those shown in Table 2.3
were compiled for sixty-eight countries14 for both 2011 and 2014 and then
compared. The results of this for these sixty-eight countries are shown graph-



















































Aluminium Coal Copper Gold Iron Ore
Figure 2.1. Prices for selected metals, 1995–2015 (index 1990 = 100)
Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet), 2016.
13 For example, a March 2015 press release by SNL Metals noted that the copper price had fallen
to a level just above the 9th decile of high-cost producers, which indicated, they argued, that the
copper price would need to fall further before significant capacity became vulnerable to closure.
Also ‘the . . . spot price of copper averaged only US$5,700/t in February, but remains comfortably
above SNL’s prediction of this year’s average mined cost of 168c/b, calculated on a co-product
basis’.
14 These sixty-eight countries emerged from the 2011 data in the same way that the seventy-two
countries in Table 2.3 emerged from the 2012 data (see the explanations in Section 2.3).
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The results of this limited experiment are ambiguous. Using the new data,
forty-two of the sixty-eight countries did experience some decline inmeasured
export dependence between 2011 and 2014. In nine country cases, this
decline was large, at more than 10 percentage points.15 In the other thirty-
three cases of decline, the decline was quite small. By contrast, in twenty-six
country cases there was no decline—rather an increase in measured depend-
ence with quite substantial percentage point increases in many cases. These
results suggest that the commodity price collapse did indeed disrupt the
previously strong upward tendency in extractives dependence evidenced in
the earlier part of this chapter. However, that disruption was not general
across all countries and a significant number among the sixty-eight saw an
ongoing and often strong increase in their levels of dependence. We will need
to await the similar data up to 2017 to see whether this somewhat ambiguous
pattern has persisted.
2.5 Implications of High Extractives Dependence
Section 2.5 is intended to provide an assessment of some of the implications
for low- andmiddle-income countries of the high levels of extractives depend-
ence that the chapter has identified. The material presented here is highly
derivative from the published work of others and is intended mainly to
support a broader debate on the topic. The discussion is sub-divided between
the short-term consequences and the longer-term perspective.
2.5.1 Short-term Consequences
Several papers have been published in the past three years or so assessing the
implications for developing economies of the sharp drop in the prices of
commodities in general but extractive products in particular.16 Thomas Lassourd
and David Manley of the NRGI have identified ten significant economic
and political consequences.17 Foremost among these are the significant losses
of fiscal revenue and the associated painful fiscal adjustment that many
extractives-dependent economies now face. They note that these pressures
apply also to some richer economies, such as Saudi Arabia and Norway, which
15 These nine countries were Eritrea (25%), Myanmar (21%), Benin (19%), Syrian Arab Republic
(17%), Gabon (13%), Mali (13%), Tanzania (12%), Egypt (11%), and Lao People’s Dem. Rep. (11%).
16 For example, Zhenbo Hou et al. (2015). However, as an indication of how quickly things have
changed, another ODI paper, published as relatively recently as August 2012, was still mainly
concerned with the very high prices (for oil) and predicting that ‘in terms of real GDP, African
countries may suffer up to a 3% loss from a doubling of oil prices’ (Cantore et al. 2012).
17 Lassourd and Manley (2015).
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have large, established reserve funds that can absorb some of the pressures.
This mitigating factor, however, is not applicable to all extractives-dependent
countries or indeed tomost of the low- andmiddle-income economies that are
our main concern: the authors mention the cases of Yemen (a low-income
country with a projected fiscal deficit of 10 per cent of GDP) and Venezuela
(a high-income country with inflation of over 200 per cent and a projected
fiscal deficit of almost 20 per cent of GDP).18 Further, anticipating a later
chapter in this volume (Solimano and Guajardo, Chapter 10, and Solimano
2017), it is well known that some countries (notably Chile) have strong
counter-cyclical fiscal arrangements in place that can mitigate some of the
consequences of lower prices, but most countries do not.
As a consequence of lower prices for their extractive exports, many
dependent economies can also expect depreciating exchange rates and higher
rates of inflation in addition to the inevitable impact on real incomes that lower
prices will cause. The lower prices are also likely to affect prospective income, as
many of the early-stage exploratory investments in certain lower-income coun-
tries are delayed or even abandoned. Lassourd and Manley (2015) mention
important prospective investments in the cases of Guinea (iron ore), Mozam-
bique (oil and gas), Uganda (oil), and Tanzania (natural gas), but there aremany
others. ICMM (2016) provides evidence of an 80 per cent decline in exploration
spending by major mining companies between 2012 and 2015.
However, not all of the consequences are necessarily negative and some
opportunities are also referred to. Foremost among these are the opportunities
that are presented by much lower fuel prices to reduce or eliminate longstand-
ing but fiscally costly fuel subsidies: an example of a country where this oppor-
tunity is being seized is Indonesia. It might be added that Tanzania has been
fortunate in timing in that its new near-shore gas came on stream in late 2015
and is already fuelling new gas-fired power generation near Dar es Salaam that
is enabling the government to reduce its dependence on high-cost imported
feedstocks and so reduce associated large fiscal subsidies; see Chapter 25 by
Östensson and Löf for more detail.19 Lassourd and Manley (2015) also suggest
that a period of low fuel prices provides an opportunity for governments to
introduce or raise carbon taxes and take othermeasures to discourage fossil-fuel
consumption and encourage the greater uptake of renewables.
Finally, they draw attention to a range of political consequences that could
arise from lower prices. For example, lower prices could either mitigate or
exacerbate political repression in countries like Azerbaijan, and ongoing
resource-related conflicts in Libya, South Sudan, and Iraq. Potentially, lower
18 These are the figures quoted by the authors and are not necessarily the most up-to-date
figures. In the case of Venezuela, there has been no formal IMF Article IV review since 2004.
19 See also Roe (2016).
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resource revenues available for governments ‘to buy social peace’ might spark
conflict in countries such as Bahrain, where they argue that the leaders have
used resource revenues to keep a lid on growing discontent. More generally,
‘a decline in natural resource prices will reduce the incumbency advantages
held by the leaders controlling the tap’ (Lassourd and Manley 2015).
The manner in which these potential impacts will apply in practice is
obviously country- and case-specific. For example, countries dependent on
goldmining have faced smaller fiscal and other economic problems because of
the relative strength of the gold price. But few if any of the seventy-two most
extractives-dependent economies that this chapter has identified will be able
to escape all of the consequences. So there is undoubtedly a very large agenda
of work needed in most of those countries to address the situation that they
are now experiencing—and will continue to experience for as long as com-
modity prices remain relatively soft.
2.5.2 The Longer-term Perspective
The purpose here is to identify some of the (positive) longer-term aspects of
resource dependence for the type of country we have identified. The ideas
are based squarely on the detailed analysis published in December 2013 by
the McKinsey Global Institute. Although this study was published before the
commodity price slump intensified, many of its broad findings remain rele-
vant to the majority of the seventy-two countries we have identified.
McKinsey (2013b) identified four main drivers of what it terms ‘resource
market dynamics’. These are:
 the growing levels of global market demand for resources, including
minerals and oil and gas (evidenced also by an earlier study, Mckinsey
2013a)20
 the gradual shift of the sources of supply to more challenging locations—
many in less-developed countries
 the environmental pressures that will both raise the costs of mining and
constrain outputs (especially of carbon-intensive fuels)
 the technology improvements that will allow more efficient and lower-
cost extraction and extraction in more difficult sites.
20 As one aspect of this, McKinsey draws on OECD forecasts that the numbers of global middle-
class consumers will increase by 3 billion over the next twenty years. The research defines ‘middle-
class’ as having daily per capita spending of US$10 to US$100 in PPP terms and is based on a 2010
paper by Homi Kharas (2010). Increased income inequality would likely add to the estimated
number of middle-class consumers. A faster rate of change in energy efficiency would somewhat
dilute the estimated impact on resource needs.
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The influences of these various component drivers on future levels of
demand for extractive products, the outputs of such products, and the costs
of producing them are to an extent offsetting. Overall, however, the perspec-
tive that McKinsey presents is one that will require investment in mineral and
oil and gas extraction of between US$11 trillion and US$17 trillion cumula-
tively by 2030. This is 65 per cent higher than the historical annual rate of
investment in these sectors, even when it allows for the reducing effects of
climate change initiatives. Figure 2.2 summarizes McKinsey’s various histor-
ical and projected data on the investments needed in these sectors both to
replace existing supplies and to provide net new capacity. This is done using
two alternative scenarios. The first assumes a supply change that allows for
‘business-as-usual’ improvements in resource productivity (e.g. more efficient
vehicles). The second builds in larger supply reductions due not only to
productivity improvements but also to changes in the energy supply mix
towards the greater use of renewables.21
It needs to be recognized that these McKinsey scenarios were constructed at
a time when the decline in commodity prices was only in its early stages
(2012/13). The large declines in some prices since then will have affected the
realism of those scenarios, but to what extent we do not know. However, as we
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Figure 2.2. Investments in oil and gas, and minerals, 1995–2030
Source: Exhibit 5 in McKinsey Global Institute (2013b: 31); reproduced here with permission
from McKinsey Global Institute.
21 McKinsey (2013b: appendix 1).
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can see from Figure 2.2, we would need to reduce the smaller of the two
projected investment amounts (the scenario that factors in climate change
responses) by almost 40 per cent in the case of oil and gas before it would
become equal to the 1995–2012 annual average investment (i.e. from US$445
billion to US$286 billion) and by almost 50 per cent in the case of minerals
before it would become equal to the 2003–2012 annual average (i.e. from US
$192 billion to US$98 billion). Any re-running of the McKinsey scenarios
would be unlikely to reduce the projected figures by such large percentage
amounts.22 So it seems safe to assume that a feasible scenario to 2030 would
still show the necessary levels of future new investment to be high relative
to the historical averages. Since the historical period used in the McKinsey
analysis (1995–2012) coincides with the period for which we have shown
extractives dependence in many low- and middle-income countries to have
risen significantly (Table 2.3), it is a further reasonable assumption that that
level of dependencewill be sustaineduntil 2030 andmay even increase further.
This being the case, there are substantial potential opportunities for the
developing countries that produce minerals and/or oil and gas. In terms of
investment, McKinsey (2013b) suggests that in its ‘potential upside’ case, up
to US$3 trillion of the total global investment in scenario 1 could be expected
to be invested in low- and low-middle income countries (cumulatively by
2030). This would represent a tripling of the levels of investment in the
extractives sectors seen in those countries since 1995. Even in its lower,
‘base case’, scenario the cumulative investment in these countries could be
at an annual rate 50 per cent higher than in the past twenty years. McKinsey
further estimates that on some assumptions this investment and the growth
that it could sustain could lift some 540millionmore people out of poverty—a
figure higher than the poverty reduction achieved in China in the previous
twenty years.23
If one accepts the McKinsey investment scenarios (or something close to
them), the necessary conditions for this dramatic gain in investment and living
standards can be expected to be in place over the next few years. However, the
sufficient conditions (in terms of governance arrangements, supporting infra-
structure, etc.) are certainly not guaranteed to be available to deliver the full
pay-off that seems to be possible. Indeed, one of the central purposes of this
and several other chapters in this book is to explore in some detail what these
further conditions might be and how they might be enhanced through the
work of a range of actors—government, companies, donors, and others.
22 Further, we can expect that lower prices and their consequences will in some cases erode the
earlier enthusiasm for climate change adjustments. A current example is very high energy prices in
the United Kingdom, which threaten the survival of domestic steel production (an intensive user of
fossil fuels), that these have now been shown to create.
23 McKinsey (2013b: 33, exhibit 7).
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In the partial absence of these further conditions, one needs to take on
board the warning notes also voiced by the McKinsey study. This showed that
between 1995 and 2011 (broadly the period over which we have reviewed the
change in extractives dependence), some 52 per cent of the lower-income
resource-driven countries of the world had failed to make significant progress
in catching up with the incomes of higher-income countries.24 The slightly
more positive insight was that, of the 77 per cent of resource-driven countries
with below-average per capita income (of US$10,000) in 1995, 48 per cent did
achieve some catch-up.
2.6 Conclusions
The statistics outlined in this chapter highlight several important facts that
have significant implications for many low- and middle-income countries.
Three points are particularly salient.
First, although high-income countries dominate extractives production
figures, countries with the highest levels of export dependence on extractives
are predominantly low- andmiddle-income countries. Second, export depend-
ence has shown a clear upward trend, with sustained increases in most coun-
tries over the last two decades. Finally, although the overall trend since the end
of the commodity super-cycle is somewhat ambiguous, this upward trend has
nevertheless continued in many countries despite the recent commodity price
reversals.
High levels of export dependence in many low- and middle-income coun-
tries, coupled with lower commodity prices, have serious economic and polit-
ical implications for these countries. The primary economic concerns over the
short and medium term are loss of fiscal revenue, exchange rate depreciation,
higher inflation, and a reduction in real income.While the principal economic
impacts are negative, lower prices do open up the possibility of reform of costly
fuel subsidies and the introduction of carbon taxes, both of which would be
positive developments. Political implications aremore ambiguous; it is unclear
whether the reduced prices will exacerbate or mitigate political repression and
(current and potential future) resource-related conflicts.
Projected trends in investment suggest that, despite reduced commodity
prices, investment in extractive industries over the next fifteen years is likely
to behigh relative tohistorical averages. This suggests that, over the longer term,
dependence on extractives in low- and middle-income countries may increase
further. Increased investment could lead to improved living standards.However,
24 McKinsey (2013b: 34, exhibit 8).
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this outcome is contingent upon the decisions and actions of a range of actors,
including government, companies, and donors.
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Mining’s Contribution to Low- and
Middle-income Economies
Magnus Ericsson and Olof Löf
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is designed to provide an up-to-date statistical analysis of the
scale of the current dependency of low- and middle-income economies on
various extractive resources in dimensions such as production, income (GDP),
exports, government revenues, exploration, and employment. The study also
attempts to explain and document how country levels of minerals depend-
ency have changed in the past twenty years.
Drawing on the detailed data available for the minerals sector, an analysis is
carried out of the situation in 2014, and of recent trends in mining’s contri-
bution to the economic development of low- andmiddle-income countries for
the years 1996–2014. By using data on variables such as production, prices,
mineral rents, exploration expenditure, government revenues, and employ-
ment, this chapter offers answers to questions such as:1
 What is themagnitude of the statistical dependency onmining industries
in low- and middle-income developing countries today?
 Has that level of statistical dependency changed over the past twenty
years, from 1996 to 2015?
 Has the level of dependency changed as a result of the sharp drop in prices
of most extracted commodities since about 2011, after the end of the
so-called super-cycle?
1 This chapter complements an earlier paper examining similar questions for both mining and
oil and gas (see Roe and Dodd 2016; Roe and Round 2017).
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The methodology is based on earlier work coordinated by the ICMM, in
which the authors participated in 2010 and 2014 (ICMM 2010, 2014).
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Mining Contribution Index WIDER
One existing approach to assessing the magnitude of the dependency of
countries on extractive resources is the MCI developed by the ICMM (2010,
2014, 2016).
In this chapter MCI is updated and also further developed. Our revised
version is called the Mining Contribution Index WIDER (MCI-W), and is
based on four indicators:
1. exports of minerals including coal as a share of total merchandise exports
2. the total production value at mine stage of metallic minerals, industrial
minerals, and coal, expressed as a percentage of GDP
3. mineral rents as a percentage of GDP
4. exploration expenditure.
MCI and MCI-W are similar, but use two different ways of combining some
measurable indicators. MCI-W uses GDP purchasing power parity (PPP, real
US$ with 2011 as the base year) from the World Bank.
3.2.2 Indicators
The rationale for including each of our four indicators is as follows.
3.2.2.1 EXPORTS
International trade in metals reflects regional and national advantages and
specializations along the value chain (Tercero Espinoza and Soulier 2016).
Mineral and metal export contribution in 2014 provides a measure for the
scale of mining in relation to other productive activities, in particular for
small low- to middle-income countries. UNCTAD validates and compiles
a wide range of data collected from national and international sources
to provide reliable statistics to facilitate analyses of the most urgent and
emerging issues. UNCTAD covers international trade and exports of metals
and minerals. The specific trade groups used are: non-ferrous metals (Stand-
ard International Trade Classification (SITC) 68); other ores and metals
(SITC 27 and 28); pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold (SITC 667
and 971); coal, whether or not pulverized, not agglomerated (SITC 321);
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coke and semi-cokes of coal, lignite, or peat, and retort carbon (SITC 325)
(UN Comtrade).
3.2.2.2 VALUE OF MINE PRODUCTION
This is non-fuel mineral production value expressed as a percentage of GDP
(1996–2014). It provides a sense of the scale of value of production relative to
the size of the economy. Note that it does not represent the contribution of
mining to GDP—on average perhaps only a third of production value repre-
sents value addition to the national economy.
The value of mine production is based on figures obtained from RawMater-
ials Group data until 2013. Figures for 2014 were collected and computed by
the authors using the same methodology (Raw Materials Group 1997: 497).
A list of minerals and metals included is given in Figure 3.1. Uranium, aggre-
gates, and limestone are not included.
3.2.2.3 MINERAL RENTS
Mineral rents are the difference between the value of production for a stock
of minerals at world prices and their total costs of production including
‘normal’ profit. Minerals included in the calculation are tin, gold, lead,
zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite, and phosphate. Mineral rent stat-
























Figure 3.1. Value of mine production by commodity (%), 2014
Note: Others include: salt, lead, chromite, manganese ore, molybdenum, bauxite, tin, palladium,
graphite, rare earth elements, kaolin, boron, fluorspar and feldspar.
Source: authors’ illustration based on data from British Geological Survey, US Geological Survey,
World Mineral Statistics, and Raw Materials Data.
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3.2.2.4 EXPLORATION
The exploration expenditure data produced by SNL Mining & Metals (2016)2
provides a forward-looking indication of the likelihood of continued mining
activity in a country.
3.2.3 Calculation
MCI-W is calculated as follows: countries are ranked in descending order for
each of the four MCI indicators. Countries for which data do not exist are
omitted from the ranking. As a result, indicator 1 is ranked out of 216 coun-
tries, indicator 2 is ranked out of 127 countries, indicator 3 is ranked out of
125, and indicator 4 is ranked out of 122 countries. For each country percent-
ile ranks are calculated based on the four indicators, by dividing the country
rank by the maximum rank within that indicator to generate a ranking
between 0 and 1. Finally, the four MCI indicators are weighted equally at 1/4,
summed up, and multiplied by 100 (ICMM 2014).
In this chapter the focus is on the low- and middle-income economies for
the years 1996–2014.3
3.3 Current Levels of Mining Contribution
to National Economies
Our MCI-W results confirm that mining is indeed the backbone of several
nations’ economies. In some nations, mining accounts for a dominant share
of the national wealth, with more than 50 per cent of exports and around
10–20 per cent of GDP: many of these countries are low- and middle-income
economies. The distinction between different regions is shown graphically in
Figure 3.2, the black areas showing the highest levels of dependency. Regions
where mining makes a particularly high contribution are Western, Southern,
and Central Africa, Oceania, Central Asia, and Latin America. Almost all coun-
tries have some, often small-scale,mining activity producing, for example, coal
and aggregates for domestic use. These mineral products are most often not
2 SNL Metals & Mining (2016) focuses on corporate spending. In reality, if one adds metals and
minerals not included by SNL Mining & Metals, and if one counts exploration undertaken by
entities not surveyed, total exploration on either a national or a global basis is definitely higher
than indicated by SNL for each country. In this chapter this difference is considered to be of minor
importance.
3 Low-income economies are defined by the World Bank as those with a gross national income
(GNI) per capita of US$1,025 or less in 2015; lower-middle-income economies are those with a
GNI per capita between US$1,026 and US$4,035; upper-middle-income economies are those with
a GNI per capita between US$4,036 and US$12,475; high-income economies are those with a GNI
per capita of US$12,476 or more.
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exported, as their low value does not allow transport over longer distances, and
hence the combined contribution by production and exports is small. There
are some regions or countries where mining contributes less to national
wealth: Western Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Japan, and South-
East Asia (lighter areas in Figure 3.2).
3.3.1 Country Rankings
In MCI-W based on the latest available data for 2014, the DRC is ranked as the
country with the largest contribution of mining to its economy (Table 3.1).
Mineral exports constitute 81 per cent of total exports there, and DRC is
ranked the fourth most important country in relation to mineral export
contribution. Mineral production value at the mine stage was US$8 billion
in 2014, and the mineral production value as a percentage of GDP was
15 per cent: on this indicator, DRC is ranked number three. Exploration
expenditure was US$300million in 2014, placing DRC in tenth place globally.
Mineral rents constituted 20 per cent of total GDP, and DRC is ranked number
two in 2014. These four variables give the composite score of 97.6 out of 100 in
More contribution to wealth Less contribution to wealth
Figure 3.2. MCI-W score by country, 2014
Source: authors’ calculations.
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the index for DRC. The top ten countries in the 2014 MCI-W ranking in
descending order are DRC, Chile, Australia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea,
Zambia, Peru, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guyana.
Of the top fifty countries in MCI-W 2014, there are only four high-income
economies (HIE), but sixteen upper-middle-income economies (UMIE),
eighteen lower-middle-income economies (LMIE), and twelve low-income
economies (LIE).
While there are two high-income countries, Chile and Australia, among
the five countries with the highest MCI-W scores, there are only two add-
itional high-income countries among the top fifty (Canada and the Russian
Federation). It should also be noted that all five of the BRICS countries
(Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa) are among
the MCI-W top forty-five.
In Figure 3.3 we present a four-dimensional chart with the export contribu-
tion shown on the x-axis and mineral value as percentage of GDP on the
y-axis. The size of the circles is proportional to the value ofmine production in
absolute terms (US dollars). The fourth dimension is time, the data being
presented only for 2014 in Figure 3.3. The figure shows the top twenty MCI-W
countries. Australia has by far the largest mining industry by value of produc-
tion, and the high value is represented by the size of the circle. The export
contribution ranking is topped by Mongolia, DRC, and Botswana at levels of
80–90 per cent of total exports, followed by Zambia, Mauritania, and Mali
Table 3.1. MCI-W top 20, 2014





Papua New Guinea 5 93.4
Zambia 6 92.6
Peru 7 91.4
Burkina Faso 8 90.5
Mali 9 89.9
Guyana 10 89.9







Lao PDR 18 83.5
Sierra Leone 19 82.5
Uzbekistan 20 81.2
Source: authors’ calculations.
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with export contribution levels at around 60–70 per cent. The graphic con-
firms that the countries with the highest levels of export contribution are
mainly LIE or LMIE. Eritrea, with only one mine of industrial scale in oper-
ation in 2014, is represented by the small circle at production 9 per cent and
export 48 per cent.
3.3.2 Value of Mine Production
While there are thirty LIE and LMIE among the top fifty MCI-W countries, the
HIE and UMIE are substantially more important in terms of production
value—for example, China, Australia, the United States, Canada, Chile, the
Russian Federation, South Africa, and Brazil (Figure 3.4). It should be noted
that the main engine of metal demand, China, is also by far the most import-
antmining country when coal is included in the production total. If coal is not
considered, but only metals and industrial minerals, Australia and China are
roughly the same size. The absolute levels of production are relatively small for
several of the states in the MCI-W top fifty—such as Guyana, Eritrea, and
Guinea—but for the economy in the broader sense, mining is an important
contributor to all the MCI-W top fifty states.
Figure 3.4 clearly shows that the total value of mineral production at the
mine stage is dominated by coal. Coal constitutes roughly half of the total
value of industry production globally. Iron ore (Fe), copper (Cu), and gold (Au)
follow next. The industrially important metals nickel (Ni) and zinc (Zn) are
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Figure 3.3. MCI-W top 20, 2014
Source: authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3.4. Value of mine production by country, 2014
Notes: Circles are proportional to value ofmine production. Coal accounts for 3/4 of Indian production value. Iron ore accounts for >3/4 of Brazilian production
value. Gold accounts for approximately 1/3 of Peruvian production value.


























value in total global production as the fertilizer minerals—i.e. phosphate and
potash—at two to three per cent of the total value of production. Thereafter
there are a number of metals and industrial minerals that each contribute less
than one per cent of total global value. (See Figure 3.1 for a complete list of the
minerals included in total mine production value.) China is by far the most
important country in terms of total production value, followed by Australia
and the United States. The top ten countries in terms of the value of their mine
production contribute almost 80 per cent of the total value of non-fuel min-
eral production at the mine stage globally.
For each of the MCI-W top twenty LIE and middle-income economies
(MIE), Figure 3.5 shows how metals and minerals contributed to the total
value of their mine production in 2014. Gold mining is the major mineral
contributor in no fewer than nine countries in this top twenty. InMali, gold is
the only mineral mined and hence contributes 100 per cent of the total value;
in Burkina Faso, Guyana, Ghana, Uzbekistan, Suriname, and Tanzania, gold
mining contributes between 75 and 94 per cent. Copper is themost important
commodity in Zambia, DRC, and Lao PDR. In Namibia and Botswana, dia-
monds are the main contributor.





















Coal Iron ore Copper Diamond value Gold Platinum Others
Figure 3.5. Contribution by commodity to MCI-W top 20 LIE and MIE
Source: authors’ illustration based on Raw Materials Data.
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In 2014, the total global value of mine production at the mine stage includ-
ing coal was around US$1,200 billion. Coal contributed US$650 billion, and
iron ore is estimated at US$145 billion. The change over time in the total
global value of mineral production follows the general metal/mineral prices,
as seen in Figure 3.6. However, for some individual countries, the changes in
the level of production have also been very important.4 For example, copper
production in DRC has increased tenfold over the last ten years and is now
twice as large as during the previous peak in the 1980s.
3.3.2.1 CHANGE OF MINING CONTRIBUTION OVER TIME, 1996–2014
Metal andmineral prices reached a peak in 2011, but have since been in a five-
year downturn that was showing some signs of correcting in 2016–17. It
should be noted, however, that most metal prices in nominal terms are still
higher than they were in the early 2000s. Our price index is made up by a
variety of metals/minerals (coal, copper, gold, iron ore, nickel, and zinc). The






































































Exploration (US$bn) (right-hand scale)
Price index (right-hand scale)
Figure 3.6. Mining development trends, 1995–2015: prices, exports, exploration, value
of mine production, mineral rents
Sources: authors’ compilation based on data from Raw Materials Group, World Bank, SNL Metals &
Mining, and UNCTAD.
4 See e.g. Eritrea and some other high-ranking MCI-W countries. Annual production data by
country for all of the countries covered are not yet available for 2015.
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value of products of the mining industry. The weighting was used to combine
the price development of different products into one index.
As Figure 3.6 shows, the price index has been on a downward trend since
2011, with a flattening-out beginning in early 2016. It is certain that the global
production value will also have dropped for 2015, but we see several import-
ant indicators making us believe that the bottom in terms of production value
was reached in late 2016 or early 2017. As can also be seen from Figure 3.6,
mineral prices are an important but not the sole determinant of the changing
levels of exports, value of mine production, mineral rents, and exploration
expenditures.
3.3.3 Export Contribution
Non-fuel minerals and metals are the major contributor to many nations’
exports. Among the top fifty countries with the highest mineral exports
relative to total exports in 2014, there were seventeen nations with a total
mineral export ofmore than 50 per cent of the total. Among the top fifty ranked
by export contribution, no fewer than 34 per cent are LIE and 28 per cent are
LMIE.Only eight countries or16per cent areHIE. The export contribution to the
MCI-W score in LIE andMIE is the most important factor explaining their high
ranks. Sierra Leone is number one with a mineral export contribution of no less
than 94 per cent of total exports. Botswana, DRC, Mongolia, and Zambia are all
countries where mineral exports contribute more than 70 per cent.
3.3.4 Exploration
Exploration activity and spending is mainly driven by expectations of future,
mostly short-termmineral demand and prices. In reality, exploration expend-
iture in a given year is closely related to metal prices in the preceding year
(Canadian Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry 2001:
20–1). This means that future metal demand, which should logically deter-
mine levels of exploration, is not a prime driver. This is a failure of the market
for this specific service. Some attempts to stimulate exploration have been
made in certain countries, with varying success. Examples are financial sup-
port to risk-willing investors in Canada and Australia (flow-through shares),
and government-funded exploration work in China, India, and Finland.
3.3.5 Mineral Rents
It is important to note that diamonds are not included in the list of minerals
for which the World Bank calculates mineral rent. Thus, countries such as
Botswana and Namibia, where diamonds are the main mineral contributor to
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the economy, will get a lower MCI-W score than if diamond rents were also
included. Mineral rent is a theoretical approach to calculate some concept of
the surplus from the mineral sector.
3.3.6 Other Factors
3.3.6.1 GOVERNMENT REVENUES FROM MINING
The capturing by government of some part of total resource revenues as
government revenues (mainly taxes and royalties) is crucial to generate devel-
opment formany reasons, not least thatmineral resources are considered non-
renewable.
3.3.6.2 EMPLOYMENT
The direct contribution of mining to the total formal employment of a country
is seldom more than 1–4 per cent in countries with large mining sectors. The
number of direct jobs created is normally relatively small, as mining is capital-
intensive; but mining also generates indirect jobs, which are more difficult to
measure. Furthermore, mines are often located in remote areas with limited
other opportunities. However, the jobs created by large mining companies are
normally well paid compared with other similar jobs in the same country. This
means that the mining contribution to the total wage bill of a country is often
proportionately larger than its contribution to job numbers.
To sum up, direct employment in the mining sector most often varies
between 1 and 3 per cent, but there are examples of much higher levels.
This is invariably the case, in particular, if informal/artisanal-sector employ-
ment is also included. Employment is an important stabilizing factor in the
contribution of mining in manymineral-rich countries. Employment has also
been generally rising in the past ten years, and has not declined as much
recently as the value of mine production, exports, and other factors directly
related to commodity prices. Employment is also somewhat less volatile than
the other factors under study, and there was for example only a marginal dip
during the global financial crisis in 2008–9.
3.4 Changes in MCI-W since 1996
The 1996 value of mineral production at the mine stage was US$300 billion
(in nominal terms), equivalent to 0.6 per cent of total world GDP PPP (World
Bank 2016). In 2011 mine value peaked at US$1,800 billion (1.9 per cent of
global GDP); it has since fallen back to US$1,200 billion and 1.2 per cent of
world total GDP. The super-cycle—the long boom in metal and mineral
markets and prices beginning in 2003—made mining a more important part
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of GDP in almost all mining countries. The share of mining in global GDP
doubled in four years, and peaked at three times higher in 2011 than in 1996.
These dramatic changes in the preconditions for mining’s contribution to
national economies also had strong effects on MCI-W. In 1996 Chile was
number one in the MCI-W ranking while DRC, which is number one in
2014, was ranked only at number 24.
Among the twenty LIE and MIE which had the highest MCI-W ranking in
1996, no fewer than thirteen economies have climbed up one step in the
World Bank’s income group classification by 2014. In 1996 the MCI-W
top fifty included six HIE, five UMIE, twenty-one LMIE, and eighteen LIE. By
contrast, in 2014 the numbers are: four HIE, sixteen UMIE, eighteen LMIE,
and twelve LIE. Zambia, Ghana, Guyana, Mauretania, Mongolia, and
Tajikistan were classified as LIE in 1996 but LMIE in 2014. Countries classified
as LMIE in 1996 but UMIE in 2014 are: Peru, Kazakhstan, Suriname, Botswana,
Namibia, Fiji, Cuba, and Venezuela. Chile and the Russian Federation became
HIE between 1996 and 2014.5 There are of course many factors influencing
these gradual economic developments, but it seems likely that the contribu-
tion of mining and minerals is one important factor.
When comparing the mining contribution to national economies between
1996 and 2014 at the global level, we see a broadly similar picture. There are,
however, regions and specific countries that have climbed up the rankings
very significantly. West Africa, for example, is a region that has nowmoved to
the top of the MCI-W rankings.
Individual countries which have climbed most in the MCI-W rankings are
in following order: Lao PDR, Eritrea, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Sudan,
Mozambique, Serbia, Togo, Mali, and DRC. Lao PDR and Eritrea did not
have any industrial-scale mining in 1996, so when mining started they went
from almost zero to a point today where mining is contributing considerably
to their economies. African mining countries in particular have gained an
increase in MCI-W score. Among the sixteen countries whose MCI-W score
increased more than 25 per cent between 1996 and 2014, no fewer than
thirteen are in Africa.
In summary, mining quite clearly increased its contribution to economic
activity in the low- andmiddle-income countries between 1996 and 2014. The
increase in contribution is higher in LIE than in MIE. Mining’s share of GDP
tripled during these years for these two categories of country. The share was
3.1 per cent in 2014, compared with 1.1 per cent in 1996. Mineral exports’
share of total exports in those countries increased by 50 per cent in the same
period. Mineral rents followed the general price developments and reached a
5 The Russian Federation is among the UMIE again in 2015.
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peak in 2011, but have declined since, although they were still higher in 2014
than they were in the 1990s. Exploration spending in the countries studied
increased over the period as a whole, but has been declining steeply since
2013. Several LIE and MIE with high MCI-W scores in 1996 have developed
successfully and risen in the World Bank GNI classification from LIE to MIE
and from LMIE to UMIE. The MCI-W index for individual countries has
moved up and down depending on the performance of their mining sector
relative to other sectors of the economy. It is difficult to draw any general
conclusions from this relative index. There is a need to further develop the
contribution index with this in mind.
3.5 The Impact of the End of the Super-cycle
Over the first decade of the new millennium, the global mining industry
moved from a long period of low prices, unacceptable levels of return, and
limited investments to a boom with record high metal prices, improved
profitability, and a flurry of new projects. The main driving force behind this
change back in 2003–4 was strong demand for metals and minerals, especially
from China. This spurred high levels of investment into the extractive indus-
try in order to increase supply to meet growing demand. Since 2011–12 metal
prices have dropped, but, excluding nickel, not to pre-boom price levels.
Among the most important metals, gold stands out in that its price has not
fallen as precipitously as those of the other minerals, and indeed has already
started to move upwards again.
As shown in Figure 3.5, gold is the single most important metal for the LIE
and MIE with the highest MCI-W rankings. Forty-five per cent of their total
mine value is from goldmining, and it is the main contributor in nine of these
twenty individual countries. In seventeen countries in the MCI-W top fifty
ranking, gold mining contributed more than 50 per cent of the total value of
all mineral production. In Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Nicaragua, and Sudan, gold
contributed 100 per cent of total value. Among all the LIE and MIE together,
there are a total of thirty-one nations where gold mining is the main con-
tributor. When small-scale/artisanal gold mining is also considered (such
production is not always fully accounted for in the national statistics used),
the importance of gold production and the significance of the relative stability
of the gold price are even greater. This is also valid for a number of LIE such as
Sudan, Burundi, and Cameroon, where small-scale/artisanal gold production
is considerable.
One conclusion is that LIE and MIE dependent on gold mining have not
been affected as severely by the end of the super-cycle as countries producing
certain other metals, such as nickel and iron ore. An example is visualized in
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Figure 3.7. The figure shows a circle for each year between 2000 and 2014 for
Burkina Faso’s position on the x-axis (mineral export as a percentage of total
exports) and y-axis (production value as a percentage of GDP). The line joins
these together in chronological order. Other circles in Figure 3.7 represent
other countries and their position in 2014. The size of the circles represents
the magnitude of mining. In 2000 Burkina Faso had limited mining, the
production value as a percentage of GDP was close to zero, and exports were
just a few per cent. By 2014 production value as a percentage of GDP
was around 6 per cent, and exports as a percentage of total exports were 50
per cent. Gold output in Burkina Faso was fairly constant between 2011 and
2014 at around 30–35 tonnes, while the gold price decreased 24 per cent
between 2012 and 2014. However, the levels of mine value as a percentage
of GDP and mineral exports were roughly the same in 2012 as in 2014. The
example confirms that the impact of the end of the super-cycle has been
smaller for Burkina Faso and other LIE and MIE where gold mining is
important.
To sum up, the end of the super-cycle has hit countries in different ways,
depending on the composition of their mineral production and many other
factors. Gold mining countries are experiencing slower but still continuing
growth. The level of export dependency and mining’s share of GDP reached a
maximum at the peak of the mining boom in 2011, when the GDP contribu-
tion reached as high as 25 per cent for some countries and export dependency
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Figure 3.7. Burkina Faso, development in export and production values, 2000–14
Note: Circles are proportional to value of mine production.
Source: authors’ calculations.
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by 2014, but the situation for most countries was still a significantly larger
contribution of/dependency on mining than in 1996. For some countries,
production value as a percentage of GDP andmineral exports was even higher
in 2014 after the price peak in 2011, because of a strong growth in production:
this is the case for DRC, Sierra Leone, and Eritrea. Countries with a higher
share of mineral exports in 2014 compared with 2011 are Burkina Faso, Mali,
Guyana, Ghana, Namibia, Mauritania, Guinea, and Botswana.
3.6 Future Implications of Extractives Dependency
Metal and mineral prices are at present low relative to the peaks of 2011, but
still well above the low levels of the early 2000s. Exploration expenditure is
also low, and investments into new mines are also at a relatively low level. At
the same time, it is clear that demand for metals and minerals in general has
not dropped as much as prices have. There are clear indications that the price
trough is generated more by an oversupply situation than by a fall in demand
(see e.g. Worstall 2015). With the gradual improvement in standards of living,
increased life expectancy, and continuing urbanization, which constitute the
three major long-term drivers of metal andmineral use, it seems as if there will
be a continuing, slow, and gradual increase in metal demand (McKinsey
Global Institute 2013). Increased recycling and alternative energy sources
might change this situation in the long-term future, but will not affect mid-
term scenarios. One of the major reasons for the 2003–11 super-cycle was the
slow response of the mining industry to increased demand. It takes a min-
imum of three to five years to increase mine capacity, and this time lag is
increasing all the time due to the increasing advantages of scale economies,
i.e. bigger mines with larger investments and longer and more difficult per-
mitting processes. In short there are no signs of the lag time decreasing—
rather the opposite. In principle, the global mining industry faces a similar
situation during the next few years as it did in the early 2000s: slowly increas-
ing demand, but some hesitancy about investing, and hence a low elasticity in
mine production in response to demand. There is today less indication of such
a strong growth in demand as was seen in the early 2000s. Nevertheless, metal
prices might shoot up when supply gets short. The situation might also be
exacerbated by the fact that investments into exploration have dropped dra-
matically in the recent past, and this might be a factor slowing the opening of
new mines when new capacity is needed.
In the second half of 2016 (the time of writing) there are some indications
that the bottom of the present cycle has been reached. However, the question
remains as to how long prices will remain at their present relatively low levels.
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The possibility of a steeper upturn than expected is not completely unrealistic
(see e.g. Keen 2016). Given the long lead times for a mining project to get into
production, it is important for mineral-rich countries not to focus too much
on present metal prices, but to maintain a long-term approach to their
national mineral resources.
As noted earlier, of the twenty LIE and MIE economies with the highest
MCI-W scores in 1996, no fewer than sixteen have climbed one step on the
Word Bank economic development classification. At the other end of
the MCI-W rankings, when we compare the World Bank classification of the
bottom twenty LIE and MIE in 1996 and 2014, there are only nine countries
that have moved up one step. There are certainly many reasons why countries
have not developed in this period, and naturally not only because of a lack of
mining activity. Nevertheless, a statistical conclusion from this chapter is that
mining can and has triggered development in several countries. When the
analysis is expanded to include how the Gini coefficient has developed in the
mineral-rich countries, it further seems as if inequalities have decreased. In
this sample of the twenty LIE andMIE with the highest MCI-W scores in 1996,
the Gini coefficient has remained constant or decreased, i.e. inequalities have
diminished in fourteen countries and increased in six countries. Further, in
one of the countries exhibiting a higher Gini coefficient in 2014, the increase
was marginal.6
3.7 Conclusions
‘Contribution’ or ‘dependency’: even the choice of words to describe the
relationship between national economies and the extractive sector poses
a fundamental choice between good and bad. The traditional perspective
in many historically resource-rich countries—such as our own country,
Sweden—has been to view mineral resources as fountains from which wealth
flows and development grows. To express it poetically, ‘Through Swedish
history sounds a mighty ringing of iron and copper from medieval times
until today’ (Furuskog 1935: 65)—clearly an analysis of the contribution of
minerals to Swedish development.
From the 1990s until just a few years ago, however, the dependency approach
was the dominant norm. The resource curse paradigm was the starting point
for critical analyses in a host of works onmining during the past twenty years.
6 The Gini coefficient is not updated every year for all countries by the World Bank or UNU-
WIDER World Income Inequality Database. In cases where the years 1996 and 2014 were not
available, the closest year was selected.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Mining’s Contribution to Low- and Middle-income Economies
67
During the super-cycle of high metal prices and high oil prices, this a priori
negative starting point was sometimes abandoned. There was an increasingly
important view based on the hypothesis that the problem might not be the
minerals as such, but rather the way the economic results they created were
handled. McKinsey Global Institute’s (2013) report entitled ‘Reverse the
Curse’ is but one example of this recent turnaround in thinking. Another
example is the discussion about mining’s potential role as a catalyst for the
diversification of national economies (Bastida 2014), the World Bank report
on ‘The Contribution of the Mining Sector to Socioeconomic and Human
Development’ (McMahon and Moreira 2014), and the study ‘Local Industrial
Shocks, Female Empowerment and Infant Health: Evidence from Africa’s Gold
Mining Industry’ (Tolonen 2014).
This chapter provides backing for this reversal and reorientation by present-
ing a thorough statistical analysis of almost all countries in the world, includ-
ing in particular all metal- and industrial mineral-producing countries. We
therefore prefer the word ‘contribution’, as we cannot imagine a world with-
out metals and minerals, and hence mineral resources need not be viewed as a
curse if managed carefully.
3.7.1 Contribution of Mining Industries in Low- and
Middle-income Countries
Among the fifty countries with the highest MCI-W scores, thirty-four are
middle-income countries, twelve low-income countries, and only four high-
income countries. Clearly mining plays a particularly important role in many
low- andmiddle-income countries. Among the top twenty countries, DRC has
the highest score, followed by Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Zambia, Peru,
and Guyana among the middle-income countries, and by Burkina Faso and
Mali among the low-income countries (rankings eight and nine). The high-
income countries Chile and Australia are ranked two and three respectively,
demonstrating that in high-income countries too, mining can and does
remain an important contributor to the national economy. Among the twenty
highest-ranking countries, Africa dominates with twelve countries. The vision
of minerals as an important part of African economic development is clearly
well founded. There are only three countries each fromAsia and Latin America,
and two from Oceania, in the top twenty.
Of the world’s ten largest mineral producers, in order of production value,
China ranks 45th in MCI-W, Australia ranks at number 3, the United States is
not even in the top fifty, the Russian Federation ranks 30, India ranks 42, South
Africa ranks 11, Indonesia ranks 31, Brazil ranks 29, Chile ranks 2, and Canada
ranks 27. This confirms that a high absolute value of mine production does not
automatically translate into an important contribution to GDP and exports.
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3.7.2 Change in Contribution over the Past Twenty Years
Among the twenty low- and middle-income countries with the highest MCI-W
score in 1996, no fewer than thirteen have climbed up one step on the GNI
development classification to the lower-middle-, upper-middle- or high-income
category. There are of course many factors contributing to this development,
but it seems likely that mining and minerals are one important factor. Geo-
graphically, Africa has benefitted most, and in particular West Africa—a region
of growing mineral importance—is the prime example of this. Among the
sixteen countries where the MCI-W score increased by more than 25 per cent
between 1996 and 2014, no fewer than thirteen are in Africa.
The value of mineral production measured as a percentage of GDP grew
from 1.1 per cent in 1996 to 3.1 per cent in 2014: on average, a growth of
200 per cent. In 1996 mineral exports as a percentage of total exports of the
LIE and MIE taken together were 12.1 per cent. By 2014 that figure had
increased to 17.4 per cent. Furthermore, the figures for both GDP and export
share of minerals and mining are considerably higher on average for LIE than
for MIE. The levels of GDP and export contribution in 2014 were still at a
higher level than in 1996, in spite of the drop in metal prices since the end of
the super-cycle.
It has not been possible to include employment in the mineral sector as one
of the contributing factors to our mining contribution index, because of a lack
of data. Nevertheless, the countries for which statistics are available clearly
demonstrate that employment is a stabilizing factor, as it does not vary as
rapidly as the other factors studied. Further, employment levels in general
increased over the period 1996–2014.
3.7.3 Impact of the End of the Super-cycle
The contribution of minerals and mining to GDP and exports reached a
maximum at the peak of the mining boom in 2011. Naturally, the figures
for mining’s contribution had declined for most countries by 2014, but
importantly the levels were still considerably higher than in 1996.
The results of this survey do not support the widespread view that mineral
resources create a difficult dependency which might not be conducive to
economic and social development—rather the opposite. Certainly, the indi-
cators on which we base our chapter only shed light on some aspects of
economic and social development. But we think we have enough substance
to claim that if additional low- and middle-income countries could locate
additional mineral resources, their chances of economic development would
be better than they are at present, when only limited mineral resources
are known.
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The Role of Oil and Gas in the Economic
Development of the Global Economy
Paul Stevens
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the role of oil and gas in the economic
development of the global economy. Its focus is very much on the context
in which established and newer developing-country oil and gas producers
must frame their policies in order to optimize the benefits of producing such
resources. It begins by outlining a brief history of the issue over the last twenty-
five years. It considers oil and gas as factor inputs, their role in global trade, the
role of oil prices in the macroeconomy and the impact of the geopolitics of oil
and gas over the same period. The chapter then considers various conventional
views of the future of oil and gas in the primary energy mix, trying to explain
why there is such a tendency to consensus in the different forecasts. Finally, it
seeks to challenge the various drivers behind these conventional views of the
futurewith an emphasis onwhy theymay prove to be very different fromwhat
is expected and how this may change the context in which producers must
frame their policy responses. The principal purpose is to explain recent devel-
opments in energy, particularly those that have led to lower oil prices since
2014, and to argue that lower prices may well be the norm going forward. For
low- and middle-income countries that were anticipating significant revenues
from oil and gas when expected prices were much higher, this will require a
number of adjustments. In particular, they will have to lower their spending
levels and seek to raise alternative sources of revenue. They must also make
plans to manage the macroeconomic consequences of lower revenues. Above
all they must give (even more) serious consideration to policies to try and
diversify their economies away from dependence on hydrocarbon revenues
and away from expectations of dependence.
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4.1.1 Recent History
This section considers some of the background context for established and
newer developing-country producers, leading to a picture which can then be
developed as they face a more uncertain future in terms of energy prices.
4.1.1.1 AS A FACTOR INPUT
Ever since the Industrial Revolution, energy has always been a key factor
of production (Landes 1969). Recent history has proved no exception. The
pattern of primary commercial energy consumption1 since 1965 is presented
in Figure 4.1.
Since the start of this century, what is clear is that energy consumption
outside of the OECD has grown very strongly while in the OECD it effectively
peaked in 2004. As explained in Appendix 1 (Stevens, 2016a), this is because
of the lagged relationship between prices and energy consumption following
the oil shocks of the 1970s and represents an important part of the story,
especially when the future is considered in Section 4.4.
As to fuel mix, Figure 4.2 illustrates the patterns since 1965. As can be seen,
oil has dominated the mix in this period as a result of its innate advantages.
Thus, because it is liquid and flows in three-dimensional space it attracts
very large economies of scale.2 It also has much higher energy content than
other fuels.3
The effect of the oil price shocks of the 1970s was to push oil out from the
static sectors (such as power generation), replaced initially by coal and gas.
However, it retained its favouredposition in the transport sector.Until recently,
gas remained a constrained fuel limited by its very high transportation costs.4
Also its use in the power sector was prescribed in the United States and the
European Union by regulation between 1975 and 1990.5 In emerging-market
1 Commercial energy is distinct from traditional energy. Commercial energy can be defined as
energy that moves in corporately controlled markets and involves some level of foreign exchange
input. This includes coal, oil, gas, nuclear, and modern renewables including hydro. This is as
opposed to traditional energy that either moves in small local markets or is non-commercial and
involves no foreign exchange input. This includes wood fuel, charcoal, animal and vegetable
residues (Stevens and Pearson 1984). Because of the lack of accurate statistics, traditional energy
is not included in the data, although in many parts of the developing world, those fuels constitute
the majority of primary energy consumption.
2 The capital cost of a storage tank is a function of surface area and its output a function of
capacity. There exists an exponential relationship between the two. Doubling the dimensions of a
tank halves the average cost of storage. ‘Tanks’ in various shapes and forms (pipelines, oil tankers,
refineries, etc.) dominate the oil industry.
3 A tonne of oil contains 1.5 timesmore energy than a tonne of hard coal and a cubicmetre of oil
contains vastly more energy than a cubic metre of gas.
4 Because of its low energy content, gas is a high-volume low-value commodity which severely
limits its effective geographic market.
5 Gas was seen as a premium fuel and the view was taken it should be preserved for premium
markets. It was viewed as too valuable to burn in power stations.
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economies, its domestic development by the (foreign) companies that had
discovered the gas was also constrained in the face of non-convertible curren-
cies. Thus the gas could only earn revenue that the foreign company could not
remit back to its shareholders.
However, despite the growing use of commercial energy, the world faced
very considerable fuel poverty. Many remain without access to electricity and
to modern cooking fuels. It is interesting to observe that the Millennium
Development Goals did not relate at all to energy. However, the more recent
Sustainable Development Goals explicitly refer to energy.6 As will be dis-
cussed, this will carry important implications for the future of oil and gas in
the development process not least because the price of solar electricity is
falling far more rapidly than many expected.
4.1.1.2 IN GLOBAL TRADE
Oil and gas aremajor internationally traded commodities. Because of economies
of scale, transporting oil and oil products is extremely easy and extremely cheap.































































Figure 4.1. World primary energy consumption by region, 1965–2016
Source: author’s illustration; unless otherwise stated, all the data in this chapter are taken from
BP (2016).
6 The seventh development goal is to ensure ‘access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and
modern energy for all’ (UN 2015).
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commoditywith a unifiedmarketwhile gas remains traded in regionalmarkets.7
Gas suffers from what has become known as ‘the tyranny of distance’. Thus a
much smaller proportion of gas consumption is traded internationally. For
many countries their oil and gas trade makes a significant contribution (both
positive and negative) to the current account in the balance of payments. In
particular, a number of oil exporters are highly dependent upon oil exports for
their foreign exchange.
4.1.1.3 PRICES AND THE MACRO ECONOMY
Ever since the oil price shocks of the 1970s, attention has been paid to the
relationship between oil prices and global GDP growth. Casual observation
suggests that the changes in oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s did affect
economic growth in the OECD. There are good economic grounds to expect
this negative relationship. Higher oil prices shifted income from the OECD































































Figure 4.2. World primary energy consumption by fuel, 1965–2016
Source: author’s illustration; unless otherwise stated, all the data in this chapter are taken from
BP (2016).
7 See Stevens (2016a: Appendix 2).
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consume compared to the OPEC countries, which in this period lacked the
institutional capacity to spend fully their windfall revenues. A large propor-
tion of this windfall was simply left in Western banks. Thus global aggregate
demand fell, generating economic recession.8
The higher prices seen from 2004 to 2014 in all natural resources have
brought the issue of ‘resource curse’ back into the policy debate (Stevens
et al. 2015).9 Linked to the debate on resource curse has also been a revived
interest in economic diversification in those countries highly dependent upon
oil and gas revenues. The key point here is that oil revenue is not income.
Rather, it simply represents the re-shuffling of the nation’s portfolio of assets.
Figure 4.310 typifies the production profile of an oil producer.
In the initial stages, production provides financial resources, which should be
used to promote economic development. Production then reaches a plateau.11
In this transition phase, it is crucial that the financial resources released by
producing the oil are used to create an alternative income-producing




































Figure 4.3. Depletion and development
Source: Author’s illustration redone from Mitchell and Stevens (2008). Figure reproduced with
the permission of Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
8 This is a very simplistic explanation. There were many other factors in play and the precise
relationship between oil price and global GDP has been much debated in the economics literature.
9 This is discussed in great detail in Chapter 5 of this book.
10 The author is grateful to Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, for
permission to reproduce the figure entitled ‘Example: Turning points in the hydrocarbon balance
of Nigeria’ from the Chatham House Report published in 2008, Ending Dependence: Hard Choices for
Oil-Exporting States by John V. Mitchell and Paul Stevens.
11 The idea that production would somehow peak, rather than reach a plateau, is totally
unrealistic. The infrastructure to produce the oil is expensive and the economics only work if it
is at full capacity. Therefore, the idea that infrastructure would be built to accommodate a short-
lived peak is not viable. Thus, the production profile would be a plateau.
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because of a lack of demand. For export earnings, this process is accelerated as
domestic consumption rises. In this stage—‘dependence unsustainable’ in
Figure 4.3—it is no longer feasible to rely on oil revenues to support the rest of
the economy. Therefore, oil-dominated economies should aim, from the very
early stage of production, to diversify away from dependence on oil revenues.
The success or otherwise of this strategy can be measured by the non-
hydrocarbon fiscal deficit.12
4.1.1.4 GEOPOLITICS AND THEIR ECONOMIC IMPACT
Geopolitics and oil are inextricably linked. There are two oil markets—the
wet barrel market where real barrels of crude oil are bought and sold, and the
paper barrel market where promises (written on paper) to deliver or take
delivery of oil are exchanged. To understand the wet barrel needs ‘Economics
101’. To understand the paper barrel market needs ‘Psychology 101’. The
relationship between the two markets is complex and controversial but
comes down to issues of perception. Those negotiating contracts in the wet
barrel market will look to the paper barrel market to give an indication of what
prices might be. Those in the paper barrel market deciding where to invest will
look to the wet barrel market for signs of surplus or shortage.
There are two problems here that aggravate oil price volatility. First, many of
those playing in the paper markets do not really understand the oil industry
and frequently misread the state of the wet barrel market, often assuming
shortages when there are none. While this may sound improbable, a similar
situation exists in foreign exchange markets, known as ‘scapegoat theory’
(Bacchetta and Van Wincoop 2004). Thus, economists trying to predict
exchange rates using the usual economic metrics will often get it wrong
because those setting the rate—that is, the traders—look at a totally different
set of metrics. The second source of price volatility is that perceptions can
change in the blink of an eye and with them so can prices!
In this context, it is easy to see the relevance of geopolitics in terms of recent
price history. Any loss of oil supplies as a result of geopolitical events, such as a
war, has affected physical supply in the wet barrel market. Wars and rumours
of war have also affected expectations in the paper barrel market. Politics have
clearly affected government policy (Stevens et al. 2013). Security-of-supply
concerns drive the energy policies of energy-importing nations, which in
turn will impact energy consumption levels and the energy mix. Equally,
security-of-demand concerns drive the depletion policies of producer govern-
ments and the rise (or fall) of resourcenationalism. This century there has been a
12 This measures the extent to which a fiscal deficit in the non-oil sector can be funded by the oil
revenues. A similar measure for foreign exchange is the non-hydrocarbon current account deficit.
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significant rise in resourcenationalism that has coincidedwith the upturnof the
commodity super-cycle.
4.2 Current Conventional Views of the Future for Oil and Gas
As indicated at the start of the chapter, the future of energy markets will frame
the need for the established and newer developing-country producers to
develop their own policies against a background of highly uncertain energy
prices. Thus it is important to begin by considering what the conventional
views of this future suggest as the most likely path. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 give a
flavour of some of the views of future energy demand from a variety of sources.
The first point to note is that there is a fairly strong consensus on the
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Figure 4.4. Increases in energy consumption by region, 2010–35 (billion toe)
Note: IEA NPS is the International Energy Agency’s New Policies Scenario; EIA is the United States
Energy Administration’s Energy Outlook 2014. BP is BP’s Energy Outlook 2014; IEA CPS is the
International Energy Agency’s Current Policies Scenario.
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Figure 4.5. Increases in energy consumption by fuel, 2010–35 (billion toe)
Source: author’s illustration; data from BP Energy Outlook 2014.
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thought likely to occur in the non-OECD countries and fossil fuels are thought
likely to continue to dominate supply.
It is interesting to speculate why there is such consensus. One explanation is
that the forecasters have models (quantitative and qualitative) based upon
similar drivers. How much certainty there is over these drivers will be dis-
cussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. There are, however, other more controversial
explanations. First there is safety in consensus. Thus, if your forecast is wrong,
so is everyone else’s forecast. Second, there is also a real problem of forecasting
discontinuities. Forecasting trends based upon business as usual is fairly
straightforward. Forecasting bends in trends can also be done with some
imaginative thinking. However, forecasting major discontinuities is next to
impossible. Even a brief acquaintance with the history of energymarkets since
the 1970s shows it has been littered with major discontinuities driven
by economics, technology, and pure accident. There were the three oil price
shocks of 1973, 1979, and 1986. There have been various accidents ranging
from Three Mile Island to Chernobyl to Fukushima for nuclear and the
Macondo spill for oil. There has been the shale technology revolution that
has had such a dramatic impact on oil supplies. The list could go on.
Finally, there is the problem of political and vested interests behind the
mutually supporting consensus of most forecasts. The IEA, for example, was
created to persuade oil-importing OECD countries to reduce dependence on
imported oil.13 Projecting shortages in the future might be seen as a good
method to encourage consumer governments to take steps to reduce depend-
ence. Equally, the oil companies have a vested interest in persuading their
shareholders that oil demandwill continue to increase and that better times in
the market lie just ahead (Stevens 2016b).
Such consensus views of a business-as-usual future are in danger of giving
false expectations to oil and gas producers. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 consider why
these conventional views of the future might be wrong, thereby forcing the
established and newer developing-country producers to consider carefully
their future policy options. Section 4.3 looks at economic and technological
concerns and Section 4.4 considers geopolitical threats to such futures.
4.3 Drivers of Future Trends: What Economic and Technical
Factors Might Derail Conventional Views of the Future?
As implied in Section 4.2, the consensus associated with forecasts of energy
supply and demand in part arises because the forecasters tend to take similar
13 It is worth remembering that the IEA was created in 1974 as Henry Kissinger’s response to the
perceived growing power of OPEC.
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views of the drivers behind the forecasts. However, as suggested, the history of
energy markets has been characterized by frequent deviations of the drivers
from the expected path. This section considers what factors might cause
the future drivers underlying the forecasts to be different from today’s
expectations.
4.3.1 Technology
Invention and innovation are embedded in the forecasts.14 There are three
particular areas where change could impact how the future unfolds: carbon
capture and storage (CCS); the development of batteries; and the spread of
shale technology.
CCS is a well-established technology. However, the costs and problems with
its adoption are considerable. First capturing the carbon adds significantly to
the cost of power generation. Also there are serious problems in capturing
from small-scale emitters. Storage faces many problems, not least ensuring
that once the carbon is stored there are no leakages. For example, a major
problem in the United States is that property rights to the sub-soil make it
unclear where responsibility would lie for maintaining the storage once the
CO2 has been injected. Solving these problems wouldmean that the very large
reserves of hydrocarbons could be burnt without aggravating climate change.
Improvement in battery technology would greatly assist in the key problem
with renewables: namely that of intermittency. Technological developments
could make batteries smaller, easier to charge, and cheaper. A good example of
possible change relates to electric vehicles. A large stock of electric vehicles
could provide considerable storage. Modern metering technology means that
electric vehicles could supply power to the grid and be paid for it.15 Further-
more, if roads could be built with induction strips, electric vehicles could
charge or discharge while travelling.16
Offering a ‘longitude prize’ might be one way to generate changes to the
technology for CCS and batteries. At the start of the eighteenth century, the
great scientific question of the age was how to determine where you were
at sea. Latitude could be measured by assessing the angle of the sun but
14 The difference between invention and innovation is that invention has strong elements of
being a random process. Innovation, which is the spread of an invention, on the other hand has
clear socio-economic and political drivers. That said, the distinction is not always so clear-cut.
15 For example, in Western Europe the average daily car journey is less than 20 kilometres.
Assuming a battery capacity of 100 kilometres (which is currently a conservative estimate), that
leaves considerable flexibility to use the car battery as storage.
16 It is worth pointing out that most of the conventional energy forecasts referred to in
Section 4.2, in this author’s opinion, are extremely conservative on the penetration of electric
vehicles into the car park.
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estimating longitude required an accurate timepiece to determine the time at
the port of origin. In 1714, the British government offered a very significant
prize for whoever came up with such a clock. It was eventually awarded in
1793 (Sobel 2011). The COP21 meeting in Paris in December 2015 actually
created the institutions that could well make a similar prize feasible in the two
areas of CCS and batteries. Thus there was the Mission Innovation group of
twenty governments, which was a global initiative to accelerate clean-energy
innovation, and the Breakthrough Energy Coalition, whichwas a global group
of twenty-eight high-net-worth investors from ten countries committed to the
initiatives of Mission Innovation.
The shale technology revolution has the capability to transform the prospects
for oil and gas supply. In the United States it has led already to a dramatic
increase in oil supply and an equally impressive increase in domestic supply of
gas.17 The revolution consisted of the development of horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing.18 A key question is how far this technology can be
used outside of the United States to produce similarly dramatic increases in
supply. Certainly, there are ample technically recoverable resources of shale
hydrocarbons globally. However, there are many barriers to converting these
resources into producing capacity. Table 4.1 outlines the conditions present
in the United States that effectively led to the shale technology revolution.
By contrast, it also shows that these conditions are for the most part not
present in the United Kingdom and a similar story is true for most other
parts of the world.
Of course, the shale technology is constantly changing and improving.
Many of the characteristics that are not currently present outside of the United
States could be made available as a result of improved technology and insti-
tutional changes.19 For example, a major barrier to using hydraulic fracturing
in Europe is concern over the impact on water supplies and the danger of
contamination of aquifers. Currently, experiments are underway to use sonic
waves rather than water and chemicals to frack the rocks and if successful this
alternative technology might allay these fears.
Changes in any of these and other technologies could obviously seriously
impact the consensus views of the future embodied in the forecast described
in Section 4.2.
17 Thus between 2008 and 2015 oil production increased from 6.8m b/d to 12.7m b/d and gas
production between 2005 to 2015 increased from 511bcm to 767bcm (BP 2016).
18 There were other technical aspects of the revolution such as the development of three- and
four-dimensional seismic modelling and coil tube drilling.
19 The recent collapse in oil prices after June 2014 has generated large cost savings and improved
efficiency in the US industry.
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Table 4.1. Factors creating the shale gas revolution in the United States
United States United Kingdom
Geology
Large shallow, material plays, implying large technically recoverable
resources. Also much of the shale had low clay content, making it easier
to fracture.
Reported to have a higher
clay content
After many years of oil and gas drilling, there were plenty of drill core
data publicly available to allow explorers to find the ‘sweet spots’ on
the plays.
No
The shale gas had a high liquids content, which greatly enhanced the
economics of the operations, especially at a time when gas prices
were low.
Not known at this stage
Research
In 1982 the US government began extensive funding of R&D by the Gas
Technology Institute into low permeability hydrocarbon-bearing
formations. The results were widely disseminated to the industry.
No
Regulation
The 2005 Energy Act explicitly excluded hydraulic fracturing from the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Water Act, the so-called
Cheney–Halliburton Loophole. Many shale gas operations were done
with little environmental impact assessments.
Strong environmental
legislation
The 1980 Energy Act gave tax credits amounting to 50 cents per million
BTUs. It also introduced the Intangible Drilling Cost Expensing Rule,
which covered (typically) more than 70% of the well development costs,
crucial for small firms with a limited cash flow. These economic incentives
were very important in the early stages of the industry, based upon small,




Property rights in the United States make the shale gas the property of
the landowner, creating a strong financial incentive for private owners to
permit the disruptions associated with shale operations. Also, the
population is used to being in proximity to oil and gas operations.
No
The system is used to licensing large areas for exploration with fairly
vague work programme commitments, which is what is needed when
dealing with shale plays.
No
The nature of the gas market
Pipeline access is based upon ‘common carriage’, so gas producers have
at least some access to pipelines, transforming the economics of shale
gas production. The United States also has a very large and extensive
gas pipeline grid.
No
Access is by Third Party
Access.
The United States is a ‘commodity supply gas market’, i.e. it has a lot
of buyers and sellers and good price transparency. Gas is easy to sell.
Not as easy as the United
States
The US domestic gas market experienced strong rising prices in the
period after 2002, culminating in a price over US$10 per thousand cubic
feet (mcf) in May 2008.
No
Industry
The industry was dominated by small, entrepreneurial companies, the
so-called momma and poppa companies.
No
The majority of the work was done by a dynamic, highly competitive
service industry. At the height of the Barnet Play in 2008, 199 rigs were
operating.
No
The capital markets are more willing to provide risk finance for oil and gas
activities.
No
Source: based on Stevens (2013b).
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4.3.2 Incomes
Another driver of future energy demand is income. The GDP growth figures
underlying the energy demand growth in the forecasts are fairly consistent
and generally quite conservative.
It is perfectly possible to imagine a GDP outcome that is very different.
Three discontinuities loom large. The first would be another global financial
crisis along the lines that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
The second could be a dramatic implosion of the Chinese economy as the
political system collapses, faced with serious internal conflict as the economy
stagnates and political reform fails to keep pace with economic liberalization.
The third might involve ‘Trumpian Uncertainty’. This refers to the fact that
President Trump, to put it kindly, is extremely unpredictable. It is not clear
when a ‘tweet’ is just a ‘tweet’ or when it is policy. It is perfectly plausible to
argue his economic policies of ‘America First’ potentially could destroy the
basis of globalization, creating trade wars that could plunge the world into
economic recession.
Less traumatic but equally impacting on energy demand growth is the
relationship between GDP growth and energy demand. In the OECD, rising
GDPhadbeen associatedwithdeclining total primary energy demand: in other
words, improving energy efficiency. However, in the non-OECD rapidly rising
GDP has also been accompanied by rapidly rising energy demand. All
the forecasts have views of future potential for improved energy efficiency
and this is a further factor that could disturb any historical relationship
between energy demands and incomes. Greater efficiency will also be driven
by improvements in technology relating to energy consumption.20 The scope
for improving energy efficiency is huge. One only has to compare Japanese
energy consumption to other countries to imagine the scope for improvement.
4.3.3 Energy Pricing
Domestic prices are the result of the combined influences of international
prices and domestic energy pricing policy. In the forecasts, generally only the
international crude oil price is forecast. Forecasting crude oil prices has always
been notoriously difficult (Huntington 1994). However, in any case, both for
demand and supply, this price is misleading. For demand forecasts, crude
prices are misleading because what matters are the final prices paid by the
20 A good example here would be improvements inmetering of electricity that allows consumers
to see precisely what each appliance costs to run. A basic assumption in economics is that the
quantity demanded is a function of price. However, most consumers have little or no idea of what it
costs per hour to run even basic appliances. If that information were to become widely available, it
could have a very significant impact on consumer behaviour.
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consumer. This requires a view of what sales and other taxes will be imposed
by the relevant government on product prices. Taxing oil products is a tax
collector’s dream. It involves a very large tax base since oil products are
involved in all sections of the economy. In the short term demand is very
price inelastic, which means high tax rates can be imposed without having
much impact on the quantity sold. Finally, collecting the tax is extremely low
cost. For many years many OECD governments have taken advantage of all
these factors and as a result have imposed very high levels of sales and other
taxes to raise revenue. Over the last few years, many other governments have
also come to realize this potential source of revenue. One consequence has
been that when the crude oil price collapsed after June 2014, many govern-
ments took the opportunity to use sales taxes to capture the revenue released
by the lower price. At the same time, countries where oil products were
subsidized took the opportunity also to reduce the level of subsidies. The
result is that oil product prices to the final consumer are now and in future
likely to be much higher than those assumed in many of the forecasts.
For supply forecasts as well, the crude price can also be misleading. For
producers what matters is the price received after the fiscal system has taken
its share of the economic rent. Thus lower prices can be offset by an easing of
the fiscal terms.
There is another supply-side complication that appears to be neglected by
most forecasters. A consequence of the collapse of oil prices since June 2014
has been a reduction in investment in upstream activities. The international
oil companies, faced with a reduction in their cash flows, have been respon-
sible for this (Stevens 2016b). On 14 January 2016, The Financial Times
reported that Wood Mackenzie had estimated that private oil companies
have shelved US$400 billions worth of upstream projects. This involved
sixty-eight significant projects accounting for 27 billion barrels of reserves.
This was equivalent to the reserves of Norway, Brazil, and Oman combined.
A similar story of reduced investment has been true for the national oil
companies that account for the bulk of global crude oil supply. This is simply
because their governments are desperate to secure increased revenues to buy
off political discontent amongst their populations of the sort seen in the
Arab Uprisings which began in Tunisia at the start of 2011. In effect, the
national oil companies (NOC) are being increasingly starved of funds. Upstream
oil is a business where it is necessary to run in order to stand still. Thus, all fields
have a natural depletion rate. Globally this averages around 5–7 per cent per
annum. Thus, lower investment in upstream producing capacity now gives
rise to the possibility in the future that, if oil demand continues to increase, as
all the forecasts imply, the oil market could face a sudden supply shortage
leading to possible price spikes within five to ten years. Even without
actual physical shortages, paper barrel markets traditionally get rather nervous
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when spare capacity falls, which means they could impose a fear premium
on oil prices.
Obviously, the future of crude prices does matter and could well disrupt the
consensus forecast discussed in Section 4.2. Since OPEC took a decision not to
cut production in November 2014, the price in effect has been launched onto
a competitive market for the first time since 1928. The result has been a
collapse in price. This in turn was the result of serious oversupply leading to
a record increase in oil inventories. A key question concerns the level of ceiling
and floor prices. The floor price is the short-run marginal cost (the variable
cost) of the highest-cost producer. Leaving aside Canadian oil sands that are
too small to make a difference globally, that floor price is defined by reference
to the costs of US tight oil production. That figure is not known for sure if only
because the technology has constantly been improving, allowing for cost
reduction as a result of improved efficiency. However, putting it around
US$25–30 per barrel is not unreasonable. The ceiling price currently is set by
the ‘fracklog’. This refers to the large number of wells in the United States that
have been drilled but not completed. They were drilled because the terms of
their leases required drilling but they were not fracked because prices were too
low. Since the end of May 2016, oil prices have shown signs of recovery.
If prices begin to rise, at some level probably between US$50 and US$60,
these wells will be completed and new supply will quickly enter the market,
relieving any signs of shortage.
All this suggests that absent any major geopolitical event, oil prices will
remain below US$60–$70 for a number of years.
4.3.4 Climate Change Policies
Another area where the consensus energy forecasts may be misguided lies
in the aftermath of COP21.21 The Paris Agreement created a legally binding
framework coming into force in 2020, once fifty-five countries accounting
for over 55 per cent of global emissions have acceded to it. The agreement
includes the long-term goal of holding ‘the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’,
and of achieving ‘a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century’. In
pursuit of this goal, parties are obliged to submit ‘intended nationally deter-
mined contributions’ (INDCs) setting out their pledges for climate action and
to review them every five years.22
21 This section relies heavily on Stevens (2016b).
22 Now referred to as ‘nationally determined contributions’ (NDCs).
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Current estimates are that the collective impact of the NDCs covering 146
countries, submitted as of 1 October 2015, would have a 50 per cent probabil-
ity of limiting the global forecast temperature rise to 2.7°C by 2100, with a
range of 2.2°C to 3.4°C (subsequent submissions would take the total number
of NDCs to 160, covering 187 countries). They would slow global emissions
growth by approximately one-third for 2010–30 compared to 1990–2010. To
increase the likelihood of maintaining global warming below 2°C over the
twenty-first century (with CO2-equivalent concentrations in the atmosphere
in 2100 of about 450 parts-per-million or less) would require a global reduc-
tion of 40 to 70 per cent of greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050, which would
require much deeper emissions cuts than most countries are planning. To
address the gap between current action and what is necessary to stay below
2°C, a ‘facilitative dialogue’will be held in 2018 to give parties the opportunity
to confirm or update their NDCs when the agreement becomes effective in
2020. The first formal review will then begin in 2023, leading to new NDCs.
It is entirely understandable that the implications of this new and major
global agenda for the energy forecasts described in Section 4.2 are far from
clear. Much will depend upon how far the NDCs will compete with each
other. This will affect total energy consumption but, above all, it will deter-
mine the likely future energy mix. Currently the debate about unburnable
carbon is well underway (McGlade and Ekins 2015; Stevens 2016b), but its
outcome is uncertain. Pending the conclusion of this debate, the implications
of this for future energy consumption remain uncertain.
4.4 Drivers of Future Trends: How Geopolitics May
Derail the Conventional Views of the Future
This chapter has so far reviewed the extremely challenging global economic
context in which policy decisions by the established and newer developing-
country oil and gas producers need to be made. Later chapters of the book
examine various components of those policy choices in greater detail. This
present chapter is a clear reminder of the inherent economic challenges of
engaging with the global oil and gas markets. However, those challenges
do not end with the various economic and technological arguments
outlined above. In addition, all oil and gas producers need to frame their
decisions in the light of a volatile and changing global political economy.
Hence this chapter ends with an assessment of some of the main features
of the current geopolitics of oil and gas, especially in the Middle East. Obvi-
ously, there is a long list of possible events that could derail the forecasts in
terms of their impact on supply and expectations. However, two areas of
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uncertainty dominate. These are the impact of the current lower prices and
the parlous state of the Middle East.
Figure 4.6 illustrates estimates of the budgetary break-even prices for oil for
the OPEC members in the summer of 2014: that is, shortly before the start of
the oil price collapse.23 The weighted average for OPECwas US$102 per barrel.
Given the much lower prices experienced since the end of 2014, many coun-
tries face serious budgetary constraints. Some countries had accumulated
financial cushions; largely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, and Qatar. However,
for the rest there was little protection, which means the governments are now
struggling to find the revenues necessary to buy off the sort of domestic
political dissent that triggered the Arab Uprisings from the start of 2011.
Many producers face serious political challenges that in some cases, such as
Venezuela andNigeria, threaten the very existence of the state. This could easily
affect their future ability to supply global markets. Such geopolitical disruptions
in turn could well frighten the paper barrel markets and lead to higher prices. In
this context, a key question is how far Saudi Arabia, as the dominant global
producer, will be willing to maintain spare crude oil producing capacity.
As Figure 4.7 illustrates, the level of spare capacity to produce crude oil has
been a crucial part of the oil market story and goes a long way to explain the
historical pattern of prices. When spare capacity gets close to zero, the market
becomes very vulnerable to price spikes. Since the summer of 1985, a central
pillar of Saudi Arabia’s oil policy has been to maintain spare capacity (of the
order of 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day) in order to calm markets in the event





















































Figure 4.6. OPEC median budgetary break-even price, 2014
Source: author’s illustration based on data in Apicorp Economic Commentary (2014).
23 The budgetary break-even price is the oil price that would provide sufficient revenue to
balance the national budget given expenditure plans and other sources of revenue.
24 As can be seen from Figure 4.7, when the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait caused a loss of almost
6m b/d as a result of UN-imposed sanctions, the increase in price was very much muted as a result
of Saudi Arabia’s ability to replace the lost crude from its own spare capacity.
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changed its approach, moving away from administering and controlling the
market to a policy geared to maintaining market share and leaving price to
find its equilibrium level in a competitive market. This to force the supply
curve to go the right way for the first time since 1928: the low-cost producers
supplying first, and increasingly higher-cost producers supplying the
residual.25 As 2016 developed, the Saudi policy reverted back to trying to
defend price by trying to get agreement within OPEC and with some non-
OPEC producers to restrict production. It remains to be seen how successful
this policy may be. However, as already discussed, the shale technology
revolution has significantly increased the price elasticity of supply of crude
oil. Thus, any tendency to see increased crude prices is likely to produce a rapid
supply response to choke off further increases. Oil prices are therefore likely to
be lower for longer than many expect.26
The second dominant geopolitical issue that could impact the energy fore-
casts concerns the state of the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).
For reasons too complex to explain in this short chapter, the MENA region is






















































































Figure 4.7. OPEC spare capacity and oil prices, 1971–2014
Note: Excess capacity refers to capacity that can be produce very quickly.
Source: author’s illustration; data from oil price BP (2015). Excess capacity is author’s estimate.
25 It was in 1928 that the major oil companies met at Achnacarry Castle in Scotland and
formulated the ‘As-Is’ Agreement, which began the process of administering oil markets and
controlling prices. This control of the market stayed in place until the 1970s when OPEC took
over the control of the market (Stevens 2013a).
26 It is important to note that prices since 2014 cannot be regarded as historically low. Between
1986 and 2004 the average price of Brent was US$33 per barrel in real terms.
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and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire—to find a period of similar uncer-
tainty in that region compared to today.
One dimension of this uncertainty concerns the deterioration of relations
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran, coming out of a sanctions regime follow-
ing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement on its nuclear
programme in 2015, is now determined to restore its crude exports to pre-
sanctions levels and beyond. This directly conflicts with Saudi Arabia’s deter-
mination post 2014 not to cede market share. It was this determination that
caused Saudi Arabia to cease its swing role and begin instead to protect its own
market share. This in turn was linked to a general perception of ‘Shi’a encircle-
ment’ within the kingdom in 2015 with President Assad in Syria appearing to
secure his position, Iran developing a détente with the United States, and the
growing Houthi involvement in Yemen. This sense of threat, real or otherwise,
encouraged the new regime of King Salman, fronted by his son Mohammad,
to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy. It remains to be seen whether Saudi
Arabia’s reversion to a policy of controlled supply in 2016 will change this
situation.
This Saudi–Iranian rivalry could be dangerous politically for the MENA
region. Iran is already deeply frustrated by what it sees (with some justifica-
tion) as President Trump trying to renege on the JCPOA nuclear deal. Thus,
there are threats of heavy fines imposed by the US Office of Foreign Assets
Control on banks operating in the United States (which covers virtually all
major banks, American or otherwise) and continued sanctions for dealing
with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). This is especially signifi-
cant since the IRGC could be covertly involved in almost any Iranian business
operation. As of August 2017, it appears that President Trump intends to take
an increasingly hard line against Iran. If as a result Iran’s frustration is not
assuaged, might it jump before it is pushed and abrogate the JCPOA nuclear
deal? Given Iran’s ability to cause significant mischief in the region, this could
well prove dangerous and could well be another factor de-railing many of the
energy forecasts that have determined the current consensus view on the
future of oil and gas markets.
4.5 Conclusions
The future of oil and gas markets looks very different from the experiences of
the last fifteen years—many oil and gas producers, especially in the developing
world, thus need to adjust their expectations and adapt their policy options.
Expectations of great wealth at the top of the commodity super-cycle are
no longer realistic. There are many reasons to think that oil and gas may
not necessarily be produced at the levels expected by many low- and
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middle-income countries and that, even if production does not disappoint,
the consequent revenues to their governments may well prove illusory. At the
very least this will require them to re-think how tomanage the expectations of
their peoples, which had been inflated to unrealistic levels.
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The Curse of the One-size-fits-all Fix
Re-evaluating What We Know about Extractives
and Economic Development
Glada Lahn and Paul Stevens
5.1 Introduction
The year 2015marked a notable deterioration in the fortunes of most new and
prospective producers of oil, gas, and minerals. Many economies that had
been enjoying 7+ per cent annual growth over the previous decade suffered
shocks. Under the oil price decline, Ghana hit debt levels of above 70 per cent
of GDP; Liberia (where oil has not yet been discovered) dismissed 80 per cent
of the staff of its nascent national oil company in an effort to rein in profligate
spending; the fall in the price of copper caused Zambia’s currency to depreci-
ate by 80 per cent; and Mongolia’s debts jumped tenfold in just six years. By
2016, countries hoping for a development boost from their natural resources
were having to readjust their expectations. Meanwhile, more experienced
exporters, starved of foreign currency, set in motion a combination of spend-
ing cutbacks and foreign currency restrictions, which had by 2018 led to a
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. In many resource-exporting or resource-
expecting countries, the signs of unsustainable spending patterns were evident
well before the price crash and accusations of mismanagement of wealth,
lost opportunities, and wasted resources will dominate their politics for years
to come.1
1 This chapter draws on an earlier Chatham House publication entitled The Resource Curse
Revisited, and the authors would like to thank everyone who assisted with that study. We would
also like to thank Alan Roe for his expert comments and suggestions, and Joseph Laredo for his
editing.
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The impacts of the debt and austerity measures, meanwhile, will influence
the stories we tell about extractives commodities and economic growth.
In the heady days of a rising oil price and seemingly unstoppable growth
in raw materials demand from China post 2003, positive stories about
the prospects for basing economic growth on extractives were easy to tell.
Three decades of economic literature drawing attention to a ‘curse of natural
resources’ became less fashionable in political debates. An industry in how to
turn a curse into a blessing in terms of governance advice and consultancy
bloomed. However, in reality, the learnings of the past half century and this
advice industry seem not to have enabled many exporting countries to avoid
the economic ills associated with the resource curse. So perhaps it is time to
revisit whatmight have beenmissed and also what is new in the current global
context for extractives and development.
In this context, this chapter revisits the historical evolution of thinking
about the interaction between extractives production and export and eco-
nomic performance.2 In particular, it revisits the large body of analysis
known as ‘resource curse’ literature, which seeks to identify a link between
resource wealth and poor economic performance. It considers how some of
this, particularly the identification of bad decision-making and weak institu-
tions as transmission mechanisms, fed into a political fashion for ‘extractives-
led growth’ that has reigned politically for the last thirteen years or so. The
chapter questions this newer agenda, which proposes ‘good governance’ as
the magic formula for turning resource wealth into a blessing. Given that it
has not succeeded in savingmost resource exporters from some of the resource
curse effects—in some cases, economic calamity—where did it go wrong? The
chapter identifies three aspects that it contends have been marginalized
in recent debates: the very different resource bases and country contexts;
the problems posed by too rapid a pace of development; and the influences
that resource discovery and development have on the political economy—
influences that militate against the effectiveness or even implementation of
the recommended ‘good governance’ practices.
There is merit in returning to the resource curse literature to look at the
problem afresh. But instead of asking the familiar question of why extractive
resources have caused poor performance, it might be more fruitful to ask
why they have not helped the rest of the economy to grow. If, as much of
the resource literature contends, dependence on rents is the problem, then
economic diversification should be the aim. For states dependent on petro-
dollars, achieving diversification is currently more urgent than ever.
Hirschman’s (1977) work on linkages between the extractives sector and the
2 This literature survey is based upon Stevens (2015). In the interest of brevity, there are several
references back to the original survey, which can be found online.
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rest of the economy can shed light on the complexity of managing this feat,
especially when there is pressure to develop the resources as fast as possible.
The chapter does not reject the idea that extractives-led growth is possible, but
argues that this possibility must be seen within a transition strategy based on
‘worst case’ depletion timelines and commodity price scenarios. Not all coun-
tries will be equipped to manage the planning for that transition. Looking
ahead, the chapter identifies several aspects in a changing global political and
environmental context as important considerations for transition countries—
and indeed for anyone studying the interactions between extractives and
the economy.
5.2 An Evolution in Thinking about the Use of Extractive
Resources for Economic Growth
Simple logic would suggest that nations presiding over large reserves of a
below-ground resource valuable to foreign markets are economically privil-
eged in comparison with less well-endowed territories. Since at least the 1940s,
various arguments in economic development theory have supported this
assumption. For example, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) argued that countries
must experience a ‘big push’ in public investment to break out of a self-
feeding circle of poverty. The revenue provided by resource extraction can
enable this by providing windfall income to finance large-scale capital
spending—and, more specifically, allow spending on foreign goods, services,
and investment through the generation of foreign exchange. The Harrod–
Domar growth model, which dominated economic thinking in the 1960s,
supported this idea. The sector should become a ‘leading development sector’
or ‘growth pole’, whose success encourages growth in other sectors as wealth
and benefits trickle down. Furthermore, historical evidence from industrial-
ized economies such as the United Kingdom tends to reinforce the belief that
countries should focus on their comparative advantage over others. That view
underpins the economic argument that a focus on producing primary prod-
ucts should promote growth (see Stevens 2015: 3).
However, there is an even longer-standing observation that abundance (not
necessarily in minerals) leads to decadence and negative economic conse-
quences. This goes back at least as far as the fourteenth century, when the
Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun identified the fifth stage in the evolution of
the ‘state’ as one of waste and squandering (Ibn Khaldun 1967 [1377]). And in
the seventeenth century, Spain’s wealth acquired from the New World
appeared to trigger the decline of that country’s fortunes, not to forget, of
course, the fate of societies in the lands that had been plundered. In the
last century, the oil price shocks of the 1970s led to greater scrutiny of the
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impacts of extractives exploitation and export growth on national economies
(Stevens 2015: 5).
Economists studying development in the 1950s and 1960s had already
begun to express concern over countries at an early stage of economic devel-
opment that depended on the export of primary products. Singer (1950) and
Prebisch (1964) argued that such countries would find themselves at a disad-
vantage in trading with industrialized countries because of deteriorating terms
of trade. Others reinforced the argument of the negative consequences of
producing and exporting raw materials by emphasizing the limited economic
linkages generated from primary sectors compared with manufacturing
(Stevens 2015: 5).
The observation of declining economic fortunes in countries with an appar-
ent comparative advantage in extractives gave rise to the thesis of a curse of
natural resources (Auty 1993) or that of the ‘paradox of plenty’ (Karl 1997).
A large body of work seeking to establish a negative statistical correlation
between abundance of natural resources and GDP performance emerged,
beginning in the late 1980s. The evidence at first appeared to support the
theory of a negative link; several OPEC countrieswere shown to have declining
GNP per capita over time compared with non-oil-producing countries of simi-
lar initial GNP and appeared also to suffer a decline in agriculture and other
sectors predating hydrocarbons development. Auty (1994: 22), for example,
points out that in Mexico ‘by 1982 virtually the entire non-oil economy
became non-tradable, that is, in need of total protection or subsidies’.
The Netherlands offers one of the most famous cases of negative impacts on
a national economy resulting from hydrocarbons expansion. Here economists
drew links between an upsurge in gas export revenue in the 1970s and the
declining competitiveness of Dutch manufacturing. As a result of spending
natural resource revenues, the economy overheated and the real exchange
rate appreciated, thus making national manufactured products far more
expensive for other countries to buy. The result was a contraction in the
non-oil/gas/mineral-traded sector (Stevens 2015: 14–15).
Over time, however, economists refined their analysis of the mechanisms
that turn an apparent blessing into a curse. These mechanisms can be roughly
put into two groups. The first relates to the impacts of economic dependence
on a primary sector with volatile market prices: long-term decline in the terms
of trade, revenue volatility, Dutch disease, crowding-out effects. The second
relates to how resource wealth is governed: the increased role of the state, and
socio-economic and political impacts (Stevens 2015: 12–27). Naturally, these
are not mutually exclusive; in theory, the former could be ameliorated with
better policy and spending decisions. The latter largely draw attention to why
this does not happen, showing that the presence of resources shapes certain
socio-political conditions, which in turn reinforce negative economic impacts.
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Interest in the effects of extractives growth on the political economy grew
from the 1990s onwards. This literature most frequently examined how the
phenomenon of large flows of revenues from a single source (requiring little
labour relative to the revenues generated) that generally accrue to government
(as owner of the resource) affects power relations, institution-building, and
government decision-making. This literature tends to conclude that the spe-
cial features of extractives-sector development are likely to encourage poor
governance and thus poor spending decisions and little fiscal prudence
(Stevens 2015: 18).
There are several variations on this theme, national dependence on ‘rent’
that accrues to a small group of government–business elites being a dominant
theme. This is alleged to discourage institution-building and encourage ‘rent-
seeking’ (positioning by groups or individuals to elicit transfers of the resource
wealth) rather than entrepreneurship and productivity in the economy.
A strand of the literature examines the ‘rentier state’ and its tendency to
crowd out productive private-sector activity and to cement legitimacy through
allocation of resources rather than through democratic competition (see
Stevens 2015: 20). Auty (2010) attributesmany of the ills noted by the resource
curse literature not to resources per se but to the dependence on rent, which
can also come from other sources (e.g. aid, canal tolls, security rents).
Closely linked to rentier theories is the notion that disproportionate fiscal
dependence on petro-dollars in particular affects the capacity of the govern-
ment to make decisions (e.g. Karl 1997). Having more money to spend tends
to weaken prudence and ‘due diligence’. Of notable importance is the ten-
dency of governments not to prioritize investments that enable long-term
income generation. This can lead to unrestrained spending on ‘prestige pro-
jects’ using expensive foreign expertise and materials (Stevens 2015: 19). In
turn, the lack of need for tax revenues from diverse sources may weaken the
prospects for democracy and the development of institutions that provide
checks and balances on, for example, government power and spending.
Developing this theme, a branch of the literature considers industrial pol-
icy, examining how centralized wealth or ‘rent’ flows can lead to top-heavy
government, prone tomarket control or intervention. A key ‘distorting’ aspect
is the impetus for government to subsidize chosen sectors and key commod-
ities. In the case of domestically produced energy resources, for example, there
is a tendency to provide them cheaply to stimulate supposedly job-creating
industries and to prop up the agricultural sector. In the 1970s and 1980s,
many resource export-dependent governments adopted an industrial policy
based on ‘import substitution’. This invariably had two components: (a) the
introduction of subsidies and growing protectionism in the form of import
controls and (b) favourable taxation of the protected activities. Instead of
nurturing industry until it was competitive without subsidy, this approach
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tended to lead to ever increasing dependence on government support, putting
an additional drain on government finances as well as creating powerful
lobbies that would resist moves to reform policy (Stevens 2015: 21–2).
Many of the dynamics described above are interlinked and can be seen as
self-reinforcing. Dirigiste wealth allocation, state capital spending, and rising
subsidies in place of policies to enhance productivity, industrial strategy, and
institution-building increase a country’s dependence on resource income,
thus making it more difficult to manage price volatility. They can also lead
to a spiral of indebtedness as countries are forced to borrow, not least to
maintain political stability, which may be tenuous if government legitimacy
is largely based on the distribution of resource wealth.
In this respect, international finance institutions (IFIs) and aid-giving bodies
are not necessarily considered neutral parties, and several studies draw atten-
tion to their role in worsening resource curse effects (Extractive Industries
Review 2003; Hilson and Maconachie 2008; Shaxson 2007).
The resource curse debate peaked in the mid-1990s as analysts looked back
at a period of some twenty years of falling commodity prices, and criticisms of
the theory began to emerge in the early to mid-2000s as the international
prices of oil and other commodities again began to rise. Critiques included
claims of selective bias associated with previous studies (choosing only
resource-rich countries whose prospects for developing other areas of the
economy were poor), a time frame too short to detect real economic impact
(the volatile 1970–90 period in particular), and the inadequacy of the tech-
nical approaches used for measuring economic progress and the links to
extractives (see Stevens 2015: 7–8).
Of course, adherents to resource curse theory as summarized earlier usually
note that this ‘is not an iron law, rather it is a strong recurrent tendency’ (Auty
1994: 12). In this regard, and in response to criticism of the IFIs, interest grew
from the early 2000s in those countries that had proved to be exceptions in
avoiding, or apparently ‘overcoming’, the curse and how they had done so.
Academics and IFI analysts, for example, often cite the cases of Botswana,
Chile, and Malaysia as resource development successes. Norway, Australia,
and Canada, as well as the United States and the United Kingdom, could also
be seen as having avoided the curse. Sowhy did these countries fare better than
otherswith similar resources? The literature tends to cite as themain reason the
strength and quality of their institutions prior to resource development.
The political economy focus that began in the 1990s blossomed into a
vibrant debate about governance in extractives-producing countries in the
2000s. Poor governance and institutions became the leading explanations
for poor economic outcomes. And this thinking led to the conclusion that
good institutions may be able to prevent negative outcomes from resource
wealth because they can constrain the predatory behaviour of those who hold
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political power. Thus, they are amechanismwith which to sever the otherwise
negative link between natural resource abundance and poor outcomes
(Stevens 2015: 26).
The growth of these ideas was accompanied by the rise of commodity
prices—particularly oil from around 2003. Resource exporters’ GDP soared.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members in particular stood out as a
sharp retort to those advocating resource curse theories. Here were six
petroleum-exporting states that remained highly dependent on their extrac-
tives sectors yet could not be judged to be worse off economically than they
would have been if they had not developed their resources.3 As the price of
commodities rose, extractives companies made new commercial discoveries in
low-income countries and foreign investment flowed in (Stevens et al. 2015).
The new questions on the table were: if some countries had done well on the
back of resource development, then what was the magic policy formula? And
(how) could this be prescribed and transferred successfully to others in the
early stages of resource development?
5.3 The Extractives-led Growth Agenda Emerges
These questions, in addition to the desire ofmany interested parties—including
aid-giving countries, multilateral financiers, and extractives companies—for
a positive development story, paved the way for what we call the extractives-
led growth agenda.4 This is built on a consensus between an influential set of
international actors around the idea that, if managed properly, extractive
industries can help to drive broad-based socio-economic development in
developing countries with extractive resources (see, for example, Africa
Progress Panel 2013: 6).
A 2013 McKinsey Global Institute report captures the optimism of com-
modities prices at their height:
If resource-driven countries, particularly those with low average incomes, use their
resources sectors as a platform for broader economic development, this could
transform their prospects. We estimate that they could lift almost half the world’s
poor out of poverty. (Dobbs et al. 2013)
3 These are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
4 A diverse set of actors promote this narrative—including donors like the World Bank, the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), the development agencies of major donor countries including
the United Kingdom, Norway, and the United States, (mainly Western) extractives companies,
consultancies such as McKinsey and Tony Blair Associates, Adam Smith International, and civil
society organizations including the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and the Africa
Progress Panel.
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Although the extractives-led growth agenda did draw on academic critiques of
the inevitability of resource curse effects, it was arguably more of a policy
fashion than a movement based on theory. It was partly born out of a surge of
investment in extractives in more challenging regions amid the high (and
rising) commodity prices of the 2000s, coupled with an increase in Asian
investment strategies focused on foreign resources. From a Western develop-
ment agency and IFI perspective, the feeling was that countries benefitting
from these benign circumstances would develop resources with or without
their assistance. Hence their best bet to remain relevant would be to promote
better practices. As the Millennium Development Goals and their only partial
achievement made clear, the problem of poverty had not gone away and a
booming market for commodities appeared to offer a golden opportunity for
some countries to address this problem, as well as to ‘graduate from aid’.
In developing countrieswith resources, technocratic and civil society propon-
ents of greater accountability and the improved handling of resource revenues
saw global governance initiatives as an opportunity for much-needed reforms.
Leaders in countries with a poor governance record were looking for a way to
improve their image internationally and earn assistance (including aid and debt
cancellation). And companies were naturally eager to promote their advantages
in good governance over new competitors and to avoid penalties in an environ-
ment of increasing anti-corruption legislation in their own countries.
The remedy or preventative for resource curse effects prescribed across the
board was good governance, institution-building, and best practices in various
dimensions of managing the resource. Prescriptions generally involved opti-
mum contractual terms, revenue transparency, institution-building, use of
stabilization funds, and local (skills and market) capacity-building to service,
and benefit from, the sector. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), launched in 2003, and the Natural Resource Charter have been particu-
larly successful in signing up both new and more established producers
including Azerbaijan, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and
Timor Leste to processes of governance improvement. Many international
extractives companies have also signed up to or added their support to these
and other voluntary initiatives. Alongside this, several detailed advisory for-
ums and source materials have been developed to guide producers, including
the World Bank-funded Extractive Industries Source Book, the Canadian-led
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable
Development, and the NRGI.
5.3.1 Has the Remedy Worked?
In the past fifteen years, a wealth of global expertise has contributed to
building a body of advice on better resource-sector management. However,
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the record of the new or economically troubled producers at whom much of
the advice of the last decade and a half has been aimed, is mixed.
Critiques of the new approaches range from their enabling corrupt govern-
ments to gain international legitimacyby cynically joining voluntary governance
initiatives (David-Barrett and Okamura 2016; Keblusek 2010) to the problem of
advocating ‘best practice’ standards to countries with little capacity to imple-
ment them.5 The World Bank/Exxon-led Chad–Cameroon pipeline agree-
ment, billed as ‘a pioneering effort . . . to demonstrate that large-scale crude
oil projects, when designed to ensure transparency and effective environ-
mental and social mitigation [sic], can significantly improve prospects for
sustainable long-term development’ (IFC 2003), is a clear example of how
such initiatives can fail (World Bank 2008).6
The more globally applied EITI has come in for particular criticism for
promising more than it can deliver (Darby 2010; Hilson and Maconachie
2008; Keblusek 2010), and a growing body of analysis is now beginning to
look back and assess the impact of the EITI in countries that have adopted
it (Alstine 2014; Mejía Acosta 2013; Sovacool et al. 2016). Sovacool et al.
(2016: 185) find that ‘there was not a single governance [or] economic devel-
opment metric in which EITI countries performed better during EITI candi-
dacy or EITI compliance than pre-EITI as well as better than other country
classes.’ Furthermore, on most of the standard governance metrics (the excep-
tions being ‘voice and accountability’, ‘rule of law’, and GDP—the last of
which can be more readily attributed to the rising oil price during this
phase), most member countries registered declines during the candidacy
period. This phenomenon is also described by Sovacool and Andrews (2015),
who posit that governments may have little incentive to continue improve-
ments once candidacy has been achieved.
The strong belief at the outset of the last commodities boom was that the
‘lessons learned’ from the oil boom–bust cycles of the 1970s and 1980s,
combined with improved fiscal policy to tame resource rent spending,
would usher in an era of more even budgeting, thus avoiding the pitfalls of
the past. Yet, in a sample of forty-eight countries dependent on exports of oil,
gas, and metals,7 Bova et al. (2016: 17) found that ‘adoption of fiscal rules or
resource funds [does] not have a significant impact on fiscal cyclicality’. In
other words, countries tended to dramatically increase government spending
5 For example, is it appropriate for a relatively poor country to focus on establishing separate
institutions and capacities for the sector in policymaking, regulation, and operations—as Norway
does—when it has neither a sufficient number of qualified staff nor enough accumulated
knowledge about the sector or the geology? See, for example, Marcel (2013).
6 Rarely can such a high technical assistance effort to ensure the effective management of oil
resources have been derailed so quickly and comprehensively.
7 Countries where these commodities represent 20 per cent ormore of total exports or 15 per cent
or more of fiscal revenues for most of the 1970–2013 period.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Curse of the One-size-fits-all Fix
101
during the 2003–13 boom in spite of putting in place the prescribed measures
to prevent this. Ghana, as discussed elsewhere in this series, is a striking
example.
Studies on the effectiveness of stabilization funds tend to agree that they
‘must be part of a broader package of institutional reforms designed to
improve the country’s capacity for resource revenue management’ (Dixon
and Monk 2011: 5) and that their usefulness depends on the quality of public
financial management systems (IMF 2007). As the examples of Chad, Nigeria,
Iran, and Cameroon demonstrate, where these are lacking, the original aims
and rules of the funds are simply not followed (Collier and Venables 2011:
11–17). Even the existence of well-managed funds does not preclude unsus-
tainable fiscal policies or the use of fund resources as collateral for reckless
borrowing (e.g. Kazakhstan in the 2000s) (Stevens and Mitchell 2008:
Appendix 1). As might be expected, Bova et al. (2016) find that fiscal measures
were effective only where there were also strong political institutions, as in the
typically cited success cases: Botswana, Chile, and Norway.
5.4 What Are the Extractives-led Development
Narrative’s Flaws?
5.4.1 There Is a Tendency to Prescribe a One-size-fits-all Solution
Political history, power relations, geography and geology, demographic struc-
tures, culture, economic structure, and level of education all influence how
extractives will affect a country’s development. And the countries that became
the focus of attention on extractives-led growth are vastly different.
Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, Hilson and Maconachie (2008) divide
countries into three groups, drawing attention to inherent political or legal-
economic features that subvert attempts at good governance. First, there
are the ‘petro-economies’ Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea,
whose dictatorial policy environments, it is argued, will simply negate the
good intentions of voluntary governance regimes. Second, there are the ‘loo-
table’ economies (Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Madagascar, and DRC), which
contain ‘lucrative pockets’ of extractives wealth, including diamonds and
gemstones. These countries have been subject to frequent violent conflict,
the groups having control over these resources being firmly entrenched in the
power structure. Third, there are ‘conventional mineral producers’ such as
Ghana, Guinea, Zambia, and Tanzania, where unfavourablemining codes and
contracts are argued to have been a greater cause of economic woes than poor
governance.
Norway, often highlighted as the success story par excellence of extractives-
led growth, had a developed democratic system of governance and a relatively
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small population at the outset of its discoveries. These discoveries were also all
offshore, and therefore less disruptive to local societies.
The rhetoric around extractives-led growth has tended to group even such
diverse countries together, considering them all to be ‘resource rich’. But this
makes little sense. The fact that two countries are sitting on the same volume
of minerals does not mean that both are ‘rich’, as their resulting wealth will
depend partly on the cost of extraction and partly on how that wealth is likely
to be shared and how many people will enjoy it. For example, in terms of
production per capita, the United Kingdom is richer in resources than Nigeria
(see Figure 5.1). This may matter in terms of deriving economic and social
dividends from resources. Myers (2005), for example, has argued that when
their production is below a certain number of barrels of oil equivalent per head
per year (b/h/y), non-OECD producing countries tend to underperform on
conventional development indicators in comparison with their neighbours.
In this diverse context, policies that contributed to success in Norway or
Botswana will not necessarily work in other countries. One glaring problem
is that countries and companies with longer periods of economic stability,
well-functioning institutions, and experience have evolved high standards of
practice. By contrast, low-income countries have lower institutional capaci-
ties, fewer skilled and experienced professionals, and different developmental
priorities (Marcel 2013). Parachuting the institutions and practices of the
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Figure 5.1. The world’s top 60 per capita oil and gas producers in 2016
Source: author’s illustration based on Myers (2015), based on BP statistical review and World Bank
population data.
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whilst consuming a disproportionate amount of resources and efforts relative
to the rest of the economy.
5.4.2 Political and Psychological Impacts Can Overpower Attempts
at Good Governance
Several scholars draw attention to the complacency that ‘rent’-based growth
may induce in government decision-makers, as well as in society more gener-
ally, and the natural psychological response to seek opportunities to gather
more rent rather than pursue ‘productive’ enterprise. The tendency to use
extractives rents to support other industries, and domestic energy, water,
and food consumption in particular, is commonly identified as a ‘distortion’
that disincentivizes and reduces efficiency and productivity (Stevens et al.
2015: 10).
Achieving institutional good governance in countries with a relatively low
capacity to manage the extractive sector at the outset will be a long, hard slog
right from the very beginning. It will require both sustained political will and
a measure of societal stability. At the same time, while it is known what needs
to be done for extractives-led development to have a positive outcome, the
reality of the political economy that develops around an extractive industry or
other, similar forms of rent-generating activity may make it impossible to
achieve that outcome.
5.4.3 Development Is Too Rapid
There is a strong tendency among countries that discover resources to develop
projects as quickly as possible and aim for rapid depletion of those resources.
Pressure to do so comes from two sources: the host government and the
operating companies. For their part, multilateral financiers and development
agencies are eager to apply their expertise to the extractives-led growth
agenda, which, even if this is not their intention, in terms of practical policy
and economic advice tends to reinforce domestic, government, and investor
pressures to ‘develop fast’ and, as a result, miss out on (the slower gestation)
opportunities to develop linkages appropriate to economic diversification and
management capacity (Stevens et al. 2015: 32–3).
5.5 Considerations for Revising the Advice to Producers
As explained in the literature review, there is economic logic in the argument
that resource revenues can improve a country’s growth prospects, potentially
raising levels of income, savings, and investment. Resource curse studies have
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tended to focus on negative outcomes and to pose the question of how
extractive-sector development has contributed to those outcomes. But a
more useful approach may be to ask why the extractive sector has in many
cases failed to become the leading sector, thereby serving as the engine to
improve opportunities and growth in other parts of the economy. Dissecting
the answers to that question might be a better way for countries with extrac-
tives reserves to understand the requirements and risks they face in develop-
ing their resources. This leads to four interlinked considerations that arguably
should guide policy:
1. Diversification of the economy from the outset of decision-making over
the extractives sector
2. The capacity for the sector to link with and contribute to the rest of the
economy
3. Options for the pace of development of extractives projects
4. Measures of performance that should guide the economy, and the pos-
sible models of development these might favour.
We will now examine each of these considerations in turn.
5.5.1 Diversification as Key
For those countries with large reserves of natural resources per capita,
depletion-led diversification—that is, into energy-intensive industries with
strong linkages to the sector—has proved a beneficial economic pathway
for at least a few countries in past decades (Australia, Canada, GCC states,
Trinidad and Tobago). Those economies remain dependent on the extractives
sector and their trajectory is not sustainable indefinitely, but we can say that
many low-income countries would not mind following in their footsteps in
terms of the living standards that their citizens enjoy. Even this development
model, however, has been challenged by the fall in the oil price. The govern-
ments of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for example, have now adopted economic
diversification as a domestic priority, tightly connected to job provision and
social stability.
For less well-endowed countries (on a per capita basis), crunch points may
occur much earlier, before even basic infrastructure such as power and clean
water has reached the mass of their populations. As the historical problems of
harnessing gas for power in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of South Asia dem-
onstrate, the mere existence of a fuel resource does not mean that it can easily
be exploited for domestic use. A country will need to at least demonstrate
resource potential—and the guarantee of returns that can be remitted to
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shareholders—to gain investor attention and realize the type of large-scale
project that requires, for example, transportation and power infrastructure.
Mitchell and Stevens (2008) and Stevens et al. (2015) have explained the
general depletion profile, whereby a country must have begun to diversify its
revenues by the time production of the commodity in question reaches a
plateau. Failure to do so will likely mean that its spending levels become
unsustainable. Naturally, commodity price volatility will also affect the length
of that transition period. If there is not sufficient growth in other areas of
the economywhen the commodity’s export volumes go into terminal decline,
the country will rapidly fall into deficits—both in its current fiscal account (for
public spending) and in its current external account (foreign exchange for
purchasing foreign goods).
In promoting governance fixes to enable extractives-led growth, far too little
attention has been devoted to whether a country has the characteristics and
capacity to make this transition.
More generally if resource-rich countries decide to develop their natural
resources, they need to consider how to use the sector as a ‘one-off opportun-
ity’ for development, bearing in mind the risks of a volatile market. It is
doubtful that this is a realistic option for new, small-scale producers that
have limited capacity for spending and implementation. A fund to manage
revenues over timewould be a necessary but not a sufficient condition. But the
prospects of such a fund being effective in countries with low capacity to
manage it are poor (Stevens et al. 2015: 21). If a slower, ‘development first’
route is taken, then countries must focus on optimizing economic linkages
with the sector.
5.5.2 Understanding Linkages—and their Limitations
Albert Hirschman’s (1977) idea of linkages from extractive projects to the rest
of the economy offers some indication of why, in many cases, the extractives
sector has failed to lead the rest of the economy upward.
Any extractive project generates linkages to the rest of the economy, which
can be categorized as fiscal, forward, and backward. Fiscal linkages refers to the
revenue generated for the owner of the resource; in most cases outside the
United States, this is the state as represented by the government. Forward
linkages refers to the supply of the sector output to the rest of the economy,
which, in the case of oil and gas projects, implies the supply of oil and natural
gas products; but this definition can be expanded to include the supply of
modern management techniques and managerial capacity to the rest of the
economy. Backward linkages refers to the inputs into the project from the
domestic economy in terms of employment, capital, and material inputs
into the value chain.
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Where new projects are being developed, it is usually hoped that these
linkages will lead to increased productivity and development in other areas.
However, Hirschman’s analysis pointed to the limitations of the linkages of
oil, gas, and mineral projects, which explains why this often does not hap-
pen.8 The ‘enclave’, high-tech nature of extractive projects makes them more
likely to be isolated from the local economy in developing countries lacking
the appropriate skills base.
In many cases, the majority of revenues from exporting the raw material
accrue directly to the government. This means that government entities,
rather than the industry, become by default the critical drivers of economic
growth and development. A government’s ability to spend revenues and
allocate resources effectively then becomes the focus for economic perform-
ance. This ability is affected not only by the level of institutional development
prior to the arrival of extractives production, but also by the strong political
and psychological factors that come into play once (a) public expectations of a
new flow of extractives revenue are raised and (b) a state–business elite has
developed on the basis of rent capture and positions itself to defend the
interests that will arise once that rent begins to flow.
5.5.3 The Pace of Development Matters
In theory, the rapid-development model offers advantages in terms of early
stage cash with which to initiate solutions to immediate and urgent problems
in an economy—such as poverty reduction, debt financing, and energy and
transport infrastructure development. At the same time, it is in harmony with
the idea of a ‘one-off ’ opportunity for development in a volatile market,
especially when there are concerns that the resources may not be worth as
much in the future. There are several pressures that tend to accelerate devel-
opment. These include popular demands to deploy the new revenues for
better standards of living; manoeuvring among elites aiming to capture the
new wealth; and the appetite of foreign companies for economies of scale and
rapid returns on investment.
However, for a country, accelerated development may mean depleting its
reserves faster than is desirable. It also poses several problems, especially for
countries that have limited institutional and regulatory capacity. These
include the inability to develop backward linkages in time to benefit from
potential new investments and opportunities to serve the sector; the lack of
time to introduce regulation of the new sector and to increase capacity
for handling and deploying new revenue flows; and vulnerability to the
8 Hirschman’s original framework pointed to negative impacts on non-resource sectors and
implicitly pointed to potential alternative sources of development.
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boom–bust cycles that are at the heart of resource curse ills (Stevens et al.
2015: 34). The result is that enhanced levels of indebtedness once resource
flows wane are inevitable.
5.5.4 Alternative Measures of Performance and Models
of Development Overlooked
The extractives-led development rhetoric may not only overrate the ability of
poorer countries to rise to the considerable challenges they face. Perhaps more
important, it may also obscure the possible comparative benefits and savings
involved in developing other sectors rather than extractives or developing the
extractives sector at a much slower pace than that advocated instinctively by
industry and investors. That may require a change in the way that companies
and investment opportunities are judged, with less emphasis on short-term
growth and more on sustainable value creation.
GDP growth is a poor indicator of the contribution of the sector to the rest of
the economy. Alternatives to GDP are being pursued by several international
institutions (see, for example, Stiglitz et al. 2009). Which measures countries,
finance institutions, and banks eventually adopt will affect decision-making
regarding extractive resources. As the economist John Talbert (2010) puts it:
Obsession with GDP growth has spurred policies to liquidate natural capital as
quickly as possible . . . correctly valuing changes in our stocks of natural capital and
the ecosystem services that they provide will help advance a science of new
metrics capable of inspiring more sustainable policy choices.
Whist new producers may not have the power to address this broader systemic
market problem, a better calculation of resource value and depletion and domes-
tic environmental costs, factored into the extractives and non-extractives GDP
calculation, would result in a better measure of sustainable diversification. The
key point here is that revenue from extractives is not income but an exchange
of below-ground resource assets for above-ground cash assets. Not only this,
but the process of reshuffling has costs—environmental (variously including
land use change, pollution, water demand increase) and often also social,
especially where extractives activities displace people whilst others migrate to
the area of resource production in search of work. For extraction to be worth-
while on anational basis, its long-termvaluemust exceed these costs. Themost
logical way of achieving this situation is to invest earnings in income-
generating activities or other assets of societal benefit that can replace their
value to the national economy over time.
A new measure of declining dependence on the sector—that is, a measure
of sustainable economic diversification—would be useful here. Tracking the
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non-hydrocarbon fiscal and current account balances over time can indicate
whether a country is moving in the wrong direction (Mitchell and Stevens
2008; Stevens et al. 2015). But reducing non-extractives or non-hydrocarbon
fiscal deficits does not necessarily indicate sustainable diversification, as
non-extractives activities often include industries that are dependent on sub-
sidized extractives input or other government subsidies. Not only can this put
an increasing burden on state finances; it can also impose environmental asset
losses and inhibit the implementation of efficient energy access and the
growth of low-carbon sectors, which most new and prospective producers
also aim at (Lahn and Bradley 2016; Bradley et al. 2018).
5.6 Conclusions
The resource curse literature provides insights that have been partially side-
lined during a period of rising and high commodity prices: a period of height-
ened international interest in increasing oil, gas, and mineral resource flows.
The evolution in thinking about the impacts of extractives on economic and
wider patterns of development reveals the folly of our predilection for a single
cause or reason for particular outcomes and ‘one big solution’ to our problems.
The shortcomings of the newer extractives-led growth agenda underscore
this folly. Country histories, populations, capacities, power dynamics, and
reserves bases, in all their diversity, are a critically under-explored set of factors
that need to be taken into account when prescribing ‘governance’ for the
sector. While good institutions and good governance are undoubtedly the
reason certain countries have been able to benefit from their extractives
endowment, this does not mean that the same policies can be applied to
other countries easily or with the same effects.
This chapter has argued that the governance challenges for new, low-
capacity producers remain immense and that the global context for extraction
calls for expectations to be revised. At the time of writing, the downturn in
commodity prices is proving challenging to exporters, many of whom bene-
fitted financially during the previous decade of high prices. Indebtedness is
likely to frame the next decade for many developing countries that have
become dependent on exports. At the same time, reliance on the sale of
high-carbon fuels is being challenged by the prospective global shift to
lower-carbon technologies and greater energy efficiency. Greater pressures
on the environment are increasing the value of assets that can be damaged
in the process of extractives development, production, and use in industry.
Turning around the resource curse question to ask why, in some cases, the
extractives sector has not become the driving sector for the rest of the
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economy suggests that much greater focus and attention should be given to
the role of the sector over time in a country’s development strategy. In the
light of this, there are four interlinked aspects of extractives-led growth that
require greater attention. These are:
Capacity to diversify: To use its extractives sector to jump-start growth while
allowing enough time for sustainable diversification, a country needs a suffi-
ciently large resource base. Understanding what kind of economic contribu-
tion can be expected from reserves over time, as well as whether there is the
capacity to channel the revenues into spending and investments that promote
self-sustaining growth in other sectors of the economy, will be key to deciding
how sensible an option extractives-led growth will be. Such understanding is
far from simple to acquire, and factors such as global market risks and trends,
including those from increasing carbon constraints and technology shifts,
must be taken into account.
Economic linkages between the new or expanded extractives sector and the rest of the
economy: To achieve these requires in each case a much deeper understanding
of what services, jobs, and business opportunities can realistically be gener-
ated from the extractives operations and for how long. Energy should be part
of this consideration—the policy for allocating and/or pricing fuels for domes-
tic use is a vital dynamic in industrial development, sustainable diversifica-
tion, and fiscal balance.
The pace of development: As suggested above, many low-income producers lack
the capacity to take advantage of rapid depletion-led growth and this will in
the majority of cases result in entrenched vested interests, imprudent spend-
ing patterns, and increased economic inequality. It is time to consider care-
fully paced development plans (in line with growing national capacity to
benefit from the economic opportunities they provide and assuming ‘worst
case’ market scenarios). Key to success will be the institutional arrangements
for managing national decisions to hold back from developing certain reserves
or to develop them at an appropriate pace against the inevitable pressures
from popular, political, and investor (shareholder) interests to ramp up pro-
duction as quickly as possible.
Alternative measures of performance: There is little disagreement that GDP
growth is a poor indicator of development, let alone sustainable develop-
ment. Alternative measures of performance, including the valuation of other
natural assets such as clean air, fresh water, and forests, need to be incorpor-
ated into the study of the impact of extractives on economies. On a practical
level, the right indicators—including the trends in non-hydrocarbon
balances—can incentivize countries to balance their portfolio of economic
interests.
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6
Political Economy and Governance
Evelyn Dietsche
6.1 Introduction
More than ten years ago, the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review (EIR)
marked the beginning of a consensus that ‘governance’ matters for the devel-
opmental outcomes producer countries can achieve from exploiting extract-
ive resources. The independent EIR commission recommended that theWorld
Bank Group and other development finance institutions should refrain from
supporting extractive resources projects unless producer countries had ‘good
governance’ in place.
At the time, it was already well understood that producer countries often
faced macroeconomic challenges and that, to manage these, they could draw
on technical support from the international financial organizations. But there
also was growing awareness that the extractive resources sector presented
serious political-economic challenges: in the presence of windfall resource
rents, self-interested politicians and bureaucrats might be tempted to use
these rents for private gain, thus undermining the positive economic and
social impacts that the sector could otherwise deliver.
This reasoning gave rise to a second consensus, namely that improving
sector governance would mitigate the political-economic challenges. This
consensus has experienced a remarkable elevation over the past decade and
has nurtured the emergence of several international initiatives and dedicated
NGOs diligently working towards improving sector governance.
At the same time, ‘governance’ as a concept has been subject to much
criticism, because it has meant different things to different constituencies
(Fukuyama 2013). Hyden et al. (2004) found that comparative political scien-
tists used the term to identify how different rules affect results. International
relations scholars looked at how processes deliver rules. Scholars of public
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administration focused on steering processes towards desired results. And,
finally, international development agencies hoped that governance could
serve as a tool to deliver positive developmental impacts. For the international
development community, the term has provided a reference point to discuss
all things political. For practitioners, it has served to reflect upon the political
economy of government policies and decision-making and to pinpoint
why technical reforms have often failed to deliver expected developmental
outcomes. At a more philosophical level, the term has contributed to
call attention to the institutional underpinnings of effective economic and
political management.
Against the backdrop of this variety of differentmeanings, it is not too surpris-
ing that ‘governance’ has remained a contested concept. Some argue that things
started to go wrong when proponents sought to operationalize ‘good govern-
ance’ to shape policy reform programmes and apply respective ‘conditionalities’
(Ahrens 2002; Opper 2008; Gisselquist 2012). For example,Mkandawire (2012)
criticized that reform programmes introduced under the banner of good
governance have supported ‘institutional monocropping and monotasking’.
The assumption has been that blueprint and standardized interventions can be
applied to every country context and deliver similar results. Andrews (2013),
who reviewed the mixed outcomes resulting from reforms targeted at improv-
ing the governance of public finances, concluded that the concept has been
poorly conceptualized in relation to the complexity of insights gained from
institutional analyses of the process of institutional change. And, Grindle
(2010) has argued that the popularity of the idea of good governance has
outpaced its capacity to deliver.
Contrasting these criticisms with the global agenda on the good governance
of the extractive resources sector raises the question of whether that agenda
has taken proper account of the concerns raised. This chapter argues that
the proposition that ‘good governance’ somehow matters for positive out-
comes has been derived from institutional analyses suggesting that ‘institu-
tions matter’. But, unfortunately, it is less clear how institutions actually get
changed. The chapter suggests reframing the political economy of extractive
resources from the negative question: ‘How can poor outcomes be prevented?’
to the positive question: ‘How can positive institutional change for better
outcomes be brought about?’ This latter question builds on Lahn and Stevens
(2017), who ask why extractive resources have not helped countries to grow
the rest of their economies.
First, the chapter reviews why it has been found that institutions matter for
the political economy of extractive resources and how this finding has
informed the resources governance agenda. Second, it explores what institu-
tions are and introduces a framework that highlights where substantial gaps
in knowledge remain. It applies this framework to, and assesses the gaps in
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relation to, the extractive resources sector. Finally, it discusses two critical
issues in the political economy of extractive resources.
6.2 The Political Economy of Extractive Resources
and Institutions
The debate on extractive resources and the developmental impacts of their
exploitation rests on the consensus that ‘governance matters’. This consensus
has developed on the back of the need to explain why many producer coun-
tries have experienced negative outcomes, but also why some countries have
experienced better outcomes.
6.2.1 Explaining Negative Outcomes
Research on the political economy of extractive resources dates back to the
mid-1990s.1 Originally, this research drew its inspiration from the desire to
explain why many countries reliant on producing such resources had experi-
enced negative economic, political, and social outcomes. A seminal paper by
Sachs and Warner (1995) was critical in drawing attention to the question of
why resource-abundant countries had not achieved better economic out-
comes. These outcomes contradicted the mainstream policy advice of the
1980s that countries could improve their economic situations if they encour-
aged investment in the resources sector. Initially, confidence had been placed
in the ability of technocrats in central banks and finance ministries to
manage the macroeconomic risks harboured by economic dependence on
the resources sectors—if necessary with help from international financial
institutions. However, the observation that many countries had not achieved
positive outcomes prompted the search for explanations as to why this was
the case.
First, researchers reconfirmed that resource-rich countries had indeed suf-
fered from worse economic performance: the proxies for measuring ‘resource
dependence’ that they had deployed in cross-country statistical analyses could
‘explain’ variance in economic performance between resource-rich and other
countries.
Then, to make sense of this finding, researchers drew on microeconomic
analyses to explain the politics of extractive resources. Assuming that politi-
cians and bureaucrats were rational individualsmaximizing their self-interests,
they conjectured that there could be good reasons why the governments of
1 There are several literature reviews on this research and these are cited in the longer working
paper version of this chapter; see Dietsche (2017).
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resource-rich countries were unwilling, or unable, to adopt policies that would
counter the macroeconomic risks and maximize the development impacts
associated with the resources sectors. They concluded that unproductive
rent-seeking behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats caused the poor out-
comes. Formal models and regression analysis were used to test more specific
hypotheses: for example, why politicians in resource-rich countries tend to
over-extract (Robinson et al. 2006), why these countries have ended up with
worse political regimes (Jenson and Wantchekon 2004), and whether the
presence of a resources sector could be associated with negative social out-
comes, such as conflicts and civil wars (Humphreys 2005).
The challenge was that researchers were left with a mixed picture. First,
critics pointed out that the quantitative studies on which these findings were
based faced some methodological problems, including that results were very
sensitive to the proxies used for measuring resource sector dependence
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011). Second, funda-
mental concerns had been raised about the suitability of the proxies used
(Andrews 2013; Arndt and Oman 2006; Van de Walle 2005). And third,
some countries had performed better than others, which suggested that the
inevitability of negative outcomes could at least be questioned.
6.2.2 Explaining Variance in Outcomes
The mixed picture suggested that the causal mechanisms responsible for
the negative outcomes were not straightforward and that scholars had strug-
gled to penetrate the complexity of causes and effects. In addition, apparent
improvements in national-level indicators were sometimes not matched by
commensurate improvements in outcomes at the sub-national level, or vice
versa apparent improvements at the sub-national level were not reflected in
national-level indicators.
6.2.2.1 STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS
The proposition that poor outcomes were the result of unproductive rent-
seeking behaviour by politicians and bureaucrats who had been left unfettered
was soon countered by a second school of thought, taking a closer look at the
political-economic power dynamics between different socio-political constitu-
encies and how these affect outcomes. Its proponents suggested that structural
characteristics and the political-economic power relationships that these
might evoke were conditioning the decisions of politicians, bureaucrats, and
other agents. Thus, rather than relying on a priori assumptions about individ-
uals, proponents of structural explanations saw decision-makers embedded in
socio-economic and socio-political relationships that, for better or for worse,
influenced their behaviour.
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The disadvantage for the proponents of microeconomic explanations for
bad outcomes over this structural perspective was that the former could hardly
appeal to politicians and bureaucrats to change their assumed rational behav-
iour in order to prevent negative aggregate outcomes. Meanwhile, the struc-
tural perspective allowed its proponents to delve deeper into the broader
social science research on the role of institutions in economic development.
This research had been brought into the development discourse from themid-
1990s, drawing on various strands of institutional analysis that had emerged
from around the 1980s to explain differences in the economic, political, and
social trajectories of modern market economies.2 These analyses indicated
that positive institutional change does not result from technocratic reforms,
but is contingent on dynamic political-economic processes that unfold
around the structural characteristics associated with resources.
6.2.2.2 STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
First among the structural factors identified as likely to affect the political
economy of resources are the physical characteristics of different types of
resources and the socio-political structures they give rise to. To show this,
several authors have drawn on the distinction between point source and diffuse
natural resources, arguing that point source resources are more likely to nur-
ture socio-political structures that support exclusive coalitions of elites hold-
ing onto power, which they use to limit non-elites’ access to economic
opportunities (Auty and Gelb 2001; Isham et al. 2005; Woolcock et al. 2001):
 Characteristic of point source resources are capital intensity and concen-
trated ownership, typically associated with large- and medium-scale oil,
gas, and mining projects. Where land rights support large-scale plant-
ations and agro-industrial enterprises producing bulk commodities, such
as palm oil, soya beans, sugar cane, corn, or industrial wood, these can
also be considered point source resources.
 Diffuse natural resources require more moderate capital inputs; economic
opportunities are more widely disbursed, capital requirements are less
intensive, and ownership is less concentrated. Diffuse resources typically
include medium-sized and small farming, but could also include small
and artisanal mining.
A related structural source of variance are colonial settlement structures and
associated institutional legacies. Acemoglu et al. (2001) observed that European
colonial powers developed different colonial-administrative institutions in the
2 For this literature, see the longer version of this chapter (Dietsche 2017).
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territories they occupied, depending on whether the prevalence/absence of
tropical diseases discouraged/encouraged European settlers from staying.
Where settlers stayed, they typically developed institutions that encouraged
investment. For example, they adopted the types of land andmineral rights that
theywere already familiar with in their mother countries. In turn, where settlers
did not stay in large numbers, they developed institutional arrangements
designed to extract natural resources and transfer them to the mother country.
Additional sources of institutional variance that researchers have pointed
to include social cohesion versus fractionalization and the types of states that
producer countries exhibit.3 For example, socially more cohesive societies
have been found to generate greater confidence and trust between govern-
ments and citizens, resulting in institutional arrangements that grant broader
access to economic and social opportunities (Easterly et al. 2006). Another
example is the distinction Auty and Gelb (2001) have drawn between stylized
‘predatory states’ and ‘developmental states’, characterizing these by their
differences in the relationships between ruling elites, the state apparatus,
and society at large. They then tied these characteristics to conditioning
structural factors, such as the types of resources exploited, country size, settle-
ment structure, and population density.
Structural explanations for institutional variance have offered a rich source
of historical-economic and socio-economic analyses from which insights into
the political economy of institutions can be drawn. Yet, they also face two
challenges of their own. First, they do not offer immediate solutions to guide
policy interventions, because the factors they highlight are often hard-wired;
and second, they cannot claim universal applicability because they are typic-
ally drawn from single-case and comparative studies.
6.2.3 Guiding Policy Interventions
The more general turn towards institutions and their role in economic devel-
opment did not go unnoticed by those who had drawn on rent-seeking
arguments to explain poor outcomes. They turned towards ‘institutions’ to
explain variance in outcomes by drawing upon the rational choice version of
institutional analysis and its basic proposition is that ‘good institutions’ can
interrupt the negative relationship between rational individual actions and
poor aggregate outcomes. This led to the conclusion that countries can
achieve better outcomes from extractive resources if only they put in place
‘good’ institutions to constrain self-interested politicians and bureaucrats,
who would then no longer be able to capture resource rents for private gain.
3 See Dietsche (2017) for additional references.
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By implication, it has been assumed that adopting ‘good’ institutions will
result in better governance of the sector. To test this hypothesis, proponents
looked out for proxies for ‘good’ institutions to use these as instrumental
variables in their multiple regression analyses. Confirming a positive statistical
relationship, they developed more or less plausible narratives to connect the
quantitative results with a storyline. Collier and Goederis (2007), for example,
applied a subjectively chosen threshold to the country rankings of the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as a proxy for ‘good’ governance and on
this basis claimed that resource curse does not occur in countries with ‘very
good institutions’. However, they and the authors of similar other studies
have not bothered to explain why the proxies they have instrumented in
their analyses actually reflect ‘good’ institutions.
In conclusion, it has not been straightforward or uncontroversial to create
indices for institutional quality. Nevertheless, institutions have come to be
seen as a principal variable explaining variance in outcomes across producer
countries. This consensus has advocated that improving institutions will
improve sector governance and, thereby, outcomes. For those sympathetic
to the explanation that unproductive rent-seeking behaviour poses the key
challenge, the policy conclusion has been that ‘good institutions’ are syn-
onymous to ‘good governance’ and both provide the solution to the ‘resource
curse’. Thus, improvements in good governance should be encouraged
and this would somehow automatically constitute positive institutional
change. At the practical level, the consequence has been that countries have
been given advice on the institutions they apparently need in order to
improve sector governance.4
In contrast, those drawing on structural institutional analyses have
remained far less ambitious in putting forth policy conclusions and action
agendas.5 Focusing on explaining variance in outcomes, they have looked
back and reflected on reasons for the variance in outcomes observed. Perhaps
because they aremore alert to historically evolved country conditions, respect-
ive scholars have taken a more cautious, if not pessimistic, stance towards
suggesting that institutional arrangements can be changed by externally
imposed advocacy pressures. At the same time, their insights provide a
sense-check on how difficult it is in practice to encourage positive institu-
tional change as well as suggesting where levers for encouraging such change
might be found.
4 See Lahn and Stevens (2017) and Gisselquist (2012) for UN organizations, multilateral
development banks, and other multilateral organizations embracing the ‘good governance’
agenda to guide their work on institutional and public policy reforms.
5 See Dietsche (2014) for a more detailed critical analysis.
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6.3 What Are Institutions?
As the political economy of extractive resources has narrowed in on ‘institu-
tions’ to explain variance in outcomes across resource-rich countries and,
thus, has come to see institutions as critical to improving the ‘good govern-
ance’ of the resources sector, it warrants taking a step back and asking how
social scientists have defined institutions. And, what they have learned about
how institutions affect development over time.
6.3.1 Taking Stock of Institutional Analyses
From the late 1980s onwards, institutional analyses experienced a revival
because researchers felt a need to explain observed differences in the eco-
nomic, political, and social trajectories of industrialized countries. Compared
with the rest of the world, these countries had experienced similarly impres-
sive gains in living standards, despite obvious differences in their domestic
institutional arrangements that had evolved over decades and centuries.
These analyses drew attention to the institutional foundations of market
economies, which mainstream neoclassical economics had chosen to ignore
by simply assuming that the institutions in place were the most efficient to be
had. Thus, there was no need to look at institutions in any great detail, but this
task was left to scholars of politics, public administration, economic history,
and sociology. Consequently, these disciplines have played a key role in
rediscovering institutions, building on the foundations that had already
been laid in the first half of the twentieth century.
The challenge for the scholarship on institutions has been that it has
comprised a wide spectrum of theories and approaches.When, in 2000, Oliver
E. Williamson reviewed the progress economists had made on this subject, he
observed that their quest for a better understanding of the role of institutions
in economic development had resulted ‘in a boiling cauldron of ideas’ with
diverse and contradictory implications for policy advice (Williamson 2000:
610). This led Williamson to develop a framework that maps out the various
strands of institutional economics across four levels of social science analysis.6
These four levels are further explained below and then applied to the extract-
ive resources sector.
Level 1: Social embeddedness: This highest level of institutional analysis has
been coined after the work of economic sociologists and anthropologists who
have studied social and economic transformations. They underline that
6 A graphic reproduction of Williamson’s framework is included in the earlier WIDER working
paper version (Dietsche 2017).
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economic systems are ultimately embedded in social networks and relation-
ships and they focus on the most durable social institutions: for example,
customs, traditions, norms, and religion. These institutions are not only
very powerful but also show a great deal of inertia. Not least, they provide
people with the belief systems that shape their understanding of the world
around them, and they generate trust and reciprocity among social groups
beyond kinship.
Level 2: Institutional environment: This second level provides the ‘formal rules of
the game’ for economic transactions, and institutions often relate to the
territorial remit of sovereign nation-states. These institutions also include
international trade and regional economic unions above the level of nation-
states, as well as sub-national states, provinces, or regions where, for example,
countries are organized as federations. Thus, this level covers countries’ polit-
ical, bureaucratic, economic, and social systems and associated property rights
and legal and regulatory regimes. Level 2 institutions are also not expected to
change frequently. But they may change over decades. For example, these
institutions can mark distinct political eras.
Level 3: Governance: Institutions at this level capture and formalize the com-
mitments of parties involved in economic transactions. Williamson described
this level as the ‘play of the game’, covering the contracts and agreements that
underpin market transactions and deal with the risk that parties may cheat or
renege on their commitments. Level 3 institutions are typically expected to
last for a few months or years.
Level 4: Efficient allocation of resources: This level captures conventional market
analyses whereby the interaction of demand and supply sets prices, Adam
Smith’s invisible hand is supposed to do its magic, and economic analyses can
focus on the efficient allocation of scarce resources. Institutional arrange-
ments are simply assumed to work efficiently in the background. They are
not assumed to change within the time frames in which market participants
take their decisions.
The two key points about Williamson’s framework which he developed
over fifteen years ago are, first, that scholars could well be referring to very
different things when they point to ‘institutions’ as a key determinant of
economic outcomes. Meanwhile, those focused on testing theories applying
quantitative techniques would be biased towards finding binary proxies
of ‘institutional quality’ that can be instrumented in statistical analyses.
And second, while social science scholars have investigated the impact of
institutions on economic, political, and social outcomes across all of the
three levels from Level 1 to Level 3, mainstream neoclassical economists
focus primarily on Level 4.
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6.3.2 Gaps in Knowledge
Next, Williamson used his framework to identify several knowledge gaps
in the study of institutions.
6.3.2.1 HOW INSTITUTIONS CONNECT ACROSS THE LEVELS
Williamson found that a key gap lies in understanding how the four levels are
connected. He maintained that each level imposes constraints on the level
immediately below it. Thus, how issues are conceived at Level 1 conditions
how they shape the rules put in place at Level 2. These, in turn, shape the
‘play of the game’ at Level 3, which then affects the allocation of resources
at Level 4.
For example, if at the highest level there is a consensus that private
property rights are necessary for value creation, this will be reflected in
Level 2 institutions where a country’s constitution will uphold a regime of
private property rights and appropriate legislation and regulations are in
place to enforce these. This then provides the basis for the private sector to
conclude contracts at Level 3, which in turn will affect the quantities of
goods and services produced at Level 4 and the prices at which these are
traded.
While Williamson considered the influence from the top to the bottom
levels strongest, he was also of the opinion that there sould be feedback from
the bottom to the top levels. For example, looking forward it might be assessed
at Level 4 that a potential investment project would be financially viable, only
if a change were made to institutions at Level 3 or above, such as a change in
the fiscal regime resulting in a reduction of costs at Level 4. Or, looking back, it
might become clear that the financial assessments of investment projects
already undertaken did not take into account actual costs that are nowmateri-
alizing at Level 4 as a result of assumptions made about higher-level institu-
tions and that these assumptions are now proving to be wrong.
A good example to explain this theory concerns the negative externalities
associated with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. To an increasing number
and range of constituencies these emissions now pose risks and increase costs
at Level 4: for example, insurance companies, those exposed to extreme
weather conditions, and those whose health is being negatively affected, to
name but a few. However, to internalize these negative externalities in the
price of GHG-emitting energy resources requires institutional changes at all
three higher levels. Notably, international climate change policy has been
trying to achieve such changes by normatively defining the control of emis-
sions as a ‘public good’ and developing relevant international agreements and
subsequent national legislation, regulations, and contractual relations to
transform energy systems and reduce GHG emission levels.
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6.3.2.2 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND HOW INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE
Another gap pertains to how institutions evolve across and within the three
levels. Williamson conjectured that pressure from above was the most power-
ful and durable driver of institutional change. Others have concurred that
institutional change that originates from the highest levels carries the greatest
potential for transforming societies and their economies (Shirley 2008). Eco-
nomic historians have also pointed to such institutional change to explain
where and why major economic transformations have occurred (Tylecote
2015). To them it is clear that transformational institutional change is driven
from the upper two levels of institutions.
6.3.2.3 HOW TO BRING ABOUT POSITIVE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
A third gap lies in driving positive institutional change. The effectiveness
of purposefully conducted institutional change is likely to suffer when such
a change results in institutional arrangements that are inconsistent and/or
incompatible with institutions at the same level or a level above. For example,
it may be very difficult to successfully implement reformed mining or petrol-
eum laws if their contents are at odds with strongly held beliefs about rights to
resources and/or with other legislation reflecting vested interests in the status
quo. Thus, effective enforcement of changes to specific Level 2 and Level 3
institutions often requires complementary institutional changes to be nego-
tiated in relation to other existing Level 1 and/or Level 2 institutions.
From a historical perspective, economic transformations have typically
coincided with fundamental changes to rights granted and enforced at Level 2,
with these being brought about by structural changes that have altered the
dynamics between socio-political constituencies and challenged the social
order that backed the prevailing property rights regime at Level 1. In the past,
such structural changes have included technological breakthroughs and major
demographic shifts. Notably, climate change and related disruptive innovations
may prove to be the next game changer.
6.3.2.4 BUREAUCRACY AND STATE CAPACITY
A fourth gap is the limited attention paid to bureaucracy and state capacity.
Yet state capacity plays a critical role in connecting the often informal insti-
tutions of Level 1 with the formal political-administrative systems established
at Level 2. It is with these systems that nation-states actually exercise their
monopoly over power and provide vital public goods and services, such as
security and the rule of law. In turn, the ‘good governance’ agenda has paid
scant attention to the question of how the institutions emerge that allow
nation-states to accumulate and use power actually, and under what condi-
tions such power is used to support broad-based economic and social devel-
opment (Andrews 2013).
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Williamson concluded that, in general, economists had been rather ignor-
ant about how institutions work and how they emerge. The lowest common
denominator is simply that ‘institutions matter’. Others have criticized more
strongly that ‘good governance’ has provided a fig leaf for a seemingly
‘technical’ approach to escaping the dead-end into which mainstream
economists believing in market liberalism had been pushed, because
of their ignorance vis-à-vis the role of institutions in market transactions
(Grindle 2010).
6.3.3 Application to the Extractive Resources Sector
In applying Williamson’s framework to the extractive resources sector, it
makes sense to start with Level 4, which captures the market analyses and
the economic assessments of projects that resource producers undertake
when they evaluate commercial opportunities and risks and decide when
and how to invest. Those who are immersed in the world of Level 4 simply
assume that the institutions that shape the markets they evaluate are stable.
Project models are continuously updated to prepare for and evaluate com-
mercial decisions. Any perceived risks that relate to potential changes in
the institutions that underpin these decisions are factored into project eco-
nomics as additional costs and/or as a mark-up on the discount rate. Thus,
the higher such risks are perceived, the more financially rewarding a project
has to be.
Extractive resources projects involve large-scale investments in immobile
assets that are tied up for long periods. Thus, resource developers strive to lock
in the assumptions that shape project economics, using Level 3 instruments
such as contracts, agreements, and guarantees. Resource developers typically
involve their substantial legal teams and procurement services to negotiate
and deliver on such instruments. Notably, the use of Level 3 instruments is
based on bilateral relationships. These include, first, the relationships between
resource developers and the governments of producer countries, including—
where they exist—the latter’s state-owned oil, gas, or mining companies. And
second, they also include the relationship between resource developers and
third parties, namely the companies from which the resource developers
purchase goods and services and those to whom they sell their output, and
the local constituencies that are impacted by resource exploration and produc-
tion activities. While a substantial body of sector-specific literature has con-
centrated on these bilateral contractual relationships, this has come at the
expense of neglecting the multifaceted relationships between a national gov-
ernment, its public authorities, and its citizens, and their impact on the
enforcement and enforceability of the bilateral contracts and agreements
that resource developers rely upon.
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These multifaceted relationships play out at Level 2, which covers property
rights, political and administrative systems, and sector legislation. Thus,
Level 2 institutions set out who formally owns extractive resources and there-
fore who can issue licences to resource developers to explore and exploit such
resources. The sector-specific institutional environment typically includes:
 Constitutional provisions setting out who owns resources in the first
instance and how licences to explore for and exploit resources can be
granted to resource developers.7
 Political and administrative systems determining which government and
public authorities (i) develop policies, propose and approve laws, collect
taxes and other public revenues, and (ii) administer the enforcement of
laws, regulations, and public policies. These systems can be particularly
complex in federal and decentralized countries that comprise several
decentralized states, regions, or provinces (e.g. Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, Peru, Indonesia).
 Sector-specific and sector-relevant legal, regulatory, and investment-
promotion regimes setting out how primary resource rights can be allo-
cated and what obligations come with these, such as domestic market
obligations and local procurement and employment targets. These
regimes provide the basis for resource developers negotiating the Level 3
contracts and agreements that underpin their investments, sales, and
export decisions.
 Various special fiscal and other institutions that host countries have been
advised to adopt as part of good sector governance reforms, such as
legislation to establish stabilization and savings funds or sovereign wealth
funds, as well as legislation on transparency.
Beyond the sector-specific Level 2 institutions, there is also the wider insti-
tutional environment making for the range and the quality of the public
goods and services that countries more generally provide to their citizens
and the private sector. This environment not only affects the cost structure
of the production inputs that resource developers and their supply chains
need (e.g. human capital and infrastructure), it also affects the ability of the
domestic private sector to leverage the resources sector to induce economic
activities in other sectors. This means that Level 2 institutions are most critical
for leveraging the potential development opportunities associated with
extractive projects, as well as mitigating their negative impacts.
7 See Scott (2008) for a comprehensive historical review of the legal traditions and historical
trajectories that have played a key role in defining primary resource ownership.
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At Level 1, sector-specific institutions include long-standing norms and
principles, such as the historic principle of ‘first come, first served’ applied in
the mining sector and the petroleum sector’s ‘law of capture’, which in many
countries have become firmly and formally embedded in sector legal frame-
works. Thus, their universal applicability is often taken as a given.
In addition, Level 1 institutions also include customary rights to resources,
such as the rights that indigenous peoples (IP) and other traditional commu-
nities may claim. Often, such rights pertain to constituencies that have his-
torically been disadvantaged and for this reason have not been formally
embedded in Level 2 institutions. Thus, there is a high risk that they conflict
with formally granted exploration and production rights. Sometimes, such as
in the case of the Australian Native Title law, efforts have been made to rectify
this situation by formalizing these Level 1 institutions with a legal provision
that is introduced at Level 2, which in turn then obliges resource developers
to take account of IP rights at Level 3 (i.e. a bilateral agreement with such
communities) and Level 4 (i.e. absorbing the costs associated with negotiating
and concluding such an agreement).
Another example of sector-specific Level 1 institutions is international
norms and standards that seek to clarify who and how the externalities
associated with resource exploration and production should be internalized
across the various institutional levels. To name but a few, these institutions
include Convention 169 (1989) of the International Labour Organization, the
concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) set out by the 2007 UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the IFC Performance Stand-
ards on Environmental and Social Sustainability and the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights. They also include international norms
on resource sector governance, such as Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting
Directive of 2013 and sections 1502 and 1504 in the US Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
6.3.4 Gaps in Knowledge Applied to the Extractive Resources Sector
Following the same order as sub-section 6.3.2, this sub-section applies Wil-
liamson’s identified gaps in knowledge to the extractive resources sector.
6.3.4.1 HOW DO INSTITUTIONS CONNECT ACROSS THE LEVELS?
Institutional reforms targeting the extractive resources sector have often
focused on specific Level 2 and Level 3 institutions, such as revising the
sector’s legal and regulatory frameworks and renegotiating contracts and agree-
ments. More recently, however, there has been a shift towards greater recog-
nition of the political settlements traced to levels 1 and 2 and which underpin
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the societies and economies of resource-producing developing countries
(Melia 2015). The aim of this shift has been to better understand variations
in the political economy of extractive institutions across (mostly) sub-
Saharan African resource-producing countries.8 Behind these variations lie
different institutional legacies that affect the connections between the levels,
especially at the intersection of Level 2 with Level 3.
For example, in countries where the legal tradition is based on Common
Law, decisions made by judges pertaining to disputes at Level 3 are incorpor-
ated into Level 2. In the early phases of petroleum development this meant
that the decisions of US judges acting under Common Law set off a path
dependency that enticed private landowners to engage in competitive drill-
ing. This, in turn, led to the rapid expansion of fossil fuels as a major source of
energy in the United States, with far-reaching consequences well beyond the
United States (Daintith 2010).9
6.3.4.2 INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: HOW DO INSTITUTIONS EVOLVE?
Williamson conjectured that pressure from above is the most powerful and
durable driver of institutional change across the levels. In the extractive
resources sector the trend has been towards establishing new international
norms and standards at Level 1 with the intention that their influence perco-
lates downward from there. In some cases, these norms and standards have
evoked new Level 2 legislation and regulations, in both producer countries
and home countries. An example is Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting Direct-
ive which requires EU member states to put in place regulations requiring
resource developers to publish details of resources revenues paid to host
governments.
In other cases, new Level 1 institutions have surpassed Level 2 and sought
to directly target the corporate practices of international resource developers
at Level 3, such as in the cases of the IFC Performance Standards on Environ-
mental and Social Sustainability and the UN Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights.
A question left unanswered is whether, or to what extent, such types of
Level 1 institutions have been able to catalyse positive changes to a wider
range of Level 2 institutions in the producer countries themselves. It may
be suggested that the transformation of social and economic structures in
producer countries cannot be brought about solely by improving corporate
social performance at Level 3, nor by paying narrow attention to, for example,
8 Melia (2015) has drawn on three strands of structural-institutional analysis to focus on how
social orders established at Level 1 affect the formal rules of the game at Level 2 across various sub-
Saharan African countries.
9 Scott (2008) provides a historical account of the evolution of resource property rights with a
focus on mining and other natural resources (e.g. fishing, forestry, grazing, hunting).
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the subject of revenue transparency at Level 1. Lahn and Stevens (2017)
allude to this in relation to diversifying economies away from extractive
resource dependency.
6.3.4.3 BRINGING ABOUT POSITIVE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
WHERE ARE THE LEVERS?
Bringing about positive institutional change is about (a) connecting Level 1
with Level 2 institutions and (b) Level 2 institutions complementing and
reinforcing each other. The argument is that institutional change cannot be
limited to sector-specific institutions if the sector is to contribute positively to
wider economic and social development. The latter requires more far-reaching
changes to the Level 2 institutions, namely those that underpin the delivery of
public goods and services more generally. For other economic sectors to thrive
alongside the extractive resources sector requires not only a broadly conducive
business environment but also tacit knowledge relevant to the production of
non-extractive goods and services. Such knowledge is built by gaining experi-
ence over time. Thus, potential levers for positive institutional change are
bound to be context-specific and dependent on the ability of relevant stake-
holders to forge alliances that can support more comprehensive institutional
change across Level 2 institutions. For example, North et al. (2006) developed
a conceptual framework spelling out the ‘doorstep conditions’ and subsequent
‘transition steps’ that have allowed some countries to transform their social
order in such a way as to generate institutions that underpin substantial
productivity increases.
6.3.4.4 WHAT ROLE DOES STATE CAPACITY PLAY?
State capacity connects the (often informal) institutions of Level 1 with the
(typically more formal) institutions of Level 2 and Level 3. The structural
transformation of resource-dependent economies requires coordinated plan-
ning and interventions across the wider public sector. North et al. (2006)
allude to the institutionalized provision of public goods and services and its
importance for broad-based increases in productivity, including the funding
mechanisms required to pay for such provision (e.g. taxation). The depth of
the challenge of building state capacity is highlighted by recent research into
governance in areas of ‘limited statehood’ and so-called ungoverned spaces
(Mingst 2013). Their prevalence stands in stark contrast to the assumption of
state sovereignty that underpins ‘good governance’. By looking at alternative
authority exercised in contested spaces and what economic activities are
possible in these, Mingst confirms the importance of state capacity and the
institutionalization of public goods and services provision for achieving
broad-based developmental outcomes on the back of extractive resources
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Political Economy and Governance
129
exploitation. This suggest that the ‘good governance’ agenda needs to reflect
upon what it contributes to state capacity building.
6.4 Discussion
This sub-section discusses (i) whether institutions are considered an independ-
ent or a dependent variable and (ii) what this means for the transformation of
social order.
The question whether institutions are considered an independent or a
dependent variable is important, because knowing that institutions matter is
not the same as understanding how they evolve and how to actively bring
about positive institutional change. Even if a particular institutional feature
has served as a variable to successfully explain variance in outcomes across
resource-dependent economies, it does not necessarily follow that it is a
variable suitable for policy interventions. It also does not say much about
how a specific institution works in relation to others across and also within
each of the three top levels of Williamson’s analytical framework.
When institutions are considered an input variable, it is assumed that they
can constrain the behaviour of powerful political elites. However, this leaves
open the fundamental question as to how these very same elites can be
convinced to develop or adopt such institutions in the first place. Elites’
push for such institutions is vital for the institutionalized provision of
public goods and services. In other words, it takes considerably more than
international advocacy and political pressure to convince those exercising
authority on the ground that it could be in their interest to use their
monopoly over power and public resources to provide institutions that
benefit not just themselves, but also others. An additional condition is
that they must first hold such a monopoly and be able to raise sufficient
public resources.
The consequence of this line of argument is that, first, it takes a conscious
shift in mindset from a view that institutions are an input for achieving a
desired outcome to one where institutions are seen as the outcome of socio-
political processes. The analytical usefulness of the concept of ‘institutions’
lies in their serving as a bridge to overcome the fundamental problem of
agency-focused theories holding individuals responsible for economic, polit-
ical, and social outcomes, while structural explanations subject the actions of
individuals to more hard-wired conditions. The concept of institutions is
useful only in order to identify how and when collective agency makes it to
the point of pushing the door open for structural transformation. The issue of
transforming social order in such a way that public authorities provide insti-
tutions that transcend personal relationships and broaden access to economic
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opportunities is about the connection and interaction between Level 1 and
Level 2 institutions.
What this means for the transformation of social order is, that in order to
establish and enforce Level 2 institutions in line with those that exist at Level
1, public authorities must first hold a monopoly over power, and second use
this power to institutionalize the provision of public goods and services.
Citizens in modern nation-states believe that elected governments and their
public authorities hold this power legitimately and are trusted to exercise it
fairly and transparently. Using this power, they provide and enforce institu-
tions as a ‘public good’, thus serving everybody residing with the territorial
boundaries of the nation-state. One of the most important public goods is the
non-discriminatory enforcement of the ‘rule of law’ by the public authorities
overseen by an elected government. However, it is worth remembering that
holding the monopoly over power comes with the ability to threaten and use
force to coerce individuals to behave in certain ways.
Enforcing Level 2 institutions also requires sufficient fiscal resources to fund
enforcement mechanisms. The cost of enforcement depends on whether
Level 2 institutions are underpinned by respective institutions at Level 1.
Compliance is most efficiently achieved if individuals internalize norms,
principles, and ideas that guide their behaviour and decisions, as opposed to
coercing compliance. From this derives the role of public authorities in
addressing the issues underlying conflicts and tensions around the exploit-
ation of extractive resources. Positively, this is achieved through political
processes that establish a consensus on balancing the costs and benefits
associated with such exploitation. Negatively, it is achieved through coercing
and oppressing those who must bear the costs imposed on them by the
benefits that others are enjoying.
The political economy framework presented by North et al. (2006) describes
the complexity of the historical processes that have allowed more advanced
countries to transition to social orders that have supported broad-based eco-
nomic and social development. The countries that achieved such transitions
early on were the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, followed by
other European, and a few other, countries. These countries have evolved to
grant their citizens rights and provide public goods and services that have
opened up access to economic opportunities.10
Melia (2015) has used part of this framework to describe how Equatorial
Guinea, South Sudan, and Chad have become stuck with social orders that
limit access to economic opportunities to elites. He has also drawn upon two
additional political-economic frameworks to describe the relationships and
10 North et al. (2006) acknowledge that the Netherlands and Switzerland could also be included
in the group of early transition countries, but their work does not include them.
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alignments between key social constituencies to reflect upon the particular
social orders that he sees underpin, respectively, the cases of Mozambique,
Angola, and Nigeria and the cases of Peru, Ghana, and Kenya. Contrary to the
assumption implicit in the ‘good governance’ agenda, none of these three
frameworks assumes that these various countries are all striving towards some
imagined uniform social order where sovereign states ‘fully’ govern their
territories. Rather, each framework highlights that the exercise of statehood
is, in some form or another, compromised and/or power is shared between
contending parties.
However, the challenge with Melia’s static approach is that he can only
explain the current status quo that prevails in these countries, but cannot
identify what collective agency would be required to move each towards
improving their currently unfavourable social orders.11 In contrast, North
et al. (2006) have identified ‘doorstep conditions’ that precede and lay the
foundation for the transition from a social order that limits access to one that
would provide open access to economic opportunities and institutionalize the
provision of public goods and services. This chapter does not offer the space to
delve deeper into the historical analysis on which these scholars’ propositions
are built. However, in brief these are:
(i) initial rule of law for elites, which refers to the formalization of proced-
ures for arbitration and mediation backed by the establishment of
property rights and a judicial system.
(ii) perpetually lived organizations in the public and private sphere, which refers
to organizations that outlive the individual members who created
them and for these organizations to become ‘legal persons’ bearing
rights and duties. Together, the first two conditions create the space for
more impersonal relationships among the elites, while at the same
time constraining absolute power.
(iii) consolidated control of the military, which speaks to the legitimization of
the use of violence, as opposed to its arbitrary use.
North et al. (2006) have observed that when these foundations are in place,
elites are more likely to find a common interest in transforming their privil-
eges into impersonal rights shared among them and which can then be
converted into rights that are granted to citizens more broadly. The conclu-
sion is that transforming social order takes time.
11 Melia (2015) does discuss ‘remedies’, referring to macroeconomic assistance, transparency
and accountability initiatives, resources for infrastructure deals, direct cash transfers, and focusing
on thematic fields for bilateral development engagements on strategic planning, employment
creation, local economic development, and cooperation with extractives sector companies.
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This also means that, first, the fast development of one extractives project is
unlikely to achieve a sustainable outcome. And second, achieving a balance in
the benefits and costs derived from the sector is more likely when there are
consecutive resource developments that provide a longer time horizon for
transforming a country’s social order. At the same time, there is still the risk that
an unfavourable social order remains entrenched, and elites do not manage to
achieve the doorstep conditions that could lead to subsequent structural trans-
formation. The historical literature suggests that structural transformation has
much to do with how political and economic elites align between themselves
and how their alignment affects non-elites. As institutions of enforcement at
Level 2 are conditioned by the social order established at Level 1, positive
institutional change requires the transformation of existing social orders.
The bad news is that there is no generic template that shows how to get to a
social order that opens access to economic opportunities. While North et al.
(2006) have provided a conceptual framework that points to the landmarks
that pathfinders should look out for on the road to achieving the transform-
ation of social order, Bates (2010) has criticized this framework for rather
underplaying the role of those who collectively prepare and walk those
paths. Arguably, resource developers and third parties routinely claim that
their contributions are supporting positive change.
The longer version of this article provides a graphic reference point for
asking whether and how these parties contribute to connecting Levels 1 and 2,
building state capacity at Level 2 and achieving consistency and comple-
mentarity within and across Levels 1 to 3 (Dietsche 2017). It sets out three
modes through which resource developers and third parties make their
respective contributions:
 The first mode depicts voluntary delivery and reporting against inter-
national standards and social investment in community development,
responding to Level 1 institutions that set international norms in
respect of companies’ social performance and their contributions to the
economic and social development of impacted communities. These con-
tributions do not intend to make an explicit difference to Level 2 institu-
tions. Especially in areas of limited statehood and so-called ungoverned
spaces, this mode presents resource developers with the only practical
course of action to deliver positive outcomes at the community level.
 The second mode depicts contributions that are aimed at particular sec-
tor-specific issues expected to improve country-level outcomes. Along
the lines of viewing ‘good institutions’ and ‘good governance’ as an
independent variable, this mode places emphasis on specific Level 2
institutions, such as particular pieces of legislation and/or regulations.
Examples include legislation on transparency or on ‘local content’.
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 The third mode views the extractive resources sector as integral to a
country’s economy and society and gives concern to the sector’s potential
contribution towards structural transformation and the diversification of
the host country economy. It is premised on positive contributions
being possible, if the country’s social order evolves towards an institu-
tional environment at Level 2 that broadens access to economic oppor-
tunities and institutionalizes better provision of public goods and
services. This mode gets close to the doorstep conditions highlighted
by North et al. (2006).
Mode 3 holds the most promise for contributing to more comprehensive
institutional changes that lead to better outcomes at the country level. Still,
a lot remains to be learned about how resource developers and third parties
can support collective action and positive realignments among political and
economic elites in support of structural transformation.
6.5 Summary
This chapter has argued that the challenge of explaining the dismal perform-
ance of many resource-rich countries has driven the debate on the political
economy of extractive resources. ‘Bad’ resource sector governance provided
one such explanation that led to the argument that institutional constraints
are needed to prevent self-interested individuals from using resource rents for
personal gain. Those looking towards institutional analyses to provide guid-
ance as to how to improve the governance of the sector often focused on
particular types of sector-specific institution. Much hope has been placed on
transparency as a means to achieve greater accountability of outcomes. Draw-
ing on the general criticism of the ‘governance’ concept, this chapter has
reviewed the literature on the political economy of extractive resources and
institutions. It has argued that too little emphasis has been put on under-
standing how and why those holding political power might support institu-
tional change that supports positive outcomes.
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Industrial policy is back. Many development economists are now arguing for a
new approach to industrial policy to achieve economic and social develop-
ment in low- and middle-income countries.1 This revival has been prompted
by several developments. First, the pro-poor development agenda of the 2000s
has been criticized for failing to develop a sustainable private sector (Whitfield
2012). For example, this is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals
(UN 2015a), placing greater emphasis on economic transformation and sus-
tainable development compared to the more poverty-focused agenda of the
preceding Millennium Development Goals.
Second, international climate policy has provided an impetus for a new
approach to industrial policy. The climate agreement reached at the Paris
COP21 in November 2015 has mandated all signatories to change course
and accelerate their move toward more sustainable and greener growth (UN
2015b). This calls not only for cleaner energy, but also for improved resource
and material efficiency (OECD 2015). And it exposes the fossil-fuel sector to
the risk of ‘unburnable carbon’ and ‘stranded assets’ (Lahn and Bradley 2016;
Mitchell et al. 2015). ‘Green’ industrial policy is seen as central to driving the
structural transformation towards a more sustainable and greener economic
system (Aiginger 2015; Hallegatte et al. 2013; Lütkenhorst et al. 2014; Rodrik
2014). Meanwhile, minerals and metals are seen as critical for a low-carbon
future (World Bank 2017).
1 Dietsche (2017b) provides a fuller version of this chapter, including a broader range of
references on new industrial policy.
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Third, on both sides of the Atlantic rising disappointment with the social
outcomes of economic liberalism and globalization are influencing political
agendas towards restrictions on trade and the movement of people (Bailey
et al. 2015; Rodrik 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Smart 2017).
Yet, opinions on industrial policy are deeply divided. Associating the term
with the interventionist import-substitution policies that were widely applied
in the post-WorldWar II and post-independence era, re-introducing industrial
policy into economic policy and development debates is seen as encouraging
unproductive rent-seeking by politically favoured companies thriving under
protectionism.
Proponents of new approaches to industrial policy maintain that investing
in productive knowledge and technological capabilities is key to achieving
sustainable economic and social development. As explained more fully in
Dietsche (2017b), they define industrial policy in broader terms than either
the old import-substitution policies, or the inward-looking policy ideas of the
new national populism. This means that new industrial policy constitutes a
‘broad church’ of ideas and people. This chapter asks what the implications of
this debate are for the extractive industries and their potential to contribute to
inclusive (and sustainable) development.
7.2 The Case for Industrial Policy
The theoretical case for industrial policy arises from the problem of tran-
saction costs and how these should be dealt with. Dietsche (2017b) discusses
this in more detail by distinguishing between (a) the typical cases of ‘market
failure’ that neoclassical economics identifies on the basis of assuming that
transaction costs are zero and (b) the real-life situation where transaction
costs are always positive and, therefore, are a problem that is inherent to all
markets in which unrelated individuals exchange goods and service.
The general case for industrial policy builds on the argument that there are
situations in which markets rely on the public sector to achieve broadly
desirable economic and social outcomes. These situations include, but are
not limited to, those cases where clear ‘market failures’ can be identified. In
essence, this means that industrial policy sits at the heart of the relationship
between markets and states, and it also shapes economies and the social
outcomes they produce.
Dietsche (2017b) discusses in some detail the ideal-type situation where
transaction costs are assumed to be zero (i.e. case (a)). Even under this assump-
tion, there are ‘special’ cases of goods and services that warrant interventions
because they are marred by the problems of non-rivalry and non-excludability.
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Congruently, interventions are aimed at designing policies and establishing
institutions that address non-rivalry and non-excludability. Dietsche (2017b)
also discusses real-life examples to demonstrate that today’s production and
use of extractive resources are heavily and fundamentally entangled with the
characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. Thismeans that themarkets
associated with extractive resources are contingent on how institutions have
shaped them, not just over the past couple of decades, but at least since the era
of the industrial revolution.2 Equally important is how these markets will
work in the future, as not only governments but also social organizations
challenge and seek to re-shape existing institutions.
This chapter focuses only on case (b), where the case for industrial policy
centres around the question of how transaction costs can be reduced to
encourage economic exchanges over distance and across time.With economic
historians and institutional economists having spelt out the critical role that
‘institutions’ play in reducing transaction costs and, thus, in establishing
markets (Dietsche 2017a), the probing question is: Who makes and shapes the
institutions that reduce transaction costs to support sophisticated market transac-
tions over distance and across time? The answer points not only towards collab-
oration and collective action, but also to the critical role that is played by
collective entities with monopoly power over the use of force. In the modern
world, this power is held by nation-states, where public authorities provide
the institutions that allow the private sector to thrive and, in the best-case
scenario, produce broadly acceptable economic and social outcomes.3
It is on this discussion that the real-life situation of case (b) builds. The
challenge is that the analysis of this situation produces not onlymore nuanced
conclusions but also no consensus on what industrial policy should really
entail. A critical initial proposition, well established at the philosophical level,
is the case for collective authorities to provide institutions whenever eco-
nomic agents interact with each other beyond personal relationships. In
today’s world, nation-states and their public authorities have become the
key collective entities that shape and maintain the institutions underpinning
economic systems and their economic, social, and political outcomes. Thus,
the proponents of industrial policy take the position that public authorities
not only can, but effectively do play a fundamental role in how economies are
structured and how they perform. Yet, proponents differ over how that role
should be played. The analysis in Dietsche (2017b) has identified several
themes that run across this ongoing debate.
2 Relevant here are resource property rights and associated sector legal regimes. On this subject,
see also Daintith (2010), Dietsche (2017a), and Scott (2008).
3 See Dietsche (2017a) for an introduction to some of the relevant literature and a discussion of
the role that public authorities play in providing formal institutions.
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7.2.1 The Risks of ‘State Failure’
Neoliberal economists have strong reservations against any type of ‘policy
interventions’, because they see ‘state failure’ as a bigger risk that any type of
‘market failure’. This concern stems from their interpretation of some of the
negative experiences with interventionist policies prevalent in Latin America
as well as in newly independent states in the 1960s and 1970s, which were
referred to then as ‘industrial policy’.4
While some countries found success—notably South Korea and Taiwan
(China)—many did not, and by 1980 much of Latin America and many
newly independent countries in Africa and Asia faced serious crises. Neoliberal
economists concluded that the risks of state failure arising from import-
substituting industrialization outweighed any gains from containing market
failures. Industrial policy was then seen through the ideological lens of soci-
alism’s failure and market liberalism’s triumph, reinforced by the decline of
the Soviet Union.
Industrial policy came to be seen as ameans for creating rents for the benefit
of political and economic elites, without delivering many, if any, of the
expected economic and social returns. These ideas and experiences were
reflected in some new economic theory focusing on rational individuals
exploiting their power over public policies to seek unproductive ‘rents’,
thereby maximizing their self-interest.5 Against the background of these the-
ories, governments were advised to avoid unproductive ‘rent-seeking’ by
keeping their hands away from industrial policy, and instead to open up to
foreign investment and trade. To date, ‘state failure’ and ‘rent-seeking’ remain
two contentious subjects that proponents of the new industrial policy must
still confront.
7.2.2 Industrial Policy as a Discovery and Learning Process
Discovering and learning are core themes in new industrial policy. The argu-
ment is that industrial policy should create a network of linkages between
public- and private-sector representatives and institutions where processes
guide information flows and joint learning. In order to shape the structure
of an economy, bureaucrats need to be closer to business. At the same time,
the public sector should not simply end up serving particular companies
or exclusive business elites. Instead, it must retain its independence from
4 Specifically associated with such interventionist policies is the concept of ‘import substitution
industrialization’ (ISI), which advocates that trade policy should aim to support domestic
manufacturing, in order to reduce imports.
5 See Congleton et al. (2008) for a review of research on rent-seeking.
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individual private interests and focus on the provision of public goods and
services that benefit the private sector more broadly.
The question is what role should public authorities play in leading a discov-
ery and learning process that identifies where transaction costs are high and
pose a hindrance to productive entrepreneurial activities? There are many
views on the specifics. One argument is that the public sector carries a respon-
sibility for coordinating and aligning stakeholders’ interests towards reducing
transaction costs—and enhancing positive externalities so that the private
sector can develop, thrive, and diversify. For example, Rodrik (2007) argues
that successfully identifying the true cost structure of an economy takes
public policy makers one step closer to removing impediments to ‘doing
business’ and enhancing positive externalities. He suggests a corporatist
approach where the public sector brings together and aligns multiple inter-
ests across different levels of policy, thereby improving the environment
for private-sector activities. Industrial policy is then not the sole responsi-
bility of a separate ministry or department, but a responsibility shared across
the public sector. In addition, this view also speaks to encouraging (or
nudging) private-sector interests to organize and identify common con-
straints and impediments that (only) the public sector can address.
There is significant congruence between this view of industrial policy and
the proposals by international mining companies to partner with govern-
ments, local enterprises, and third parties to enhance mining’s positive con-
tributions to development, and minimize any negative impacts on host
countries and communities (ICMM 2011; McPhail 2017). Similarly, propon-
ents of the notion of ‘shared value’—a concept that has emerged within the
debate on extractives-led development—argue that governments, companies,
and third parties need to work together to remove impediments that hinder
local companies from participating in project supply chains (e.g. bureaucratic,
financial sector-related) and to encourage positive externalities by providing
training and support to local entrepreneurs and workers (e.g. skills, manage-
ment, HSE compliance). In addition, industrial policy as a discovery and
learning process is also relevant for the challenge of climate change, because
it suggests identifying and addressing the impediments and disincentives that
discourage the private sector from developing and investing in cleaner and
alternative energy sources.
The case for encouraging collaboration for joined-up discovery and learning
has been supported by three further observations. First, many Western indus-
trialized countries look back on a long history of experimenting with decen-
tralized approaches to industrial policy, where the development of particular
sectors and industries has been supported by fostering innovation and com-
petitiveness through networking across private- and public-sector entities
(Keller and Block 2015; Warwick and Nolan 2015).
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Second, there are the Asian latecomers to the industrial revolution that
successfully supported the structural transformation of their agrarian econ-
omies and societies during the second half of the twentieth century. It is now
generally accepted that East Asia caught up with theWest by actively support-
ing and networking the export-oriented sectors, industries, and firms—
contrary to mainstream policy advice to keep the public sector’s hands off
the private sector (Amsden 1989; Khan and Jomo 2000; Lin 2012; Lin and
Chang 2009; Strom 2017; Wade 1990).
Third, there is the observation that, as countries get richer, so their econ-
omies typically diversify (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003). They get richer not by
producing more of the same using what resources they already have, but by
learning how to produce more of an increasingly diverse range of goods and
services. Moreover, more diversified economies have not seen a withdrawal of
the public sector: ‘learning to produce a more diverse range of goods and
services’ has often been supported by a higher level of public goods and service
provision, supplying inputs that have allowed a broader range of economic
activities to prosper. Some see this achievement of structural transformation
and diversification as the essence of the development process (Mkandawire
2012; Rodrik 2007).
However, for industrial policy as a discovery and learning process, there is
no presumption that the public authorities can always get things right—at
least not first time around. It is expected that mistakes will be made and that,
as part of learning, these can and will be corrected. What matters is that the
incidence of overall successful cases of private–public collaboration eventually
exceeds the unsuccessful cases. Indeed, if no mistakes are made it can be taken
as a sign that industrial policy is not daring enough and that the country
might have missed potential gains. Even in the presence of rent-seeking
special interests, leaving market failures unaddressed does not by itself change
that order for the better. Stiglitz (2015) argues that not pursuing any industrial
policy may also serve special interests, namely those interests that cherish the
institutional status quo and benefit from the absence of state support that
broadens access to economic opportunities.
7.2.3 Setting and Pursuing Socio-economic Objectives
A third theme involves the setting and pursuing of socio-economic objectives.
This complements the second theme, because it raises awareness that, first,
the process of discovery and learning must serve a purpose and, second, that
economic theory on its own cannot decide what the desirable outcomes
actually are. Objectives must be guided and set by political processes at various
levels. Furthermore, this theme also rejects the binary framing ofwhether or not
countries should pursue industrial policies. It replaces it with the much
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more exploratory question of how individual countries can go about designing
industrial policies in support of the objectives that their respective political
leadership has set, as well as how their respective public sectors can implement
such policies efficiently and effectively.
For example, in the context of climate change, a green industrial policy for
structural transformation and diversification is often seen as paramount to
achieving the global objective of limiting greenhouse gases (GHGs). Altenburg
(2011) and Lütkenhorst et al. (2014) see green industrial policy as part and
parcel of tackling the daunting challenge of transforming economies and the
entire global economic system towards greater energy and resource efficiency
and ‘beyond GDP’ objectives. They also see the past as a problematic bench-
mark by which to judge contemporary strategies.
7.2.4 Improving Productivity
A fourth theme is focused on improving productivity. It rests on the argument
that, due to positive transaction costs, the private sector is unable to address
structural challenges that hold back growth. An example is large-scale invest-
ment with high fixed costs, such as the provision of utilities or transport
infrastructure that can serve a wide range of economic activities. For these to
be built, it may be necessary to incentivize the simultaneous expansion of
upstream and downstream activities. For example, in the context of the
extractive industries, public investments in infrastructure may not only raise
the productivity of a site where extractive resources are produced, but also that
of other industries in adjacent areas, such as agricultural and other land-based
natural-resources sectors.
However, while in the presence of positive transaction costs public author-
ities have a key role to play in supporting the private sector to achieve such
improvements, this role does not equate to the proposition that the econ-
omy should be led or actively run by the state. Nor does it support the
proposition that states should own and run industries that are subject to
natural monopolies. Rather, the theme highlights the problem that the
private sector requires the institutionalization of solutions that address
structural market failures and enable positive externalities. Industrial policy
becomes the medium to identify the nature of structural market failures
and to develop and trial solutions: an example is strengthening education
and training systems to deliver highly skilled tradespersons, technicians, and
professionals.
Several authors have discussed the role of public authorities in improving
productivity with reference to developmentally oriented states, as opposed
to ‘predatory states’ captured by narrow elites (Strom 2017;Wade 2010, 2014).
In an earlier UNU-WIDER publication, Auty and Gelb (2001) distinguished
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
New Industrial Policy and the Extractive Industries
143
between two stylized political-economic models to explain why resource-rich
countries had not kept pace with other countries that had started off with
similar productive capabilities. These models suggested that economic trans-
formation and diversification on the back of exploiting natural resources
hinges on what happens around these sectors, as opposed to what happens
more narrowly in these sectors. A highlighted characteristic of developmen-
tally oriented states is political elites that actively pursue structural transform-
ation and manage to avoid possible capture by economic elites. They also
exercise self-restraint in using authoritative power for gains that accrue only
to themselves.
However, while proponents of industrial policy agree that improving prod-
uctivity is a key objective, there is little agreement on how to do it. In this
context, an intensely debated question has been whether countries should
comply with, or defy, their comparative advantages based on their existing
factor endowments.6
7.2.5 Building Comparative Institutional Advantages
A fifth theme centres on static versus dynamic comparative advantages.
A country’s current comparative advantages are not only, nor even necessarily,
down to its endowments of physical resources, but reflect policies and broader
institutional arrangements relative to those of other countries. They underpin
factor productivity and how it is maintained and improved.
Essentially, this theme emerged from studies tracing the specific character-
istics of advanced industrialized countries to their particular institutions and
how these have evolved over time as the outcomes of political-economic
processes.7 Historically minded social scientists have focused on the institu-
tional characteristics shared by countries that have managed to transform and
diversify their economies. Respective research has included comparative ana-
lyses on the economic structures of OECD countries and the ‘varieties of
capitalism’ that these countries display, even though they are all similarly
well off.8 It has also included comparative studies on the successes of East
Asian countries.9
6 See the debate between two prominent East Asian economists, who hold opposing views on
this (Lin and Chang 2009). This debate is summarized in Box 1 in Dietsche (2017b).
7 See Thelen (2004) for a comparative analysis of the vocational and skills training systems in
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan, and how these relate to the different
structures of these countries’ economies.
8 See, amongst others, Eichengreen (2007), Hall and Soskice (2001), Ostrom (2005), and
Williamson (1985).
9 See, amongst others, Chang (2007), Haggard (2004), Khan (2000), and Lin (2012). Some authors,
such as Lange (2005), have traced the capabilities associated with such interventions to an
institutional legacy of more direct colonial rule, as opposed to the indirect colonial rule exercised
elsewhere.
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As this research views comparative advantages as the outcome of the
comparative institutional advantages that a country has built over time, the
focus is on the question of how countries have got to where they are, rather
than accepting—as a fait accompli—their existing comparative advantages.
Importantly, it is not assumed that advantageous institutional arrangements
are a given. Hence, this fifth theme links back to the second and third themes
regarding discovering and learning, driven by the pursuit of clear socio-
economic objectives. Together, these themes indicate that the task is not
merely one of quickly designing and announcing industrial strategies
and policies, but one of more slowly and purposefully re-shaping existing
institutions and building new ones.
7.2.6 The Political Economy of Transaction Costs and Institutional Change
The last theme is arguably the most controversial: at stake is the issue that—
given the positive transaction costs that exist in the real world—there is no
guarantee that institutional change per se will reduce these costs. Instead,
institutions reflect the political-economic interests of those who were able to
shape them in the past and those who are able to re-shape them in the future.
Political power-holders may use industrial policy for their own interests and
those of their respective political constituencies. Hence, the risk is that of
‘rent-seeking’ and ‘state failure’ discussed earlier as the first theme.
However, there are signs that the overtly pessimistic view on the omnipres-
ence of ‘state failure’ and ‘rent-seeking’ is being replaced with a more nuanced
understanding, which recognizes that the social order, underpinning how
political power-holders behave and what they see as their legitimate role in
society, is critical to outcomes. Thus, this view concludes that what matters is
how policy makers and state institutions deploy industrial policy: positive
institutional change can be a possible outcome, but it is not guaranteed. As a
consequence, recommendations on industrial policy should be judged not
from an ideological perspective, but on the basis of whether they address
systemic challenges that hinder an economy from delivering positive socio-
economic outcomes.
Quite clearly, the narrow position that governments should disengage com-
pletely from the pursuit of industrial policy is in decline. In part, this is
because few still maintain the view that markets are perfect. In addition,
industrial policy now has such a wide range of interpretations that economists
of different persuasions can subscribe to it. When it comes to the empirics,
however, we should expect to see variance in outcomes: the pursuit of indus-
trial policy will fail in some countries, while in others it may well deliver
positive results.
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7.3 Industrial Policy and the Extractives-led
Development Agenda
Since the mid-twentieth century, there have been three perspectives on the
nexus between extractive industries and industrial policy. These pertain to
three periods that have been more fully discussed in Dietsche (2017b).
7.3.1 The Unfulfilled Promise of State-led Industrialization
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the commonly held view was that state-led
industrialization was needed to achieve catch-up with the more advanced
economies. Foreign companies had dominated the resources sectors in the
colonial era. Generous concessions granted to foreign companies had brought
low-cost Middle Eastern oil to the global market and had pushed down
prices. But newly independent governments in Asia and Africa sought to take
control and transfer the assets of the Western-owned oil majors to newly
created state-owned oil and mining companies. The ensuing battle between
the governments and the companies prompted key producer countries to
actively intervene in the pricing mechanism and encouraged further nation-
alization. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was
established to tilt market power in favour of the producers.Many governments
took control over the sector with a view to using the resulting revenues to
finance ambitious industrial development projects as well as the expansion of
public provision more broadly.10
At the time, some economists raised concerns that it would not be straight-
forward to industrialize and diversify economies on the back of exploiting and
exporting unprocessed commodities.11 Their fear was that, although countries
would be exploiting their current comparative advantages, specialization in
primary commodity exports would ultimately lead to declining terms of trade.
Economic historians referenced the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
to point to a mixed picture of potential outcomes.12
Analytical tools were also developed to examine the potential connections
between the resources-based industries and other economic sectors.13 For
example, drawing onhis linkage theory, Hirschman (1977) doubted the potential
of export-oriented resources sectors to serve broader economic development and
diversification.
10 The history of Chile in these respects is discussed in some detail in Solimano and Guajardo
(2017).
11 See Prebisch (1950) for the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis. 12 See also Auty (2001).
13 See Roe and Round (2017 and Chapter 23, this volume) for a more in-depth examination
of this subject.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
146
7.3.2 Sector Liberalization in the Ascendant
By the 1980s many low- and middle-income countries faced fiscal and debt
crises, compounded by the commodity price slumps of the time. Some needed
to accept IMF and World Bank stabilization and structural adjustment pro-
grammes.While state-led industrialization on the back of the resources sectors
was not always a failure, it had a high failure rate when political and economic
elites abused it for their own advantages. This led to the rise of the microeco-
nomic notion of ‘rent-seeking’ in the 1980s and 1990s.
This was also the time of the ‘Washington Consensus’, stressing that state-
led industrialization had resulted in state failure. However, its proponents
argued that the extractive industries could help countries return to growth
by generating much-needed foreign exchange. The implicit industrial policy
advice at the time was that countries should attract more foreign investment
into the resources sectors, including privatizing and/or selling off their state-
owned companies. During this time, almost all national mining and some oil
and gas companies in low- and middle-income countries were privatized and
sold off, thus removing their troubled finances from the public accounts. In
several low- andmiddle-income countries, significant new private investment
and some increased public revenues followed as a result of this approach: for
example, in Ghana after 1986 and in Tanzania after 1996.
7.3.3 The Promise of the Extractives-led Development Agenda
Since the late 1990s, low- and lower-middle-income countries generally have
received substantial foreign investment, funding large-scale oil, gas, and min-
ing projects on an unprecedented scale. The construction and operation of
such projects has boosted growth rates and per capita income. But they have
often not delivered on the expectation that positive trickle-down effects
would generate broader benefits, including more diversified economies and
more economic opportunities at national, subnational, and community
levels. This disappointment has prompted serious questions as to why this
expectation has not been met.
Since the early 2000s, this questioning has taken place at two levels. At the
community level, the environmental movement has highlighted the discon-
tent of local communities, where negative impacts are felt most immediately
and intensively. At this level, extractive companies have been pushed to
improve their local impact management and their relationships with local
communities.
Meanwhile, at the macro-level many resource-rich countries have done
worse than those less well endowed with natural resources (the ‘resource
curse’). To explain this, researchers initially focused on the macroeconomic
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and fiscal challenges facing resource-rich countries and identified respective
policy responses to counter these. But attention also shifted towards
the political economy of resource rents as an explanation of why neoliberal
policy-prescriptions had not resulted in broad-based socio-economic develop-
ment. A consequence of this shift has been the emphasis placed on the
‘good governance’ of the sector and respectively targeted propositions on
‘appropriate’ sector governance. International initiatives, such as the EITI and
the NRGI, have invested in gathering and disseminating information, and have
encouraged greater transparency and better governance in the sector, especially
in relation to resource revenues and the legal, regulatory, and contractual
arrangements underpinning these.
However, despite these developments it has unfortunately remained rather
unclear whether and/or to what extent these efforts have supported countries
in diversifying away from the extractives sectors. As underlined in the intro-
duction to this chapter, the very suggestion that it is possible to transform and
diversify an economy on the back of extractive projects draws attention to
what happens around the sector.
7.4 What Next on New Industrial Policy
and Extractives-led Development?
Unfortunately, because the debate on new industrial policy is so multifaceted,
it is also rather inconclusive and does not (yet) provide governments of
countries with extractive resources with any sort of road map that could
guide them on the strategies most likely to produce long-term sustainable
benefits. Worse even, some proponents taking part in the various debates on
‘new industrial policy’ as outlined above probably regard the extractive indus-
tries as an almost irrelevant sideshow to these debates: they would see the
focus areas for actions as being the manufacturing sector and its associated
technologies.14 The review so far presented in this chapter—and in more
detail in Dietsche (2017b)—has sought to demonstrate that this would be far
too narrow a view: several strands in the newer literature suggest important
potential roles for the extractive industries in contributing to economic diver-
sification. The remainder of this section sets out four observations on new
industrial policy and extractives-led development.
14 This observation does not mean that all proponents of industrial policy are set on reviving
and encouraging manufacturing independently of the extractive industries. For example, Stiglitz
(2015) recognizes that an economy based on natural resources can use those resources as a basis for
diversification. He points to South Africa’s experience of moving from producing earth-moving
equipment for the mining sector to producing automobiles.
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7.4.1 A Positive Role for the Extractive Industries
With broader global acceptance of the case for industrial policy and a more
nuanced understanding of what such policy might comprise, there are no
obvious reasons why considered governments would not choose to devote
some part of their resource revenues to support other non-extractive sectors
with appropriate policy measures. There is now an increased international
understanding of the importance of, first, observing and, second, supporting
what happens around the sector, as opposed to focusing more narrowly
on what happens within the sector. This understanding has been reinforced
by several years of insights distilled from observing the successes and failures
of the extractives-led development agenda to which the UNU-WIDER project
on ‘Extractives for Development’ also seeks to contribute (UNU-WIDER n.d.).
This developmentmakes it more likely that any host government that seeks to
apply a new industrial policy approach in the interest of long-term sustainable
economic development based on diversification will be able to draw on exten-
sive international ideas and increasing support for these, including from
development agencies that back respective initiatives such as, for example,
the economic growth corridors of the World Bank.
Not least, this suggestion corresponds with the arguments of those propon-
ents who associate new industrial policy with structural transformation, char-
acterized by increased product and service sophistication and the transfer of
resources towards more productive economic activities (Felipe 2015). More-
over, it is quite clear that in the period of high investment during the last
super-cycle some lower- and middle-income countries have seen the transfer
of some resources to higher-productivity activities associatedwith their increas-
ing dependence on minerals and/or oil and gas. However, the challenge to
which there has not yet been a generally good response is how to sustain such
initial gains by spreading productivity gains to other sectors.
Contrary to the position that some host governments like to take, such
spreading does not happen automatically. In fact, new industrial policy suggests
it requires smart policies that support, for example, enterprise development,
local skills training, and the promotion of new investments in non-extractive
sectors that have the potential to become viable on their own. The more
nuanced thinking that is now underpinning the debate provides several ideas
on taking forward such policy interventions and developing supportive institu-
tions.Mentioned earlierwas the example ofRodrik (2007). Alsonoted abovewas
that there is significant congruence between this view on new industrial policy
and the proposals put forth by international mining companies to partner with
governments, local enterprises, and third parties to enhance mining’s positive
contributions to development, and minimize any negative impacts on host
countries and communities (ICMM 2011).
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Another line of thought is suggested by Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014, 2017),
who have cautioned that the East Asian model of export-led manufacturing
growth may not be that relevant for the late developing economies of, for
example, sub-Saharan Africa. However, Stiglitz also notes that, in addition to
the key role the East African model assigns tomanufacturing, several other of its
features remain very relevant for new industrial policy. First, as an export-led
model, the East-Asian model does not face significant demand constraints from
small domestic markets. Second, it addresses the FOREX problem of countries
that might otherwise have been limited by that constraint. Third, it provides a
convenient basis for learning-by-doing and the absorption of new technologies
from abroad, which are critical elements for discovering and learning (see 7.2.2
above). Fourth, the East Asian model provides relatively easily taxable revenues
and so helps to boost public spending capacity. Finally, being centred on a
discrete number of enterprise units, it provides for a relatively natural system of
accountability for those revenues, as compared to the problem of taxing a huge
and dispersed set of agriculture-based businesses. A quick glance at this list of key
factors suggests their relevance for the extractives-led development model.
On the other hand, there is the question: If not manufacturing, what can
serve as the basis for the industrial policy endeavours of the later developers?
Stiglitz’s answer is that any new industrial policy needs to adopt a multi-sector
approach and, with respect to this, in most countries the agricultural sector
also needs to play a bigger role. This would require that more policy attention
is paid to formalizing land rights, to promoting more advanced technologies,
to encouraging non-labour-saving innovations, and to supporting respective
skills development and learning across the relevant constituencies. The service
sector can also be a key growth sector, butwill typically need a lot of support for
skills development and the opening up and development of selective tradeable
services. Both the agricultural and the service sectors, if better supported by
industrial policy, can provide important complementary activities to those of
extractive industries. In essence, a multi-sectoral approach needs to be mutu-
ally reinforcing and encourage economic activities around a buoyant extrac-
tives sector in which private operators are willing to invest. Contrary to the
view that was commonly held in development circles until recently, there is no
reason for the extractives sector to be sidelined and treated as an embarrassing
irrelevance alongside calls to industrialize and diversify economies. Instead,
host governments should think of the extractives sector as an integral part of a
broad-based, multi-sector approach to industrial policy.
7.4.2 Much Theory, Less Practice
Much of the debate on new industrial policy appears to happen in the intellec-
tual space of economists hypothesizing what countries ought to be doing. This
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comes at the expense of paying less attention to what countries have actually
been trying to do and what in the process they have, or have not, achieved.
An example of this is the intellectual debate centred on the arguments about
whether countries should be complying with or defying their comparative
advantages,15 which merits the question of what these arguments hold for
the extractives-led development agenda. First, the argument of complying with
comparative advantages would broadly point to the following recommenda-
tion: low-income countries endowed with extractive resources should con-
tinue to focus on this advantage and encourage investment in this typically
export-focused sector. For example, in the case of sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, this would entail pursuing policies that attract those export-oriented,
low-skill, labour-intensive industries that China and other emerging market
economies are moving on from. The assumption would be that over time both
types of foreign investments will somehow contribute to countries advancing
their productive knowledge and technological capabilities.
Second, the argument for defying existing comparative advantages would sug-
gest that countries should strive to acquire concrete new production experi-
ences via learning-by-doing and cross-sector collaboration. In the context of
the extractive sector, this argument would point towards acquiring productive
knowledge and technological capabilities that are transferable across sectors, so
that ancillary sectors with growth potential could gain a basis from which to
launch. This is the argument for focusing on selective work packages associ-
ated with the development phase of extractive projects to support enterprise
and skills development that can be capitalized beyond the sector (such as in
relation to civil construction, infrastructure development, or general business
services work).
Notably, both arguments are preoccupied with advising on the ‘right’ policy
interventions, but this comes at the cost of paying insufficient attention to
how positive institutional change would be brought about as result of such
interventions. In addition, both arguments assume the continuation of open
trade and cross-border investment.
7.4.3 Local Content as Industrial Policy
A topic that the extractives-led development agenda has well embraced is
‘local content’, seen as a means to build linkages between foreign investment
in extractives projects and the local economy.16 But let’s face it: local content
strategies and policies are industrial strategies and policies by a different name.
15 Elaborated in more detail in Dietsche (2017b) and Box 1 therein.
16 Alternative terminology may refer to local procurement and local employment, or to local
participation.
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And, as there is no universally agreed definition, local content practices can
vary widely across countries: for example, some governments focus narrowly
on the procurement of goods and services from companies that are owned
by nationals, while others consider not only local procurement but also
local hiring, skills development, community-based enterprise development
activities, or shared infrastructure development (IPIECA 2016). In recent
years, many countries hosting extractive industries have put much effort
into developing local content strategies, policies, laws, and regulations with
the objective of retainingmore value in the country and in local communities.
At the same time, there is still relatively little research that gathers and
investigates empirical evidence on what local content policies have actually
delivered.
7.4.4 Secondary Impacts of International Environmental and Social Policies
Concerns over climate change and associated international, national, and
local environmental policies are driving the green industrial policy agenda,
which has culminated in the universal climate agreement reached at the Paris
COP21 in November 2015. This development has prompted observers to
consider the impacts on the extractives-led development agenda. This think-
ing has shaped new terms, such as ‘stranded assets’ and ‘unburnable carbon’,
where the low-income producers of extractive resources are often assumed to
be the takers of the consequences of green industrial policies. At the same time,
the extractives-led development agenda is assuming that economic growth
will continue to be energy- and material-intensive.
The impacts of green industrial policy vary across the energy and the
minerals sector: the former is likely to see a greater shift towards renewables,
while at the same time some transformational green economy technologies
are reliant on metals and minerals (World Bank 2017). Furthermore, some of
the critical green technology minerals are produced as by-products of other,
more conventional minerals as well as through various forms of mining: these
include not only industrial mining but also artisanal and small-scale mining,
which generates a lot of employment but comes with a range of additional
environmental and social challenges. In particular, stricter regulations on
sourcing minerals from conflict-prone and high-risk areas that are comple-
menting green industrial policiesmaymean that themining sector will see the
expansion of new forms of so-called urban and/or flexible mining: that is, the
recovery and recycling of secondary materials. Finally, as and when the struc-
tural transformation associated with green industrial policy progresses and a
more circular economy evolves, there is the influence of the financial sector
choosing more carefully what types of primary and secondary extractive
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resources activities it will invest in, including funding the implementation of a
more circular economy.
7.5 Conclusions
There are at least three reasons why industrial policy is back on the agenda: the
revision of the pro-poor development agenda of the 2000s; international
climate policy pushing for a more sustainable and greener economic system;
and disappointment with the social outcomes associated with economic lib-
eralization and globalization. Yet, opinions on new industrial policy remain
divided, ranging from evoking fears again over the risk of unproductive rent-
seeking to populist calls for industrial policy as the panacea for all that might
have gone wrong with neoliberal capitalism. Those in the middle of this wide
spectrummaintain that investing in productive knowledge and technological
capabilities is critical for economic and social development.
This chapter has sought to disentangle the debate on new industrial policy
and how it relates to the resources-led development agenda, where the latter
builds on the premise that the extractive industries can have a positive devel-
opmental impact provided that host governments pursue ‘appropriate pol-
icies’. The very suggestion that it is possible to transform and diversify an
economy on the back of these industries draws attention to what is happening
around the sector.
The chapter highlighted the challenge that its proponents hold different
views on the role that new industrial policy should play. Picking up several
themes that run across the ongoing debate, it drew the sobering conclusion
that there simply is no consensus on new industrial policy. At best, it is at the
philosophical level where a case can be made for the positive role of public
authorities in providing institutions that reduce transaction costs. This left a
rather incomplete picture of what new industrial policy could bring to the
extractives-led development agenda. Looking forward, the chapter drew atten-
tion to four observations that re-emphasize some important points of connec-
tion between the newmainstream literature on industrial policy and the basic
attributes of the extractive industries.
The first observation was that the evolving debate encourages new thinking
on a positive role for extractive industries as part of a multi-sector approach to
industrial policy. Second, a large part of the new industrial policy debate is
focused on what countries ought to be doing and what the right policy
interventions are that they should be pursuing. This has come at the expense
of paying more attention to the subject of positive institutional change,
underpinning the development of comparative advantages for the future.
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Third, increasingly popular local content strategies and policies are indus-
trial strategies and policies by another name, but often with a particularly
narrow focus and without tracking whether these strategies and policies have
actually resulted in the positive institutional change that can sustain gains in
productive knowledge and technologies over time.
Finally, the green industrial policy agenda has prompted observers to con-
sider the impact of this agenda on the extractives-led development agenda.
With the green industrial policy agenda focusing on the structural transform-
ation of the largest and most industrialized countries and emerging market
economies, low-income producers of extractive resources are cast in the role of
passive takers of the consequences of these policies. Notably, the impacts vary
across the energy and the minerals sector: the former is likely to see a greater
shift towards renewables, while the latter, in addition to traditional mining,
may see the strengthening of new forms of urban and flexible mining and a
shift towards the circular economy concept.
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Part IV
Policy Challenges in the
Macro-management of Extractives
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8.1 Introduction
Managing natural resource wealth requires accommodating to often very large
increases in investment, production, exports, and government revenues
within the economy of the host country, and setting appropriate macroeco-
nomic policies—especially fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies—both
to prevent resource wealth from destabilizing the economy and to ensure that
its potential for economic development is maximized.
In Part IV of this book we examine this complex challenge from a number of
perspectives, both theoretical and practical: the latter based on two contrast-
ing country examples (Ghana and Chile). Before doing this, it is useful to set
out a simple framework of ideas to guide the reader through some of the
complexity around macro decision-making and policy management. That is
the purpose of this short chapter.
At the outset, we make four fundamental points. These follow from the
specific and somewhat unusual characteristics of the macroeconomic flows
that result from the development of the extractives sector. These four points
are: (i) foreign direct investment, production, export, and revenues are often
large; (ii) for each project there is a strong degree of uniformity in the sequence
of activity from discovery through development to production; (iii) the non-
renewable resource is finite, and so are the revenues; (iv) commodity prices are
often volatile, which means that extractives’ export receipts and public rev-
enues are volatile as well.
First, the scale of extractives follows from the capital intensity of the sector.
Oil andmining companies are often large businesses. For low-income countries
(LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) the capital intensity of extractives
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means that investment and production are frequently non-marginal. This is a
point made in Chapter 23 by Roe and Round, in their review of indirect
impacts. Indeed, extractives revenues can be so large relative to the size of the
host economy that theirmacroeconomic effects dominatemuch of what else is
happening in the economy.
A second introductory point is the explicit recognition that the conversion
of any extractive resource, whether minerals, or oil or gas, into something
useful for society (e.g. improved healthcare or a more diversified industrial
base) entails a standard sequence of asset transformations. First, the natural
resource needs to be discovered, and then it must be ‘produced’ (i.e. dug up or
pumped out and brought above the ground or the ocean) and then sold. This
process converts the natural resource into a monetary asset, part of which will
(quickly or slowly) be transferred from the extractive companies as a stream of
revenue for the host government. That revenue stream takes the form of taxes,
royalties, and any claims (through an equity stake or an explicit production-
sharing arrangement) that the government has over some part of the produc-
tion generated by extractives companies. The subsequent transformation into
an asset of value to society works through the public finances. This includes
public investments in infrastructure as well as education and health services
that contribute to the accumulation of human capital, and through any
additional private investment which can be stimulated as public projects
with high social returns are chosen. In sum, a sequence of macroeconomic
flows associated with asset transformation—as illustrated in Figure 8.1—can
be anticipated (their scale and character, of course, depending upon whether
good or bad policy choices are made).
Third, the economic lifespans of natural assets are finite, ranging from a few
decades to several centuries, hence the importance of thinking about their
transformation into other assets. Our characterization of the extractives value















































Figure 8.1. A chain of asset transformations
Source: authors’ illustration.
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chain as a sequence of asset transformations helps link the finite nature of a
natural asset with the set of revenue and spending decisions that constitute
the fiscal policy responses to the significant new macroeconomic flows that
follow from investment in extractives.
The fourth fundamental observation is that resource revenues are likely to
be highly volatile (judged by the historical record of commodity prices over
the last hundred years or more). In countries where extractives are large
relative to GDP, that volatility translates into significant volatility in export
receipts and public revenues. Further, when the fiscal terms for the transfer of
rent from extractives companies to a government are progressive—meaning
that the government secures a higher share of the rent when prices are
higher—then the fiscal terms augment revenue volatility. In other words,
contract terms which transfer a greater share of rent at higher prices also
transfer a greater challenge of managing volatility to the public finances.
Together these four dimensions of the extractives sector are central to the
approach to macroeconomic and fiscal management that any resource-rich
country needs to establish. We now discuss the issues in more detail.
8.2 The Nature of the Basic Problem
To function well the process of asset transformation needs to be underpinned
by a clear set of legal and administrative structures and specific rules within
which any policies can be analysed, decided, and then administered. Ideally,
these institutions should provide clear legal guidance about the differentiated
rights and responsibilities of governments, companies, and citizens. In the
absence of such an institutional foundation, backed by a consensus sufficient
to sustain it, the potential benefits of extractive activities will be lost. More-
over, the underlying challenges can overwhelm the technical capability of
government, leading to adverse development outcomes.
Establishing an appropriate andmanageable legal, institutional, and admin-
istrative structure is therefore a crucial component of sound natural resource
management for all countries. However, the circumstances under which
sound institutions are most needed are often also those which are hardest to
establish. This is especially so in the LICs. The institutional issues are further
illustrated in the case studies on Ghana and Chile in Chapters 10 and 11.
Some dimensions of the institutional structure beyond those involving
macroeconomic management are discussed more fully in other parts of the
book. One issue discussed is the fact that greater complexity arises because the
issues that need to be embraced by this broad structure for policy choices
involve many separate parts of government administration: ministries of
oil, energy, and mining; industry and environmental regulators, revenue
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authorities, central banks, and various sector ministries such as labour, health,
and education.
Adding further to this complexity is the fact that these different areas of
policy responsibility come into play at different times along the asset-
transformation chain. Although there is some uniformity in the sequence of
discovery, investment, and production, and so predictability in institutional
and policy challenges along the chain, the unusually broad range of technical
and administrative tasks means that effective management of extractives
typically involves a wider range of specialist knowledge and more systematic
coordination than do other areas of government policy. Further detail and
discussion of these matters can be found in Henstridge and Rweyemamu
(2017), AfDB (2015), OPM (2013), and in Chapter 17 by Kathryn McPhail in
this volume.
8.3 Macroeconomic Management and Dutch Disease
Themost familiar way of representing themacroeconomic challenges faced by
a country with newly discovered oil or mineral wealth is by reference to the
concept of ‘Dutch Disease’. This so-called disease arises from a set of circum-
stances that are commonly associated with the discovery and exploitation of a
large natural resource, and the associated asset transformation as described
earlier. Specifically, it occurs when a country experiences a large inflow of
foreign currency (perhaps in billions of dollars) associated with the new
investment needed to produce the extractive resources, and later, after a lag
of four to five years or longer, it also experiences the large production revenues
from the sale of the extracted resources. These significant foreign inflows can
lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER) which has the effect of
making domestic goods (often referred to as ‘non-traded’ goods) relatively
more expensive and international goods (or ‘traded’ goods such as traditional
exports) relatively cheaper. As a consequence, the non-extractive sectors of
the economy—such as those in export agriculture or in embryonic industrial
production––are likely to experience declining production and employment
at the same time as the production of extractives expands.
Why is this problematic for the longer term if not for the immediate future?
The answer is in part because natural resources have finite lives and in the
longer term any economy needs to look to its non-extractives sector to sup-
port a growth path that is genuinely sustainable (see also Chapter 5 by Glada
Lahn and Paul Stevens). In addition, any expansion of an enclave (and capital-
intensive) sector alone would lead to growth in aggregate GDP, but at the same
time a worsening of the income distribution (unless some significant part
of the resource rent is redistributed via the fiscal system, either in the
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form of increased social protection or in public services). Without fiscal
redistribution, there is a danger that most people will feel excluded from the
fruits of extractives-led economic growth. Public expectations can become
seriously inflated merely by the news of resource discoveries, as our case
example of the recent experience of Ghana demonstrates. Then any failure
tomeet these expectationsmakes the politics of macroeconomicmanagement
even more difficult. Managing these problems, and avoiding a sharp RER
appreciation, is essential to safeguarding macroeconomic health.
The likely magnitude of the Dutch Disease threat depends on both the size
of any new extractive resources relative to the size and absorptive capacity of
the host economy, and also the scale of any existing financials flows in and
out of the country. But it is fairly clear that Dutch Disease is likely to pose a
greater threat to countries with small economies and limited absorptive
capacity—especially if the new resource wealth is large relative to the pre-
existing macroeconomy.
8.4 Fiscal Policy as the Main Instrument
Governments can utilize both fiscal and monetary policy to mitigate the risk
of Dutch Disease. However, there is general recognition that in both LICs and
many MICs fiscal policy has to bear the brunt of responsibility with monetary
policy normally taking the stage as a supporting player.1 So we proceed for the
moment with the proposition that the main bulwark available to govern-
ments to avoid or mitigate the threat of Dutch Disease is its own fiscal policy
and public finance management (PFM) more generally.2
Any host government can in principle choose both the speed at which it
scales up its own spending and also the composition of that spending in the
light of new extractive revenues. This is a set of choices that need to be
considered not only in relation to those revenues that accrue to the govern-
ment itself, but also in the light of the extra demand pressures caused by the
broader economy-wide spending increases associated with the investment
and the later production of extractives. Ideally, total spending (government
plus private) should be managed to grow in line with the absorptive capacity
of an economy: that is, the production capacity of the economy to respond,
1 This is mainly because most LICs and many MICs have only small financial sectors (limited
monetary depth and only small or non-existent capital markets), which makes the use of the
traditional instruments of monetary policy both difficult and potentially destabilizing (e.g. even
small open-market transactions in government debt can cause large movements of interest rates—
assuming that these rates are not administratively fixed).
2 A systematic discussion of how the dangers of Dutch Disease can be addressed by both fiscal
and monetary policy can be found in Magud and Sosa (2010).
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without excessive shortages, to any extra demand. If total spending outstrips
absorptive capacity, this is likely to increase the price of domestic goods
(including skilled labour and real estate, both of which are inelastic in supply)
and thereby provoke a RER appreciation. But since no government has direct
control of the private component of total spending,3 it is clear that its major
effective instrument is the control of its own spending. More specifically, it is
commonly argued that increases in total government spending in response to
increased extractives revenues need to be moderate and consistent from one
year to the next—large and irregular annual increases will make Dutch Disease
more likely and more damaging. But government can also mobilize a second
useful PFM instrument. This is the pattern or composition of government
spending. For example, increased spending on imported goods as well as any
government spending that can increase the elasticity of supply of domestic
non-tradable goods will reduce the demand pressures on domestic supply and
so reduce the risks associated with limited absorptive capacity. One example is
increased spending on training, to increase the supply of citizens with the
requisite skills. Public spending that reduces the costs of supplying tradable
goods can also offset some or all of the negative impact of an RER appreciation
on the incentive to produce tradables (e.g. increased spending on transport
infrastructure that serves to reduce the costs of exporting may potentially offset
any disincentive to export production arising from an RER appreciation).
8.5 The Hierarchy of Fiscal Policy Choices
Beyond this basic set of propositions about the role of fiscal policy in man-
aging total spending in the economy, we can conceive of a stylized sequence
of policy choices that the fiscal authorities need to address in managing their
new-found extractives wealth. This sequence of choices follows the sequence
of asset transformations set out above in Section 8.1. These choices have been
set out in more detail in AfDB (2015) and are summarized here rather more
concisely.
The fiscal policy choices start from any material exploration activity. The
investment in explorationwill have an early impact on public revenues—from
employing people and buying supplies locally—regardless of whether the
exploration venture discovers a commercially viable mineral. At the point of
declaration of commerciality, expectations of wealth grow, especially in the
geographical vicinity of any discovery. Further development will be needed
before a ‘final investment decision’, which would be a material commitment
3 Some indirect control can of course be exerted by the use of interest rate and other components
of monetary policy.
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in the case of oil and gas (but more like one initial step with more smaller
bundles of ‘sustaining’ capital investment decisions to follow for mining). At
the final investment decision point, a reasonable certainty of the likely timing
of investment and production can be established.4 Given expected volumes of
production and export, the prospects for future mineral revenue can then be
evaluated—based on assumptions about future prices.
The modelling of revenue projections is then a combination of (i) reason-
ably clear engineering timelines for development and the construction of
production and export facilities, (ii) price assumptions (which are subject to
uncertainty), and (iii) some assessment of geological and engineering risk,
mixed with non-technical risks. These projections condition at least four fiscal
decisions:
 Decision 1: Should a government borrow in advance of the arrival of
resource revenue streams in the knowledge that those government rev-
enues may be delayed for several years because of (i) a long lag between
the construction work involved and production and (ii) a further lag as
capital or investment allowances work out and production companies
begin to pay significant corporate tax?5
 Decision 2: Should a government quickly spend the bulk of its newly
acquired revenues or save some part of these, and if so, how large a part?6
 Decision 3: Having decided on that part of its own revenues to be spent
reasonably quickly, should a government spend on consumption (e.g.
increasing the salaries of civil servants or improving operations and
maintenance (O & M) activities), or should it instead invest in new
infrastructure and other investment goods (e.g. roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals)?
 Decision 4: For the saved portion of its revenues, what should govern-
ment do with those savings? Choices include: saving by depositing funds
in general foreign currency reserves managed by the nation’s central
bank, or establishing some form of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) with or
without a stabilization function. In the case of an SWF, there is the further
4 In practice, commercial operators will normally work with a range of different scenarios, each
associated with specific assumptions about uncertain parameters, especially prices.
5 This is a bigger problem in mining than it is in oil and gas because of the prevalence of
production sharing agreements (PSAs) in the latter case.
6 There is sometimes scope for mixing up the concepts of savings and investment. Here we
distinguish between spending, whether on consumption or on investment, and financial savings.
This is different from themore formally correct distinction between spending on consumption and
savings—where savings can also mean public capital expenditure on physical assets as well as
accumulating financial assets. Our reasoning is that an increment to public expenditure financed
by foreign revenues is constrained by the absorptive capacity of the economy in a way that parking
financial assets overseas is not: see Chapter 9 by Rick van der Ploeg and Tony Venables.
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choice of whether the SWF should be mandated to invest funds only
outside the country or partly in domestic assets, thereby risking additional
local spending pressures as such funds are used for domestic investment.
We now review a few of the considerations that apply to each of these four
steps in the sequence of decisions.
8.6 Early-stage Borrowing
An early-stage decision for many governments in LICs and MICs is that of
whether to borrow internationally to increase their capacity to spend extract-
ive revenues in advance of their arrival.
There are some sound economic reasons why a sensible government
might consider borrowing in advance of any receipt of revenue flows. In
particular, if the borrowed funds are invested in improving infrastructure
and other potentially growth-enhancing activities, this might increase the
future tax base, thereby partly self-financing the additional expenditures.
The country’s growth and development benefits will then arrive earlier,
without compromising its ability to make future debt repayments once
the revenues from natural resources do arrive. At the same time, all debt-
financing incurs a cost for governments in the form of the interest repay-
ments, with the monetary payments involved being in principle usable for
other public purposes. Furthermore, for even a well-conceived public good
investment (such as a vital new road), it is well documented that the
government will only receive a small part of the increased economic pro-
duction in the form of increased tax revenues with which to service its extra
debt (see Buffie et al. 2012).
The technical calculus involved here is relatively straightforward: the justifi-
cation for any additional debt service burden hinges on the costs of the new
borrowing, the existing burden of debt service, and above all on whether the
borrowed funds are used for productive purposes––their use to finance
increased consumption would obviously be problematic. There are also
some obvious risks associated with accumulating debt in the expectation of
future revenues. Those flows can never be fully certain given the inherent
volatility of commodity markets, and the uncertainties about the timing of
extractives production. If revenues are smaller than anticipated, then debt
levels could become unsustainable, thereby undermining the government’s
future ability to spend and invest. Venezuela in 2017/18 is an extreme
example of this syndrome: one of the world’s most richly endowed oil econ-
omies is close to debt default. Ghana, discussed by Bawumia and Halland in
Chapter 11, is a less extreme example of debt over-accumulation.
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Indeed, for many such countries there is a strong temptation to borrow that
can override narrow technical factors. The reason is that this decision
involves the confluence of three dangerous realities. First, public expectations
about a prospective windfall are often hyped up by the media (and often
politicians), thereby putting pressure on government to show early results.
Second, due to the nature of extractives discovery and production, the most
significant government revenues (e.g. from corporate tax) may typically take a
long time to materialize—sometimes over a decade between discovery, con-
struction, operations, and major revenue streams accruing to governments.
Many governments will quite reasonably look for some stopgap financing to
limit the time gaps between the announcement of new resource discoveries
and any benefits associated with increased spending. The third reality is that
international bankers—in search of new investment opportunities—will
be only too willing to market new sovereign borrowing opportunities to
newly extractive-rich economies—even including some that have had quite
recent experience of severe debt-servicing problems (e.g. Ghana before
1996, when the country was granted debt relief under the HIPC and Extended
HIPC processes).
One main lesson from Ghana’s recent experience (Bawumia and Halland,
Chapter 11) is that debt-financed spending in response to short-term political
pressures is unlikely to meet longer-term productive goals. It is more likely to
result in spending that fails to match the high costs of debt financing, thereby
creating a burden for future generations. Ghana illustrates the challenges of
establishing a sufficiently comprehensive and credible fiscal framework in
circumstances when it is most needed; Mozambique offers a similar and
more recent example of this general problem.
8.7 To Spend or to Save?
When resource revenues eventually arrive, the government is faced with a
second key decision. What part of these revenues should be spent now (for
either extra government consumption or public investment) and what part
should instead be kept as financial savings for the future?
The classical theoretical answer to this question (referred to as the Hartwick
rule) is that since the new revenues represent themonetization of an asset that
is being depleted over time as part of a sequence of asset transformations,
revenue should be invested fully in commensurate amounts of new public
capital—primarily infrastructure and human capital—in order to avoid a net
reduction in national wealth (Hamilton and Hartwick 2005). But there is an
alternative theoretical viewpoint, namely that natural resource wealth can be
regarded as a net addition to national wealth, in which case a portion of the
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revenues could be used to increase government consumption—in line with
the ‘permanent income hypothesis’ (PIH).
In reality the decision to spend or save and the balance between these will
be determined by each particular country’s political and economic situation.
The theoretical considerations that govern the short-term versus long-term
decision (to save or to consume) are reviewed more completely by van der
Ploeg and Venables in Chapter 9.
A central and important practical proposition is that many developing
economies suffer from a chronic scarcity of the capital needed for economic
development. Given this, spending on additional public investment makes
sense since the marginal returns from such investment are likely to be high.
The most important caveat is of especial relevance to many oil economies
such as Nigeria and Venezuela. This is that where the capacity to absorb such
spending is limited (e.g. there is perhaps a limited technical ability to design
large investment projects or maybe technical limitations on the country’s
ability to procure, implement, and monitor projects) then there is a need for
greater caution. This argues for some planned delays in committing to such
investment but also provides a strong case for first ‘investing in investing’ as
recommended in Collier (2010).
Notwithstanding the points made above, at least some of the extractive
revenues should arguably be saved in almost all country cases, and for two
main reasons. First, the prices of most extractive commodities are highly
volatile and so the full spending of all incoming revenues as and when they
arrive would likely cause serious negative fiscal consequences. These include:
(i) high levels of volatility in government spending characterized by revenue
shortfalls in years of low prices and inflated spending in years of high prices;
and (ii) pro-cyclical patterns of spending, which would exacerbate the
unavoidable booms and busts of commodity price cycles. Second, even when
there are demonstrably high returns to extra domestic investment, there are
limits in most countries as to how fast government spending can be increased
in the short term. As noted earlier, limitations on absorptive capacity together
with sudden large increases in total domestic spending (buoyed by high levels
of fiscal spend) are likely to inflate prices and appreciate the RER (to the
detriment of traded goods production and economic growth). So despite pub-
lic and political pressures, it would invariably be important to allocate some
part of the increased government revenues to increased financial savings,
whether to park the revenues in the face of an absorption constraint, or as a
more explicit smoothing device rather than spending all of them.
One increasingly common way of avoiding a tendency to volatility in the
public finances is to enable inter-temporal expenditure smoothing by adopting
clearly defined fiscal rules. Such rules typically set out to stabilize the evolution
of revenues over time by requiring savings in periods of higher commodity
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prices and possible dissaving at other times. They are typically set as numerical
limits on budgetary aggregates and can be defined in various different ways:
examples include spending rules, budgetary rules, revenue rules, and debt
rules—see, for example, IMF (2009); Kopits and Symansky (1998).
The cases of Chile and Ghana (in this volume, Chapters 10 and 11, respect-
ively) illustrate many of the practical issues that arise as countries seek to apply
these rules in different and often difficult political-economic contexts.
8.8 To Invest or to Consume?
The third decision in our stylized hierarchy of fiscal planning choices relates
to the part of total government spending (consumption plus investment)
that should be allocated to consumption rather than to investment. Some
spending must be used to address immediate short-term needs such as
ongoing operations and maintenance (O&M) of existing infrastructure
(and also public-sector wages). Some increment to consumption owing to
an increase in national wealth is consistent with the PIH. So the available
revenues can rarely be committed fully to longer-term investments. But
on what basis might the decision on an appropriate allocation be reached?
There is no definitive technical answer but merely a few relevant
observations.
It is rather appealing—publicly and politically—given capital scarcity to
state that investment spending should be favoured as being more visible but
also more productive than consumption spending. Hence if the project prep-
aration and management constraints can be addressed, then investment
should arguably be the number one priority. However, against this there is
much evidence that many LICs also suffer from a serious deficit of adequate
O&M of their existing capital stock. Indeed, recent economic modelling has
shown that the returns to O&M for existing capital investments can be
significantly higher than those for new investments (Adam and Bevan 2014).
Further, as noted earlier, building better public-sector capability to select
and implement investment projects may be a key contributor to public capital
and growth and so some non-investment spending that helps to build this
capability is an important complement to actual investments. Ideally the
government can strike a balance between consumption spending and invest-
ment based on these sorts of considerations as both are needed in most
country cases to achieve development objectives. However, in reality the
third decision is often hijacked by various political economy pressures (e.g.
to hike public-sector wages) as the example of Ghana, in Chapter 11, so clearly
demonstrates.
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8.9 Where Should Any Financial Savings Be Placed?
If and when the government has decided to save some part of its extractive
revenues—as in the ‘parking fund’ outlined by van der Ploeg and Venables,
Chapter 9, or as a smoothing instrument, a final choice relates to the decision
about where to place (‘invest’) those savings. Two main options present
themselves, namely: (i) save the foreign currency received from the extractive
resources as an increase in reserves at the central bank, or (ii) through the
creation of a specialized fund—a sovereign wealth fund (SWF).
Saving through an SWF requires initial and ongoing investment. Addition-
ally, both the set-up costs and the ongoing administrative costs (e.g. of fund
management) are likely to be large and these costs are only justified if the
revenues from natural resources themselves are both large and likely to be
sustained over many years. So, for example, the administrative costs of the
long-standing Norway SWF, though large in absolute amount, are very small
relative to the huge capital fund that has now been accumulated (almost
US$900 billion by 2016). By contrast a newly established fund in LICs such
as Tanzania and Mozambique would be unlikely to build capital at more than
about US$200 million per annum even on favourable assumptions about
commodity prices, political will, and investment returns, and so the fixed
costs of establishing and then operating that fund could be disproportionately
high. More generally if the anticipated revenue streams are small, or saving’s
main aim is to smooth expenditure over the medium term rather than to
accumulate for the long run, then the costs of an SWFmay not be justified and
saving via the central bank may be preferable. This is likely to be the case in
many LICs.
8.10 Chapters 9, 10, and 11
The remaining chapters in Part IV develop some of the key points made above
and elaborate on them by reference to both theory and some practical case
examples.
Chapter 9 by van der Ploeg and Venables considers the short- versus the
longer-term aspects of the macroeconomic problem. Specifically, they address
two of the decisions identified above. The first is how much of any revenue
windfall should be used for boosting current household consumption or
current government spending, and how much should be used for accumulat-
ing assets of some sort: that is, consumption versus saving? The second
question is: should any saving be invested in foreign assets (an SWF for
short) or domestic assets, and if so, why?
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Chapter 9 addresses these problems by first setting out a model framework
that captures the trade-offs between the alternative uses of resource revenues.
This model is used to confirm that intergenerational efficiency in the saving–
consumption choice depends on the return to investment, r, and the rate at
which society trades off present consumption for future consumption, as
measured by the consumption rate of interest.7 They next use the model
to remind us that in an economy that has access to perfect international
capital markets (and suffers no capital scarcity), the inter-temporal smoothing
of consumption would conform to the pattern suggested by the PIH. This in
turn would suggest that all savings and the resulting asset accumulation
after a natural resource windfall should be placed in foreign assets, such
as an SWF. However, they argue that this theoretical result is largely irrelevant
for LICs.
However, that argument is also qualified theoretically by the further point
that as capital is accumulated and debt is reduced, the (domestic) rate of return
falls, so that a developing economy could in principle converge to look more
like an economy with no capital scarcity. Thus, starting from a low base,
capital is accumulated, income rises, and the rate of return falls, ultimately
reaching a level similar to that in high-income countries where it can support
similar levels of income and consumption. This in turn leads to some inter-
esting conclusions about the optimal time path of consumption. Specifically,
the consumption increment (relative to that seen in the pre-windfall baseline)
is largest immediately after the windfall, and then declines. The intuition
behind this is that the current generation is by definition poorer than future
generations (assuming that there is positive growth), so that the consumption
increment is skewed towards this poorer generation. At the same time, room is
made for investments to stimulate growth and development. In brief, once the
model framework is modified to include the key developing-country features
of capital scarcity and high borrowing costs, the policy messages are signifi-
cantly different from those of the PIH.
Finally, none of the above takes account of the further developing-country
reality of limited absorptive capacity and other bottlenecks that might con-
strain new investment: e.g. a paucity of high-return projects ready to be
implemented even when finance is available. In the public sector, in particu-
lar, there is unlikely to be a pipeline of good investment projects. These
problems have to be addressed before effective investments can be under-
taken. The authors argue that in these cases, it makes no sense to spend
natural revenues on inefficient projects. Instead, there is a strong case for
7 Which in turn is defined as ρ + ηg, where g is the (trend) rate of growth of consumption and the
parameter η > 0 is the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (capturing the rate at
which the marginal value of consumption diminishes as individuals become richer).
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establishing a ‘parking’ fund for natural resource revenues until such time as
they can be used efficiently in the domestic economy.
A central recommendation from Chapter 9 is that resource-rich countries
need to be clear about the reasons why they may commit part of any revenue
windfalls to invest in foreign assets via some sort of SWF. A commonly men-
tioned reason is to accumulate financial assets that can be used to generate
permanent income for future generations: this implies an investment port-
folio comprised mainly of assets with longer-term maturities. However, the
relevance of such reasoning in themajority of LIC cases is questionable since it
relies on the proposition that returns on additional domestic investment are
already close to those available on alternative (foreign) assets. The second
possible reason for investing some part of revenue windfalls in an SWF
invokes the point that the efficient path of investment in the domestic
economy will depend on that economy’s absorptive capacity: ideally this
should be slowly built up through a programme of ‘investing in investing’.
In the meantime, it is appropriate to argue that some part of savings might be
‘parked’ offshore until they can be invested efficiently in the domestic econ-
omy: this implies an investment portfolio comprised mainly of assets with
relatively short-term maturities. A third possible reason is to insulate the
economy from short- to medium-run fluctuations in commodity prices.
Given the likelihood of such fluctuations, it makes sense to accumulate pre-
cautionary buffers in a stabilization fund, especially since it is difficult to hedge
away all this risk using financial derivatives.
Chapter 11 by Bawumia and Halland shows how the neat theoretical logic
of Chapter 9 tends to unwind when real-world political economy intrudes
as it has done with damaging consequences in the case of Ghana over the
past decade.
They note that Ghana’s discovery of oil in 2007 raised public expectations
substantially: for many—the public and politicians—as the prospective rev-
enues appeared to be the long-awaited solution to Ghana’s developmental
challenges. Regrettably the outcomes that subsequently materialized were
sharply at odds with those expectations and at first glance seem to provide
support for some versions of the resource curse hypothesis. Between 1983 and
2008 Ghana had been one of the stars of the ‘Africa rising’ story, the toast of
the international development community. Ghana’s GDP more than quadru-
pled in nominal terms between 2001 and 2007 and the country established a
track record of macroeconomic stability and fiscal discipline. The chapter
provides a detailed picture of how this high-quality track record was gradually
established prior to 2007. It also notes that when oil was discovered, the
Ghanaian authorities (the governments from both the main political parties)
were very assiduous in seeking to learn lessons from the experiences of Nigeria
and other oil-rich countries, and to put in place solid institutional arrangements
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to avoid a resource curse, including apparently strong devices to encourage
fiscal discipline.
However, the authors then closely document the set of often relatively small
deviations from good practice that cumulatively undermined the initial good
intentions—the new institutional arrangements notwithstanding. Their
account of this provides an excellent real-world example of the practical
messiness of the concept of ‘institutions’ as elaborated by Evelyn Dietsche in
Chapter 6, and how this can so easily rebound to the detriment of macroeco-
nomic management. Specifically, by the end of 2008 Ghana’s inflation had
risen by 8 percentage points; the exchange rate had depreciated by 20 per cent
(relative to 2006); the fiscal deficit had risen to 6.5 per cent of GDP; and
international reserves had fallen to only 1.8 months of import cover (versus
3 months in 2006).
Notwithstanding this set of disappointing outcomes, the new post-2008
government continued efforts to build sound institutions to address the
known problems of the resource curse: types (ii) and (iii) institutions in
Dietsche’s terminology. In particular, it developed (with a great deal of inter-
national guidance and support) the Petroleum Revenue Management Act
(PRMA) and the Petroleum Commission Act, both in 2011. A degree of macro-
economic improvement was also achieved partly as a result of a new IMF
programme that ran from 2009 through 2012. The authors document in detail
the truly dramatic deterioration in the country’s macroeconomic situation
that resulted after that and through 2015: a deteriorating current account
balance, declining GDP growth, a sharp decline in capital investment, a big
increase in external debt and the associated interest payments, a large cur-
rency depreciation, and a big increase in the government’s borrowing from
the central bank.
A critical point from this chapter is what it reveals about the political
economy of extractives versus the economic theory of effective macroeco-
nomic management as set out by van der Ploeg and Venables in Chapter 9.
In Chapter 11 Bawumia and Halland argue that there were particular factors at
work in Ghana’s political and electoral system that help to explain the dis-
juncture as between the theoretical and the practical. For example, Ghana is
an effective democracy but one in which only a small margin (in terms of
percentages and sometimes actual numbers of votes) has separated the two
major parties in recent elections. Consequently, with a four-year term, the
pressure on any government to deliver is acute and the loss of even a small
number of votes can reverse electoral outcomes. Given this reality, and con-
sistent with the political business cycle literature, incumbent governments in
Ghana have generally expanded fiscal policy in election years. If you then
introduce a future oil bonanza into the political calculus, political-economy
reasoning would suggest that the first government to enjoy resource rents will
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do all it can to remain in power—even at the risk ofmacroeconomic instability.
A fundamental insight is that, in economic terms, the implicit discount rate
used by politicians may exceed the rate of interest by the probability of being
removed from office.
Chapter 10 by Solimano and Guajardo adds to this canvas of political-
economy issues by documenting the case of Chile and its large mineral
exports (mainly copper). Today Chile is usually characterized as a country
that has been unusually successful in managing the macroeconomic conse-
quences of its large extractives wealth. But as the authors explain, the histor-
ical story has been politically turbulent, the record onmacro-management has
often been poor, and even today’s situation is compromised by a variety of
question marks over the practices employed and the manner in which polit-
ical factors still intrude on decision-making.
Historically Chile has long been dependent on a high level of mineral
commodity exports: nitrates from the 1890s and copper from the 1930s
until today. However, the magnitude of mineral dependence has varied over
time partly as a result of dramatically differing government approaches to
industrial policy (ranging from import-substituting dirigisme to aggressively
liberal). Historically, the institutional framework of Chile’s copper sector has
been affected by the dominant role played by mainly US-owned foreign
corporations. A variety of disputes over the conduct of that ownership built
progressively into a national mood that led first, under the government of
Eduardo Frei Montalva, to the Chileanization law no. 16.425 of January 1966
that created copper public–private joint companies. Then, more dramatically,
in July 1971 the country’s Constitution wasmodified by the new government,
led by Salvador Allende, and the copper mines were nationalized. However,
this intense statist approach was then moderated under the military govern-
ment of Augusto Pinochet that seized power in 1973. That new government
moved quickly to establish a far more liberal, outward-looking, and friendly
approach to foreign companies, especially in the mining sector.
As the authors point out, this also left in place a somewhat contradictory
approach to the mining sector. On the one hand the new mining laws and
codes of the early 1980s were explicitly pro-private sector. On the other hand
the new Constitution of 1980 reflected much of the pro-state flavour of the
1971 nationalizations. In particular, in 1976 CODELCO was established as a
major and distinct state enterprise for managing the still-nationalized copper
companies. CODELCO’s role then and still today involves it in very significant
fiscal transfers to government (largely to finance military purchases by the
Chilean armed forces without the standard budget oversights).
Over time the Chilean copper sector, CODELCOaside, has been progressively
de-nationalized with an ever-larger share of mining assets being held by private
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companies that also enjoy significant benefits as incumbents. The decree law
established in 1974, and still ruling today, allows unlimited repatriation of
profits by foreign investors and the option of an invariant tax structure for
investments. This has made Chile one of the world’s most attractive mining
destinations for foreign investors and investment has picked up significantly as
a consequence, especially after the final ending of dictatorial rule in 1990.
The chapter then devotes considerable attention to the variety of fiscal
stabilization arrangements introduced from the later 1980s to mitigate the
impacts of the volatile copper price. It notes that in addition to establishing a
set of formal fiscal rules, these and later the revised arrangements from 2006
and later 2011 (the Fiscal Responsibility Law) also established two formal
SWFs designed to manage budget surpluses generated at the time of copper
price booms. A third relatively hidden fund is constituted by the surplus
accumulated from CODELCO by the (secret) copper law which benefits the
armed forces. During the commodity price super-cycle, these three funds
together accumulated some $30 billion of assets—equivalent to around
10 per cent of GDP. In sharp contrast to what happened in Ghana there is a
substantial literature—reviewed by Solimano and Guajardo—that demon-
strates how these arrangements have rendered the Chilean economy far
more resilient than before to copper price shocks. The formal institutional
arrangements have some things in common with those adopted de jure in
Ghana. But the practical execution of these arrangements has enabled Chile—
but not Ghana—to achieve a significant countercyclical fiscal capacity.
But this is not to say that the political-economy dangers are wholly absent
in the Chilean case and the authors assess in detail a variety of issues of
concern. In particular they suggest that an amount equivalent to 10 per cent
of GDP (plus a similar amount in central bank reserves) is likely to be an
excessively conservative amount to hold to insure against the risks of copper
price volatility. This is particularly the case given Chile’s low levels of public
spending on education, health, pensions, and other social sectors as a share of
GDP relative to those of comparable Latin American economies. Second, they
note the high level of discretionary authority still left with the fiscal author-
ities notwithstanding the rules that are in place. Those rules clearly condition
the accumulation of funds but do not offer similar guidance as regards the
drawing down of funds. So that decision remains one that can be influenced
heavily by political manoeuvrings. Politics is never far out of the picture.
These last points notwithstanding, the Chilean experiences of the past
decade demonstrate that a broadly effective macroeconomic management
of large extractive revenues and their inherent volatility is possible even
though that effectiveness is always under threat from the additional vagaries
of political-economy processes.
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Extractive Revenues and Government
Spending
Short- versus Long-term Considerations
Frederick van der Ploeg and Anthony J. Venables
9.1 Introduction
Resource-rich developing countries often display poor growth performance
because they fail to save and invest a sufficiently high fraction of their resource
revenues. This problem is exacerbated if they borrow when world prices of
their resources are high, fail to put the extra funds to good use, and then get
into serious problems with repayment of principal and debt service when
world prices collapse. Some have put the revenues from their windfall into
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), but often their objectives are unclear and their
management lacks economic discipline, with many of these funds being run
down when there is a change of government or times get hard. Furthermore,
these funds are often raided for political purposes. Also, countries have often
invested in international investments with low returns rather than in domes-
tic investments with potentially higher returns, and have funded SWFs while
also issuing expensive sovereign bonds.1
1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at UNU-WIDER’s workshop ‘Extractive
Industries and Development’, led by Tony Addison and Alan Roe, on 11–12 April 2016 in
Helsinki. The chapter relies heavily on earlier work: Collier et al. (2010), van der Ploeg and
Venables (2011, 2012, 2013), van der Ploeg (2011), van den Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013),
Wills (2015a, 2015b), van den Bremer et al. (2016), Venables (2016), and especially Venables and
Wills (2016). Thanks to Alan Roe for useful comments. Support from the BP-funded Oxford Centre
for the Analysis of Resource-Rich Economies is gratefully acknowledged.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
We offer an analytical treatment of how to best manage revenues from non-
renewable natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, andminerals, focusing on
two key questions. The first is how much of the windfall should be used for
boosting current household consumption or current government spending,
and how much should be used for accumulating assets of some sort. This
concerns the choice between consumption and saving. The second question is
whether saving should be invested in foreign or domestic assets. For the time
being we refer to foreign assets as SWFs. Domestic asset accumulation means
investment in the domestic economy, which might be capital spending by
either the public or the private sector, and includes expenditures on education
and health that build human capital.
We argue that, in capital-poor developing economies, savings rates out of
resource revenues should be high, and the priority should be to invest them in
the domestic economy. The case for high savings rates is motivated by both
the temporary nature of revenues from exhaustible resources and the lack of
sufficient finance to undertake capital projects. There is a clear opportunity
cost to placing funds offshore in SWFs, as the case for an SWF turns on three
main reasons:
 The first is to transfer part of the windfall to future generations. However,
if there is capital scarcity, this is best done by investing in the domestic
economy rather than by accumulating assets abroad.
 Second, ‘parking’ windfall revenue in SWFs is needed if the efficient time
profile of domestic investment does not line up with the time path of the
resource windfall. Natural resource revenues should be held in SWFs until
they can be used most productively in the domestic economy, recogniz-
ing that it takes time to build up a high enough quality domestic infra-
structure, legal system, educational system, and health system.
 Third, it is necessary to put some of the windfall in a so-called stabilization
fund to build up a precautionary buffer to deal with the volatility of
commodity prices. This is especially important when hedging is too
expensive, as most future markets do not exist or are too thin, or hedging
is deemed to be inadvisable from a political point of view.
Section 9.2 sets out our framework and captures the trade-offs between
alternative uses of resource revenues. A key feature of our inter-temporal
framework, when applied to a developing country, is that the economy starts
out with a low capital stock and thus a low level of income per capita.
A resource windfall enables the economy to speed up the process of economic
development, building up the domestic capital stock by investing at least part
of the windfall. Returns to this need to be compared with alternative uses such
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as consumption or improving the foreign-asset position (cutting sovereign
debt or building SWFs).
Sections 9.3 and 9.4 analyse the long-run saving decision, making the case
for investing resource revenues in the domestic economy, rather than in
SWFs. Section 9.5 investigates the possibility that many developing econ-
omies are not—at least in the short run—ready to undertake high-return
domestic investments even when they are in dire need of them. Further,
such economies have experienced booms and busts as domestic spending
has moved in line with natural resource revenues, often rising and falling
too abruptly. The domestic investment path must be efficient, so it (and
spending more broadly) must be decoupled from current revenue flows. To
achieve this, resource revenues may need to be parked in offshore funds, but
this should be temporary, until productive domestic investments can be
found and funds can be fruitfully and efficiently invested without destabiliz-
ing the domestic economy. Section 9.6 discusses issues surrounding the vola-
tility of resource revenues. This volatility impacts government revenues and
the macro economy, and there is a case for building a stabilization fund to
cushion these impacts. Section 9.7 concludes.
9.2 Inter-temporal Efficiency and the Present Value
Budget Constraint
Our inter-temporal model has two key ingredients. One is the economy’s
inter-temporal budget constraint, and the other the efficiency conditions
that shape choices within this budget constraint. Starting with the inter-
temporal budget constraint, we define the wealth of the economy at date t, Wt,
as the value of all assets held by the economy:
Wt  Ft þ PVYt þ PVNt (1)
Wealth consists of three components. First, net foreign assets, Ft (negative if
foreign debt); the rate of return on such assets is r which, for the moment,
we take to be constant. Second, the present value of income generated by







The economy’s capital stock is K and the production function is Y(K) (depend-
ing also on labour, which we hold constant and suppress in the notation). The
integral is thus the present value of the economy’s output net of investment
K̇, at all future dates, discounted at rate r to date t. The return on domestic
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capital is the marginal product, Y0(K), decreasing in K. Third, the value of
subsoil assets: that is, the expected present value of the natural resource
revenues, net of extraction costs, which is also commonly referred to as
resource wealth. Expected net natural resource revenue at date τ is denoted





Discovery of natural resource reserves leads to a path of revenues,Nτ, whichwe
take to be exogenous and determined by the size and nature of the resource
deposit and by future prices. Thus, we assume that the extraction path of a
given field is not given by Hotelling’s rule but determined by geological
considerations. For oil, the relevant concern is Darcy’s law that describes the
flow of a fluid through a porous medium. The discovery—or any change in
expected future natural revenues, for example, due to a change in the resource
price—shifts the expected present value of resource revenues, PVNt, and hence
shifts the resource wealth of the economy.
The inter-temporal budget for the economy constrains the time path of
future consumption, Cτ,τ  t by the economy’s total wealth. If the economy
has access to perfect capital markets, this too can be expressed as a present
value constraint, so:




Hence, at each date, the present value of consumption, PVCt, should not
exceed the total wealth of the economy, consisting of foreign assets plus the
discounted value of production income plus natural resource wealth. This
implies that the ‘no Ponzi games’ condition is satisfied.
Intergenerational and inter-temporal efficiency conditions characterize the effi-
cient allocation of wealth between assets and the efficient rate of asset accu-
mulation: that is, the division of income between consumption and saving.
The condition for efficient allocation of wealth is to hold assets yielding the
highest return and, where multiple assets are held, choose quantities of each
such that their marginal rates of return are equalized. This means dividing
domestic and foreign assets, Kþ F, such that Y0(K)¼ r.
Intergenerational efficiency in the saving/consumption choice depends on
the return to investment, r, and the rate at which society trades off present
consumption for future consumption, as measured by the consumption rate
of interest. The consumption rate of interest according to the Keynes–Ramsey
rule consists of the pure rate of time preference, ρ, reflecting inherent
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impatience and the desire to consume now rather than in the future, and a
term that captures changes in society’s income through time. To be precise,
the Keynes–Ramsey rule implies that the consumption rate of interest is ρþ ηg,
where g is the (trend) rate of growth of consumption and η > 0 is the inverse of
the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (capturing the rate at which the
marginal value of consumption diminishes as individuals become richer).
The second term, ηg, captures that future generations may be richer than the
present generation, so a marginal unit of consumption is less valuable to them
than to people currently alive. For a developing country, this can be thought of
as saying that, if income is growing (g > 0), poverty reduction needs are greater
now than in the future, so the future is discounted more heavily, especially if
intergenerational inequality aversion is large. Typically, ρ¼2 per cent and
η¼2, so if consumption is growing at 3 per cent per annum, the consumption
rate of interest equals ρþ ηg¼8 per cent per annum. Developed economies are
no longer catching up and typically have lower trend rates of growth and thus
lower rates of interest.
The efficiency condition for inter-temporal savings/consumption decisions,
recognizing that the consumption rate of interest must equal the rate of return
on investment (see Appendix), is thus:
r ¼ ρþ ηg or g ¼ ðr  ρÞ=η (5)
Thus, given the budget constraint, if the rate of return on assets, r, is high,
consumption should be relatively low today and high in the future; that
is, consumption should grow fast, g¼ (r ρ)/η. The reason is that a lot is
saved today to make the most of the high rate of return. If the budget
constraint is relaxed (e.g. if a windfall of resource revenue becomes available)
and values of r, ρ, and η remain unchanged, overall consumption increases but
the subsequent rate of change of consumption is unaffected.
Finally, resource windfalls can last for many decades or even centuries. It is
therefore not appropriate for society to base intergenerational welfare compari-
sons by using data on inter-temporal savings and consumption choices made
by individuals. This is why the Keynes–Ramsey rule, as shown in Equation (5),
captures the societal ethical trade-offs between generations today and in the
future. Following this rule, one should probably use a very small or even zero
rate of pure time preference, ρ, as it seems unethical to discount the welfare of
future, yet unborn generations. A similar stance has been taken by the Stern
(2007) review in the context of climate policy. This argument is especially
strong for investment projects with a long horizon (Gollier 2013). The coeffi-
cient of relative intergenerational inequality aversion should come from deep
ethical considerations on how much society is prepared to forsake consump-
tion today to boost consumption of future generations.
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9.3 Benchmark Management of Windfalls: The Permanent
Income Hypothesis
This analysis leads naturally to the celebrated permanent income hypothesis
(PIH), which has often been used as the basis for advice to resource-rich
economies. It requires the bold assumption that the economy can borrow or
lend internationally at a constant (and exogenous) world rate of interest,
which we denote r*, and thus that the domestic capital stock adjusts such
that Y0(K)¼ r¼ r*. This is tantamount to assuming that the economy can
borrow from or lend to world capital markets at a relatively low rate and has
no shortage of domestic capital because it has invested up to the point where
there are no investment opportunities that yield more than the return on
foreign assets. Often, a second assumption is made to ensure that the time
path of consumption is fully smoothed; namely, that the rate of pure time
preference equals the rate of interest, so that ρ¼ r*. The condition for inter-
temporal efficiency, r*¼ ρþ ηg, given this assumption, is indeed satisfied if
aggregate consumption is constant through time, g¼0.
Sometimes an alternative, perhaps more realistic, second assumption is
made to ensure that the resource dividend per capita rather than aggregate
consumption is held constant over time (e.g. van den Bremer and van der
Ploeg 2013). This requires that the rate of pure time preference is set to a lower
value—that is, ρ¼ r* ηn—where n is the rate of population growth, because
this ensures from Equation (5) that g¼ (r* ρ)/η¼n and thus that growth in
consumption per capita is smoothed. For ease of exposition, we abstract
from population growth in the remainder and suppose that ρ¼ r*. Many
governments in resource-rich developing economies are focused on winning
the next election and reaping as much benefit as possible from a resource
windfall. Such governments may thus employ amuch higher pure rate of time
preference, especially when their grip on office is not so strong.
Without resource revenues, an economy satisfying these assumptions will
have constant consumption and wealth through time, so:
C ¼ r*W ¼ YðKÞ þ r*F (6)
The first of these equations comes from integrating the budget constraint,
Equation (4), given also that the time path of consumption is fully smoothed.
The second is the flow budget constraint stating that consumption equals
production income given a constant capital stock.
What is the effect of revenues from a current or future natural resource
windfall? A discovery of natural resources, which takes place at date t¼0,
has present value PVN0. However, it is often the case that revenues may not
be earned for a further five or ten years until all exploitation investments
have taken place and the pumping or mining starts (e.g. Arezki et al. 2016).
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With the assumption that r* is exogenous, the domestic capital stock, K, and
hence the level of domestic non-resource output are both fixed by the equa-
tion Y0(K)¼ r*. It follows that a resource windfall has no effect on the optimal
choice of domestic capital stock or on investment in the domestic economy.
Hence, none of the resource windfall should be invested in the domestic
economy because with access to perfect capital markets the level of domestic
investment should already be at its optimal level.
Consumption jumps up on impact of the news of the discovery of new
resource wealth and well ahead of the revenues pouring in as the news of
future resource extraction is fully discounted in efficient markets. Further-
more, with the assumption that r*¼ ρ consumption is constant at that new
level along the entire optimal consumption path thereafter. Because at the
date of discovery wealth jumps by the value of the resource discovery,
ΔW¼ PVN0, where Δ denotes the discrete change at the date of discovery,
the discrete jump in consumption at the time of the discovery is therefore:
ΔC ¼ r*ΔW ¼ r*PVN0 (7)
Hence, consumption increases by an amount equal to the annuity value of the
resource discovery. This increase in consumption occurs at the date of discov-
ery and is maintained in perpetuity thereafter.
These are two very strong results. They stem from two bold assumptions:
(i) the domestic capital stock is such that the marginal product of capital
equals the world interest; and (ii) ρ¼ r*, so the time path of consumption is
flat. Neither of these assumptions is appropriate for developing economies,
and in the next section we look at the consequence of relaxing both of them.
Despite this, the PIH gives some important messages for the fraction of natural
resource revenues that should be saved and the path of asset accumulation.
We turn to these now.
The time profiles of the flows of income and consumption and of the stocks
of assets are shown in Figure 9.1, with time on the horizontal axis. For simpli-
city, we assume that the economy has no foreign assets or debt at the date
of discovery, F0¼0. As noted above, wealth jumps up by PVN0 at the date of
discovery, and is constant thereafter. This means that as the resource follows
its depletion path (assumed to be exogenous) and PVN declines, so foreign
assets, F, increase to exactly offset this, F¼ΔW PVN, as illustrated. This is in
line with the Hartwick rule which states that any depletion of subsoil wealth
must be mirrored by an equal increase in above-ground wealth.
Hence, the increment in consumption is constant, ΔC¼ r*PVN0, that
resource income N declines (exogenously; dashed line in Figure 9.1), and
that interest earned on other assets, r*F, increases. The sum of these is the post-
discovery increment to income, Nþ rF, which, by the flow budget constraint,
must equal saving, S, plus the increment to consumption, Nþ r*F¼ΔCþ S, as
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illustrated by the solid line in Figure 9.1. These savings all go into foreign assets,
S ¼ Ḟ, driving the increase in F illustrated in Figure 9.1b.
It is convenient to write these relationships one further way. As Nþ r*F¼
ΔCþ S and ΔC¼ r*PVN0¼ r*PVN0¼ r*ΔW¼ r*Fþ PVN, savings must satisfy:
S ¼ N  r*PVN or S=N ¼ 1 r*PVN=N (8)





ΔW = PVN0 = F + PVN














Figure 9.1. Managing resource windfalls according to the permanent income hypoth-
esis (PIH): (a) flows; (b) assets
Source: authors’ illustration based on own calculations.
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Equation (8) gives the savings rate out of the flow of resource revenue, S/N, a
key policy variable. This depends on PVN/N, the ratio of the present value of
resource revenue remaining to the current flow of resource revenue. For an
extremely long-lived stock of natural resources, the present value of natural
resource revenue remaining, PVN, is large relative to current resource revenue,
so the savings rate is low. The shorter lived a resource discovery (the faster
the decline in revenues), the smaller is this ratio and the higher the rate
of saving. Of course, the PIH implies that saving out of total resource and
non-resource wealth is constant. Some further insights follow from some
examples.
The simplest one is where the value of resource revenues declines exponen-
tially at the constant rate κ (as illustrated in Figure 9.1). In this case, the share
of resource revenue saved is:
S=N ¼ k=ðr*þ κÞ (9)
because the revenue flow is Nt¼N0e κt and the present value of natural
resource remaining is PVNt¼N0e κt/(r*þ κ). This demonstrates clearly that
the savings rate should be higher, the faster the rate of decline of resource
revenues, κ. Thus, for example, if revenues are expected to decline at twice the
rate of interest, two-thirds of resource revenue should be saved. The savings
rate is constant during the life of the resource, although this is not generally
the case, as illustrated in the next example.
Another example is where revenues from depletion are constant until the
point of exhaustion is reached at date T, so N ¼ N for t < T and then drops to
zero. As reserves are depleted, PVNt falls, so the savings rate rises. The present




N=r* so the savings rate increases during the






The rationale underlying this time profile for the savings rate is that, as time
progresses, the stock of the resource left becomes smaller relative to the flow,
and thus the windfall becomes more temporary, necessitating more saving.
Figure 9.2 illustrates this for two resource discoveries of equal size. For both,
the flow revenue from extraction remains constant over the life of the
resource, but the duration and hence the level of the flow differs. Figure 9.2a
shows the two revenue flows, with revenue,N, on the vertical axis and time on
the horizontal axis. Both profiles, shown by the solid and dashed lines, have the
same initial present value, PVN0¼1 (with r*¼0.04), but that depicted by the
solid line depletes the resource slowly so that it lasts for forty years, whereas
that depicted by the dashed line depletes it more rapidly so that it only lasts for
thirteen years. The optimal savings rates for these depletion profiles are illus-
trated in Figure 9.2b, and follow Equation (10).
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In both cases, the savings rate increases over the course of depletion, as the
present value, PVNt, gradually reduces and the flow N and discount rate r* are
constant. Because PVNt goes to zero as exhaustion approaches, the savings
rate eventually rises to 100 per cent. The impact of the rate of depletion is
dramatic. In the case of slow depletion, the optimal savings rate rises from
20 per cent in the first year to 100 per cent in the final year. Hence, a policy
rule that set a constant savings rate would be seriously sub-optimal regardless
of the level at which it was set. It is important to have a constant savings rate
out of the sum of natural resource and all other forms of wealth, not out of the
windfall. The savings path for rapid depletion is strikingly higher than for slow
depletion, starting at 60 per cent rather than 20 per cent.
In summary, for a given net present value of a resource discovery, the
shorter its duration the higher should be the savings rate, and more surpris-
ingly, for a range of extraction paths the optimal savings rate should rise
over time.
9.4 The Case for Investing Resource Windfalls in the
Domestic Economy
Most developing countries have only asymmetric access to world capital
markets: they can save more readily than they can borrow. Typically, as
Fast depletion
(a) Resource revenue flow, Nt
Slow depletion















(b) Saving rate, St/Nt
Slow depletion
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Years, t
500
Figure 9.2. (a) Resource revenue flow; and (b) optimal savings rates for depletion
Source: authors’ illustration based on own calculations.
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borrowers they are either entirely cut off or they can only borrow at a sub-
stantial premium over the world risk-free interest rate to compensate for
perceived high risks of default. To capture this reality we retain the model of
Section 9.2, but now assume that the interest rate faced by the domestic
economy is a function of the stock of foreign assets (or debt) that it holds.
We denote this R(F), which implies that the economy has to pay a premium
on its foreign debt if it is indebted.2 If the country is not indebted, then it has
perfect access to international capital markets and thus the domestic interest
rate relevant for investment decisions, r, still equals the world interest rate, r*.
If the country is indebted, then it only has imperfect access to international
capital markets and thus the domestic interest rate exceeds the world rate, and
is increasing in the level of debt. We capture this with the following
specification:
If F  0;RðFÞ ¼ r* and if F < 0;RðFÞ > r*;R0ðFÞ < 0 (11)
While R(F) is the rate of interest, the marginal cost of borrowing will exceed
this if taking onmore debt raises the rates the country has to pay on its existing
debt.3 Thus, the marginal social cost of borrowing is r(F)¼R(F)þ FR0(F), which
we assume is also decreasing in F (i.e. increasing in debt). Capital scarcity of
this type fundamentally changes the answers to both our questions in
Section 9.3—the division of resource revenues between consumption and
savings, and the assets that savings should be used to acquire. The policy
prescriptions will thus be very different from those emanating from the PIH.
9.4.1 Using the Resource Windfall for Domestic Investment
and Foreign Assets
Total assets in the economy, denoted by A, consist of domestic capital K and
foreign assets (or debt) F: that is, A Kþ F. If the economy is asset scarce in the
sense that themarginal return on domestic capital satisfies, Y0(A) > r*, all assets
should be held as domestic investment and none in an SWF. However, if this
economy can borrow—that is, choose F < 0—it will do this until the return on
domestic capital is driven down to the marginal cost of borrowing:
2 Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) and van der Ploeg and Venables (2011) document empirical
evidence for a positive relationship between foreign debt and the domestic interest rate. They find
that the effect of resource exports on interest rate spreads is positive, but not significant, suggesting
that resources worsen creditworthiness. They also conduct a similar analysis where the cost of
borrowing depends on resource revenues, with themain difference being that the cost of borrowing
drops, and consumption jumps immediately at the date of discovery of the new natural resource
reserves.
3 It is possible that a resource discovery may reduce the economy’s cost of borrowing, as resource
revenues are perceived to be a form of collateral for loans. This shifts R(F) downwards.
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Y 0ðKÞ ¼ Y 0ðA FÞ ¼ rðFÞ (12)
If some of the windfall revenue is saved, then the economy’s assets increase.
To see howmuch of an increase, dA, is allocated to foreign debt reduction, dF,




Y 00ðA FÞ þ r0ðFÞ
 
dA; dK ¼ r
0ðFÞ
Y 00ðA FÞ þ r0ðFÞ
 	
dA (13)
If the marginal cost of borrowing increases with indebtedness, then r0(F) < 0
and the denominators in Equation (13) are always negative. Hence, the bigger
the capital scarcity as indicated by the magnitude of |r0(F)|, the bigger the
fraction of the increment in total assets that is allocated to domestic capital,
dK/dA ∈ (0,1]. In the limiting case where the country is completely shut out of
capital markets, r0(F) will be equal to minus infinity and the whole of any
increase in assets goes to domestic capital formation. At the other extreme,
the PIH maintains the assumption that the marginal return or cost of lending
and borrowing is given on world capital markets, so r0(F)¼0 and hence the
domestic capital stock is unaffected by the change in assets, dK¼0, and all of
the increment in total wealth is allocated to net foreign assets, as we saw in
Section 9.3.
Hence, countries that are capital scarce should use resource windfalls to
increase the domestic capital stock (including human capital), and pay
down foreign debt if investment is sub-optimally low. The case for increasing
domestic investment is further reinforced if a resource boom brings its own
direct financing needs. For example, infrastructure projects may need to be
brought forward and new downstream projects may also be needed, placing a
demand on public funds. There may also be general equilibrium effects. The
boom is likely to change the structure of the economy, with some sectors
booming and others contracting. The ‘Dutch Disease’ analysis suggests that
this will involve a reallocation of economic activity into non-tradable goods
and away from non-resource tradables (e.g. Corden and Neary 1982; van der
Ploeg and Venables 2013). If the non-resource traded sector is relatively
capital-intensive, this will mean that the capital–labour ratio in the economy
as a whole will decrease.
9.4.2 Capital Scarcity and the Optimal Choice between Saving
and Consumption
We have thus seen that it is not appropriate for a developing economy to set
up an SWF and lend to the rest of the world, but it may be more appropriate to
use its newly found wealth to pay down existing debt as well as to invest in the
domestic economy. Now we consider total savings out of windfall revenues
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and their implications for the growth of domestic income and consumption.
The inter-temporal efficiency condition and the ethics therein set out in
Section 9.2 are fairly standard, but it should be realized that it is a very simple




½rðFÞ  ρ > 1
η
ðr* ρÞ with Y 0ðKÞ ¼ rðFÞ (14)
Because themarginal cost of borrowing satisfies r(F ) > r*, the cost of capital and
thus the consumer rate of interest will be high so that the time path of
consumption is rising through time. The rate of return is now higher than
the world interest rate. However, as capital is accumulated and debt is reduced,
the rate of return falls and the economy converges to one without capital
scarcity. Thus, starting from a low base, capital is accumulated, income rises,
and the rate of return falls, ultimately reaching a level similar to that in high-
income countries and supporting similar levels of income and consumption.
This is illustrated in Figure 9.3a showing consumption and Figure 9.3b show-
ing assets; the paths C̃ and Ã are baseline paths in the absence of natural
resource revenues.
A resource bonanza shifts the inter-temporal budget constraint of the econ-
omy and allows both current consumption and saving to increase. This speeds
up the rate of asset accumulation. More assets at any date mean a lower
marginal cost of borrowing, r(F ), and hence a slower rate of increase in
consumption. The situation is as illustrated by the solid lines A and C in
Figure 9.3. Consumption jumps up at the date of discovery but then increases
less rapidly. Assets are accumulated more rapidly, more than offsetting the
decline in the value of natural resources remaining in the crust of the earth.
We also observe the following. First, the consumption increment (the differ-
ence between the new path of C and the baseline C̃) is largest immediately
after the windfall, and then declines. This is in sharp contrast to the results
from the PIHwhere the increment was constant through time. The intuition is
that the current generation is poorer than future generations, so the consump-
tion increment is skewed towards this poorer generation. At the same time,
room is made for investments to stimulate growth and development.
If the windfall is very large there may be a ‘permanent’ element that con-
tinues in perpetuity, but for small windfalls the consumption paths illustrated
in Figure 9.3 converge (see van der Ploeg and Venables 2011). At the same time
as it brings forward consumption, the natural resource windfall also means
that accumulated assets are greater at all dates. This brings down the rate of
return in the economy as time proceeds. Effectively, the optimal use of the
natural resource windfall has the effect of bringing forward development, as
can be seen by comparing the consumption and asset accumulation paths
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with and without the windfall in Figure 9.3. The share of resource revenues
that should be saved depends, as before, on the precise path of natural
resource revenues. However, the argument of this section tends to reinforce
the message that savings should increase through time; the additional effect is
the front-loading of the consumption increment.
In summary, allowing for capital scarcity and high borrowing costs, the
policy messages are significantly different from those of the PIH. The con-
sumption increment is front-loaded whereas resource revenues should be used
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Figure 9.3. Optimal revenue management in a developing economy
Source: authors’ illustration based on own calculations.
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principally for domestic investment, which brings forward the development
path of the economy.
9.5 Absorption Constraints and the Case for a Parking Fund
The prioritization of domestic investment rests on there being domestic pro-
jects that yield high returns (social as well as private returns), and on projects
being delivered in an efficient sequence and manner. Yet, it is possible that—
in the short run—because of absorption constraints and other bottlenecks
there may be few high-return projects ready to be implemented. This is a
common problem in newly resource-rich developing economies. There will
inevitably be a mismatch between the time profile of (efficient) investment
and that of resource revenues. Rather than spending revenues on inefficient
projects, there is then a case for having a fund that plays the role of ‘parking’
resource revenues until they can be efficiently used in the domestic economy.
The case for parking funds until the economy is able to absorb extra spending
efficiently involves both micro- and macroeconomic arguments.
A country seeking to scale up investment will encounter numerous bottle-
necks. In the public sector, there is unlikely to be a pipeline of good invest-
ment projects. There may be a lack of capacity to design and develop projects;
project selection and cost–benefit processes may be weak; and so too may be
the ability to procure, implement, and monitor projects. These problems have
to be addressed before effective investments can be undertaken, which implies
a strong case for ‘investing in investing’ (Collier 2010). Sequencing of projects
also matters because the return to one project depends on other complemen-
tary projects. For example, the return to private investment may be low,
particularly if public investments in infrastructure and other aspects of pro-
ductive capacity are lagging.4More broadly, additional domestic spending will
increase demand for both traded and non-traded goods. As demand increases,
the economy will move up its supply curve of non-traded goods, creating
both a quantity and a price response. Because the supply curve is less elastic
in the short run than in the long run, upwards price pressure is acute if
spending increases too rapidly. This is likely to be particularly true for
‘home-grown’ capital. Although equipment can usually be imported, struc-
tures and human capital require domestic capacity (e.g. in the construction
and training/teaching professions), all of which take time to develop (van der
Ploeg and Venables 2013).
4 In terms of Equation (14), Y00(K) is particularly large (negative) in the short run. As themarginal
product of capital falls more with domestic investment, more should be devoted to foreign assets.
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There need not be market failures associated with these bottlenecks and
price responses. It may be merely a feature of the supply side of the economy
and the political system that projects take time and have to be done in
sequence and that it takes time before the necessary political support is
obtained. Nevertheless, this timing dictates the rate at which investment
can be increased. If extra investment demand is more likely to be met by a
price increase than by a quantity response, it is efficient to slow down the rate
of investment until supply can catch up. This suggests that investment should
be ramped up quite slowly. Hence, resource revenues should be parked in
foreign assets until they can be spent in a cost-effective manner on the
efficient investment path.
9.6 Volatility of Commodity Prices and the Case
for a Stabilization Fund
The volatility and unpredictability of commodity prices creates a third argu-
ment for using an SWF, namely to function as a stabilization (or liquidity)
fund. The optimal size of such a fund depends on how the government and
the economy respond, ex post, to shocks that occur. Are shocks sufficiently
costly that self-insurance through a stabilization fund is necessary, or can they
be managed by other means?
An extreme way of doing self-insurance is the ‘bird-in-hand’ rule, according
to which all revenues are placed in an SWF, and spending is a fixed share of the
SWF. Essentially, resource revenues are discounted at an infinite rate, so the
spending rule is just a fixed share of above-ground assets and ignores below-
ground wealth entirely as done in Norway (e.g. Bjerkholt and Nicolescu 2004;
Barnett and Ossowski 2003). Consumption of resource windfalls is thus heav-
ily back weighted, and therefore unable to deliver domestic investment which
we have argued is efficient for many resource-rich developing economies. The
bird-in-the-hand rule is therefore not appropriate for poor countries because it
exaggerates the risk that revenues might terminate earlier than expected,
while completely ignoring the much larger risks to low-income societies
from deferring growth.
A more general strategy to smooth the impact of commodity price volatility
is to save when the price of the resource is high, and dissave or borrow when it
is low. The foreign asset holdings will fluctuate with the commodity price but
the size of the stabilization fund will fluctuate around zero as the expected
value of the fund should be zero. This view needs to be modified for two
reasons. First, owing to asymmetry of borrowing and lending costs, borrowing
during a sharp downturn in commodity prices is likely to be expensive, if not
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impossible. Borrowing rates will be high and, following the fall in prices,
many a developing resource exporter will likely be shut out of most borrowing
options. Second, commodity and in particular oil price shocks are typically
long lasting and it is difficult to reject the hypothesis that the oil price follows
a random walk. If shocks are permanent or very long-lived, it is less necessary
to save for intergenerational reasons but it will be important to build a more
sizable stabilization fund (van den Bremer and van der Ploeg 2013). Precau-
tionary savings—that only take into account the utility costs of failing to
smooth consumption optimally—stem not from risk aversion but from
prudence.
The necessary size of a stabilization fund depends on the costs incurred if, in
the event of a commodity price fall, the country is unable or unwilling to
borrow. These costs come through bothmicro- andmacroeconomic channels.
Precautionary saving only takes into account the volatility costs of failing to
smooth consumption optimally, but problems overall are exacerbated by the
fact that the fall in revenue principally impacts on government budgets and
spending. The consequent and potentially high costs of negative shocks make
the case for creating a stabilization fund that gives government the space to
undertake countercyclical fiscal policy (e.g. moderate the pace of spending
cuts) necessitated by a revenue downturn. Such a fund is evenmore important
in countries with asymmetric borrowing and lending costs. This is because
borrowing during a crash in commodity prices is tough.
The management of a stabilization fund, once it is established, opens up a
further set of issues. For example, expected rates of return should be adjusted
for risk, including political risks such as the possibility that a liquid asset (such
as foreign-exchange holdings) might be more easily looted by a future govern-
ment than illiquid assets (such as domestic infrastructure). Further, a diversi-
fied portfolio needs to take into account the correlations between returns on
the various assets chosen to hedge against commodity price volatility and the
risk inherent in the below-the-ground natural resource wealth (van den Bremer
et al. 2016). Rates of return should include the full social costs and benefits of
investments and take into account effects of any investment on the domestic
macroeconomy, especially if there is limited absorptive capacity.
Finally, we note that an alternative way of insurance is through hedging
strategies as used, for example, by Mexico. However, such strategies typically
only offer insurance for a relatively short period. We do not discuss them
further as future markets are too thin and costly to make this a reliable strategy
in most situations. One issue is that the funds may be so large that they could
be seen to manipulate commodity prices, and for many countries such hedg-
ing strategies are too risky from a political point of view. For most countries, a
stabilization fund is a more reliable and pragmatic strategy.
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9.7 Conclusions
Savings rates should be high and domestic investment should be the priority
for developing countries when managing resource windfalls. Management of
foreign assets—held perhaps in an SWF—can support this strategy, but it is
important that there is clarity on the roles that foreign assets can play.
The first possible role for foreign assets is to put resource windfalls into an
intergenerational savings fund with the purpose of replacing below-ground
resources with above-ground financial assets. The financial assets are used to
generate permanent income for future generations. The desirability of such
funds depends principally on the long-run investment opportunities (or lack of
them) in the domestic economy, and on political economy. Such a fund should
focus on assets with long investment horizons, matching the permanent nature
of the fund. Such a fund makes sense for countries with a large domestic infra-
structure stock already in place and good access to international capital markets.
In such a case, the rate of return on further domestic investment is unlikely to
exceed the return that canbemade on investments through an SWF. Sucha fund
also makes sense if it is unlikely to be raided by future governments.
These conditions clearly do not prevail in most developing economies.
Capital scarcity means that investment in the domestic economy is a priority.
This investment can help place the economy on an accelerated growth path,
bringing forward economic growth and consumption benefits. If directed
towards the non-traded sector, this investment can also limit inflation from
resource-financed demand. In developing countries the demographics are such
that capital is needed to support jobs for a growing work force, not flows of rent
for pensioners. From a political perspective it is also better to sink investments
in physical structures and assets rather than leave them in easily drawn-down
financial assets. The case for long-run intergenerational funds held in foreign
assets is therefore not very strong for developing countries.
To overcome the timingmismatch between receiving resource revenues and
investing them efficiently in developing countries, a parking fund—the second
possible motive for considering investment in foreign assets—is appropriate.
The efficient path of investment will depend on the absorptive capacity of the
economy, which ideally should be slowly built up through a programme of
‘investing in investing’. This requires that savings be parked offshore until
they can be efficiently invested in the domestic economy. This fund should
invest in assets with a relatively shorter investment horizon than the
intergenerational fund.
The third possible reason is to insulate the economy from short-to-medium-
run fluctuations in commodity price revenues. Given the likelihood of
such fluctuations, it makes sense to accumulate precautionary buffers in a
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stabilization fund, especially as not all the risk of exposure to volatile resource
prices can or will be borne by resource extraction firms or can be hedged away
with financial derivatives. Therefore, natural resource exporting countries are
well advised to self-insure by using stabilization funds. These funds provide an
additional source of interest income when commodity prices crash, and a
stock of assets that can finance countercyclical fiscal policy when monetary
policy is constrained. Stabilization funds, particularly in developing countries,
should hold assets that can be liquidated at short notice if the prices of their
commodities fall. Their spending rules must permit fast liquidation, contin-
gent on the resource price, and should also include a mechanism for recapit-
alizing the fund when the price rises again. The establishment and
implementation of such rules is no easy task and even in broadly successful
cases such as that of Chile there is ongoing controversy about the specific rules
for the accumulation and draw-down of funds (see Solimano and Calderón
Guajardo 2017).
These three types of funds held in foreign assets have different purposes,
and so need separate legal structures and investment mandates. A developed
country’s intergenerational fund should invest in long-horizon assets and
spend a fixed share of above- and below-ground wealth. A developing coun-
try’s parking fund should invest in shorter duration assets and have a rising
limit for the amount spent each year, with this constraint used for domestic
investment. Stabilization funds should focus on liquid assets and have spend-
ing and recapitalization rules tied to the commodity price. All funds should
design their portfolios with subsoil assets in mind—hedging resource price
volatility at the start of the windfall and rebalancing towards a diversified
portfolio as the resource is exhausted. It may well make sense to manage these
funds from within a single government body, but they should remain inde-
pendent in line with their original aims, with an investment mandate and
spending rule that is appropriate for their purpose.
Appendix: Optimization Problem in the Presence
of Capital Scarcity
The social planner’s problem is to choose consumption, C, and investment, I, in the
face of exponentially declining oil revenues, N, to maximize utility:













subject to the constraints describing foreign asset accumulation:
Ḟt ¼ rðFt ÞFt þNt þ YðKtÞ  Ct  It (A2)
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accumulation of physical capital:
K̇t ¼ It  δKt (A3)
and the time path of natural resource revenues:
Ṅt ¼ N0 expðκtÞ (A4)
(cf. van der Ploeg and Venables 2011; Wills 2015a). We incorporate capital scarcity by
assuming that interest rates may be elastic with respect to foreign assets F, r(Ft) >
r,r0(Ft) < 0 for Ft < 0 and r(Ft)¼ r otherwise. Output is produced using domestic capital
and a fixed stock of labour, Yt(Kt) and L ¼ 1, and it is sold at the constant world price
P*¼1. The Hamiltonian for this dynamic optimization problem is:
H  UðCÞ þ λ1½rðFÞF þN þ YðKÞ  C I þ λ2½I  δK þ λ3½N0eκt  (A5)
This has the optimality conditions:
HC ¼ U 0ðCÞ  λ1 ¼ 0;
H1 ¼ λ1 þ λ2 ¼ 0;
ρλ1  λ̇1 ¼ HF ¼ λ1½r0ðFÞF þ rðFÞ;
ρλ2  λ̇2 ¼ HK ¼ λ1Y 0ðKÞ  λ2δ; and
ρλ3  λ̇3 ¼ HN ¼ λ1;
(A6)
and the transversality condition limt!1½expðrtÞλ1;t Ft  ¼ 0. The Euler equation or
Keynes–Ramsey rule can be derived from the first-order conditions as follows:
g ¼ 1
η
½rðFÞ þ r0ðFÞF  ρ (A7)
where g denotes the rate of growth of consumption. Therefore, consumption will be
delayed as long as the country faces a premium on its debt (F < 0), so the rate of
consumption will be rising with time. The decision of whether to use the income
that is not consumed for domestic investment or foreign savings follows from equating
the marginal utility of consumption to that of an extra unit of foreign assets or
domestic capital:
U 0ðCtÞ ¼ λ1 ¼ λ2 ) rðFÞ þ r0ðFÞF ¼ Y 0ðKÞ  δ (A8)
Since with capital scarcity the left-hand side is a negative function of F, we establish
that the optimal stock of capital rises as the stock of foreign debt is curbed.
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The Copper Sector, Fiscal Rules,
and Stabilization Funds in Chile
Scope and Limits
Andres Solimano and Diego Calderón Guajardo
10.1 Introduction
The copper sector constitutes the main export product and the main source of
fiscal revenues, foreign exchange, and national income in the Chilean econ-
omy. Its price is affected by both changes in productive demand (chiefly in the
construction sector and industry in copper-importing countries) and specula-
tion inmetalsmarkets. Copper price volatility can havemajormacroeconomic
consequences for the internal economy. Since the 1980s andmore aggressively
in the 2000s, Chile has developed macroeconomic mechanisms to deal with
this volatility.1
After the nitrate cycle faded away in the 1930s, copper started to play a
pivotal role but mines were owned and exploited by foreign corporations
(mostly originating in the United States) under often-generous tax policies
and repatriation of dividends arrangements. In this context, ‘Chilenization’
(mixed public–private partnership) policies were developed in the 1960s to be
followed by nationalization in 1971 (approved by the Chilean Congress with
the unanimous support of all political parties) that gave the full responsibility
of property and management of copper mines to the Chilean state. Those
policies were initially maintained by the military regime after the coup of
1973 but then gradually reversed as the country embarked on a neoliberal
1 The authors thank Alan Roe for the useful comments and suggestions he made on an earlier
version of this chapter. Comments fromMaximiliano Acevedo and Ciro Giraldez, ChileanMinistry
of Finance, are also appreciated.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
economic model. As early as 1974 a decree law (DL 600) to attract foreign
investment was enacted that provided tax, repatriation, and property protec-
tion for foreign corporations. This was followed in the 1980s by amining code
for foreign corporations that paved the way for a steady privatization of the
large-scale copper production sector. In the 2000s, the policy regime regarding
mining established low royalties and moderate taxes for foreign direct invest-
ment along with generous leasing and concession agreements to private
investors. However, the prevailing constitution, approved in 1980 and still
ruling, maintained several provisos of the nationalization policies of 1971.
At macroeconomic level, the Chilean government created the copper sta-
bilization fund (CSF) in 1987. The copper fund accumulated resources when
the current price was higher than a reference price and drew down funds
accumulated in previous periods when the current price was below that
reference price. This was followed by a fiscal rule (2001) and later by a law of
fiscal responsibility in 2006 which created the economic and social stabiliza-
tion fund (ESSF) that replaced the existing CSF and created the pension reserve
fund (PRF).2 The ESSF is oriented to dampen the effects of changes in inter-
national copper prices and copper demand on domestic economic activity
(output, investment, and employment), the balance of payments, and the
fiscal budget. As the revenues from the copper sector are a main source of
fiscal revenues, this would help ensure a more stable stream of revenues for
the state and, in principle, avoid cycles of expansion and contraction in public
expenditure.
The fiscal rulewas to operate under the principle that ‘permanent’ spending
should follow ‘permanent’ revenues (determining what is permanent in an
uncertain and volatile world is not easy) and was expected to contain fiscal
spending and isolate it from political and social pressures.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 10.2 provides a brief
historical background of the evolution of the copper sector from the 1930s to
the present and focuses on the relationship between GDP and investment
cycles and copper price cycles. Section 10.3 documents the evolving institu-
tional regime governing the copper sector from the 1950s until the present.
Section 10.4 shows the interplay between fiscal shocks, fiscal rules, and
stabilization funds and provides additional detail on their origin, rules of
operation, and expected benefits. Section 10.5 evaluates the existing macro
framework in Chile to cope with external cycles, highlighting also some open
questions regarding the optimal level of resource accumulation of these funds
in an economy of high inequality and pending social demands and the
prevailing discretion governing the use of funds in bad times.
2 In addition to the ESSF and PRF there is an opaque fund managed by the defence ministry and
Chile’s armed forces to finance the acquisition of military equipment (see Section 10.3).
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10.2 Brief Historical Background of a Mineral-exporting
Economy and Cycles Related to the Copper Sector
Historically Chile has been reliant on natural resources such as nitrate,
copper, coal, gold, wheat, and other commodities for its development pro-
cess. Two long cycles of commodity dependence can be distinguished:
the nitrate commodity cycle of boom and decline that started around 1880
until its eventual decay in the early 1930s, and a copper cycle that started
in the 1930s and continues until today. In the period 1900–20, nitrate
exports accounted for 65–80 per cent of total exports, which, in turn,
represented nearly 40 per cent of GDP (Cariola and Sunkel 1982; Meller
2006). The government imposed an export duty on nitrate that financed
nearly 50 per cent of total public expenditure. Eventually, the boom of
Chilean natural nitrate came to an end when Germany managed to develop
synthetic nitrate at a lower cost; as a consequence, the Chilean production
of nitrate declined by nearly 75 per cent between 1928 and 1934 (Díaz et al.
2016), prompting an economic and social crisis in the country. Since the
1930s, copper started to replace nitrate as the main export commodity,
mainly directed to the American market.
Owing to the adverse effects of the Great Depression in core economies that
hit Chile very hard in the first half of the 1930s, the country switched from a
commodity export-oriented growth pattern into an import-substitution
growth and industrialization strategy. In the period 1950–70, the importance
of exports in GDP declined sharply and fluctuated between 7 and 9 per cent.
Copper income at that time represented 55–65 per cent of exports and
15–30 per cent of total fiscal revenues (see Table 10.1).3
Table 10.1. Annual average copper exports from Chile, 1960–2014
1960–9 1970–9 1980–9 1990–9 2000–9 2010–14 1960–2014
US$ millions (2014) 3,582 5,017 4,978 7,695 23,316 42,754 11,994
% of total exports 68.9 63.9 45.8 37.8 45.7 53.9 52.5
% of GDP 8.1 9.4 9.4 8.3 14.9 16.4 10.6
Source: authors’ elaboration based on DIPRES (2016).
3 In the last fifty-five years, reflecting Chile’s effort at diversifying its export base, the share of
copper in total exports declined from nearly 70 per cent in the 1960s to 46 per cent in 2000–9,
followed by a small increase again by 2010–14 when the sharemoved slightly above the 50 per cent
mark (see Table 10.1). However, as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP), copper exports
doubled from 8.1 per cent in 1960–9 to 16.4 per cent in 2010–14.
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10.2.1 The Copper Sector, Policy Shocks, and Macroeconomic Cycles
In macroeconomic terms, we observe a broad positive correlation between
growth and investment cycles on the one hand and the evolution of real
copper prices on the other, perhaps acting with some lags (see Figure 10.1).
The dominant pattern is that years of slowGDP expansion, including episodes
of negative growth (recessions and depressions) have often followed a reduc-
tion in real copper prices. These cycles have also been accompanied by adjust-
ments in other variables such as investment, employment, and the real
exchange rate.4 Because of the importance of the copper sector and the
country’s trade and financial openness, Chile has developed a set of fiscal
rules and SWFs to deal, with varying degrees of success, with external shocks,
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Refined copper price, real (US$ cents/lb) Average copper price
Figure 10.1. GDP growth, investment, and real copper price, 1960–2015
Notes: Deflator: US producer price index (all commodities).
Source: authors’ elaboration based on World Development Indicators, Central Bank of Chile data,
and Cochilco (2016).
4 Variations in the price of copper are closely related to external economic activity (chiefly in the
construction sector and industry), and also to financial speculation in commodities in what looks
like a mean-reversing process.
5 Several positive evaluations (although somewhat incomplete in their scope) of these rules have
indicated that these policies are a successful example of natural resources boommanagement from
a macroeconomic perspective (Céspedes et al. 2014; Frankel 2011). At the same time, these studies
make some recommendations regarding forecasting methodology. However, these evaluations
tend to overlook the opportunity cost involved in the accumulation of resources in stabilization
funds and neglect the lack of rules governing the use of funds. Moreover, in terms of its output
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A well-established regularity is that investment is highly pro-cyclical,
moving closely with but adjusting more than GDP, particularly in recession
years (see Figure 10.1). The two main recessions/depressions in the period
1970–2015 took place in 1975 (associated with anti-inflationary shock policies
and a decline in the price of copper) and in 1982–3 (led by a domestic financial
crisis following unregulated banking deregulation and a currency crisis) (see
Solimano 2012). In these two short but deep ‘depressions’, GDP declined
sharply, on average, between 12 and 16 per cent, and investment contracted
further in the range of 20–35 per cent. Then, there were two other years of
negative growth—1999 (a follow-up of the effects of the Asian and Russian
crises) and 2009 (following the global financial crises)—in which GDP con-
tracted between 1.2 and 1.5 per cent each year and investment declined
between 10 and 15 per cent.6 As could be expected, in these four episodes of
recession and depression the cut in investment was several times greater
than the decline in GDP. In turn, the durations of the recoveries/expansions
after these recessions/depressions were of variable magnitude, the longest
being the period 1984–2008 after the depression of 1982–3 and before the
recession of 2009.
10.3 The Evolving Institutional Framework of the Mining
Sector: The Cycle of Foreign Ownership, Nationalization,
and de facto Privatization
Historically the institutional framework ruling the copper sector in Chile has
been affected by the dominant role played by foreign corporations (mainly
US) in the mining sector. Arrangements affecting prices, taxes, royalties, and
other factors did not always benefit the Chilean nation. In fact, following
World War II (1939–45) and at the start of the Korean War (1950–3), the US
government decided, unilaterally, to fix the copper price (at 24.5 cents/lb),
which was a level less than half the market price (54.5 cents/lb). As the United
States was the main buyer of Chilean copper, this led to losses of export
earnings and was a major concern for the Chilean authorities (Millán 2006).
A commission was sent to Washington DC to claim retribution for this
composition, the Chilean economy is still heavily concentrated in mining and services with a
reduced share of the manufacturing sector in GDP, suggesting tendencies to de-industrialization
(Solimano and Schaper 2015).
6 Historically, the mining industry has been the sector that contributes the most to total
investment given its capital intensity and the lumpy nature of investment. In the period
2008–14, mining investments represented nearly a quarter of total gross fixed capital formation.
Mining accounted for roughly 30 per cent of total foreign direct investment from 1974 and 2015,
equivalent to US$37,700 million.
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decision and a Washington Agreement was signed in 1951. This arrangement
allowed the Chilean State, through the Central Bank, to dispose of 20 per cent
of copper production by buying it from American companies in Chile at the
fixed price and then selling it at its market price to other countries. This
unfavourable agreement did not appease Chilean demands and in 1955 the
New Deal law was established in order to promote copper production and to
regulate the tax structure of the mining industry. The shortcomings of this
agreement in the following years paved the way for the Chilenización
del Cobre (‘Chilenization of copper’) adopted under the Christian Democrat
President Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964–70). The Chilenization law no. 16.425
of January 1966 created copper public–private joint companies in which the
Chilean state would buy 51 per cent of the property of the copper mines over a
period of fifteen years. This was the first serious, albeit cautious, attempt to
recover Chile’s natural resources base for national development.
In 1970, the political winds had changed in Chile and a socialist president,
Salvador Allende, was elected by popular vote (despite active Nixon–Kissinger
covert destabilization efforts, now documented by official United States Con-
gress records). Once in government, Allende sent to Congress a law to nation-
alize copper mines. In July 1971, the country’s Constitution was modified
with the unanimous support of representatives of all political parties, from
conservatives to communists, and copper mines were nationalized.7
On 11 September 1973, the Allende government was ousted by a bloody
military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Once in power, the military
junta started talks with copper companies in the United States (Anaconda
and Kennecott) to rapidly compensate American corporations affected by
nationalization approved by the previous parliament (that had been closed
by the army after the military coup). Friendly policy towards foreign invest-
ment in the copper sector and other activities started to develop, although the
nationalization of copper mines was not officially reversed by the military
government (Solimano 2012). As mentioned before, in 1976 CODELCO was
established with the mission of managing the copper companies that were
nationalized in the Allende period. Contrary to what happened to other public
companies, CODELCO was not included in the several massive privatization
programmes undertaken during Pinochet’s dictatorship. That same year, a
highly controversial secret law dating from 1958—the Copper Restricted
Law—directed to fund the acquisition of military equipment and weapons
out of copper-sector profits was modified. As noted before, in 1976 the new
7 A technical commission of the Chilean government made an assessment that accumulated
earnings of foreign mining companies since their creation were ‘excessive’ and the Chilean
government refused American demands for further compensation. This action reinforced
Richard Nixon’s determination to destabilize the Allende government.
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copper law (maintaining its secret status) stated that ‘10 per cent of gross
revenues of CODELCO’ were to be directed to finance military purchases by
the Chilean armed forceswithout the standard overseeing (formal accountabil-
ity) by parliament and the general comptroller of the country. This law is not
subject to direct congressional oversight in its operation.8
Two key elements of the mining legislation in Chile are the Organic Law of
Mining Concessions (1982) and the Mining Code (1983). Although the 1980
constitution states that the Chilean state has ‘absolute, exclusive, inalienable,
and imprescriptible domain over all mines and resources underneath Chilean
soil’, the combination of the Organic Law and the Mining Code gives, in
practice, priority to private property rights and mining concessions (leasing
arrangements granted by the state). Leasing rights can be extended indefin-
itely by the holders of leasing rights (concessioners) by paying very small fees
(less than US$10 per hectare per year according to specificities of the surface)
with a renovation preference for the incumbent even over the claims of the
Chilean state. Indeed, if the Chilean state were to nationalize private mining
companies, it would have to compensate private companies with a monetary
sum equal to the present discounted value of the estimated future cash flows
of the project. In reality, one of the effects of this legislation has been a
progressively denationalized/privatized property of mines concentrating
increasingly in big private companies that enjoy the incumbent status.
It is important to note that, owing to its corporate governance and tax
regime, CODELCO—as with all the public companies—is subject to an extra
40 per cent tax over profits which represents an extra extraction of its net
revenues besides the resources transferred to the armed forces through the
secret copper law. Currently, with relatively depressed copper prices, this
framework has turned CODELCO into a company with a potentially vulner-
able financial situation that is affecting its ability to undertake its investment
planning for future years. Despite its huge profits, CODELCO’s debt grew by
247 per cent between 2004 and 2015 as it transferred to the state treasury an
accumulated amount of US$56,000 million in the same period (the highest
financial transfer in CODELCO’s history).
Thehistoryof themining-sector legislation since themilitary regime included,
as indicated, DL 600, established in 1974 and still in place today, which allows
unlimited repatriation of profits by foreign investors and the option of
an invariant tax structure for investments made under this regulation. Tax
invariability and loopholes havemade Chile one of themost attractivemining
8 Currently, several previous commanders-in-chief of the army and high-ranking generals are
under investigation, accused of illicit and corrupt management of funds arising from the secret
copper law.
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destinations for foreign investors. In response, foreign direct investment in
mining started to pick up a few years after the return to democracy (rather
than during the period of authoritarian rule itself) and the post-Pinochet
governments have maintained, on the whole, the mining legislation enacted
by the General.9
In 2003, the Chilean Congress appointed a special commission to study the
possibility of introducing new private-sector mining taxation arrangements
in response to a series of allegations of persistent practices of tax avoidance
and after a decade of massive foreign investment in the mining sector.10
This congressional special commission identified various legal mechanisms
used by private corporations to declare negative profits, such as transfer
pricing, fraudulent forward manipulations, accelerated depreciation, and
Table 10.2. Parametric changes in relevant variables and effects on effective and structural
fiscal incomes by sector, 2014
Variable Unit of
change












Copper price (CODELCO) 1 cent (US$) –36.1 –1.5 –0.1 0.0
Copper production 1% change –17.0 –0.7 –21.7 –0.7
Nominal exchange rate 1 peso (CLP$) –4.2 –0.2 –5.7 –0.2
Production cost per unit 1 cent (US$) –36.1 –1.5 –36.1 –1.1
Reference copper price 1 cent (US$) 0.0 0.0 –36.0 –1.1
GMP-10
Copper price (BML) 1 cent (US$) –11.4 –0.5 0.3 0.0
Copper production 1% change –34.3 –1.4 –33.5 –1.5
Nominal exchange rate 1 peso (CLP$) –4.3 –0.2 –4.5 –0.2
Production cost per unit 1 cent (US$) –5.1 –0.2 –5.1 –0.2
Reference copper price 1 cent (US$) 0.0 0.0 –11.8 –0.5
Source: authors’ elaboration based on DIPRES (2016).
9 Accounting schemes (non-penalized) have been used for purposes of tax avoidance. Very
favourable conditions for foreign investors were embedded in DL 600: ‘It is good to be true, and the
companies know it,’ said Radomiro Tomic, a copper expert, former Chilean ambassador to the
United States, and a prominent political leader who happened to be the Christian Democratic
party’s presidential candidate in the 1970 elections, running against Salvador Allende and Jorge
Alessandri, to The Washington Post in 1982, reflecting on the business climate of those years
(Diehl 1982).
10 According to former Senator Jorge Lavandero Illanes (former head of the Mining Commission
in Congress), only two out of forty-seven private copper companies paid taxes to the government
between 1995 and 2002 (Lavandero Illanes 2004).
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debt interest payments. After extended political discussion and lobbying by
the mining companies, in 2005, the specific mining tax (SMT)—which taxed
profits but not the value of sales or physical production, as in the traditional
concept of royalty—was passed into a law.11 Unfortunately, this SMT con-
tributed only about 1 per cent of total fiscal revenues and 5 per cent of total
mining taxes between 2006 and 2015. The fact that the royalty is levied on
profits rather than on the value of production, along with the practices to
diminish profits, may account for this meagre revenue.
10.4 A Macroeconomic Perspective: Orthodoxy,
Fiscal Rule, and Stabilization Funds
Chile’s economic performance in recent decades is often presented as a case of
sound macroeconomic management by international financial institutions
such as the World Bank and the IMF and the international financial commu-
nity. The policies in place provide an almost textbook example of macroeco-
nomic orthodoxy, combining inflation targeting, a fiscal rule, a free-floating
exchange rate, and an open capital account and SWFs. The Fiscal Responsi-
bility Law of 2006 is supported by the fiscal rule and two formal SWFs
(to manage the budget surplus generated at the time of copper price booms):
the ESSF which had accumulated, by mid-2016, nearly US$16 billion and the
PRF, running a surplus of US$8.3 billion.12 A third, relatively hidden fund is
constituted by the surplus accumulated by the (secret) copper law aiming to
benefit the armed forces, which has accumulated nearly US$5 billion. Thus,
over US$30 billion are held in the three stabilization funds, not a minor
amount for an economy with US$300 billion GDP.
The literature evaluating these arrangements suggests that they have suc-
ceeded in reducing economic volatility stemming from terms-of-trade shocks
and other internal and external shocks affecting the macro economy. For
example, Franken et al. (2006) show that the reduction in GDP volatility
between 1991 and 2003 was associated with a reduction in the volatility
of the monetary and fiscal stance. Larraín and Parro (2008) find that
roughly 60 per cent of GDP volatility reduction is related to the fiscal rule
and the prevailing flexible exchange-rate regime. Furthermore, De Gregorio
and Labbé (2011) show that the Chilean economy has become increasingly
resilient to copper price shocks since 1985, and especially since the 2000s
11 Specifically, the specificmining tax is not a royalty because it taxes profits rather than revenues.
Therefore, there is a double incentive to underestimate revenues and to overestimate costs.
12 TheESSF is an amended and extended legal formalizationof theCopperRevenueCompensation
Fund established in 1987. The PRF is a special fund dedicated exclusively to guaranteeing the
sustainability of state-funded pension payments.
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owing to its macroeconomic framework. Céspedes et al. (2014) show that the
policy mix adopted by Chile allowed a strong countercyclical fiscal response to
the global financial crisis of 2008–9 (the countercyclical fiscal stance was not
pursued after the decline in copper prices in 2013).
An early attempt to manage the impact of the volatility in copper prices was
the Copper Revenue Compensation Fund (CRCF) created in 1987. This fund
aimed at preventing the occurrence of fiscally induced economic cycles at the
time of upward movements in international copper prices (e.g. governments
have a propensity to pro-cyclically increase public spending at times of
enhanced fiscal revenues). The CRCF was set to accumulate resources (savings)
when the copper price was higher than a long-term reference price (set by the
fiscal authorities); in turn, accumulated resources could be spent when the
copper price was lower than the reference price. According to the Chilean
budget office (DIPRES 2016), the CRCF was successful in managing price
booms by reducing external debt and unsustainable government spending.
The resources of the CRCF were used after the Asian crisis (1998–2003) and
before that in 1993 and 1994.
Despite a prudent fiscal policy during the 1990s, a more sophisticated
framework was later adopted to tie the hands of fiscal authorities. In 2001,
the administration of President Ricardo Lagos created a fiscal rule that implied
the calculation of a ‘structural balance’ (SB). This was intended to operate as a
self-imposed policy of fiscal restraint. The idea behind the structural fiscal rule
is simple but not without problems of implementation: fiscal spending should
follow ‘long-run’ (permanent) values of the price of copper, GDP growth, and
other key parameters affecting the budget. However, determining what is
permanent can be tricky, particularly in the case of copper prices (a variable
with a strong random component), and nor is potential GDP growth a simple
concept to define and forecast.13 It is apparent that a main role of the fiscal
rule is of a political–economic nature: it provides a (scientific) disciplinary
device, supported by the wisdom of economic experts and aided by the
principles of inter-temporal macroeconomic theory, for governments to con-
tain social and political demands for higher public spending, particularly in a
highly inegalitarian society such as Chile.
The Fiscal Responsibility Act was approved under the first administration of
President Michelle Bachelet in 2006. The SB rule improved its methodology
of income measurement and in 2011, under the administration of President
Sebastián Piñera, a second generation methodology was applied, giving rise to
the cyclically adjusted (fiscal) balance (DIPRES 2011). Again, an advisory fiscal
council was convened in 2013 to monitor the operation of the new rule.
13 Expert committees were appointed and asked to determine the permanent values of key
parameters to be used by fiscal authorities.
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The structural fiscal balance rule allows government spending expansions
only when there is an increase in structural incomes driven by long-term
copper prices and potential GDP growth (see Box 10.1 and Table 10.2). If the
target for the structural budget is set at 1 per cent of GDP, this means that
expenditure for the next year will be 1 per cent of GDP lower than structural
income. To obtain structural estimates of potential GDP and long-run copper
prices, members of expert teams provide their estimates to the Ministry of
Finance. When the effective balance is larger than the SB, the surplus is saved
in the ESSF. When the effective balance is smaller than the SB, the deficit is
coveredwith funds from the ESSF.However, the exact value set for the SB in the
fiscal rule is still discretional and largely depends on the appraisal of relevant
macroeconomic conditions by the Ministry of Finance. The first surplus target
for the SB was set by the authorities at 1 per cent of GDP during the period
2001–7. Three arguments to choose this numberwere given at that time: (i) the
public sector was a net debtor (11 per cent of GDP); (ii) there were potential
increases in future fiscal liabilities related to pension guarantees, infrastructure
investment needs, and potential borrowing constraints; and (iii) it was
decided that the Central Bank needed to be recapitalized.14 Because of progress
in funds accumulation during the previous period, the surplus target was
diminished to 0.5 per cent of GDP for 2008 and again to 0 per cent in January
BOX 10.1 FISCAL SENSITIVITY TO CHANGES IN COPPER PRICES AND COPPER
PRODUCTION
Chile’s fiscal position is strongly affected by changes in both copper price and copper
production. Small changes in relevant variables have a significant impact on effective
fiscal incomes. However, the use of a medium-term reference price prevents the effects
of cyclical shock in structural fiscal incomes. The budget office (DIPRES) simulations show
that a change of 1 cent (US$) in the copper price reduces fiscal revenues by US$37.5
million. The reference price is useful to deal with uncertain global conditions, but
structural fiscal incomes also depend on internal copper production. A reduction of
1 per cent in copper production of CODELCO has an impact of US$17 million on
structural fiscal incomes. The same change in private mining production can reduce
fiscal incomes by US$34million. Production is affected not only by international demand
through price changes but also by local conditions such as rising energy costs, water
availability, the decreasing ore grade of minerals, and increasing social and environmen-
tal issues as a consequence of natural resources activities (see Table 10.2).
14 Because of the crisis of 1982–3, one of the most severe in Chile, several banks went bankrupt
and the government had to bail out banks with a cumulative fiscal cost equivalent
to approximately 35–40 per cent of GDP.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
210
2009 to provide fiscal space for a fiscal expansion to counteract the effects of
the global financial crisis. This value has been maintained since then.15
In Figure 10.2, we can observe the evolution of the SB rule (based on the
fiscal balance evaluated at the estimated long-run values of copper prices and
GDP) over the business cycle. We can observe, as expected, that the evolution
of the SB is smoother than that of the current (effective) balance. The changes
(deterioration) in the current (effective) balance were significant during the
Asian financial crisis of 1997 (at that time there was only the CRCF) and also
during the global crisis of 2008. In 2009, an aggressive countercyclical fiscal
expansion was adopted by the fiscal authorities.16 Between 1990 and 2008,
there had been, on average, a surplus in the effective fiscal balance in Chile of
1.9 per cent of GDP. However, by contrast in 2009 the budget ran an effective
deficit of 4.4 percentage points of GDP as a consequence of the cyclical decline
in revenues and the effect of a large fiscal expansion.
It can be argued that the fiscal rule prevented an unsustainable increase in
public expenditure in the period of the copper price boom through 2007, and
before the global turbulence of 2008–9. In fact, between 2003 and 2007, when
the copper price increased by 220 per cent in real terms, the structural fiscal
balance averaged 1.1 per cent of GDP whereas the effective surplus was
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Figure 10.2. Fiscal balance, 1990–2014
Source: authors’ elaboration based on DIPRES (2015a).
15 The structural balance achieved –3.1 per cent of GDP (deficit) in 2009 and the effective
balance was –4.4 per cent of GDP (deficit).
16 It is worth noting that the IMF at that time was recommending countries with fiscal space to
adopt expansionary fiscal policies.
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points of GDP were saved by the Chilean state in the SWFs during 2003
and 2007.17
As mentioned previously, after the global financial crisis, a combination of
countercyclical fiscal policy and expansive monetary policy was adopted in
Chile. According to Céspedes et al. (2014), close to US$4 billion from the ESSF
(2.8 per cent of GDP) was assigned to the economic recovery in January 2009
(later during that same year more money was spent) with several measures
driven by the Central Bank, such as stopping the accumulation of reserves,
easing collateral requirement of repo operations, and temporarily loosening
rules regarding bank reserves. As we can see in Figure 10.2, the SB has remained
consistently negative since then.
In February 2010, a major earthquake followed by a tsunami struck the
centre-south of Chile, causing hundreds of deaths andmajor physical destruc-
tion of housing and infrastructure. Reconstruction became the first policy
priority of the nation, and public expenditure grew by 5.5 per cent in real
terms in 2010. The Piñera administration nonetheless committed to reduce
the structural deficit, and a –0.6 per cent of GDP was achieved by the end
of the Piñera government in 2014. Since then, the authorities have expressed
their intention to return to structural surpluses but predictions are that this
may not be achieved before 2020 because of the expected lower price of
copper and slower GDP growth.
10.4.1 Asset Management of SWFs
Because of the copper price boom of 2002–7, the ESSF and PRF both increased
their savings in that period, although the government later drew almost
US$9 billion from the ESSF throughout 2009 to finance the fiscal expansion
of that year. The resources of the ESSF can be used at any time to complement
current fiscal incomes in periods of fiscal deficits. They can also be used for the
amortization of public debt and to capitalize the PRF. Figure 10.3 presents the
accumulation pattern of ESSF and PRF and also the average annual rate of
return of each fund. In fact, we can observe that despite its good profitability
before the global financial crisis, negative results have been realized in more
recent years, mainly in the ESSF. Overall, the total return since 2007 has been
in line with a fixed income portfolio with a nominal rate of return of 2.28 per
cent for the PRF and 3.14 per cent for the ESSF.18
17 Between 2003 and 2007, average GDP growth was 5 per cent (average GDP growth declined
to 3.4 per cent in the period 2008–15).
18 Rate of return is calculated based on the time-weighted rate of return methodology devised
by the Ministry of Finance.
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According to the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2006, the Ministry of Finance
is responsible for both funds and is assisted by a financial committee of experts
to define the investment policy and structure of the funds.19 In turn, the
Central Bank, in its role of fiscal agent, is responsible for materializing the
investment guidelines defined by the Ministry of Finance and choosing
the actual asset allocation and the strategic composition of the funds, and
managing the cost related to its administration.
The investment policy of the funds seeks to maximize their market value
subject to a certain level of risk exposure. Portfolio composition is tailored to
maintain high liquidity, low credit risk, and low volatility investments in
order to accommodate future fiscal deficits and avoid losses for the funds.
Indeed, the current investment policy of the ESSF and the PRF relies mainly on
bonds and fixed-income instruments. Bonds accounted for almost 70 per cent
of total assets in both funds in 2010 and 2011. However, following the
recommendation of the financial committee, since 2012 in the case of the
PRF and 2013 for ESSF, equities have been part of both portfolios in order to
increase the profitability of funds, accounting for no more than 18 per cent in
the case of the ESSF and no more than 8 per cent for the PRF. All instruments
are in reserve currencies such as the Swiss franc, the yen, and the euro but the
funds are denominated in US dollars (for a more detailed version of this
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Figure 10.3. Sovereign wealth funds
Source: authors’ elaboration based on DIPRES (2015b).
19 Decisions and recommendations made by the financial committee are not mandatory for
the Ministry of Finance. The president of the committee is chosen by the fiscal authority. The
committee also reports to Congress about asset management of SWFs.
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10.4.2 Macroeconomic Effects: Growth Volatility and Country
Risk Reductions
As noted earlier, several authors have documented the fact that the macroeco-
nomic framework of Chile has been successful in reducing output volatility
since 1990. Indeed, as we can see in Figure 10.4, based on Céspedes et al.
(2014), there has been a significant reduction in GDP growth volatility since
1984, with a relatively stable period (lower output volatility) even after the
global financial crisis of 2008–9.20
The combination of fiscal rules, two SWFs, flexible exchange rates, and an
independent Central Bank is said to have contributed to lower output volatil-
ity in Chile—certainly relative to most other comparable countries. This may
be true, although it is not simple to ascertain the contribution of each com-
ponent of the policy package to lower output volatility. In addition, it is fair to
say that the actual fiscal and monetary policy decisions following the judge-
ment of specific authorities—rather than the pure mechanical operation of
supposedly impersonal policy rules—are likely to have contributed also to









































































Figure 10.4. GDP growth volatility (ten-year rolling window) and macroeconomic
policies
Notes: CSF, copper stabilization fund; IT, inflation target; FER, flexible exchange rate; SB, structural
balance; FRL, fiscal responsibility law; ESSF, economic and social stabilization fund; PRF, pension
reserve fund.
Source: authors’ elaboration based on Díaz et al. (2016) and Central Bank of Chile data.
20 To measure volatility, Céspedes et al. (2014) compute the ten-year rolling window average
of the standard deviation of GDP growth.
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Another benefit claimed in the literature on the Chilean fiscal rules and
SWFs is their contribution to a reduction in the country risk (Larraín and Parro
2008; Marcel 2010; Schmidt-Hebbel 2012). The argument posits that as the
government develops its credibility through an independent Central Bank
and a solid fiscal position—along with an important implicit source of collat-
eral, namely the ESSF—the risk perception of the economic agents decreases.
One manifestation of this, following Marcel (2010), is depicted in Figure 10.5
where we can observe that Chile’s sovereign risk spreads have diminished in
absolute terms and compared with Latin America and Asia. Although we
cannot assume a causal relationship between the adoption of this set of
macro rules and the reduction of sovereign risk spreads, we can observe a
slight reduction in the sub-period previous to the global financial crisis, and a
level considerably lower than in Latin America in the whole period. Moreover,
we can see that after the global crisis the level of Chile’s country risk spreads
returned more rapidly to pre-crisis levels, whereas Latin America continues
with its pre-crisis levels.
10.5 Conclusions
Historically, macroeconomic cycles in Chile have been led by fluctuations in
the prices of its main mineral and agricultural commodities. To counteract
this trend, between the 1940s and 1970s the country tried to boost import-
substitution industrialization with a productive role attached to the state.
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Figure 10.5. Country risk spreads (1999–2016, basis points)
Source: authors’ elaboration based on Central Bank of Chile data.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Copper Sector, Fiscal Rules, and Stabilization Funds in Chile
215
the 1970s as Chile embarked on a neoliberal development strategy (Solimano
2012). As the economy opened to foreign trade more aggressively in the
1970s and 1980s, the relative importance of copper exports as a proportion of
total exports declined fromnearly 80per cent in the early 1970s to around50per
cent nowadays, reflecting the effects of export diversification and a sharp
increase in total export volumes. However, in spite of diversification, copper
has remained a critical source of fiscal revenues and foreign exchange. Since
the 1980s, the authorities have developed various mechanisms to dampen the
effects of shocks in the copper price on the domestic business cycle.
A CSF was created in 1987, and then a fiscal rule in 2001. The fiscal rule was
expected to constrain possible spending propensities of the fiscal system and
delink the domestic economy from the sometimes-disruptive effects of terms-
of-trade shocks. In 2006, an ESSF and a PRF were established as part of a
broader fiscal responsibility law. There is a relative consensus that these
mechanisms have contributed to providing fiscal predictability and have
also contained the impact of external shocks on fiscal spending and the
business cycle. In addition, it is claimed that this macro framework has
contributed to reducing output volatility, thereby reducing borrowing costs
and lowering country risk premiums. The IMF and the international financial
community often portray Chile as a successful example of the benefits of
having fiscal rules, stabilization funds, inflation-targeting, an independent
central bank, and flexible exchange rates.
The analysis in this chapter recognizes progress in these areas but also
highlights loose ends in the operation of these funds and draws attention to
some trade-offs not always recognized in the laudatory evaluations of the
Chilean case. In particular, we stress that rules leave substantial space for
discretion and their implementation requires non-trivial judgements. Specific
features need to be addressed by policy makers. First, the fiscal rule requires
predicting, with accuracy, long-run (or permanent) values for key parameters
such as copper prices, and potential GDP growth. This is not a simple task and
has required a proliferation of expert committees and frequent revisions
affecting the operation of these rules. Second, the value for the structural fiscal
budget has been changed several times by the authorities since 2001, thereby
reducing its anchoring role on expectations and policy predictability. Third,
the stabilization funds (particularly ESSF) are asymmetric in their operation
rules. On the one hand, there are clear rules of accumulation; on the other
hand, no rules exist for using the resources of these funds, say to counteract an
economic downturn or recession (tied, for instance, to the level of the output
gap or the unemployment rate). As of now, the decision to withdraw resources
from the SWFs depends on the discretionary judgement of the fiscal authority.
In addition, it is not possible to track where the resources are finally spent
(e.g. on consumption or investment), and therefore evaluate the efficacy of
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countercyclical fiscal policies and some of their long-run effects. Fourth, it is
unclear what would be the optimal level of resource accumulation in various
stabilization funds. Currently, the ESSF, PRF, and defence fund have assets of
nearly 10 per cent of GDP (this does not include the international reserves
held by the Central Bank, which would add, roughly, another 10 per cent of
GDP). This raises the question of a possible tendency towards over-insurance
in fiscal management. Fifth, Chile is a country whose levels of public spending
in education, health, pensions, and other social sectors as a share of GDP are
consistently below those of the OECD and other Latin American economies of
middle and large size. This suggests an opportunity cost of over-investing in
stabilization funds in terms of over-restricted social spending in a country
with high indices of income and wealth inequality (Gini coefficients for
income above 50 per cent and for wealth over 70 per cent; Solimano 2016).
Finally, we note that Chile maintains very generous legislation towards
foreign direct investment and domestic companies in the mining sector.
This includes low royalties along with the perpetual renewal (at almost no
cost) of licences granting mining exploitation rights to incumbent private
corporations at the expense of forgone revenues for the Chilean state. This
has led to a highly privatized and denationalized copper sector. CODELCO,
the state-owned mining company, lacking an important degree of financial
autonomy from the treasury, is forced by law to provide 10 per cent of its gross
revenues to the armed forces for the acquisition of military equipment and
weapons. This arrangement affects the ability of CODELCO to finance its
capital investment projects with its own internal resources and also reduces
the availability of fiscal revenues (transferred from CODELCO to the treasury)
that could otherwise be directed to social spending and public infrastructure.
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Oil Discovery and Macroeconomic
Management
The Recent Ghanaian Experience
Mahamudu Bawumia and Håvard Halland
11.1 Introduction
Much of the extensive literature on the ‘resource curse’ phenomenon suggests
a negative correlation between national resource endowments and economic
growth (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001), and literature subsequent to Sachs
and Warner has concentrated on identifying various mechanisms, including
real exchange rate appreciation, through which natural resource wealth
impacts on growth.
Ghana’s situation since 2007 provides a unique opportunity to consider the
resource curse hypothesis: it also provides limited support for some versions of
this hypothesis, but ultimately tells a simpler story of insufficient fiscal and
monetary discipline. Crucially—and contrary to, for example, Botswana—
Ghana was not able to manage expectations sufficiently after oil was dis-
covered: consistent with van der Ploeg’s (2011) ‘anticipation of better times’
hypothesis. It is also consistent with Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), who
conclude that the combination of natural resource rents and high government
consumption provides an explanation for the curse, and with Collier and
Hoeffler (2009), who argue that the combination of rents from the extractive
industries and open democratic systems is associated with slower growth
unless there are enough checks and balances. Ghana’s large increase in sover-
eign debt after the discovery of oil reflects the concerns of Mansoorian (1991),
who suggests that an abundance of natural resources may encourage countries
to assume unsustainable levels of debt.
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Tightly fought elections in 2008 and 2012, in the context of expected or
newly available oil revenues, generated a situation where electoral promises
trumped the need tomanage expectations, generating spending pressures that
ultimately could not be contained. Institutional weakness, often proxied
by aggregated indexes of institutional quality, took on very precise forms in
Ghana. These specific forms are discussed in detail later.
Ghana’s case also corresponds well with arguments from the political
economy of macroeconomics, surveyed by Persson and Tabellini (2000).
A fundamental insight from this literature is that the implicit discount rate
used by politicians may exceed the rate of interest by the probability of the
politicians being removed from office. Hence if a political faction expects to be
expelled from office in the near future, it will extract oil or minerals much
faster than is socially optimal and will also borrow against future oil revenues
(van der Ploeg 2011).
Bleaney and Halland (2016) do not find evidence that natural resource
wealth in general promotes fiscal indiscipline. However, their econometric
model, based on the most disaggregated fiscal data currently available, does
not explain the performance of some outliers such as Ghana and Mongolia.
The Ghana case example therefore extends what can be learned about the
resource curse based on the prevailing econometric analysis.
Section 11.2 of this chapter elaborates some of the key developments in
the period leading up to the discovery of oil, in 2006. Section 11.3 provides
the context of the policy choices faced by the government in the subsequent
period, after oil had been discovered and the legal framework was put in
place to manage oil revenues. Sections 11.4 and 11.5 examine the deterior-
ation of public finances and the large accumulation of debt following the
discovery of oil. Section 11.6 analyses the decline in capital expenditure
following Ghana’s oil discovery. Section 11.7 examines Ghana’s declining
economic growth following the oil discovery, while Section 11.8 examines
the possible increase in corruption post-oil discovery. Section 11.9 places
the developments in Ghana in the context of the political system and in
particular the specific context of narrowly won elections. Section 11.10 asks
the question ‘What could Ghana have done differently?’ Section 11.11
concludes.
11.2 Ghana before Oil
From the year 2000 until around 2012, Ghana was one of the stars of the
‘Africa rising’ story, the toast of the international development community,
and a benchmark for other African countries in the areas of democracy and
development. In particular: (i) it had enjoyed stellar GDP growth between
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2001 and 2008; (ii) it had received substantial HIPC debt relief to the tune of
$4.2 billion after reaching the HIPC completion point in 2004; (iii) it had
benefitted from the experiences of countries such as Nigeria, and had put
together a strong framework to avoid the oil curse: especially the Petroleum
Revenue Management Act (PRMA) 2011 (Act 815, Republic of Ghana 2011)
which sets the key parameters for the accounting and collecting of petroleum
revenues; and (iv) it had a good record of democratic governance, with a free
press, rule of law, and reasonably strong institutions.
One would therefore have expected Ghana to be on the list of sub-Saharan
African countries able to avoid the natural resource curse. However, even
before oil production began in 2011, and increasingly thereafter, Ghana
found itself embroiled in all the problems of the curse. In August 2014 it
requested a bailout from the IMF.
In a recent earlier paper (Bawumia and Halland 2017) we summarized in
some detail the disastrous record of macro management in Ghana in the pre-
liberalization period from 1960 through 1983, and the recovery through 1999.
This recovery was followed by a period of excessive fiscal expansion, high
inflation, and currency depreciation in the run-up to the presidential and
parliamentary elections in 2000. The immediate focus of the new government
of President John Agyekum Kufuor, elected in peaceful democratic elections
that year, was to restore macroeconomic stability. This would consolidate
many of the reforms initiated in 1993 by the Economic Recovery Program
(ERP). The term of the Kufuor government also coincided, from 2001 to 2006,
with adherence to an IMF programme that was required to obtain HIPC debt
relief. In a sense, Ghana during this period was operating under a quasi-fiscal
rule: a major shift in macroeconomic policy, from one of monetary accom-
modation, to one of fiscal stringency and monetary discipline.
A major pillar of this macroeconomic stabilization process was old-
fashioned fiscal consolidation, involving a medium-term fiscal framework;
the stabilization of domestic public debt; robust revenue mobilization; and
prudent spending. For example, the 2003 fiscal programme set a target of zero
net domestic financing of the public-sector borrowing requirement for 2003.
The government’s fiscal policy strategy from 2001 also focused on debt
reduction. Under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), Ghana’s
debt relief was estimated at US$4.2 billion in nominal terms. After the
enhanced HIPC initiative was implemented in 2004 and Ghana qualified for
the MDRI, Ghana’s external debt decreased significantly, from 156.3 per cent
of GDP in 2000 to only 17.2 per cent of GDP by 2006 (Table 11.1). Thanks to
the HIPC relief, Ghana’s external debt declined from US$6.02 billion in 2000
to US$2.17 billion by 2006. Furthermore, the proportion of exports used to
service Ghana’s debts declined from 28.1 per cent in 2000 to only 4.5 per cent
by 2006 (Table 11.1).
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Table 11.1. Ghana, selected economic indicators, 2000–8
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Annual percentage change unless otherwise stated
Real GDP 3.7 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.7 5.8 6.4 6.3 7.3
Inflation 40.5 21.3 15.2 23.6 16.4 13.9 10.9 12.7 18
Broad money 46.5 41.4 50.0 35.8 25.9 14.3 39.1 36.3 37.0
Reserve money 52.6 31.3 42.6 28.2 18.5 11.2 32.3 30.6 34.1
Ex-rate depreciation 49.8 3.7 13.2 17.3 2.2 0.9 1.1 4.8 20.1
91-day T-bill 38.0 27.0 26.6 19.6 17.1 11.8 9.6 10.6 24.7
BOG prime rate 27.0 27.0 24.5 21.5 18.5 15.5 12.5 13.5 17.0
Gross reserves (US$m) 233.4 364.8 640.4 1,425.6 1,732.4 1,894.9 2,269.8 2,836.7 2,036.0
Months of imports 0.84 1.2 2.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.0 2.7 1.8
Overall balance (US$m) –116 8.6 39.8 558.3 10.5 84.3 415.1 413.1 940
Crude oil (US$ per barrel) 25.93 25.5 29.9 29.5 41.7 56.8 58.1 94.1 98.5
NPLs % 11.86 19.6 22.7 18.3 16.1 13.0 7.9 6.9 7.6
External debt (US$m) 6,021 6,025 6,131 7,548 6,447 6,347 2,172 3,590 3,871
Debt services/exports 28.1 16.4 10.1 4.9 7.2 7.7 4.5 4.6 4.3
As percentage of GDP
Budget deficit 8.6 7.7 4.9 3.2 3.2 2.0 4.8 4.9 6.27
External debt 156.3 115.9 105.9 101.0 73.1 59.6 17.2 24.9
Debt services 14.1 5.9 3.5 1.7 2.2 2.0 1.3 1.3 0.4
External debt services (US$m) 544.8 306.6 204 126 194.9 215.2 166.7 192.5 52.2
Current account balance 10.16 10.7 4.3 1.3 9.7 12.6 13.1 16.1 24.2
Note: BOG = Bank of Ghana; NPLs =non-performing loans; T-bill = treasury bill.


























Monetary policy at this time was underpinned by the adoption of an
inflation-targeting framework, with the central bank taking advantage of the
statutory independence that parliament had enshrined in the Bank of Ghana
Act (BOG 2002).
This new fiscal andmonetary policy framework caused a decline in inflation
and inflationary expectations and strengthened Ghana’s external payments
position. Headline inflation declined from 40.5 per cent in 2000 to 12.7
per cent by 2007 (Table 11.1), and between 2001 and 2007 the overall balance
of payments was in surplus (except for a deficit of US$10.5 million recorded in
2004. Gross international reserves increased from US$233 million (less than
one month of import cover) in 2000 to US$2.84 billion (approximately three
months of import cover) by 2007.
Additionally, after an initial sharp depreciation of the cedi against the US
dollar in 2000, relative exchange rate stability was restored in 2001, when
the depreciation was just 3.7 per cent. This was followed by 13.2 per cent and
17.3 per cent nominal depreciation in 2002 and 2003 respectively, 2.2 per
cent in 2004, 0.9 per cent in 2005, 1.1 per cent in 2006, and 4.8 per cent in
2007 (anchored by declining inflation expectations). Between 2004 and 2007
the cedi depreciated by an average of 2.25 per cent annually against the
dollar (Table 11.1). This contrasted with the cedi’s historical instability and
its 50 per cent depreciation in 2000.
11.3 Discovery of Oil
In June and August 2007, the United Kingdom-based firm Tullow Oil, and its
US partners Kosmos Energy and Anadarko Petroleum, announced two signifi-
cant oil discoveries off Ghana’s coast. Some initial reports conveyed the
impression that Ghana’s reserves were comparable in size to those of Nigeria
and Angola (Modern Ghana 2007b).With oil production projected to begin in
2010, the Ghanaian government was optimistic. In particular, there was a
sense among government officials and the population that Ghana would be
freed from the clutches of donors and international financial institutions, to
pursue a more independent and growth-based development agenda. With an
election on the horizon for 2008, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP)
government was eager to maximize the political benefit of the oil discovery,
and in the process arguably did not manage expectations sufficiently.
However, impacted soon afterwards by increased domestic government
spending and the global oil and food crisis, Ghana’s economic environment
took a turn for the worse as early as 2007–8. The government then faced the
choice of fiscal contraction, full cost recovery for utilities, postponement
of some already committed expenditures, or continued fiscal expansion.
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Government factions argued that as the world was heading towards a reces-
sion, Ghana needed to adopt counter-cyclical policies, and therefore aggregate
demand needed to be increased in the interim. It was argued that public
finances could then be balanced later when the crisis was over, and when
the oil was expected to start flowing in 2010.
For a government facing an imminent election in 2008, this was a persua-
sive argument. There was a sense that some reduction in the price trends and
the forthcoming oil revenues would soon abate Ghana’s economic difficulties
(Bawumia 2010). The natural resource discovery gave a false sense of greater
fiscal space than was the case.
The expansionary fiscal policy of 2007–8 had predictable consequences, and
the economy quickly suffered a setback: inflation increased from 10.9 per cent
at the end of 2006 to 18.1 per cent at the end of 2008, and the exchange rate
depreciated by 20.1 per cent in 2008 compared with only 1.1 per cent in 2006.
The budget deficit increased from 4.8 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 6.5 per cent
of GDP by 2008. Gross international reserves declined from US$2.27 billion
(three months of import cover) in 2006 to US$2.04 billion (1.8 months of
import cover) in 2008 (Table 11.1). Thus the beginnings of the natural resource
curse were evident in Ghana long before the first drop of oil was produced.
Nevertheless, the government of Ghana expressed determination to make
sure that Ghana’s oil resources would be managed well so as to avoid the
dreaded curse (Amoako-Tuffour and Ghanney 2013). The government con-
vened stakeholders to learn what pitfalls to avoid and which best practices to
follow from the diverse experiences of countries such as Nigeria and Norway.
To underpin good governance in the oil sector, and based on these discus-
sions, public consultations, and international best practices, Ghana passed
both the PRMA and the Petroleum Commission Act in 2011.
11.4 Deterioration of Public Finances
Notwithstanding these efforts, Ghana’s public finances began to deteriorate
quickly following the oil discovery in 2007. As Figure 11.1 indicates, public
finances were generally sound from 2001 to 2007. For example, in 2005 there
was a deficit of only 2 per cent of GDP. But this subsequently increased to
6.5 per cent of GDP in 2008, as the government increased expenditure in that
election year in anticipation of oil revenues. Following the onset of oil pro-
duction in 2010, the fiscal deficit narrowed, but only temporarily, to 4 per cent
of GDP in 2011.
The 2008 elections brought a change of government, from the NPP to
the National Democratic Congress (NDC). Notwithstanding this change,
increased pre-election spending also occurred ahead of the 2012 elections.
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Ghana signed on to a further IMF programme in 2009 for the period 2009–12.1
The programme restored macroeconomic stability, with inflation, the fiscal
deficit, the exchange rate, and real GDP growth generally moving in the
direction of stability. However, the IMF programme ended in mid-2012, and
notwithstanding the progress that had been made, and with an election
approaching, the authorities decided not to renew it.
As the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections drew closer, the
incumbent NDC government dramatically increased expenditures relative to
2011–14 revenues. While government tax revenue averaged approximately
18.9 per cent of GDP between 2011 and 2014, government expenditures
increased from 20.1 per cent of GDP in 2011 to no less than 34.5 per cent in
2012—before declining to 28.2 per cent at the end of 2014 (IMF 2014). In the
2012 election year, Ghana’s budget deficit reached GH₵8.7 billion, and
amounted to some 11.6 per cent of GDP. This was the highest-recorded budget
deficit in Ghana’s history.
To make matters worse, the bulk of the increase in government expenditure
between 2011 and 2014 (94 per cent) was on recurrent expenditure (mainly
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Figure 11.1. Fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP, 2000–14
Source: authors’ illustration based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, Ghana.
1 This was a Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility arrangement that built on Ghana’s second
Poverty Reduction Strategy. The main goal of the programme was to eliminate Ghana’s large fiscal
imbalances by 2011 and put in place strengthened institutions for public financial management
(IMF 2009).
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bill represented some 46 per cent of total tax revenue but it had increased to
72.3 per cent of tax revenue by December 2012 (Government of Ghana 2013).
Thisfiscal stance resulted in double-digitfiscal deficits of 11.6 per cent and 10.9
per cent ofGDP in 2012 and2013 respectively, and a provisional 9.5 per cent of
GDP in 2014 (Figure 11.1). This was the first time in independent Ghana’s
history that the country had double-digit fiscal deficits two years in a row. It
resulted in the government being cash-strapped and unable tomeet some of its
obligations on statutory payments (for example, for health, education, and
local government) as well as some non-statutory payments.
11.5 Rising Levels of Public Debt
The debt relief that Ghana obtained under the HIPC initiative had reduced
the country’s debt burden significantly. However, with the onset of oil
production, the public debt stock rose dramatically to GH₵76.1 billion (67.1
per cent of GDP) by the end of 2014, versus 30 per cent in 2008 (Figure 11.2).
At the same time government borrowing became much more expensive, as
illustrated by the successive increases in the risk-free treasury bill rate; see
Bawumia and Halland (2017: Figure 3). Such large-scale borrowing—made
possible by the large expected oil revenues—and the ensuing high returns
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Figure 11.2. Total debt as percentage of GDP, 2000–14
Source: authors’ illustration based on data from Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, Ghana.
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crowding out the private sector, which was increasingly unable to borrow. The
interest burden of this increased and high public debt stock was also consid-
erable, growing from 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2008 to 7.1 per cent in 2015; see
Bawumia and Halland (2017: Figure 4).
This high interest burden, combined with a rising wage bill, left Ghana’s
government with very little money for other critical areas. To put this in
perspective, the government of Ghana’s 2015 budget allocations (excluding
internally generated funds and donor contributions) to the eightmost import-
ant spending ministries including education, health, and transport ministries
amounted to about GH₵952 million, whereas interest payments on Ghana’s
public debt stock in the same year were GH₵9.5 billion—that is, ten times the
combined allocations to these critical ministries.
This situation was reminiscent of Ghana’s situation before the HIPC debt
relief, when the debt burden had reduced the critical fiscal space that could
have enhanced capital and social expenditure. At 67 per cent of GDP, by 2015
Ghana’s debt stock had crossed the critical 60 per cent level: a particular
concern to developing countries with limited access to capital flows. In fact,
Ghana’s debt by then was right back on the unsustainable track that had led to
its HIPC relief.
How could Ghana have so misjudged its capacity to borrow so soon after
obtaining HIPC relief just a few years earlier? Apart from the oil discovery
heightening expectations about ability to pay, it should also be noted that
Ghana’s GDP was rebased in 2010, thereby statistically increasing Ghana’s
GDP by 60 per cent from 2007. This made the debt-to-GDP ratios look satis-
factory on the surface. What policy makers may have overlooked was the fact
that the GDP was rebased without an attendant increase in foreign exchange
liquidity. In this situation, taking comfort from an apparently low debt-to-
GDP ratio was potentially very misleading.
11.6 Declining Capital Expenditure
According to Hartwick’s rule (Hamilton and Hartwick 2005), resource-rich
countries, in order to maintain wealth and build strong foundations for
economic growth, should offset the depletion of their natural resources by
commensurate levels of investment in produced capital—primarily infrastruc-
ture and human capital. But in the case of Ghana, notwithstanding the new
oil revenues and the massive increase in the debt stock, capital expenditure as
a percentage of GDP has actually been in decline since 2007. From an average
of 12 per cent of GDP between 2004 and 2008, capital expenditure declined to
4.8 per cent by 2014; see Bawumia and Halland (2017: Figure 5). This meant
that before the oil discovery Ghana was spending amuch higher proportion of
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its income on capital investment than it has been since the oil discovery. This
decline in infrastructure investment runs counter to what was anticipated and
what good practice recommends.
In accordance with Section 21(5) of the 2011 PRMA, four priority expend-
itures were approved by parliament in the annual budget funding amount
(ABFA): (i) expenditure and amortization of loans for oil and gas infrastruc-
ture, (ii) roads and other infrastructure, (iii) agricultural modernization, and
(iv) capacity-building (including oil and gas). Table 11.2 shows the allocations
to these areas for the 2012 budget year.
Even though on paper the oil revenue allocation is skewed towards infra-
structure, the overall decline in capital spending means that the total alloca-
tion to infrastructure is likely to have declined. In the earlier paper (Bawumia
and Halland 2017) we document several other related aspects of the macro-
economic deterioration that followed the discovery of oil. These include:
(i) a loose monetary policy associated with excessive Bank of Ghana financing
of the government (2017: Figure 6); a sharp increase in the rate of inflation
through the 2008 elections and beyond (2017: Figure 7); a severe deterioration
in the country’s external payments position and its international reserve
holdings (2017: Figures 8 and 9); and a progressive depreciation of the cedi
currency against the US dollar (2017: Figure 10).
11.7 Declining Real GDP Growth
While the discovery of oil initially boosted economic growth, real GDP
growth in Ghana has declined significantly since 2011. Data from the
Ghana Statistical Service (Government of Ghana 2011) show that real GDP
growth increased from 8.4 per cent (without oil) in 2008 to 15 per cent in
2011 (when it ranked among the highest in the world). Since 2011, however,
real GDP growth (including oil) has slowed down—to 7.9 per cent in 2012,
and then to around 4.2 per cent in 2014 (Figure 11.3). The 2015 budget
projected further declining growth—to 3.5 per cent, at a revised oil price
Table 11.2. Annual budget allocations to four priority areas, 2012
Priority areas GH₵ millions
Expenditure and amortization of loans for oil and gas infrastructure 100.00




Source: Government of Ghana Budget 2013.
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of US$52.8 per barrel.2 Non-oil GDP growth has similarly declined from
9.4 per cent in 2011. The actual growth rate in 2015, at just under 4 per
cent, was only marginally higher than in the year 2000, and less than half
the rate achieved in 2008 without oil.
The decline in real GDP growth can be attributed to a number of factors
including: (i) the increase in current expenditure at the expense of capital
expenditure; (ii) the greater fragility of both the private sector (partly due to a
reliance on public contracts that could not be honoured given the need for
adjustment post-elections) and the financial sector (given the accumulation of
arrears and related non-performing loans); (iii) an increasing debt burden that
has reduced critical fiscal space; and (iv) reduced macroeconomic policy cred-
ibility affecting investment decisions.
11.8 Corruption, Post-discovery
We now turn to consider some aspects of Ghana’s political economy that
arguably contributed to the macroeconomic malaise. An important strand of
the relevant literature attributes the natural resource curse to the political and
social factors at play in a given country (Rosser 2006; Schrank 2004; Snyder











































Figure 11.3. Real GDP growth, 2000–15, %
Source: authors’ illustration based on data from Ghana Statistical Service.
2 The initial budget projection was based on a price of US$99.3 per barrel.
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corruption and rent-seeking (Acemoglu et al. 2004; Isham et al. 2002; Leite
and Weidmann 1999; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).
The basic argument is that natural resources create ‘rents’, and political
elites compete for their control. Natural resource wealth provides incentives
for administrations to stay in power at any cost—by bribing voters, supporting
patronage-based and unproductive investments, encouraging a shift from
productive entrepreneurial activity to unproductive rent-seeking, weakening
institutions, and resisting efforts to further accountability, transparency, and
modernization. Corruption imposes a fiscal burden on the economy through
the waste of resources that could otherwise have been more productively
spent or saved.
In the case of Ghana, there are some indications that corruption may have
been on the rise since the discovery of oil. The Afrobarometer Survey con-
ducted in 2014 by the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD
2014) found that public perceptions of corruption had significantly increased,
and there was a similar perception of an increase in corruption in the run-up
to the 2008 elections under the NPP government (CDD 2008). According to
the 2014 survey, three quarters (75 per cent) of respondents said corruption
had increased over the previous year.
11.9 Ghana’s Political System in the Context of Oil
Ghana practises what has been described as a hybrid system of governance.
The president is chosen directly by the people (unlike in the parliamentary
system), and is head of government and head of state with full executive
powers. But unlike the system operating in the United States, for example,
the Fourth Republican Constitution, under which Ghana operates, makes it
mandatory for the president to select a majority of ministers from parliament.
This means that power is significantly skewed towards the executive branch
of the government. The executive branch also plays a large part in judicial
duties. Not only is the executive responsible for framing and presenting
all bills sent to parliament, but the president wields the power to appoint
justices to the High Court and Appeals Court (acting on the advice of the
Judicial Council) as well as Supreme Court, and to appoint the chief justice
(in consultation with the Council of State and with prior approval of parlia-
ment). In practice, therefore, Ghana’s political system is a presidential one
(Banful 2011).
Ghana is a multiparty democracy, but of the twenty-three political parties
registered in 2014, very few are active across the nation. The strongest, most
vibrant parties are the NDC, the NPP, the Convention People’s Party, the
People’s National Convention, and the Progressive People’s Party. However,
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the relative dominance of the NDC and NPP in various general elections since
1992 has turned Ghana’s democracy into a virtual two-party system. All
general elections since that year have been closely contested between the
two parties. Only a small margin (in terms of percentages and sometimes
actual numbers) separates the two. The NDC won the presidential elections
and a majority of parliamentary seats in the 1992, 1996, 2008, and 2012
general elections, while the NPP won the presidential elections and a majority
of parliamentary seats in the 2000 and 2004 general elections.
In the 2000 presidential elections, after both candidates failed to secure the
required votes in the first round, the elections went to a run-off. NPP candi-
date John Agyekum Kufuor secured 56.9 per cent of the votes. In the 2004
presidential elections, he secured 52.5 per cent of the votes to defeat John Atta
Mills of the NDC, who received 44.6 per cent of the votes. The 2008 election
saw Mills defeat Nana Akufo-Addo of the NPP by the narrowest of margins—
41,000 votes (of about 12 million registered voters and nine million actual
votes)—in another run-off poll. This was the closest election in Ghana’s
history, and the first to follow the discovery of oil. It speaks to the functioning
of Ghana’s democracy that the incumbent government was defeated by the
opposition, even if by the narrowest of margins. The 2012 election was also
fiercely fought: the NDC’s John Dramani Mahama received 50.7 per cent of
the votes, while NPP candidate Nana Akufo-Addo received 47.7 per cent.
Such close margins indicate that for a four-year political term, the pressure
on any government to deliver is high. A loss of the support of even a small
number of voters can turn the next election.When oil was discovered in 2007,
the incumbent NPP government raised public expectations to a high pitch
(Modern Ghana 2007a). President John AgyekumKufuor declared, ‘It is a great
time to be Ghanaian’ (Abissath 2008). As discussed above, the main economic
indicators deteriorated sharply ahead of both the 2008 and 2012 elections: the
first time while the NPP was in government, the second time while the NDC
was the incumbent party. Consistent with the political business cycle litera-
ture, incumbent governments in Ghana have generally expanded fiscal policy
in election years. In a joint review of public expenditure, Republic of Ghana
et al. (2011) found that in election years (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008)
the fiscal deficit (on a cash basis) as a percentage of GDP was 1.5 per cent
higher than the year before. The 2012 fiscal outcome following the oil discov-
ery therefore cannot be wholly attributed to the discovery, even though the
discovery may have amplified the political business cycle.
Much of the literature on the political economy of resource booms predicts
that the first government to enjoy resource rents will do all it can to remain in
power. In the case of Ghana, this drive may be further facilitated by a skew in
political power towards the executive branch. Ghana’s experience may there-
fore support some researchers’ hypothesis that presidential systems are more
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prone to this sort of tendency than parliamentary systems (Andersen and
Aslaksen 2008; Persson and Tabellini 2003).
11.10 What Could Ghana Have Done Differently?
The objective of this chapter is not to provide policy recommendations for
Ghana, but rather to make available an empirical account of Ghana’s experi-
ence to guide other recent or upcoming oil and mineral producers. In that
context, it is useful to briefly discuss what Ghanamight have done differently.
11.10.1 Anchoring Fiscal Discipline
While the discovery of oil provided Ghana with the fiscal space to increase its
borrowing, there was a clear and present danger amid a lack of actual value.
In the case of Ghana, plans for how the loans were to be spent—and the
transparency of their terms—were arguably insufficient. In sum, institutional
mechanisms were insufficient to check unsustainable fiscal expansion. Could
fiscal rules of the type employed in Chile and discussed by Solimano and
Guajardo (2017) help in such a context?
11.10.2 Fiscal Rules and Budget Institutions
Fiscal rules commit governments, usually but not always by legislation, to
numerical targets—most often budgetary aggregates pertaining to debts, def-
icits, expenditures, and revenues. The aim is to tie the hands of the fiscal
authorities in a bid to achieve greater fiscal discipline. Research on the effect-
iveness of fiscal rules does not indicate that fiscal discipline follows in a straight
line. Ossowski and Halland (2016) note that fiscal rules seem to work best in
countries with:
 a prior commitment to fiscal discipline
 strong institutions
 political commitment and consensus
 policy credibility
 strong public financial management capacity
 fiscal transparency
 robust monitoring.
It is therefore possible that a country lacking fiscal rules but possessing
a commitment to fiscal discipline and good institutions will outperform a
country with well-designed fiscal rules but with less commitment to fiscal
discipline, less political consensus, and weaker institutions.
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Chile provides a good example of the success of fiscal rules amid depend-
ence on resource revenues (Frankel 2011). There, the structural budget balance
is targeted to allow some cyclical flexibility. The medium-term equilibrium
price of copper and the output gap are decided on by two non-partisan expert
panels. The Chilean mechanisms are discussed in greater detail in Solimano
and Guajardo (2017).
What is clear from the literature is that political economy considerations
are critical to the success—or otherwise—of fiscal rules in resource-rich coun-
tries. For many low-income countries, infrastructure needs are high, as is the
demand for public-sector wages. Governments facing elections may attempt
to respond to these two demands by embarking on infrastructure projects
without conducting value-for-money audits, and by increasing public-sector
wages (Gelb 1986; Medas and Zakharova 2009). Similarly, it is very difficult for
politicians in low-income countries that have just discovered a resource to
make an argument to increase savings and pursue some sort of inter-temporal
optimization, as argued in a recent paper by van der Ploeg and Venables
(2017). This is especially the case when elections are hard fought and close
in margin.
The application of fiscal rules in Ghana is new territory: the history of the
country’s fiscal management is one of fiscal indiscipline interspersed with
short periods of fiscal discipline. In Ghana even a fiscal rule enshrined in law
might lose out to the promise of electoral victory. Judging from successive
administrations’ very poor observance of the 2002 Bank of Ghana Act and the
2011 PRMA, fiscal rules by themselves are not sufficient to guarantee fiscal
discipline.3 What is needed is a commitment to, and a consensus on, fiscal
discipline across the political divide, policy credibility, and a building up of
strong public financial management capacity. With these requirements in
place, a fiscal responsibility law might work.
11.10.3 Anchoring Monetary Discipline
In Ghana, fiscal dominance following oil discovery and production was also
accommodated by the central bank. Central bank financing of the fiscal deficit
increased fourfold between 2007 and 2008 (in the run-up to the 2008 elec-
tions), and subsequently increased sixfold between 2008 and 2014. In the
context of an inflation-targeting framework, such an increase in liquidity was
bound to compromise the central bank’s ability to maintain price and
exchange rate stability.
3 A detailed account of how Ghana’s PRMA has been breached one way or another can be found
in NRGI (2015).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
234
11.10.4 Bank of Ghana Act and Central Bank Independence
The case for central bank independence is based largely on the argument that
central banks need to be protected from political interference to deliver on the
goal of price stability (Alesina and Summers 1993; Bade and Parkin 1982;
Parkin 1987). Yet some research (including in developing countries) indicates
mixed economic performance even where central banks are independent
(Berger et al. 2001; Eijffinger and de Haan 1996; Klomp and de Haan 2007).
In the case of Ghana, the 2002 Bank of Ghana Act was a landmark piece of
legislation that established the independence of the Bank of Ghana. The Act
states that the Bank shall support the general economic policy of government
and promote economic growth and effective operation of banking and credit
systems in the country, ‘independent of instructions from the Government or any
other authority’ (BOG 2002, emphasis added). This provisionmakes the Bank of
Ghana, on paper at least, one of the most independent central banks in the
world (Ayensu 2007).
This historic Act gives operational independence to the Bank of Ghana and
specifies, inter alia, that: ‘Government borrowing from the central bank in any
year will be limited to 10 per cent of its current year’s revenue.’
To achieve its primary objective of maintaining price stability, the Bank of
Ghana in 2002 formally adopted an inflation-targeting monetary policy
framework. In this context, the central bank should be able to choose instru-
ments independent of political pressure and have minimal responsibility for
financing government deficits. Fiscal reforms to maintain a broad revenue
base, and thus reduce the need for seigniorage revenue,4 then become crucial
(Tuladhar 2005).
So why is it that central bank financing has grown so dramatically since
the oil discovery, and why has the 2002 Bank of Ghana Act not been able to
restrain this increase in central bank financing? The answer most likely lies in
the inability of the central bank to withstand pressure from the government.
There are no sanctions for breaches of the Act. Also, under the Act, the Bank of
Ghana does not report to parliament. Furthermore, the ceiling on lending to
the government is based on the government’s estimate of revenue collection
in the current year, which provides an incentive for an upward bias in revenue
estimates. Instead, such legislation might have set a ceiling on the bank’s
lending to the government that is based on the government’s actual revenue
collection in the previous year.
The experience of Ghana shows that while monetary policy matters, fiscal
policy matters even more. Ghana’s monetary policy framework could not
4 Seigniorage is the difference between the face value of money (i.e. coins or notes) and its
production cost.
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withstand sustained pressure from the fiscal authorities in 2000, 2008, and
2012—all election years. It is clear that governments must commit to fiscal
discipline beyond the electoral cycle. In the context of Ghana’s most recent
(April 2015) IMF programme, the central bank will be required to reduce its
financing to the government to 5 per cent in 2015 and zero in the 2016
election year (IMF 2015). The conditions necessary for fiscal rules to be effect-
ive are probably the same as those necessary for central bank independence:
policy credibility, fiscal discipline, political commitment, and political con-
sensus, among others.
11.10.5 Transparency
To enhance transparency in the management of natural resources, Ghana
joined the EITI in 2003 and became compliant with EITI in 2011. Ghana
also set up the Public Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC) in 2011
under Section 51 of the 2011 PRMA, to conduct independent assessment
and monitor the utilization of oil revenues to ensure accountability by
government.
How much have PIAC and EITI contributed to enhancing transparency
in the management of Ghana’s oil resources? The Institute of Economic
Affairs Ghana, a leading public policy think tank, has developed the Petrol-
eum Transparency and Accountability Index Project to monitor transparency
and accountability in the oil sector. Since 2011, their index has focused on
four key areas: revenue transparency, expenditure transparency, contract
transparency, and the Ghana Petroleum Funds. The 2015 report found that
steady progress had been made with regard to the transparency of revenue
expenditure and the Ghana Petroleum Funds. Contract transparency showed
the least improvement, lacking public disclosure of contracts and the associ-
ated process (IEA 2015). An earlier paper (Bawumia and Halland 2017) dis-
cusses in more detail how the example of the Atuabo gas project—the largest
project yet undertaken in the sector—illustrates the remaining weaknesses of
the approval and transparency processes in Ghana.
Furthermore, contracts for prospecting or exploration rights in Ghana’s oil
and gas sector are issued through an administrative process, rather than
through competitive tendering. Ghana also does not have any mandatory
contract disclosure provisions, and therefore details of oil contracts that do
not come before parliament can only be disclosed by a ministerial directive.
Notwithstanding Ghana’s compliance with EITI, civil society organizations
have called for increased disclosure of information on beneficial ownership in
mineral and oil contracts (which is voluntary under EITI). Furthermore, there
have been claims that the oversight responsibility of PIAC may have been
curtailed, with the record over the last two years indicating that PIAC has had
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difficulties in carrying out its mandated activities, partly because of under-
funding. According to Adam (2014), in 2014 PIAC received only 14 per cent of
its proposed budget.
11.10.6 Strengthening the Law on the Management of Oil Revenues
Ghana’s PRMA includes the following provisions: a limit of 70 per cent
utilization of expected revenues in any financial year; payment of excess
revenues into the Petroleum Holding Fund; a transfer of at least 70 per cent
of the excess revenue into the Petroleum Stabilization Fund; and the balance
to be paid into the Heritage Fund (an endowment fund to support develop-
ment for future generations when petroleum reserves have been depleted).
However, and significantly, the oil revenues due to the budget can be used as
collateral for loans for the first ten years of oil production.
But in the face of dwindling foreign exchange reserves, the Petroleum
Stabilization Fund was drawn down well before oil prices fell and before there
was any actual shortfall in petroleum revenues. As the funds transferred to the
Stabilization Fund increased in 2012 and 2013, the government set a cap on
the amount to be transferred into the Stabilization Fund. The cap was set at
US$250 million at a time in 2013 when the balance on the account stood
at US$426 million. This provided fiscal space to spend the excess amount of
US$176 million. Civil society organizations have argued that the withdrawal
of funds from the Stabilization Fund was illegal, since this was not made
public and was first brought to the attention of the public by a whistle-blower
(ACEP 2014).
The lesson from Ghana’s experience thus far is that while stabilization and
savings funds can help smooth spending, they can certainly not prevent
slippages. In the case of Ghana’s PRMA, this is compounded by the fact that
the collateralization of future oil revenues was allowed for the first ten years,
thereby undermining the initial objective to limit excessive spending permit-
ted by oil discoveries.
11.10.7 Forecasting Government Oil Revenues
The literature contains persuasive evidence that official forecasts of revenues
during resource booms tend to be overly optimistic (Forni and Momigliano
2004; Frankel 2011; Jonung and Larch 2006). This is arguably the case
in Ghana.
According to Adam (2014), Ghana’s 2011 PRMA as designed gives an incen-
tive to governments to project higher revenues than are likely realizable,
because 70 per cent of the projected benchmark oil revenue is allocated to
the budget. In 2011, for example, the government projected that it would
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receive GH₵1.2 billion from oil. The total amount actually earned, however,
came down to GH₵667 million: a shortfall of GH₵583 million. The bench-
mark revenue for 2012 was over GH₵1 billion,5 but the amount actually
received came down to GH₵562.4 million. In 2011, forecasted oil revenues
from corporate taxes of GH₵600 million (GH₵384.1 million for 2012) were
arguably unlikely to materialize (Adam 2014). This is because the Jubilee
partners6 are entitled to capital cost recovery under the 1987 Petroleum
Income Tax Law (PNDC Law 188). The over-projection was arguably motiv-
ated by the provisions of the 2011 PRMA, by which the proportion of the oil
revenues that accrues to the budget (ABFA) is based on projected benchmark
oil revenues.
In the 2015 government budget presented to parliament in November 2014,
oil revenues were estimated at GH₵4.2 billion (3.1 per cent of GDP) based on
an oil price of US$99.3 per barrel, although global oil prices at the time were
actually close to US$50 per barrel. It was argued that the use of the US$99.3
price was dictated by the PRMA legislation (specifying a seven-year moving
average price) even though this over-optimistic forecast implied a revenue
shortfall of GH₵2.7 billion (2 per cent of GDP). Prudence would have dictated
that, despite the law, no budgeted expenditures be made in relation to unreal-
izable revenues.
The government later, at the prompting of the IMF (in the context of
negotiations for an IMF bailout), presented a revised oil revenue estimate of
GH₵1.5 billion (1.1 per cent ofGDP) using the price ofUS$52.8 per barrel, even
though the original budget was approved by parliament in January 2015.7
To enhance safeguards against fiscal indiscipline, adequate legislation
and methodologies for revenue forecasting are imperative. Frankel (2011)
has recommended, following Chile’s example, that resource-rich countries
consider establishing independent non-partisan expert panels to forecast
resource revenues for the budget and the extent to which prices (of oil, in
the case of Ghana) deviate from their long-run averages.
11.11 Conclusions
The discovery of oil in Ghana in 2007 raised public expectations quickly and
substantially. For many, oil appeared to be the long-awaited solution to
5 Based on a projected oil price of US$90 per barrel.
6 Tullow, Kosmos, Anadarko, and Sabre, which are currently producing Ghana’s oil from the
Jubilee Field (offshore).
7 Statement to parliament on ‘Implications of the fall in crude oil prices on the budget’
submitted by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 12 March 2015.
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Ghana’s developmental challenges. This hope was reflected in the 2008 and
2012 election campaigns, which saw political parties promise much in the
areas of education, infrastructure, and health, among others. Fiscal discipline
was given only low priority, as parties focused on winning the elections.
As a consequence, the public finances deteriorated, debt returned to unsus-
tainable levels, current account deficits ballooned, foreign exchange reserves
dwindled, the exchange rate depreciated rapidly, interest rates rose, inflation
rose, and real GDP growth declined. These are the hallmarks of a resource
curse. Ghana’s experience suggests that symptoms of the resource curse that
have dimmed its prospects since the discovery of oil could have been avoided
in the presence of:
 a broad-based political commitment to fiscal and monetary discipline
 strong institutions, including the ability to uphold relevant fiscal and
monetary legislation
 strong public financial management capacity
 transparency in the management of oil resources
 alignment of expenditure with realizable revenues in the context of
independent oil revenue forecasts.
The case of Ghana may not fit smoothly into the classic resource curse
narrative because several of the usual transmission channels—such as an
appreciation of the real exchange rate and the volatility of commodity prices,
or armed conflict—are missing. Nevertheless, as discussed in the introduction
to this chapter, the Ghanaian story in part reflects the insights provided by the
literature on the political economy of development, and more specifically the
political economy of the resource curse. The immediate cause of the lack of
fiscal and monetary discipline in Ghana can be found in policy decisions.
Importantly, Ghana’s story allows us to move beyond vague notions of
‘institutional quality’, measured by aggregate indexes, when considering the
resource curse and how to address it. The Ghanaian experience confirms that
there are specific institutional checks and balances that must be upheld if a
country is to avoid the resource curse. From a fiscal and monetary perspective,
these include early management of expectations, a broad-based political com-
mitment to fiscal discipline as opposed to a reliance on fiscal rules, full and real
(as opposed to nominal) independence of the central bank, as well as the
establishment of means to isolate from political pressures any sovereign
wealth fund and the government entity responsible for oil revenue projec-
tions. Ultimately, these factors are likely to be critical in determining whether
the discovery of natural resources will adversely affect economic growth or
not. In the case of Ghana, they were key factors in the regrettable shift from
boom to gloom just four years after the discovery of oil.
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The Regulation of Extractives
An Overview
Tony Addison and Alan Roe
12.1 The Basic Frameworks
Every resource-abundant country faces the need to regulate the sector in the
public interest, given its significant social, economic, and environmental
impact. This is a daunting challenge, requiring not only the design and
enactment of the necessary laws and regulations but also the assignment of
responsibilities for implementation across ministries and often numerous
government agencies. The regulatory system must be: comprehensive (while
avoiding unnecessary complexity, which is a disincentive to investment);
transparent (to avoid manipulation and regulatory ‘capture’); and imple-
mented to a high standard. These are demanding tasks for any country, not
least a low-income country (LIC) with a resource windfall, yet they are essen-
tial for the extractives sectors to yield economic and social improvement.
Three frameworks are available to help understand the nature and complex-
ity of the regulatory challenge: (i) a life-cycle approach, (ii) an institutional
approach, and (iii) an organizational-responsibility approach.
The first is based upon the life cycle of mining as well as oil and gas projects.
That cycle begins with the discovery of the asset after geological exploration.
This is followed by its extraction, entailing often large investments by a
company or companies which has the effect of monetizing the previously
inert asset, then the taxation of the project which transfers some of the
monetary benefits to the public authorities during its operational phase, and
then a closure process. At the beginning of the life cycle, a licensing process is
required for the exploration stage and for the project’s eventual investment
and operating stages. Contracts must be drawn up with the companies
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involved, some of which may be based upon general law, while others will be
case-specific agreements requiring negotiation. There are also likely to be a
wide range of regulatory issues associated with, for example, the release of
land for the project, and for the re-settlement and compensation of resettled
populations.
Over the life of the project, which may last decades, not only do the
taxation arrangements need to be clearly defined and implemented (and
possibly adjusted to changing circumstances) but ongoing arrangements are
also needed to ensure that the project complies with national environmental
and social standards as well as employment regulations. Any social obligations
that the commercial companies take on towards local communities need to be
implemented as agreed and monitored. This may involve legislation and the
enforcement of mandatory obligations. Any public projects to catalyse the
economic development impacts of the extractives activities must be legislated
for and implemented. Finally, project closures can be demanding, especially as
environmental and social standards are now higher than historically: these
require additional regulatory processes that need to be actioned effectively.
At all stages of the project’s life cycle, there may be breaches of standards,
regulations, and local laws which require the application of appropriate
sanctions.
A second useful framework is that based upon Oliver Williamson’s ‘eco-
nomics of institutions’ (Williamson 1985, 2000), which is discussed in detail
in Chapter 6 by Evelyn Dietsche on institutional dimensions in this volume.
This framework reminds us that any regulatory system must be aware of, and
sensitive to, four layers of institutions. The first layer consists of social, cultural,
and religious normswhich provide the core of the country’s social networks and
relationships, and which exert a high level of influence over economic deci-
sions. These norms differ across countries. Therefore, transplanting a regula-
tory system that works well in one country context into another does not
automatically result in success. The second layer consists of the formal institu-
tional structure that has been created with or without the presence of an
extractive industry. This includes the institutional arrangements that govern
relationships between the central government and regional and local govern-
ments, as well as relations between countries: for example, membership of a
customs union. Again, a country’s political, bureaucratic, and economic
arrangements will be unique in some respects, and so not amenable to a
simple transplant of another country’s regulatory system for extractives.
The third layer involves those institutions that Williamson refers to as the
‘play of the game’. These include the agreements and contracts negotiated to
deal with certain specific and relatively narrowly defined issues pertaining
to an extractives project. These agreements may or may not be consonant
with the general laws of the country that would be included in Williamson’s
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second layer. Finally, any country’s market system will have its own character-
istics, including the completeness or otherwise of its markets, and its defin-
ition of the appropriate role for government policy. The design of regulatory
systems for extractive industries should consider how national markets
systems operate given the other three institutional layers.
The third useful framework relates to the range of different organizations
that input to the overall regulation of an extractives sector; government
ministries, parastatal organizations, and other public and quasi-public agen-
cies. Although it is often assumed that regulatory responsibility resides nar-
rowly with a country’s ministry of mines or petroleum, the reality is invariably
far more complex. This is evident in the wide range of issues that we have
already listed in discussing the first and second frameworks. A stylized and
somewhat over-simplified example of this complexity is presented in work by
Oxford Policy Management (OPM 2013) which is reproduced as Figure 12.1.
It maps the main stages of the life cycle (shown in the top row of the diagram)
to the main legal and organizational arrangements that most countries have
in place for industry regulation. The lower part of this figure labelled ‘admin-
istration’ identifies just a few of the many public agencies that are typically
involved in addressing those aspects that are described in the other two
sections of the figure. Later in this chapter we provide a specific country
example that fills out the detail of this more fully.
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Figure 12.1. The regulatory framework: a typical structure
Note: O&G refers to oil and gas.
Source: OPM (2013: Figure 3); reproduced here by permission.
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12.2 The Regulatory Challenge in Low-income Countries
Multiple layers of time sequences, institutions, and organizations make it diffi-
cult to effectively regulate the extractive industries in any country. LICs with
incomplete and fragile institutions, and even some middle-income countries
(MICs) with limited capacities, typically encounter significantly worse difficul-
ties.When anewmineral or energy resource is discovered, the countrymayhave
had very limited previous exposure to the technical challenges of regulation in
the extractives sector, a weakness often compounded by a politics that favours
short-term gains for the governing elite and their commercial associates rather
than building regulatory systems that protect the public interest into the longer
term. There is a large literature on the regulatory deficiencies—and consequent
disasters, especially environmental—experienced in the developing world,
especially (e.g. see Chapter 16 by Bell).
There are generic reasons that help to explain weak regulation and the even
weaker enforcement of established regulations. Many LICs lack capacity in
technical areas such as tax administration and environmental protection to
effectively enforce regulation. Often the data—for example, on production
levels and the quality of particular minerals—are extremely poor, thereby
undermining those elements of regulation that rely on hard information.
Some legal systems are highly vulnerable to corruption and other abuses of
power: indeed, the motive to obtain high government office is sometimes
driven by the expectation of large personal gains from the extractive indus-
tries themselves.
In other cases, active state ownership in the production of an extractive
resource—perhaps through full ownership of a production company or a large
equity stake—can easily result in conflicts of interest between the public
regulatory function and the public ownership function. Additionally, when
public employees are poorly paid, fines for breaching regulations can some-
times be used to supplement personal incomes. The ultimate sanctions that
would truly punish an offending company, including closure, may often be
avoided because they would impose a high level of hardship on those working
in, or otherwise dependent on, the extractive activity. Lighter penalties will
often be regarded as a normal cost of doing business and as such will be
unlikely to lead to fundamental changes in behaviour.
These generic issues are associated with the many more specific challenges
that host governments face in regulating their resource sectors. The African
Development Bank (AfDB, 2015) has drawn attention to several such chal-
lenges, among which three are perhaps the most significant. First, can the
recipient countries find enough of the specialist personnel and the related
technical resources needed to design, implement, and manage a comprehen-
sive regulatory system? This is a particularly difficult challenge not least
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because the industries of mining and oil and gas are so highly specialized with
many technical dimensions: the skills available to the regulatory bodies
should ideally match those available to the mining and oil and gas companies
themselves. Even though highly skilled specialists can be bought in—for
example, to help negotiate contracts—they may not be easy to find and
certainly they are expensive. Yet, governments still need some minimum
basic skills to identify, recruit, and work effectively with any external special-
ists who are hired.
Second, can governments manage the effective coordination of regulatory
activity across the wide range of ministries and other state agencies that
ideally should be involved in different aspects of extractives regulation? This
is a profound and under-estimated problem not least because few govern-
ments acquire such a high level of cross-agency coordinating capability in
relation to most other aspects of their work. Tanzania is an example of the
complexity involved: see Box 12.1. The Tanzanian experience demonstrates
that coordination across such a wide range of actors is difficult and that
failures can arise at many different points. Effective coordination requires
that different agencies must recognize the specialist roles of other agencies
Box 12.1 WHO IS INVOLVED IN EXTRACTIVES REGULATION IN TANZANIA?
The complete answer to this question involves a plethora of ministries and agencies that
ideally need to work together to deliver the ‘all of government’ approach as advocated
by Kathryn McPhail in Chapter 17. The Vice President’s Office is nominally the lead
coordinator on overall policy but often needs to defer to the Office of the President.
The other ministries and agencies involved include the Ministry of Energy and Minerals
(MEM) as the lead policy and administrative institution; the Tanzania Petroleum Devel-
opment Corporation or TPDC (now the NOC) as the designated national partner in all
petroleum-related ventures; the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority that has
recently taken over the regulatory functions of TPDC; the Energy and Water Utility
Regulatory Authority (EWURA) whose role is confined to midstream and downstream
regulation; the Ministry of Finance (MOF), as the lead policy institution in setting royalty
and profit-sharing terms at the project level; the Attorney General’s office that is also
involved in negotiation and devising contracts; the Tanzania Revenue Authority that
collects income taxes from gas companies. MEM collects the large share of non-tax
revenues from petroleum activities via TPDC, including royalties, licence fees, application
fees, and annual rent, and the government profit share from oil and gas, with MOF
collecting revenues from equity holdings, and local authorities collecting a local service
levy from mining companies. If this was not already a daunting enough coordination
challenge, the National Environment Management Council in coordination with local
authorities manages environmental issues; theMinistry of Labour and Employment leads
on the formulation of labour, labour market, social security, and employment policies;
while the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Human Settlements Development has to
approve land allocations for extractives use.
Source: Roe (2017: Box 1); reproduced here by permission.
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on some sub-topics and defer to them in those cases in the national interest
rather than compete for supremacy. But it is often difficult for a powerful
ministry or minister to defer to another agency, although there will invariably
be a need for some sacrifice of power if the system is to work well. Tanzania
and other cases also illustrate how important it is to have some over-arching
national vision of the long-term potential of the extractives sector that can
guide the policy and regulatory interventions. In the absence of such a vision
effective coordination is likely to be compromised (Roe 2017).
Third, in developing that vision and the policies needed to support it, how
do governments resist the inevitable and loud public pressures to see quick
material gains from any newly discovered extractive resource: pressures that
are encouraged and amplified by the often-exaggerated media coverage which
accompanies discoveries? The problem here is that the clamour for quick gains
stands in stark contrast to the realities of the lengthy delays and inherent
uncertainties that are associated with natural resource discoveries. Production
never starts immediately and even when it does start there is always a further
lengthy lag before government revenues begin to rise commensurately. This
fact is well documented in many case studies but is invariably poorly commu-
nicated to the public at large. Consequently, governments are often pressured
into poorly devised policies that are seriously sub-optimal and effective only
in pandering to populist sentiments. But set against public anxiety for quick
results is the reality that high-quality strategic decision-making—about, for
example, supporting investments—needs long-term and carefully built insti-
tutional arrangements. The recognition that the long term necessarily spans
the lives of several governments—assuming they are democratically elected—
requires not only skills in the civil service but also some consensus across
different political parties if a regularly changing and unpredictable regulatory
structure is to be avoided.
12.3 Outline of Part V
The five chapters that follow in this part of the book address merely a
sample of the critical issues in the regulation of the sector; they do, however,
serve to illustrate the points made here about the generic problems and
challenges of this task. So, they include a perspective on the problem contrib-
uted by a senior practitioner—Toni Aubynn—who has overseen mining regu-
lation in a large African economy, followed by detailed reviews of the
regulatory challenges in relation to three key areas of regulation. These are
the taxation of mining operations, the operation of state-owned oil companies,
and the wide range of issues associated with environmental regulation. This is
not an all-encompassing list but it does cover a set of the most important
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regulatory areas. Other areas of regulation are addressed in earlier and later
chapters of the book (for example,macroeconomic regulation) and some aspects
of regulation as applied to local content, downstream activities, and commu-
nity development are to be found in the relevant chapters on those topics.
References
AfDB (2015). Delivering on the Promise: Leveraging Natural Resources to Accelerate Human
Development in Africa. Abidjan: African Development Bank Group and Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation.
OPM (2013). DFID PEAKS Topic Guide: Extractive Industries, Development, and the Role of
Donors. Oxford: Oxford Policy Management.
Roe, A. R. (2017). ‘Tanzania—fromMining to Oil and Gas: Structural Change or Just Big
Numbers?’ WIDER Working Paper 2017/175. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free
Press.
Williamson, O. E. (2000). ‘The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead’, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(3): 595–613.




Regulatory Structures and Challenges
to Developmental Extractives
Some Practical Observations from Ghana
Toni Aubynn
13.1 Introduction and Background
It is now well established that resource-rich low-income countries, even
though they produce less minerals than their high-income counterparts,
depend more on the extraction of natural resources for their economic devel-
opment and transformation (McKinsey Global Institute 2013). This places
natural resources extraction at the heart of the socio-economic development
and transformation of resource-endowed LICs. Central to the transformative
and developmental power of natural resource extraction is an effective regu-
latory framework that guides the promotion of investments in the sector and
the establishment of effective procedures responsible for the extraction and
management of the utilization of such resources. The role of an effective
regulatory regime in promoting economic growth and development has
excited considerable interest among researchers and practitioners in recent
years (Jalilian et al. 2007; World Bank 2004).
One key question is how do regulatory structures contribute to the harness-
ing of the natural resource extraction for socio-economic development and
transformation? Another is how can regulation be improved to ensure that it
plays its expected role in the attraction of investment and the management of
the utilization of natural resources in LICs?
Ghana is currently a lower-middle-income economy with per capita income
of about US$1,100 and a population of 24 million (Government of Ghana
2013). The country is endowed with significant amounts of ferrous and
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non-ferrous minerals including, gold, bauxite, manganese, diamonds, and
iron ore as well as hydrocarbons. It has been mining gold for over a century
and currently ranks second only to South Africa in gold production in Africa.
By virtue of its former name, Gold Coast, Ghana has historically been touted
as being adorned with gold and other natural resources. The country’s mining
sector has also undergone various reforms including a regulatory transform-
ation that is believed to have resulted in the improvement in the mining
sector of the country.
Drawing largely on the case of Ghana, this chapter seeks to share the
experience of regulation in the extractives sector and offers some perspectives
on the purposes, content, and challenges of the practical regulation of an
extractives sector in a resource-endowed lower-middle-income economy.
The chapter looks at both the design and content of a regulatory system in
the mining sector of Ghana and throws light on the practical challenges
(technical and political) of implementation. In the light of the increasing allure
of resource nationalism the chapter also takes a brief navigation into the
manner in which relationships are established and maintained by the regula-
tory bodies with both large multinational companies and artisanal and small-
scale (ASM) mining operations. An earlier related paper (Aubynn 2017) also
examined the manner in which Ghana’s regulatory standards have been influ-
enced by various international initiatives including those of the following
agencies: the IFC, EITI, and the ICMM, to highlight their impact on domestic
regulations. Conclusions are drawn to underscore the importance of effective
and collaborative regulations in maximizing the transformative potential of
resource extractions in less developed resource-endowed countries.
There is an abundance of literature on natural resource extraction and
its impact on resource-rich countries, and a growing body of work that
focuses on natural resources governance (Auty 1993, 1998, 2000; Collier and
Venables 2011; Roberts 2013) which informs the background to this chapter.
The chapter also relies quite heavily on the author’s own experience in the
field as well as documentary materials at the Ghana Minerals Commission,
the Ghana Chamber of Mines, the Ghana Statistical Services, the Bank of
Ghana, and the ICMM.1
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 13.2 provides a brief
but general examination of the role of regulatory structures in mineral
resource development. Section 13.3 focuses on Ghana’s case with a brief
1 The author was until August 2017 the Chief Executive Officer of the Minerals Commission of
Ghana, with nearly twenty years of previous experience in the extractives sector including oil and
gas. Before he joined the Commission, he was the Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana Chamber of
Mines. He has written a number of academic papers on mining-related subjects.
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look at the trajectory of the country’s regulatory structures since the colonial
era. A recent related paper (Aubynn 2017) spells out more fully the contrasts
between the policies of the early post-independence years; the reformed
policies of the post-1983 period; and the gradual evolution of policies subse-
quently. The post-1980s regulatory reforms reveal an interesting dynamic in
the contribution of mining to the economy and so this period is examined
more fully in Section 13.4 in terms of both the regulatory reforms themselves
and their impact on the various benefit streams within the economy. A key
emerging outcome of recent regulations in resource economies has been the
more active promotion of local content and value addition frameworks.
Section 13.5 provides a brief examination of Ghana’s local content policy
framework and its implications for the integration of the country’s mining
sector into the economy. Section 13.6 concentrates on the regulatory challenges
from the practical perspective of the regulator and provides some suggestions on
how the extraction of Ghana’s mineral resource can play a true catalytic role in
Ghana’s development. Finally, Section 13.5 draws some conclusions on the role
of regulatory structures in enhancing the contribution of mineral resource
extraction to the socio-economic development of the country.
13.2 The Role of Regulatory Structures in Mineral Resource
Development
This section deliberately avoids the temptation of engaging with the intrica-
cies of the definition of ‘policy’ and ‘regulation’. Suffice to say that regulation
policies are the ‘rules of the game’ governing decision-making by socio-
economic actors—such as individual firms as producers or consumers. They
are a purposeful course of action designed and implemented mainly by gov-
ernment agencies with the objective of shaping future outcomes in ways that
are more desirable than would otherwise be expected. Furthermore, regula-
tions have the force of law, prescribed by a superior or competent authority,
relating to the actions of those under that authority’s control. Regulation
policies can take many forms and the specific forms of regulation policy
adopted in developing countries have changed over time (Jalilian et al. 2007;
Minogue 2006). Roberts (2013) asserts that regulatory variability seen in sub-
Saharan Africa is based on the push and pull of domestic elite-driven govern-
ance orientations, including among others, post-conflict and constitutional
transitions, transnational influences and impositions. Ghana like many
African countries since independence has experienced regulatory variability
ranging from command and control to relatively liberal structures, which also
reflect the governance orientation and, to a greater extent, external influences
and impositions (including influences and impositions, and conditions arising
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out of the World Bank and IMF). The outcome of a regulatory system can be
assessed against the yardsticks of effectiveness and efficiency. To assess the
effectiveness of regulation one needs to assess the extent to which it achieves
the goals set by the government for the regulatory authority.
According to Parker (1999), a well-functioning regulatory system is one that
balances accountability, transparency, and consistency. Similarly, effective
regulatory agencies must not only operate within their legal powers but also
be accountable for the consequences of their actions. Transparency relates to
regulatory decisions being reached in a way that is revealed to all interested
parties. Regulatory consistency ensures predictability and the ‘level playing
field’ which also underpins legitimacy. Inconsistent regulatory decisions
undermine public confidence in a regulatory system and could also create
uncertainty for investors. One area that undermines regulatory consistency is
political interference, which often alters the regulatory rules of the game for
short-term political advantage. This makes a strong case for some kind of
‘independent’ regulator.
Jalilian and his colleagues (2007) argue that between the 1960s and the
1980s, market failure was used to legitimize direct government involvement
in productive activities in many developing countries as they promoted
industrialization through import substitution, invested directly in industry
and agriculture, and extended public ownership of enterprises. However, the
role of state regulation has since been redefined and narrowed to reflect the
requirement for an undistorted policy environment in which efficientmarkets
could thrive. This change of course has resulted from the apparent success of
market liberalization programmes in some developed countries, and the evi-
dence of the failure of state-led economic planning in developing ones (World
Bank 1995).
13.3 Trajectory of Mining Regulations in Ghana
Since the date of Ghana’s independence in 1957, several variants of mining
and allied regulation policies have been implemented with the aim of ensur-
ing the most effective exploitation of the country’s mineral resources and
the maximization of their benefits. The recent regulatory framework in the
mining sector of Ghana was part of the deregulation framework adopted
under the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) of the early 1980s,
which in a way reflects the role of external factors in grooming the regulatory
framework in the country. The key driver for the chosenmode of regulation of
the mining sector under the SAPs was the disappointing record of investment
and the imperative to drive that higher. The central objective of regulation
in the mining sector since the early 1980s has been to promote sustainable
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development and poverty reduction through the extraction of the country’s
mineral resources. Efficiency and effectiveness have also been key drivers of
mineral sector regulation to ensure the greater attraction of foreign direct
investment into the sector, increased mineral production and revenues, and
from that enhanced foreign exchange earnings and greater employment.
However, prior to the 1980s and tracing back to colonial days,2 other
regulatory paradigms were adopted to try to ensure the sustainable and bene-
ficial exploitation of the country’s mineral resources. Two of those systems—
the pre- and immediate post-independence policies, and those in place during
the period of mining’s decline from the 1960s—are examined in detail in
Aubynn (2017). The analysis there underscores the point that the last three
decades have seen significant progress inminerals production and benefits due
largely to the implementationof relatively effectivemining regulationpolicies.
13.4 The Regulatory Structures of the 1980s and Beyond
The steeply declining fortunes of mineral production during the 1970s and
early 1980s have been blamed less on the absence of ore than on the overall
impact of the macroeconomic malaise of the country, as well as production
constraints of the sector (Hutchful 1996; Barning 1990). The unfavourable
macroeconomic environment coincided with increased concerns over political
unrest and the possibility of expropriation or sudden changes in taxation
policies, as well as the prevailing laws on repatriation of profits. These factors
combined precluded any new large-scale direct foreign investment (Warhurst
and Bridge 1997: 2):
The political and economic exigencies of the time, including the continuing
decline in most economic indicators, made a compelling case for the government
of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) to begin negotiations with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for economic assist-
ance and policy guidance, which culminated in the adoption the Structural
Adjustment Programme (SAP), locally christened the ‘Economic Recovery
Programme’ (ERP) in 1983.
The policies and regulations introduced from that date typified the freemarket
and private property ownership advocacy of neoliberalism. This stood in stark
2 It is not known exactly when mining began in the country. Tsikata (1997) suggests that the
existence of largemineral resources including gold, diamonds, bauxite, andmanganese was among
the key reasons for Britain’s imperial adventures in Ghana during the nineteenth century, even
though the country’s influential position in mining dwindled steadily over that period (Acquah
1995; Dumett 1999).
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discord with the previous state control of mining, which saw the state as
dirigiste or neo-patrimonialist. As Ghana is a resource-rich developing coun-
try, it was no surprise that special attention in the Ghanaian reforms was paid
to the mining sector to enable it to play a leading role in the revival of the
ailing economy through the conversion of mineral assets into other national
wealth. More specifically, Ghana developed a set of new mining codes that
have come to best illustrate the so-called ‘first generation of mining codes’ in
Africa since the 1980s (Campbell 2004; African Agenda 2003). According to
Campbell (2004), Ghana’s mining codes of the 1980s (Minerals and Mining
Law 1986, PNDCL 153) reflect a new generation of liberalization approaches,
including the privatization of state enterprise and very extensive deregulation.
Numerous mining operations previously owned by the state were privati-
zed and new private investment in the sector was actively encouraged.
Section 13.4.1 takes a closer look at the key legislative and institutional reforms
that were introduced as part of this major change.
13.4.1 Mining Legislation
The key legislative framework for mining in Ghana since the mid-1980s
is laid down in the Minerals and Mining Law, 1986, PNDCL 153 (Law 153)
as amended by the Minerals and Mining Amendment Act 1993, Act 475
(Act 475), and since 2007, amended and replaced by the Minerals and Mining
Law 2006 Act 703. Within the current legal framework, all minerals in Ghana
are vested in the president on behalf of and in trust for the people of Ghana.
Thus, regardless of who owns the land upon or under which minerals are
situated, the state is the owner of all minerals occurring in their natural state
within Ghana’s land and sea territory, including its Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ).3 According to the law governing mining in Ghana, the exercise of any
mineral right requires a licence to be granted by the government minister
responsible formining, who in turn acts as an agent of the state for the exercise
of powers relating to minerals.
The World Bank (2002: 152) notes quite correctly that building effective
regulatory structures in developing countries is not simply an issue of the tech-
nical design of the regulatory instruments but also involves the quality of the
supporting regulatory institutions and their capacity. During this period new
institutions were established, such as the Minerals Commission and the Envir-
onmental Protection Agency (EPA), set up in 1986 and 1994 respectively to
3 EEZ is a sea zone prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, over
which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including
energy production from water and wind. It extends no more than 200 nautical miles from the
territorial sea baseline.
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provide regulatory effectiveness. The Minerals Commission in particular has
the authority under the constitution to regulate, manage, and advise the
government on the utilization of mineral resources and coordinate policies
in relation to minerals. It also seeks to ensure a one-stop shop for investors in
the minerals sector in order to reduce the problems of complex bureaucracy
and administrative inertia.
13.4.2 Investment
In order to attract venture capital into the mining industry in Ghana, the
government also undertook a review of its tax and incentive regimes in respect
of mining and introduced what may be described as relatively generous
investment incentives for mining companies, including:
 Reduction of corporate tax from 50–55 per cent prior to SAP, to
45 per cent in 1986; later scaled down further to 35 per cent in 1994.
In 2002, the corporate tax rate was further reduced to 25 per cent but was
reversed to its 1994 level of 35 per cent in 2012 (Government of Ghana
Budget 2012).
 Exemption from customs duties in respect of plant, machinery, equip-
ment, and accessories imported specifically for mining.
 Sweeping changes, in 2012, in the fiscal imposts for mining. For example,
capital allowances were increased from 20 per cent in the first year of
production and 15 per cent per annum subsequently, to 75 per cent and
50 per cent respectively in 1986; further revised in 2002 to 80 per cent in
the first year and 50 per cent subsequently. Capital allowances have since
2012 been changed to a flat rate of 20 per cent for a fixed period of
five years.
 A negotiable foreign exchange retention regime of a minimum of 25
per cent.
The government, through SAP, also provided finances for the purchase of
spare parts and materials, and for the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as
roads and railways. This new climate of support led to significantly increased
investment in the mining sector, making it a major springboard for the
economic recovery of the 1980s up to the mid 1990s. What then has been
the impact of these policy and regulatory changes onminerals production and
the benefit streams for the economy since the 1980s? Section 13.5 briefly
examines the various contributions of the mining or minerals sector to the
economy of Ghana. An earlier paper (Aubynn 2017) looks at these same
contributions in greater detail.
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13.5 Contribution and Benefits Stream
The mining industry globally has been generally criticized for not contribut-
ing ‘enough’ to its host countries. In Africa, and Ghana in particular, the
criticism has been heightened in recent decades when commodity prices,
particularly for gold, have experienced an unprecedented bull rally (United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2011; Africa Union Commission
and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2009). The impression
created, especially by anti-mining NGOs and certain sections of the media, is
that mining is not only environmentally destructive but also does not make
any meaningful contributions to the socio-economy of the country. This
impression of extreme environmental degradation and limited benefits asso-
ciated with the mining industry has often overshadowed the contribution it
makes to the economy. In Section 13.5.1 I briefly review the sector’s contribu-
tions to investment and associated capital inflows to the economy, and on
domestic revenue, foreign exchange earnings, and employment.
13.5.1 Capital Injection and Production of Minerals
During the decade prior to 1985, the mining industry had virtually stagnated.
There were no significant new investments into the country in general and the
mining sector in particular. However, largely as a result of the policy measures
described above, coupled with favourable world market prices for some min-
erals, a substantial re-capitalization for the mining industry, notably gold, has
occurred. Specifically, between 1983 and 2016 the Ghanaian mining sector
experienced cumulatively over US$16 billion in new foreign direct investment
(FDI) for exploration, the establishment of newmines, and the expansion and
rehabilitation of already existing ones (Aubynn 2017). This investment boom
has led to the doubling of production of all minerals since 1983. Gold, by far
the most important mineral, has increased more than tenfold. Production
from the ASM sector has increased from less than 1 per cent in 1990 to over
30 per cent of total gold produced by 2013.
Furthermore, these investments have also provided enormous spin-off
benefits including the provision of supporting infrastructure (roads, houses,
schools, hospitals, and the extension of electricity), on-the-job training oppor-
tunities for Ghanaians and the transfer of technology.
13.5.1.1 DOMESTIC REVENUE GENERATION
One of the major areas of benefits from mining has been and remains the
generation of domestic revenue to the state. Details of the substantial
increases in the various fiscal contributions are shown in Table 13.1.
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Table 13.1. Contributions of the mining sector to domestic revenue, 1990–2012
Year Corporate tax Mineral royalties PAYE Reconstruction levy Total IRS (GRA) % mining to total
1990 2,825,941,158 1,893,436,000 52,818,068,300 8.94
1991 821,844,979 3,021,277,000 61,485,625,496 6.25
1992 455,051,883 4,545,804,000 74,931,531,366 6.67
1993 4,393,447,293 7,485,121,000 2,649,306,000 113,236,997,000 12.83
1994 7,214,082,000 12,783,689,000 4,810,802,000 166,595,941,000 14.89
1995 20,392,973,000 20,911,926,000 7,951,763,000 275,513,201,000 17.88
1996 9,160,528,000 35,527,027,000 16,834,543,000 424,491,908,000 14.49
1997 9,868,796,000 34,594,950,000 25,022,023,000 605,782,577,000 11.47
1998 14,450,773,000 49,841,242,000 31,016,506,000 785,436,693,000 12.13
1999 31,117,108,000 48,620,419,161 27,839,260,000 901,663,758,000 11.93
2000 15,789,167,000 118,736,935,173 59,243,800,000 1,409,445,273,000 13.75
2001 24,812,893,000 127,358,386,430 76,111,678,000 4,251,467,579 1,950,162,751,000 11.92
2002 23,501,158,000 153,452,471,032 101,457,668,000 26,474,633,878 2,757,747,781,032 11.06
2003 68,137,702,000 194,387,579,429 141,049,450,000 16,785,882,702 3,824,078,389,429 10.99
2004 100,331,114,000 215,743,706,000 134,357,711,000 36,346,622,100 5,333,114,704,000 9.13
2005 269,889,639,000 235,951,903,000 194,058,939,000 22,957,004,700 6,446,385,048,000 11.21
2006 404,361,775,000 316,254,789,000 216,525,776,000 11,085,262,400 7,333,916,866,000 10.20
2007* 47,415,690 40,882,042 34,587,597 – 901,242,340 14.42
2008* 73,554,697 59,004,892 47,139,242 – 1,222,272,177 15.32
2009* 124,600,880 90,415,902 103,061,985 – 1,731,633,034 18.21
2010* 241,578,780 144,697,000 132,469,710 – 2,441,331,842 21.29
2011* 649,902,536 222,024,706 161,822,107 – 3,746,024,194 27.61
2012* 893,773,828 359,392,853 207,495,934 – 7,461,202,977 20.72
Note: * Contributions for 2007 to 2011 are in GH¢; all others are in cedis.


























The collection of these taxes and royalties over the years has positioned the
mining sector as the leading contributor to the domestic public revenue of
Ghana. Between 1995 and 2003, for example, the total annual average con-
tribution by the sector to Ghana’s domestic revenue was the equivalent of
approximately US$40 million, representing an average of approximately
10 per cent of total government domestic receipts. However, the drastic decline
in gold and other commodity prices since around 2011, coupled with the
expansion in domestic revenue sources, especially resulting from the novel
inclusion of revenues from oil production,4 has meant a dip in the sector’s
contribution to overall domestic revenue generation to a low of 16 per cent in
2016 (Aubynn 2017). That notwithstanding, themining sector hasmaintained
its leadership as the single most important revenue generator for Ghana.
13.5.1.2 FOREIGN EXCHANGE
In terms of foreign exchange or receipts frommerchandised export for Ghana,
mineral exports have maintained a consistent leadership as the country’s
number one earner since 2000. The share of minerals in the total foreign
exchange earnings of Ghana has increased from 14 per cent in 1990 to an
average of 41 per cent since 1993, outpacing cocoa as the country’s most
important foreign exchange earner (ISSER 1996–2010; Bank of Ghana 2010).
As shown in Figure 13.1, in 2012,mining earned over US$4 billion or 42 per cent
of grossmerchandise exports value and has sustained a similarly high percentage
contribution in spite of the inclusion of oil in Ghana’s basket of exports. Gold
has contributed between 86 per cent and 95 per cent of the earnings from the
country’s total mineral exports since 1986.
Critics of the industry have questioned the extent to which the high foreign
exchange earned from mineral exports is retained in Ghana (Akabzaa 2001;
Akabzaa and Darimani 2001). Available records at the Minerals Commission,
the Ghana Chamber of Mines, and the Bank of Ghana, however, indicate that
on the average, mining companies have returned more of their export pro-
ceeds than is statutorily required (GCoM2012, Aryee 2014). This is contrary to
the commonly held view that mining companies retain their earnings largely
in offshore accounts.5
Table 13.2 shows that since 2009, mining companies have kept an average of
about 27 per cent of their exports in overseas accounts and returned approxi-
mately 72 per cent to Ghana. Similar ratios pertained in earlier years. For
instance, between 1998 and 2000, a quarter of export earnings (US$177million)
4 Ghana began the production and export of oil in commercial quantities during the last quarter
of 2010.
5 The former Governor of the Bank of Ghana, Paul Acquah, confirmed this in a speech he
delivered at the 79th Annual General Meeting of the Ghana Chamber of Mines; see Ghana News
Agency report on 9 June 2006; ghanadistricts.com.
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was repatriated to Ghana. But by the end of the commodity price boom in
2012, the sector was returning approximately US$3.2billion, representing 73
per cent of total mining exports receipts.
13.5.1.3 EMPLOYMENT GENERATION
In terms of employment numbers, the massive retrenchment occasioned by
the implementation of SAP from 1983 onwards had an initial debilitating
effect on employment in the mining sector. Before the 1980s, the sector was

























































Figure 13.1. Trends in total exports by key sectors
Source: author’s illustration based on Minerals Commission data.








2009 2,384,836,583 1,812,255,608 76
2010 3,290,792,703 2,222,901,896 68
2011 4,245,370,284 3,173,491,961 75
2012 4,525,657,336 3,268,084,143 73
Source: data from Ghana Chamber of Mines (2013).
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number is believed to have shrunk to 15,000 largely due to the massive
retrenchment exercise at the long-established Obuasi Mines. However, total
direct employment in themineral sector surged back to about 23,000 by 1995.
By 2004, this number had reduced to approximately 18,000 Ghanaians,
attributable to the closure of the Teberebie Mines and redundancies at
the Damang Mines.6 According to the 2012 Annual Report of the Ghana
Chamber of Mines, the sector at that time directly employed approximately
23,000. The Minerals Commission put it significantly higher at 27,000 to
include other mining contractors. But of great significance is the fact that
analysts including the Chamber of Mines have long estimated that indirectly
the mining industry offers employment of about five times this number
through local purchases and the award of various kinds of contracts (Ghana
Chamber of Mines 2001). These estimates, which relate only to large-scale
mining, are substantially increased when we also consider the large army
of youth employed in the informal, less-regulated artisanal mining sector
of Ghana, which has been variously estimated at 500,000–1,000,000
(e.g. McQuilken and Hilson 2016).
Critics of the industry argue that open-pit mining lacks the capacity for
significant employment generation, due largely to its capital intensity and
short lifespan.7 This is true to some extent and examples to make the point
are shown in Aubynn (2017). But, flipped to the other side, one can argue
that the breath of the newer technology of open-pit mining in the early
1990s has been rather timely, allowing for new operations in areas such as
DamangWassa, Akyempim, Iduaprim, Tebeberbe (in the Western Region),
Amansie, Chiraano, Kenyaasi, Nkawkaw, Akyim, and so on, which were not
previously known to produce gold, to be brought on stream and actively
benefit from the production of gold. This development provided a conduit
to absorb the mass of underground miners who would otherwise have been
retrenched following the evidently poor performance of the country’s
underground mines.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the prioritization of the mining sector
under SAP for major support has paid good dividends in terms of employ-
ment, foreign exchange earnings for the country, and capital injections.
It remains to be seen how these dividends have translated into social
improvement and sustainable development. That question is discussed in
Section 13.5.1.4.
6 This estimate includes employees in the exploration area, contractors as well as suppliers to the
large-scale mining companies. It does not include artisanal and small-scale miners.
7 Open-pit goldmining has become common in Ghana only in recent years (i.e. since the 1990s)
relative to underground mining, as the fortunes of the latter, which was then dominant in the
country, began to dwindle.
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13.5.1.4 GDP AND INTEGRATION INTO THE ECONOMY
The data suggest that the contribution of mining to GDP has seen steady
improvements since the implementation of the SAP in the 1980s. In 1991
the industry contributed only a little over 1 per cent to Ghana’s GDP. Since
1992, mining has contributed an average of 5 per cent to Ghana’s GDP, and
like the other indicators, this has steadily improved since the 2000s, reaching
a high of 14 per cent in 2012 (ISSER 2005–12).
However, in an earlier paper, I observed a rather poor linkage of the sector
with the rest of the national economy (Aubynn 2015). The relatively low, but
increasing contribution to GDP, coupled with low linkage of mining with the
economy, can partly be explained by the absence of an industrial base for the
manufacture of inputs required by the rather technology-intensive industry,
leading to most being imported. The steady increases in the mining GDP
contribution may, however, reflect the gradual increase in local participation
in mining support services such as drilling, exploration and explosives,
cement, lime, and high density pipe (HDPE) manufacturing and supplies in
the sector. The topic of local content is critical in this respect and Aubynn
(2017) looks in greater detail at the regulatory challenges to which this matter
gives rise.
13.5.2 Local Content: The Evolution of Regulatory Approaches
In Ghana, both the Minerals and Mining Act Law, 2006 (Act 703) and its
predecessor, Act 153 of 1986, sought to promote a localization policy and
facilitate improved production linkages. Indeed Clause 50(3) of Act 703 calls
for the eventual ‘localization’ of mining staff. In particular, the passage of the
Minerals and Mining (General) Regulative Instrument (LI), 2012-LI 2173,
marked the beginning of the implementation of local content policies in the
mining sector.
The LI 2173 provides a clear interpretation of Act 703 and focuses on three
areas, namely: (i) the employment and promotion of a local workforce, (ii) the
procurement of locally produced goods and services, and (iii) additional
licensing and reporting requirements. Of most interest for our present pur-
poses are the first two, as discussed in greater detail in Aubynn (2017).
13.5.2.1 THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION
Since the regulation came into force in 2013, the Minerals Commission has
worked with the Ghana Chamber of Mines for its practical implementation.
Most of the major mining companies submitted both their localization
and procurement plans to the Commission for approval by the end of 2014
and 2015. These plans have been reviewed by a committee. Between 2012 and
2013, the Commission undertook a process of broad consultations based on
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which an initial list of eighteen items earmarked for local procurement was
pruned down to eight. While this may seem a significant reduction, in reality,
the eight items constitute over 60 per cent of the value of the total local
procurement budget of the companies concerned. In 2014, following the
successful implementation of the first edition of the local procurement list,
the latter was increased by an additional eleven items to a total of nineteen.
So far an average of 80 per cent compliance has been recorded by the Com-
mission with a total of US$183 millions worth of goods and services procured
at home in Ghana in 2015. These were purchases that were otherwise likely to
have been made from abroad.
With respect to the localization of employment, all the major mining
companies submitted their plans, which were reviewed by a committee estab-
lished at the Commission and that includes representation from the Immi-
gration Services. This means that approval for residence and work permits
for expatriate staff of holders of mineral rights will depend on satisfactory
compliance with the localization regulation.
13.6 Key Regulatory Challenges
The previous sections have underscored the very impressive change to the key
indicators of mining and the macro and socio-economy of Ghana in the past
three decades. The assumption has been that the impressive performance of
the mining sector has been due in part to the regulatory changes introduced
since the reforms starting in 1983. However, as a student and practitioner of
mining policies and sector regulation in Ghana for close to two decades, one
cannot help but observe a number of regulatory challenges and bottlenecks
which need to be addressed if Ghana is to achieve the full benefits of its
minerals extraction. The following four are prominent amongst the chal-
lenges and are discussed in some detail in the ensuing sections:
 multiple regulations and inter-institutional conflicts
 capacity of regulators
 political will and interference
 the balancing act of dealing with large-scale multinational and local
small-scale mining sectors.
13.6.1 Multiple Regulations and Inter-institutional Conflicts
The mining sector is, arguably, not only the most regulated sector in Ghana,
but also the sector whose regulation engages by far the largest number of
regulatory institutions. The 1992 Constitution and the Minerals and Mining
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Law of 1986, as amended in 2006, mandate the Minerals Commission to
regulate and manage the utilization of Ghana’s mineral resources, including
the coordination of policies in relation to them.8 However, currently at least
six other institutions, namely the EPA, Forestry Commission,Water Resources
Commission, Ghana Revenue Authority, Ministry of Finance, and the Bank of
Ghana, exercise additional strong and direct regulatory authority over the
sector. The resulting complexity of regulations and interpretation as well as
conflicts among regulators have in many cases led to undue delays and
bureaucracy in permit processing. A classic example of the institutional con-
flict is the confusion between the Minerals Commission (the Inspectorate
Division) and the EPA as to who has the ultimate authority to regulate tailings
dam construction. Both institutions claim the authority to regulate the con-
struction of any tailings dam, to the effect that while the EPA insists on the
plastic lining of all tailings, the Minerals Commission argues that the impera-
tive of lining of tailings dams with plastic sheeting should be dependent on
the nature of the soil. It argues further that, where proven to be technically
feasible, clay lining would achieve the same outcome. This has created serious
concerns among mining companies, which continue to seek clarity in the
area. Similarly, in October 2015, the Bank of Ghana announced certain regu-
latory changes in respect of the export of gold in the small-scale mining sector.
The areas of new regulations were deemed to be outside the scope of the Bank
of Ghana. This led to the association of Licensed Gold Exporters (LGE) taking
the matter to court. In the event, the government found it necessary to
temporarily suspend the granting of new export licences and renewal of
expired ones. Even though the matter has been successfully resolved out of
court, one can surmise that the loss of revenue and foreign exchange during
the period of the suspension has been considerable.
These multiple regulations and their attendant inter-institutional conflicts
not only defeat the purpose for which the Minerals Commission was estab-
lished, i.e. to be a one-stop shop for investment in the mining sector,
but also create needless layers of bureaucracy and institutional tensions.
The recent merger of the hitherto stand-alone Mines Department with the
Minerals Commission as the latter’s Inspectorate Division, and the subse-
quent relocation in the same office premises, has clearly improved regulatory
efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, the original idea of a one-stop-shop Com-
mission modelled on the Australian Department of Minerals and Mining is
not only achievable but also relevant today if regulatory efficiency and the
effectiveness of the Minerals Commission are to be enhanced.
8 Minerals Commissions Act 1993, Act 450 section 2(1).
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13.6.2 Capacity of Regulators
Institutions and regulations are only as good as the capacity of their human
resources. After over a century of mining in Ghana and with relatively good
training institutions such as a dedicated university (University of Mines and
Technology) for the training of mining professionals, Ghana can be said to
have relatively good-quality human resources in the area. As indicated earlier,
Ghana is endowed with substantial mineral resources and its predominant
mineral, gold, appears to spread almost across the nation, leading to a number
of major mines and numerous small-scale (legal and illegal) mining activities
across the country. As of September 2016, the Minerals Commission had total
staff strength of 220, less than 40 per cent of which is technical. Most of the
technical staff have solid academic backgrounds (mostly second degree
holders) with significant industry experience and are generally highly com-
petent. However, more than half of the Commission’s technical staff are in
their fifties, posing potential challenge for succession.9 Similarly, the sheer
volume of monitoring, inspections, and extension work required makes it
impossible for fewer than a hundred staff to fully and effectively accomplish
all the tasks that are required. In particular, the absence of adequate staff at
district level has been blamed as one of the reasons for the increasing spate
of illegal mining operations in the country. The inadequacy of staff has also
meant insufficient inspection and monitoring of the operating mines. For
example, the current situation in which the country’s flagship Obuasi mine
has had to be placed under care and maintenance for a revised programme of
development has also been partly blamed on a failure of the Inspectorate
Division to effectively monitor the development of the mine to pick
up early warning signs.10 The lack of sufficient staff with the relevant skill
sets is not dissimilar to the generally unattractive remunerations and other
conditions of employment that most public sectors face—particularly in
African countries. The Commission is currently undertaking the refurbish-
ment of some of its regional and district offices to make these more attractive
and also to enable them to accommodate the anticipated increase in the
number of staff.
Similarly, equipment and other resources that technicians need for their
work to be effective raise further significant capacity challenges. Apart from
the Machine Laboratory, which has been described as being in good state, the
Environmental and Assay laboratories currently require major investment in
order to meet the challenges of a modern mining industry.
9 The statutory retirement age in Ghana is sixty.
10 The Obuasi mine is estimated to have over 7 million ounces of gold reserves.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Regulatory Structures and Challenges to Developmental Extractives
267
13.6.3 Political Will and Interference
One of the key features of the post-SAP regulatory structures in Ghana has
been the reduction in the previous undue bureaucracy and political interfer-
ence in the minerals title-application processes. For example, the application
for minerals title is now based on a first-come-first-served principle and should
begin at the Minerals Commission. The law endows the minister responsible
for mining with the ultimate power to grant or terminate any mining title.
Yet, the same law ensures that the power is not capriciously exercised.
The regulations enjoin the minister to seek the advice of the Minerals Com-
mission and the minister’s decisions are largely based ‘on the advice’ of the
Minerals Commission.11 This principle has largely held in Ghana. However,
there have been a few, even if outlying, instances where ministers have
instructed that specific concessions be processed by the Commission for
some companies, contrary to the advice offered. Similarly, it is common
knowledge, backed by anecdotes, that some individual politicians (not neces-
sarily representing the position of government or parties) have used their
influence to intervene in the seizure of equipment used by illegal miners in
their operations. Even though this practice may be the exception rather
than the rule, it needs to be checked to avoid gradual escalation and also to
maintain the integrity of regulations and their implementation. To overcome
the temptation of political interference and to deepen transparency as well as
reduce other human intervention in the minerals titling (granting of conces-
sion) processes, the Commission is establishing a digitized mineral cadaster
system that allows applications for mineral titles to bemade via the Internet.12
This, combined with an open tender system, will hopefully reduce to the
barest minimum the incidence of interference and human intervention
in the grant of minerals titles and improve the efficiency and transparency
of the system.
Another area of concern is the creeping ‘regulator uncertainty’ that occurs
in the aftermath of political change. It is fast becoming a norm that new
political parties, which win general elections, begin office with a significant
dose of suspicion of the regulator and often question the regulator’s loyalty to
the new government.13 In the event, some regulatory agencies become the
punch-bag for needless public ridicule and opprobrium. During this period of
‘sparring’ for trust between political appointees and technocrats, instances of
11 The law enjoins the minister to seek the advice of the Minerals Commission, and a minister
who disagrees with the Commission must provide reasons for the disagreement.
12 This process is expected to ‘go live’ by April 2017.
13 This situation may have arisen and perhaps have been made worse by instances in which
some public servants have shown open bias and declared support for certain political parties.
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direct intervention in the day-to-day activities of regulators become common.
One example, widely publicized in the local and social media, is the recent
action (in May 2017) of the minister of Lands and Natural Resources announ-
cing the interdiction of nine district mining officers of the Minerals Commis-
sion and their assistants without recourse to the policies of the Commissions.
Similarly, normal processes of recruitment by the Commission have had to be
halted at the instance of the sector minister for an indefinite period, com-
pounding the capacity challenges intimated earlier in this chapter. These
burgeoning attempts at interfering and truncating the activities of regulatory
agencies during political transitions have occurred under the governments of
both of the dominant political parties in Ghana, the NDC and the NPP. This
has tended to directly affect not only the image and credibility of public
institutions but also the psyche of employees who work in them and who
feel unjustifiably victimized as a result of political change.
13.6.4 The Balancing Act of Dealing with Large-scale Multinational
and Local Small-scale Mining Sectors
Ghana has two broad categories of mining operations—the large-scale, oper-
ated largely by multinational mining giants such as Newmont, Gold Fields,
and Anglogold Ashantis; and a large mass of small-scale miners (SSM), includ-
ing many unlicensed operators locally known as the galamseys. Ghana is
among the few countries where small-scale mining is legalized and regulated
(Small-Scale Mining Law 1989, PNDC Law 218). Yet, it is also an area where an
estimated 70 per cent of the over one million operators work outside the
confines of the law.
As noted in earlier sections of this chapter, the large-scale mining (LSM)
companies produce the bulk of Ghana’s gold (an annual average of 3 million
ounces in 2011–15). Gold production by the SSM cannot be dismissed as
unimportant, however, as the contribution from them has grown from neg-
ligible levels in the 1990s to over a million ounces (since 2013). Laws and
regulations exist for both categories of miners and these are managed mainly
by the Minerals Commission and the EPA. Regulation of LSM operations has
been largely formal and relatively simple.
However, the same cannot be said of the SSM. Themass of SSMs, dominated
by the galamseys, have been associated with the devastation of the physical
environment of some areas, including the massive pollution of a number of
river bodies in Ghana such as the Ankobra, Tano, and Abirem. The galamseys
operate substantially in utter defiance of the law. Interestingly, their negative
operations are known to be carried out in the full glare of law enforcement
institutions and in disregard of any real sense of sound environmental man-
agement. There have been instances, often reported in the media, where
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unregistered mining operators have invaded the concessions of some LSM
companies. The most recent (February 2016) case in point is the invasion of
AngloGold Ashanti property at Obuasi by a large mass of illegal miners (esti-
mated at five thousand). Clearly, while the LSMs are held to strict regulatory
standards, the same cannot currently be said of the SSMs.
The question that has often been raised is why SSMs are not, in fact, held to
the same regulatory standards as the LSMs. Several reasons have been assigned
to explain their defiance of the law in spite of the existence of clear laws and
regulations to guide their operations. These reasons include the long and
complex application process, lack of finance in an activity which has increas-
ingly become capital intensive, lack of knowledge about the licence acquisi-
tion process as well as the lack of capacity fully to enforce the law due to the
sheer numbers of people (estimated at 1.5 million) involved in SSM in the
country vis-à-vis the available resources for policing.
While these stated reasons are no doubt very important and potent, the
major challenge, in my view, is the lack of political will by successive govern-
ments to resolutely address the challenges posed by illegal SSM. The culprits
here are the two biggest political parties, the NDC and NPP, which are the
only political parties to have run the affairs of government under the Fourth
Republic constitution since 1992. As noted in two previous papers (Aubynn
2006, 2009), successive governments have considered the political economy
of enforcing the SSM regulations potentially too costly to their electoral
fortunes by virtue of the number of SSMs representing a potential source of
significant electoral votes and the lack of alternative employment opportun-
ities.14 They have had to engage in a difficult balancing act of attracting and
protecting FDI in the country while at the same time ensuring the availability
of opportunities for local citizens, including the opportunity to engage in
mining. In the event, politicians of successive governments have often
competed in their overt or tacit support for the operators of illegal mining.15
This lack of political will to enforce the laws and regulations on SSMs
has not only strengthened the hands of these unregistered operators
but also emboldened them to invade the concessions of some large-scale
mining companies. Some analysts have attributed the recent (February 2016)
invasion of AngloGold Ashanti property at Obuasi by illegal miners as an
14 This becomes more pronounced during national election years as major political parties
compete in their tacit or overt declaration of support for galamseys and their assurance of
assistance to them once they win power.
15 In 2012, the arrest of a group of illegal mining operators by the National Security in the
Obuasi area was described by a member of parliament as ‘state terrorism’. Some people have also
interpreted the failure of the government to act decisively in the face of the illegal occupations of
the Obuasi mine as a lack of political will to act in the face of impending elections. It must,
however, be said that there have been significant efforts by the current NPP government to fight
the menace of galamseys in a more comprehensive manner.
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eloquent expression of this ‘emboldenment’ occasioned by the lack of polit-
ical will to enforce the laws. It is imperative that a bipartisan approach is
found to the enforcement of the country’s minerals and mining laws if a
race to the bottom, with devastating environmental consequences, is not to
take place. There should be a collective understanding that illegal mining is
a ‘no-go’ while encouraging and supporting regularized SSMs.
13.7 Conclusions
The role of natural resources extraction in the socio-economic development
and transformation of resource-endowed LICs is no longer a myth. Evidence
abounds, in the literature, about the potential of resource-endowed countries
to harness their resources to propel growth and development. What remains
to be fully understood, however, is the role that a regulatory framework can
play in promoting and accelerating such transformation and development.
Drawing on the case of Ghana, this chapter has discussed in some detail the
powerful influences that regulatory structures can have in changing the
dynamics of resources extraction to benefit a country’s growth and develop-
ment. The study did not attempt to establish a direct correlation between
specific regulations and their impact on mining and economic growth.
However, significant improvements in all the macroeconomic indicators on
mining, including FDI inflows, production, domestic revenue, and foreign
exchange, since the implementation of Ghana’s post-1980s liberalizedmining
regulatory framework, provides ample evidence of the potential of a well-
managed liberalized regulatory regime to catalyze minerals-driven economic
growth in the country. The recent (2013) implementation of new localization
and content policies is a conscious effort to more fully integrate mining into
the local economy.
The ability of the state to provide effective regulatory institutions with high
levels of technical and other capacities is key to how well regulatory regimes
can drive the transformation and economic development catalyzed by min-
eral extraction. The establishment of institutions such as the Ghana Minerals
Commission and the EPA, with relative independence, during the 1980s and
1990s respectively, and the relative efficiency of the regulatory policies and
instruments that they are asked to operate, are likely to have contributed in
no small measure to the relative success of Ghana’s case. Collaboration among
regulatory agencies as well as regulated organizations is also imperative for
the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation. The practice of regulation by
‘policing’ and insistence must give way to regulation by collaboration and
assistance. Similarly, the implementation and adaptation of international
standards have proven to be effective tools for addressing some of the capacity
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challenges of regulatory institutions, including the transfer of internationally
acceptable practices to developing countries in general andGhana in particular.
There are, however, some critical challenges that need to be addressed if the
benefits of regulatory reforms are to be harnessed fully. For example, creeping
political interference in the affairs of these regulatory institutions, inadequate
human resource capacity, multiple regulations, and inter-institutional con-
flicts threaten to reduce or significantly erode the gains made by the new
regulatory structures in Ghana.
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The Taxation of Extractive Industries
Mining
James M. Otto
14.1 Mineral Taxation: A General Overview
14.1.1 Introduction
Governments have probably been taxingmines ever since governments began
taxing economic enterprises. What have governments learned over time?
Basically you need to achieve balance—if you tax too heavily in the short
term, over the long run the tax base is reduced because investors will shy away
from new investment, and if you tax too lightly, society may feel slighted that
it is not receiving its fair share of benefits. Though the above principle is
simple, its implementation is not, and tax policy makers grapple with how
to create a balanced tax system on an ongoing basis. Mineral prices fluctuate
widely, more so than many other commodities, which complicates achieving
a balanced approach. While there are tax tools that assist in accommodating
wide price fluctuations, many governments simply adjust rates and bases to
react to commodity price cycles. This chapter examines some of the issues that
are of current interest to tax policy makers.
14.1.2 Mineral Rents
The academic literature is replete with the treatment of the concept of eco-
nomic rent—a surplus of income that can theoretically be taken away from an
investor without altering its economic behaviour. Economists have long toyed
with the concept that the taxation of a mine can be adjusted to capture its
economic rent. In practice, few nations attempt to capture all economic rent,
but all taxes, and especially taxes such as income tax, excess profits taxes, and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
additional profit taxes do appropriate at least some economic rent for the
benefit of the state. It is beyond the scope of this short discourse on mine
taxation to delve into the extensive literature on the application of economic
theories concerning mineral rents to the design of taxation policy in the
mineral sector.1 While tax policy makers may grasp the theoretical concept
of economic rent, most are more concerned about achieving a real-world
balance that satisfies investors and society.
14.1.3 Evolution of Mineral Taxation Schemes
Mineral-sector taxation systems tend to evolve, reflecting the current state of
the business cycle. When mineral commodity prices are high, mineral-led
economies tend to adjust their tax systems to capture more of the perceived
excess profits, and when prices are low, systems are adjusted to allowmines to
remain economically viable. The most common way to adjust the mineral-
sector taxation system is through themanipulation of royalty schemes, because
such schemes do not affect other types of taxpayer. Recently, as a result of the
commodity super-cycle commencing around 2002, there was a resurgence of
interest in self-adjusting taxation approaches designed to appropriate ‘excess
profits’ based on either rate-of-returnmeasures (Australia, Liberia, Malawi, Solo-
mon Islands, and Zimbabwe) or annual profit-to-cost ratio principles (Chile and
Peru).2 Tax schemes imposed during times of rising prices are vulnerable to
repeal when prices fall or investors shy away. For example, Australia imposed a
resource rent-type tax when the super-cycle became apparent but repealed it
shortly thereafter when prices dropped. Likewise, new taxes driven by the
super-cycle in both Zambia and Mongolia were short-lived, and other nations
have reconsidered their royalty rates.
Governments have several direct ways of participating in the sharing of
income generated by mines. The simplest way is through taxation. Another
route is for the government to establish a state mining enterprise that itself
operates mines, or to enter into some sort of joint-venture interest arrange-
ment with a private investor that entitles it to a share of profit or dividend
distributions. However, the trend over the past several decades has been to
emphasize taxation and few nations today directly mine minerals or take a
majority equity position in mines. Worldwide, the trend has been to privatize
state-owned mines (for example, in Malaysia, Peru, Poland, and Russia) and
today their governments look to taxes, not dividends, for fiscal revenues.
1 For an introduction to mineral rent theory and taxation see Tilton and Guzman (2016),
Boadway and Keen (2013), Land (2010), Otto et al. (2006), Cordes (1995), and Land (1995).
2 For a history of resource rent types of tax applied to mining see Land (2010).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
276
Other nations that formerly owned mines have partially privatized them by
reducing the state’s equity to a minority share, such as ZCCM Ltd. in Zambia.
Over the past two or three decades there has been a trend to rely on laws
rather than negotiated agreements to set out taxation schemes for large pro-
jects. For example, Indonesia, which developed the ‘Contract of Work’ that
has been widely emulated worldwide in mining agreements since the early
1970s, has abolished such agreements and nowminers are subject to tax under
the general tax laws. Negotiated mining agreements played an important role
in many mineral-led economies that lacked an adequate system of laws to
accommodate large-scale projects, but as legal systems have matured, the
need for them has waned in many nations. In this author’s opinion, the time
for such agreements has passed, and nations that still use them should con-
centrate their efforts on strengthening the underlying system of laws, rather
than spending the considerable time and effort it takes to negotiate them.
When considering fiscal reform, whether through changes to taxes or equity
options, it is important to examine the system as a whole, not just a compo-
nent part. For example, when comparing royalty rates in different nations,
one should not be too concerned if the rate is higher or lower than in another
nation because other tax types may offset the difference in royalty (for
example, a lower or higher income tax rate). Today, many nations make use
of project fiscal modelling to aid with tax reform policy analysis. Mine fiscal
models allow a holistic assessment, taking into account the impact of all taxes
on a typical or model mine, and provide the ability to carry out a sensitivity
analysis of the impact of various scenarios onmeasures such as internal rate of
return and total effective tax rate. For example, Peru was interested in chan-
ging its approach to mine taxation and it commissioned fiscal modelling
to assess its competitive position with other countries,3 conducting fiscal
scenario modelling exercises before moving forward with two rounds of
mineral-sector-related fiscal legislation. Such analysis has become more rou-
tine and accessible with the availability of tools such as the Fiscal Analysis of
Resource Industries Methodology and supporting software developed by the
IMF (IMF 2016). Many governments that lacked confidence in their capacity
to conduct fiscal system analysis have sought outside assistance from organ-
izations such as the IMF, the Commonwealth Secretariat or specialist consult-
ants, such as this author. In this author’s experience, nations that analyse the
impact of a variety of tax scenarios using modelling have more stable fiscal
systems and are better able to attract investment on a continuing basis.
While various tax rates and bases have changed over the past several dec-
ades, the basic mineral-sector taxation methods have remained more or less
3 See Otto et al. (2000) and Otto (2002).
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the same, with the exception of the introduction of general value-added taxes
(VAT) in many nations and a new form of additional profits mining tax in
Chile and Peru. In this author’s opinion, the greatest strides recently have been
in tax administration, where the capacity of governments has strengthened,
particularly in mineral-led developing economies. Many governments have
established specially trained large-taxpayer compliance units. For nations that
still have weak tax administration capabilities, simpler taxes remain preferable
to more complex types. For example, the author, when meeting with officials
in the tax authority of an African nation, learned that none of them knew how
a new excess profits tax (crafted by external consultants and passed into law)
was calculated or were familiar with the concept of internal rate of return.
Unfortunately, the progress made by tax authorities to stem fiscal leakages
resulting from transfer pricing practices remains slow in both developed and
developing economies. While input and output transfer pricing mechanisms
are well known, the ability of governments to address these practices has
remained weak. In this author’s opinion, most nations today have developed
their mineral-sector tax systems to achieve a ‘theoretical’ fair balance between
national and investor interests, but transfer pricing linkages remain a major
challenge that distorts actual revenue collection.
14.1.4 Revenue Distribution
Fiscal revenues generated by mining enterprises can be substantial, and where
they form a large part of government’s revenue, their distribution can be
controversial. Subnational governments obtain their revenues from two prin-
cipal sources: through the annual allocation of the national budget and from
earnings that they obtain from the collection of various taxes that they are
empowered to collect. Often, the respective tax powers of central and sub-
national governments are set out in the nation’s constitution. In many
nations, there is tension between the various levels of government regarding
revenue distribution and taxing powers.
Subnational governments in areas that have mines often profess that since
the minerals come from lands within their jurisdictional boundaries, they
should receive preferential distribution. Subnational governments in areas
without mines take a more egalitarian view—mineral revenues should be
distributed equally or in such a manner that will do the greatest number of
beneficiaries the greatest good. Otto (2001) has observed that in practice, there
is often a bias in mineral-sector fiscal systems towards those areas in which
minerals are mined either through statutorily defined distribution mechan-
isms or through the devolution of taxing powers to subnational government.
In many developing nations there is a trend for subnational governments to
acquire a greater portion of the tax or royalty take, either through statutory
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allocation of certain tax receipts or through direct taxation, as they gain
administrative capacity. For example, over the past several decades, sub-
national governments have seen a greater portion of tax taken in nations as
diverse as Brazil, Peru, Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia.4 In
Brazil, the royalty is split as follows: 23 per cent to the state in which the mine
is located; 65 per cent to municipalities; 2 per cent to the national fund of
scientific and technological development; and 10 per cent to the mining
ministry, of which 2 per cent is earmarked for environmental protection in
the mining regions.
The degree to which taxing authority is devolved among various levels of
government is usually set out in the national constitution and in the various
organic laws of the nation. Most mines are subject to a variety of taxes and fees
levied by different levels of government. Typically, the largest tax cost is at the
national level with lesser amounts being paid to subnational governments.
Table 14.1 indicates the author’s assessment of whether a certain type of tax is
amenable to being assessed at the national, provincial, or local level.
In a previous study by this author (Otto 2001), an analysis of the mining
fiscal systems in over twenty nations indicated that mining sector taxation in
developing economies was highly centralized at the national level. Today, in
Table 14.1. Fiscal methods and their amenability to fiscal decentralization
Tax type National govt. Provincial govt. Local govt.
Income or profits-based tax Y P N
Import duty Y N N
Export duty Y N N
Royalty (profit-based type) Y P N
Royalty (ad valorem type) Y Y P
Royalty tax (unit type) Y Y Y
Royalty tax collected nationally and % distributed Y Y Y
Licensing fees Y Y Y
Surface rental or land use fees Y Y Y
Withholding taxes on loan interest, dividends,
services
Y N N
VAT on goods and services Y P N
Sales and excise tax Y P P
Stamp duty Y Y Y
Property tax (on book or assessed value) Y Y Y
Payroll-based taxes Y P N
Surtaxes Y Y Y
User fees Y Y Y
Note: Y = Yes, well suited; P = possibly suited; N = not a good fit
Source: Otto (2001).
4 A variety of distribution mechanisms used in Australia, Canada, Chile, Ghana, Indonesia,
Peru, and Tanzania are described in ICMM (2009).
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the author’s experience, that remains the same. Nations with a federal system
of government, such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, and the United States, were
more likely to devolve significant taxation power to provincial governments,
most often through a jurisdictional income tax, royalty, and sales tax. The
study revealed that few governments devolve significant taxing power to local
government, except occasionally a tax on the value of commercial property.
The World Bank Group collects and makes available detailed data on fiscal
decentralization5 but unfortunately mining is not broken out as a separate
category for analysis.
While there are often good reasons to consider fiscal decentralization, it is
this author’s experience that achieving such decentralization is in practice
quite difficult. Taxation powers are often inflexible either because of consti-
tutional constraints or because central authorities are reluctant to devolve
taxation power to subnational governments. The more common scenario is
for national government to maintain taxing authority but to mandate a
certain portion of fiscal revenues for distribution to subnational governments.
For example, in Peru there was substantial pressure for the central government
to share more of the mining fiscal take at the local level and the operations of
some mines were affected by acts of civil disobedience. In response, over the
course of a decade changes were made to the fiscal laws and now a portion of
both royalties- and mines-derived income tax is collected centrally but dis-
tributed to subnational governments.6
14.1.5 Special Aspects of the Mining Industry and the
Tax Policy Response
Tax policy makers grapple with the issue of uniqueness. Should a uniform
taxation system be applied to all economic sectors or should a more compli-
cated system be developed that takes into account the unique attributes of
each sector? Each sector in an economy has different cost, revenue, and
related profit attributes. Additionally, government objectives for various sec-
tors may differ—for example, maximizing employment, providing security
of supply, generating revenue, and so forth. The willingness of investors to
invest in a sector may be impacted by how that sector is taxed, and if the
taxation system is different for each sector of the economy, will preferential
taxation cause detrimental distortions in the economy? Additionally, if the
tax system is non-uniform, it will be inherently more complex and relatively
more difficult to administer.
5 Database access is available at: http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/
fiscalindicators.htm.
6 For a description of the distribution system see Neyra (2011).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
280
Otto (2001) has observed that most governments afford the mining sector
special tax treatment, taking into account those attributes that distinguish it
from other sectors. This section briefly examines several mineral-sector tax
discrimination issues and related policy approaches. The treatment below is
not exhaustive, and it is not uncommon to witness other discriminatory
taxation practices.
Discrimination by mineral type: Because operational economics may differ
from mineral type to mineral type, many nations statutorily define groups of
minerals that are subject to different royalty rates. For example, diamond
mines have the potential to generate profit levels that may not be obtainable
by a gravel mine, and the royalty rate for diamonds will be set higher than that
for gravel mines.
Discrimination by level of investment: Mines come in many sizes and some are
on a commercial scale while others are artisanal. Many nations exempt arti-
sanal miners, whether licensed or not, from paying a royalty, in recognition of
the fact that tax enforcement is unrealistic. SSMs may enjoy a reduced royalty
or royalty exemption and may also be subject to a low-income tax rate if the
system is graduated. Very large mines and mines owned by the political elite
may be offered the opportunity to negotiate unique tax terms in a special
agreement with the state. Large, expensive-to-build, long-lived mines may be
offered the ability to stabilize all or some types of tax for a defined time period.
To entice investment in a large project or to aid in project financing, a few
nations, such as Indonesia and the Philippines,7 provide a ‘holiday’ from one
or more types of tax for qualifying projects.
Discrimination by nationality: Bilateral investment and double taxation trea-
ties offer special tax treatment for investors from the signatory nations; this
may be unavailable to investors from non-treaty countries.
Discrimination relating to costs: Exploration expenses. Exploration expenses
will be incurred before taxable income is available. Governments provide special
provision for how pre-production (pre-income) exploration expenses are han-
dled for future income tax purposes. Many nations allow exploration expend-
iture to be carried forward to the first year of mineral production, when the
accumulated expenditure is either expensed or amortization is commenced.
Mine development and equipment. The development of a mine is
dependent on specialized equipment and the developer will initially need to
import large quantities of equipment from specialized foreign suppliers. Many
nations exempt mining equipment from import duty and VAT during at
least the initial development period. Other nations provide refunds or apply
zero-rating schemes that have the same impact as an exemption. Mines are
7 Details are reported in PWC (2012).
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capital-intensive and large expenditures are required before operations can
commence. Many governments recognize the capital intensity of the industry
and provide various means to accelerate recovery of capital costs (i.e. depreci-
ation) once production commences.
Discrimination relating to export sales: Manymine products are often destined
for highly competitive international markets. Many governments impose no
(or very low) export duties on minerals and provide a means whereby VAT on
export sales is either not applied or applied in a way that allows for a refund or
credit.
Discrimination relating to commodity price cycles: Mines produce rawmaterials
used to make other things and are vulnerable to substantial price changes on a
periodic, business-cycle-related basis. Some countries allow royalties to be
waived or deferred from time to time for projects experiencing short-term
financial stress and most countries provide for the carrying forward of losses.
14.1.6 Transparency
The disclosure of tax payments by commercial enterprises is a delicate fiscal
issue in most nations. In a competitive world, information on a rival’s
payment of its various taxes can provide a competitive advantage. Many
governments accept this principle and hold such payment information con-
fidential. On the other hand, the public may be concerned that payments to
government, perhaps to the executive branch or to a tax authority controlled
by the political elite, can result in corrupt or questionable practices. One of the
challenges faced by tax policy makers is how to balance the need for commer-
cially necessary confidentiality with the public’s need to hold the government
accountable for how it receives and uses fiscal remittances.
Mineral-sector taxation transparency is an issue that has seen rapid change
in recent years. This is largely attributable to two factors: the EITI and the shift
away from secretly negotiated agreements (arranged with individual compan-
ies) towards standardized licencing and/or the public disclosure of negotiated
agreements. In today’s interconnected world, even if a nation and company
desire to keep a negotiated agreement confidential, it may be leaked, and once
available on the Internet, it is difficult to then control its unlimited dissemin-
ation. Specialized ‘agreement websites’make it possible for the public to access
a wide range of mining agreements.8
The EITI is a relatively new initiative that can trace its political origins to
2002 when the United Kingdom’s then prime minister Tony Blair released a
speech that called on companies and governments to publicly disclose their
8 For example, visit http://www.resourcecontracts.org/, http://www.atns.net.au/, and http://
repository.openoil.net/wiki/Main_Page to access a wide variety of mining and petroleum agreements.
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fiscal payments and receipts. The following year, a Statement of Principles to
increase the transparency of payments and revenues in the extractives sector
was prepared and then agreed by over forty institutions. In 2004, under the
auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, a World Bank-administered Multi-
Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) was created to lend technical assistance to govern-
ments that wished to promote extractives sector fiscal transparency policies.
Over time, the 2003 principles laid the groundwork for an international
standard of reporting: governments report on the various taxes they receive
from themineral industry and companies report the amounts that they pay to
government; the amounts paid and received are then subject to reconciliation,
and the results are normally made public. A nation’s EITI process is periodic-
ally assessed to determine whether it is in compliance with the standards or
not. By 2016, over fifty nations, including many mineral-led economies, were
attempting to implement EITI, of which about 60 per cent were largely com-
pliant with the standards.9 Being a fairly new initiative, it remains to be seen
whether the EITI will prove effective in stemming corrupt practices over the
longer term, but the disclosure of fiscal payments and receipts required by the
EITI promotes accountability and is certain to make fiscally related corrupt
practices more difficult to implement.10
14.1.7 Revenue Stabilization Funds
Mineral commodity prices are prone to large fluctuations attributable to
many factors but such changes are most often related to global business
cycles affecting the mineral supply and demand balance. Nations whose
annual budgeting is dependent on mining revenues are vulnerable to rapid
increases and decreases in commodity prices. It can be a challenge to match
annual expenditure to annual fiscal receipts, particularly where a large part of
the budget is relatively inelastic, such as in the payment of government
workers, the provision of essential health, education, and security services,
debt servicing, and so forth.
One approach used to deal with revenue instability is to implement a
revenue stabilization scheme whereby ‘excess’ revenues received during
times of high prices are saved and then expended when revenues drop. Such
schemes have been implemented by a number of nations and they can
9 A history of EITI, a listing of nations that are implementing it and a copy of the Standards are
available at https://eiti.org/eiti/history.
10 For an introduction to transparency issues see ‘Emerging Economies: Transparency and
Accountability in the Extractive Industries’, Working Paper Series published by the NRGI
available at http://www.resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/publications/emerging-economies-
transparency-and-accountability-extractive-industries.
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effectively help to smooth the revenues available for the budgeting process.11
However, such schemes are vulnerable to political risk—a system adopted by
one generation of lawmakers may be quickly repealed by the next generation
of lawmakers who may want to dissolve the fund to spend the saved funds
immediately (perhaps to fulfil election promises or to service debt). For
example, Papua New Guinea implemented a mineral revenue stabilization
fund scheme commencing in 1974 that worked well for several decades
before its implementing act was repealed in 1999 by a new generation of
lawmakers.12
14.1.8 Sovereign Wealth Funds
A SWF is a state-owned fund or entity that usually receives its capital infusion
partially from fiscal revenues and partially from its earnings on investments.
Such funds are becoming increasingly common and over seventy funds now
exist or are in the planning stage.13 For natural resource-led economies, such
funds have at least four main purposes—to provide revenue smoothing (such as
when used in part as a revenue stabilization fund), to provide for future sustain-
able income, to diversify income, and to limit available government expenditure
based on the absorptive capacity of the economy. Key issues for policy makers
when setting up such a fund include: who controls or manages the fund, the
type of investments that can be made by the fund, and how and when earnings
on those investments will be disbursed and to whom.14 Many SWFs are set up
so that annual disbursements to the government or its designated recipients are
capped in some way in order to preserve the fund’s capital base. Like revenue
stabilization funds, SWFs are vulnerable to political action by lawmakers and
governments who may over time seek to redirect a fund’s earnings and distribu-
tions. While some SWFs operate with a goal of public transparency, others are
highly secretive and may be subject to potential abuse and corrupt practices. In
an attempt to promote transparency, good governance, and accountability
standards, several dozen SWFs have jointly developed a voluntary code of
principles, the ‘Generally Accepted Principles and Practices’, also known as the
11 For an example, Chile maintains an Economic and Social Stabilization Fund whose
primary purpose is to partially cover cyclical reductions in fiscal revenues. A description of the
fund is available at http://www.hacienda.cl/english/sovereign-wealth-funds/economic-and-social-
stabilization-fund.html.
12 For a discussion of the fund and an accounting of its inflows and outflows see Otto and Dorian
(1989) and Lum et al. (1995).
13 A listing of SWFs and a brief description of their main attributes are available at http://www.
swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund-rankings/.
14 An analysis of the issues involved in setting up a SWF within the context of a non-renewable
resource-led developing economy (Papua New Guinea) is available at http://www.treasury.gov.pg/
html/misc/Sovereign%20Wealth%20Fund%20Discussion%20Paper.pdf.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
284
‘Santiago Principles’. However, an analysis by Behrendt (2010) concludes that
adherence to the principles is generally falling short.
Bauer (2014) and Ang (2010) have documented that many SWFs are suc-
cessful in meeting their objectives but others are not. For example, the Nauru
Phosphate Royalties Trust was a SWF set up by the Republic of Nauru, funded
through revenues derived from phosphate mining.15 At its peak the trust was
worth more than one billion Australian dollars, which were to be used for
the future benefit of Nauru’s population of around 10,000 people. Abusive
spending and mismanagement of the fund by officials eventually led to its
bankruptcy and it was dissolved in 2014.16
Ang (2010) has proposed that for SWFs to work well they must meet four
critical benchmarks: legitimacy, intent, performance, and endurance. Bauer
(2014) recommends six steps that promote good SWF governance:
 Set clear fund objective(s) (e.g. saving for future generations, stabilizing
the budget, and earmarking natural resource revenue for development
priorities).
 Establish fiscal rules—for deposit and withdrawal—that align with the
objective(s).
 Establish investment rules (e.g. a maximum of 20 per cent can be invested
in equities) that align with the objective(s).
 Clarify a division of responsibilities between the ultimate authority over
the fund, the fundmanager, the day-to-day operational manager, and the
different offices within the operational manager, and set and enforce
ethical and conflict-of-interest standards.
 Require regular and extensive disclosures of key information (e.g. a list of
specific investments, and names of fund managers) and audits.
 Establish strong independent oversight bodies tomonitor fund behaviour
and enforce the rules.
Unfortunately, while some SWFs meet the Ang benchmarks and the Bauer
recommended steps criteria, many do not.
14.1.9 Double Taxation Treaties
Many nations have entered into ‘double taxation treaties’ in order to promote
investment. Such bilateral conventions between two countries seek to elim-
inate the double taxation of income arising in one country and being paid to
15 Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Act 1968.
16 RONWAN Finalisation Act 2014 (No. 19 of 2014).
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residents of another country. Otto and Cordes (2002: 6–17) have observed
that the content of such treaties varies widely but that they usually contain a
number of investment-related incentives useful to the mining industry such
as: reduced dividend withholding tax; reduced interest withholding tax; cred-
iting of income taxes paid by a home country taxable entity in the host
country; and the recognition of deductions allowed in the host country as a
valid deduction for host country crediting. Of particular importance to
foreign-owned mines are treaty provisions that reduce withholding tax rates
below the normal statutory rate. Withholding taxes are often one of the
largest fiscal costs incurred by a mine and treaty rates are often set substan-
tially below the statutory rate. Many double taxation treaties have been
deposited with the United Nations Secretary General and are available at its
online United Nations Treaty Series collection website.17
14.2 Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes
14.2.1 Direct Taxes
For the purposes of this chapter, ‘direct taxes’ means all taxes, fees, and other
imposts that are paid by a mine directly to government. The most common
types of direct tax applied to mining include:
 income tax
 turnover tax
 withholding tax on dividends
 withholding tax on loan interest payments
 withholding tax on salaries
 withholding tax on payments for foreign-sources services
 royalties
 value-added tax or sales tax
 customs duties
 taxes based on land area (such as rent)
 taxes based on asset value (such as property tax)
 provincial and local taxes
 stamp duties/transaction fees
 transport-related taxes (user fees)
 employee or payroll related taxes, fees, contributions, pension schemes
 progressive, excess profits, and additional profits taxes.
17 To access the United Nations Treaty, see https://treaties.un.org.
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Of these direct tax types,18 perhaps the types that are of most interest to the
current generation of tax policy makers are excess/additional-profit-type
taxes. Most nations do not impose taxes specifically designed to capture
‘excess profits’. However, when the business cycle pushes mineral commodity
prices up, governments may act to impose a special tax to capture some of the
perceived increased rent and then may repeal the tax when prices descend.19
For example, during the price boom that commenced around 2004 Australia,
Mongolia, and Zambia imposed new ‘excess profits’ taxes but repealed them at
the end of the price-cycle boom. Other nations, such as Chile, Peru, and
Liberia, imposed new excess profits taxes but have maintained them even as
prices have fallen. A well-designed excess profits tax should be self-adjusting
to take into account changing profitability. However, the reality is that excess
profits taxes are highly vulnerable to political processes linked to the
business cycle.
In practice, there are three principal types of tax designed to capture excess
profits: progressive tax; rate-of-return-triggered additional profit tax; and
profitability-ratio-triggered additional profit tax:
 With a progressive tax, when the magnitude of annual profits (net
income) or prices goes up, the tax rate goes up. The rate increase may be
tied to a progressive corporate income tax (such as in the United States
and Venezuela) or to a royalty where the royalty rate is linked to the
commodity price (such as in Mongolia).
 A rate-of-return-triggered additional profit tax is favoured bymany econo-
mists because of its linkage to the concept of economic rents. When a
statutorily set rate of return is exceeded, an additional tax is imposed. The
idea is not to capture all economic rent, but to instead impose an add-
itional tax when a rate-of-return calculation suggests that there are sub-
stantial economic rents. Typically the rate-of-return trigger rate is in the
range of 20–25 per cent. The rate-of-return-based calculation is based on
the statutorily defined cash flow of the mine to date. It is possible for the
tax to be triggered in some years, but if the rate of return falls below the
trigger rate, the additional profits tax is not paid. Historically, rate-of-
return-triggered additional profit taxes were considered by many govern-
ments as too administratively difficult to calculate, but new accounting
and calculation approaches developed by the IMF (such as IMF-drafted
provisions incorporated into the income tax acts of Liberia, Malawi, and
other client countries) have addressed this problem.
18 For a description of each direct tax type and its trend see Otto (2017).
19 For additional information see Otto (1992a); Otto (1992b); Land (1995); Cordes (1995); Otto
and Cordes (2002); Otto et al. (2006); Land (2010).
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 Unlike rate-of-return-based taxes, another form of additional profits tax is
based not on the cash flow of the mine over time, but instead on the ratio
of profits to costs in the current tax year. If the ratio exceeds a limit, the
additional profits tax is triggered and it is applied to either gross sales
revenues (a form of royalty) or a statutorily defined operating income. In
Chile and Peru, which impose this latter type of tax, the effective rate of
the additional tax is progressive—as the profit ratio increases, the effective
additional profits tax rate increases.
In this author’s opinion, rate-of-return and additional profits taxes can be
a good option for some governments, provided that they have adequately
trained tax officials. Any sort of tax whose calculation takes into account costs
is more difficult to implement, monitor, and enforce than one that is solely
based on revenues (such as an ad valorem type royalty). The introduction of
these types of complex tax is best suited to nations with a strong, well-funded,
and educated tax authority.
14.2.2 Indirect Taxes
In addition to taxes that result in a direct monetary payment to government,
governments can impose requirements on miners that result in higher costs.
Several examples of indirect taxation include:20
 free equity or carried interest state participation
 mandatory local sourcing (goods, services)
 downstream processing
 local community development requirements
 social infrastructure development requirements
 foreign exchange requirements.
In most parts of the world, mining by wholly state-owned enterprises is no
longer practised. However, some nations, predominantly in the West Africa
region and in former ‘Soviet sphere’ nations, still require a minority state
participation interest in large mines. The means by which such an interest is
created varies.21 Daniel (1995: 175) describes state equity as ‘the acquisition
by the government (or a state-owned enterprise) on behalf of the state of a
participating interest or a claim on after-tax profits in a joint venture with
20 For a detailed description of various types of cost that can be considered indirect taxation
see Otto (2017).
21 For a more complete treatment see McPherson (2010), Otto and Cordes (2002), and Radetzki
(1985).
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privately owned companies’. Today, most equity interests provided to gov-
ernments fall into one of the following categories:
 Free equity : This term means that the state receives an ownership interest
at no cost to itself. The ownership interest does not oblige the state to
participate in the paying of any costs associated with the project. It does,
however, entitle the state to a share of distributed dividends or profits.
Free equity will have a large impact on an investor’s profits, and a require-
ment for free equity is considered a major detriment by most potential
investors. The rationale usually offered for such a requirement is that the
state’s contribution to the project is the mineral endowment being
exploited. Free equity interest requirements have waned over the past
several decades, except in the West Africa region. This is probably attrib-
utable to the realization by governments that free equity requirements
had a substantial negative impact on potential fiscal revenue because little
investment was occurring. Even in the West Africa region where many
nations have a 10 per cent free equity requirement in their mining code,
proposed mining projects can sometimes be exempted from the equity
requirement (such as in Ghana and Guinea).
 Working interest equity: This type of equity is sometimes referred to as
‘participating equity’. The equity interest is purchased by the state accord-
ing to an agreed or statutorily defined pricing scheme. After purchasing its
interest, the state must contribute to the expenditure needs of the project
in proportion to its shareholding. Most investors do not view this require-
ment as a major investment impediment as long as the purchasing pro-
cedures are clearly defined. Some investors welcome working equity
participation because it can reduce certain types of risk. The mining
laws of Botswana, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea require that the
government has an option to acquire a working equity interest in new
mines, and these nations have been successful in attracting foreign
investment into their mining sector.
 Carried interest equity: This is a specialized form of working equity and has
all the attributes of working equity described above, except for the way in
which the ownership interest is paid for. Instead of a cash-based transac-
tion, the state’s share is paid for from the future dividends or profit
distributions that would have been distributed to that ownership interest.
The amount due to the investor from the state accrues interest. The result
is that formanymines, the state will not receive any dividend distribution
for many years, if ever. In practice, the amount due to the investor may
increase steadily over the years. In effect, but not in form, this type of
equity can be thought of as similar to a loan extended by the investor
to pay the state’s equity purchase cost and ongoing participation costs.
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Carried interest requirements are typically not required by statutory man-
date, but arise instead in a negotiated agreement where a government
desires an equity stake but is not able to currently pay for it. For example,
the government of Mongolia entered into an agreement with foreign
investors to develop a large copper mine, and a related shareholder’s
agreement provided the carried interest equity provisions.22
 Free carried interest equity: This type of equity is a special form of carried
interest equity but with the important difference that interest does not
accrue on the amount payable to the investor by the state. In effect, this is
a form of interest-free loan.
If the private-party investor is required to provide free equity or free carried
interest equity, many investors would view this as a form of indirect taxation.
14.3 Tax Incentives and Income Tax Adjustments
Governments that seek to attract mineral-sector investment sometimes pro-
vide special provisions within their tax legislation or in negotiated agree-
ments. Otto (1992a, 2000) has identified ten particular tax incentives that
some nations offer to mineral-sector investors. Based on the author’s experi-
ence, these tax incentives and income tax adjustments are still in use today23
and include:
 tax holiday from one or more tax types
 loss carry forward
 exploration cost expensing
 social cost expensing
 capitalized cost deductions (such as amortization/depreciation)




It should be noted that the generosity of nations offering tax incentives to
potential investors tends to vary with the business cycle. With the advent of
the so-called super-cycle that commenced around 2002 and that resulted in
mineral commodity price increases and an abundance of exploration andmine
development funding, some nations pulled back on incentives and many
22 The agreement between the state, Rio Tinto, and other parties is available at http://www.
resourcecontracts.org/contract/ocds-591adf-MN2079301876RC-1658/view.
23 For a description of current trends in tax incentives see Otto (2017).
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raised taxes.With the subsequent fallback in prices, it can be expected that the
tax incentives will be one tool used by governments to compete for scarce
capital. It is interesting to note that a major mining tax study conducted by
ICMM (2009) concluded that many companies consider tax incentives as less
important than tax disincentives, such as high rates.
In many developing nations, a key issue is that of tax stabilization. Large
mines can require enormous initial investment. Because the resource on
which they depend is location specific, that capital is immobile, and the
captive investment is subject to the risk that once the mine is built, the
taxation system may be amended to the investor’s disadvantage. Investors
and their lenders may thus require an assurance that the fiscal system will
remain stable, at least for a certain period for time, before they will invest. In
its tax study, ICCM (2009) reported that the two most important tax issues
for mining companies are stability and predictability. Governments with a
history of political or fiscal system instability may find it necessary or useful
to provide the stabilization of one or more taxes in order to meet investor
needs. There are two principal ways in which governments approach fiscal
stabilization: by terms negotiated in an agreement with the state24 and by
provisions set out in a law. The former approach allows flexibility on a
project-by-project basis while the legislated approach provides for standard-
ization. Fiscal policy makers, whether negotiating an agreement or drafting
a law, have several key issues to address: Which taxes are to be stabilized? Is
just the tax rate stabilized or is the tax basis also stabilized? For what time
period is stabilization allowed? Can the state impose new tax types on a
project once it is built?
Governments that provide tax stabilization have increased administrative
challenges. Each mine that operates under a stabilization scheme becomes an
exception to the existing fiscal system when that system evolves. Over time,
many separate ‘tax systems’may result asmines are granted tax stabilization at
different points in time. The administration of many mine tax schemes, each
operating under a different stabilized regime, is a challenge for governments.
As an example, in discussions with a tax authority in a South American nation
that allows tax stabilization, the author was told that over fifty different taxing
schemes had resulted for mines in that nation. In this author’s experience,
standardized limited-term tax stabilization, such as the non-negotiated
optional schemes set forth in the tax laws of Chile and Peru, can be a valuable
tool to attract investors, but should be restricted to very large projects in order
to avoid the administrative challenge.
24 For a description of tax stabilization provided in mining and petroleum agreements, see
Daniel and Sunley (2010).
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14.4 Transfer Pricing and Other Tax Minimization Schemes
Transfer pricing is a major problem for governments, and a particularly vexing
challenge for mineral-led economies. Kar and Spanjers (2015) estimate that
developing and emerging economies lost US$7.8 trillion from illicit financial
flows from 2004 through to 2013, of which about 83 per cent was attributed to
the fraudulent invoicing of trade.
There are many ways in which taxpayers can reduce their tax burden, either
legally or otherwise. Most tax minimization schemes are linked to either
increasing reported costs (input manipulation) or reducing reported revenues
(output manipulation). Often, the goal is to transfer a portion of taxable
income from the host nation in which the mine is located to a low or zero
income tax rate jurisdiction.
An example of input manipulation is when a foreign investor sets up a
company in a no- or low-tax nation (i.e. a tax haven) and that company
then provides management, marketing, or other services and/or loans to the
company in the host nation at a cost higher than what might have been
charged had the two firms not been affiliated. The effect is to increase tax
deductions in the host nation, thus lowering taxable income. For services, it is
difficult if not impossible for a tax authority to determine whether input costs
are artificially inflated. For loans, the task is somewhat simpler but is still difficult
to identify. For this reason, somenations have developed loan interest deduction
limits based on thin capitalization rules25 and a cap based on a percentage of
earnings before income tax (for example, in Germany and Norway). If the cap is
breached, a portion of loan interest may be non-deductible or treated as a
dividend. In this author’s experience, tax minimization schemes based on
input cost manipulation are commonplace.
The output manipulation of revenues has long been a problem for tax
authorities. A simple practice is for the producing company to sell its output
to an affiliated company located in a no- or low-tax jurisdiction, reducing its
gross revenues in the host nation and thus reducing the amount of income tax
and royalty. The affiliated company in the low-tax nation then on-sells the
output at the full market price. Some nations still lack basic provisions in their
mining and tax laws to control output price manipulation. In mining laws
recently drafted with the help of this author, sections to assist tax authorities
have been added, such as: a requirement that all sales must be on an arm’s-
length basis; all sales to an affiliate must be reported; all sales are subject to
royalty revision if the authority determines that the sale was not on an arm’s-
length basis; penalties apply in case of a violation; and repeated violations can
25 For an in-depth analysis of thin capitalization rules, see Blouin et al. (2014).
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result in the mining concession being cancelled. Even with adequate legal
provisions, detecting transfer pricing can be a major challenge because deter-
mining whether a fair price has been paid is a challenge. For many commod-
ities a reliable reference price is not available. For example, many metals are
sold in the form of a multi-metal concentrate (such as one containing lead,
zinc, and silver) that contains varying levels of deleterious substances (such as
sulphur and arsenic). There are market reference prices for refined lead, zinc,
and silver but not for concentrates. Tax authorities often lack access to infor-
mation (for example, sales contracts from across the globe) that would allow
them to determine a fair price for such concentrates. An additional challenge
is that each sale for delivery may be different because themineral beingmined
may be non-homogeneous—the coal from one part of a mine may have a
different heating value than the coal from another part of the mine and thus a
different monetary value.
Most developing-nation tax authorities are ill equipped to deal effectively
with transfer pricing schemes and even well-trained tax authorities in devel-
oped nations struggle.26 International ‘standards’ such as the OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,27 in this author’s opinion,
have been ineffectual as applied to the mineral sector.
Worldwide, governments continue to work on improving legislation to
control transfer pricing and other tax minimization practices. For example,
it is fairly simple to amend a mining law to require that any mineral sales or
any service type contract with an affiliate be reported to government along
with a copy of any associated invoice or contract. Arm’s-length pricing require-
ments are suitable for both amining law and the tax act and thin capitalization
rules are appropriate for the tax act.
14.5 Conclusions
The taxation of themining industry varies considerably from nation to nation
and evolves over time, reflecting the response of politicians and tax author-
ities to a variety of factors including commodity price cycles, levels of investor
interest, and changing national objectives. Today, governments have access
to tools and expertise that can assist them in fiscal reform efforts, including
software that can allow the holistic testing of tax scenarios on project eco-
nomics. While the types of taxes and investment incentives have remained
26 TheWorld Bank Group has published a mineral sector transfer pricing reference guide for use
by tax authorities. See Guj et al. (2017).
27 OECD (2010).
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fairly static for the past several decades, annual profit-ratio-based additional
profits taxes newly introduced by Chile and Peru may be of interest to some
nations—particularly nations with a strong, well-funded, and educated tax
authority. Historically, some nations sought mineral-sector-derived revenues
from both taxation and direct participation by the state in mining, either
through a state mining enterprise or through some sort of joint venture or
share participation arrangement. That is less common now, except in the
West Africa region, as many nations have concluded that they can achieve
the objectives of control and risk-free revenue more effectively through legis-
lation. There has also been a move away from negotiating mining agreement
fiscal terms towards a reliance on standardized requirements set out in the
general tax laws. In this author’s opinion, the time for such agreements has
passed, and nations that still use them should concentrate their future efforts
on strengthening the underlying system of laws, rather than spending the
considerable time and effort it takes to negotiate agreements that are specific
to individual companies or projects. However, for very large projects, stand-
ardized limited-term tax stabilization, achieved either by a non-negotiable tax
stabilization agreement or by statute, can be a useful tool to attract investment
and requisite financing. Progress by tax authorities to stem fiscal leakages that
result from transfer pricing practices remains slow in both developed and
developing nations. While input and output transfer pricing mechanisms
are well known, the ability of governments to address these practices has
remained weak. In this author’s opinion, most nations today have developed
their mineral-sector tax systems to achieve a ‘theoretical’ fair balance between
national and investor interests, but transfer pricing linkages remain a major
challenge that distorts actual revenue collection.
The emphasis of this chapter is on how mines are taxed, not on how tax
revenues should be distributed and used. However, it is noted that one of the
influencing factors that drives fiscal system policy evolution is the issue of
whether subnational governments should have additional taxing power or be
given special revenue dispensation. It is the author’s experience that devolv-
ing additional tax power to subnational governments is often not possible
because of constitutional constraints or because central authorities wish to
maintain control. The more common scenario is for national government to
maintain taxing authority but to statutorily mandate a certain portion of fiscal
revenues for distribution to subnational governments.
In summary, this chapter has provided an introduction to the various
taxation approaches applied by governments to the mining sector and it
includes a description of the principal tax types and investment tax incen-
tives. It has briefly described the main policy issues pertaining to mineral-
sector taxation. Its primary message is that governments, when devising
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mineral-sector fiscal systems, should carefully assess their fiscal options in a
holistic, balanced approach that anticipates commodity price cycles, and that
mining companies should anticipate fiscal system changes that reflect the
evolution of the political economy in which they operate.
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National Oil Companies as Instruments
of Risk and Reward
Patrick R. P. Heller
15.1 Introduction
State-owned oil companies have proven themselves capable of reaching tre-
mendous heights—as generators of public revenues and stewards of core
industries—and devastating lows—as squanderers of national resources and
agents of corruption. Sometimes, both sides of this dichotomy can be illus-
trated by the same company. In recent years, no company has provided a
more dramatic example than Brazil’s Petrobras.
Coming of age during Brazil’s period of military rule, Petrobras became an
increasingly skilled and effective company throughout the 1960s and 1970s,
developing particular expertise in deep-water exploration and production.
The Brazilian oil sector was opened to competition in the 1990s, and Petrobras
continued to thrive, generating secure petroleum resources and revenues for
the state, helping stimulate a thriving Brazilian private sector in oil services,
and expanding its operations overseas (de Oliveira 2012). By the 2010s, indus-
try ‘experts’were hailing Petrobras as a model of commercial efficiency (Heller
et al. 2014).
The company’s positive image came crashing down in 2014, with the
public revelation that Petrobras had sat at the centre of a multi-billion-dollar
bribery and price-fixing scheme. Petrobras directors had conspired with a
cabal of Brazil’s leading construction companies to rig massive procurement
processes and award contracts to participants in the conspiracy at inflated
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prices. Corrupt officials were rewarded for their efforts with bribes upward of
US$2 billion. The impact of this ‘Operation Car Wash’ scandal on Petrobras
was dire. The company had to write down US$17 billion in direct and indirect
losses from the scandal, and saw its share price fall by 80 per cent from its
2014 high point to the end of 2015. The scandal devastated Brazil’s economy
and rocked its political system to its core, resulting in the indictments of
hundreds of public officials and industrial titans, undermining confidence in
the economy, and contributing heavily to the political destabilization that
culminated in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff (IMF 2016;
Leahy 2016).1
At its best, Petrobras illustrated the reasons that so many countries have
invested in national oil companies (NOCs) as centrepieces of their strategies
for developing their oil and gas sectors. The world’s most successful NOCs,
including Norway’s Statoil, Saudi Arabia’s Saudi Aramco, and Malaysia’s Pet-
ronas, have maintained vigorous exploration programmes, delivered strong
returns on public resources, decreased long-term reliance on costly private
partners, and/or helped promote the rise of a technocratic class of private
businesses and professionals.
But Petrobras’ fall from grace underscores a set of risks common to NOCs,
which in many cases have resulted in a net negative contribution to oil-sector
management. At the core, these enterprises’ positions at the intersection of
public policy, commercial ambition, massive economic rents, and networks
of elites leave them particularly vulnerable to being used as vehicles for
patronage. In many cases, weak incentives or management structures also
render them ineffective developers of petroleum reserves, which can mean
they waste significant portions of the public resources they are entrusted with
overseeing.
NOCs can increase their governments’ share of long-term rewards from the
oil and gas sector. In virtually all cases they expose their governments to risk,
both financial (via the reinvestment of petroleum revenues back into the
unpredictable industry itself) and political (via the kinds of patronage mech-
anisms to which Petrobras so spectacularly fell prey and via principal–agent
problems that sometimes lead the company’s goals to diverge from the gov-
ernment’s). Rather than examining the question of whether or not a state
should create an NOC, this chapter takes as a given that almost all non-OECD
oil producers already have one. The study focuses instead on constructing a
1 The formal rationale for Rousseff ’s impeachment was improper manipulation of the budget,
not the ‘CarWash’ scandal. But the scandal was one of themajor flash points that led to the crisis in
confidence in the government.
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risk–reward lens oriented around an attempt to inform the kinds of practical
questions that governments face in managing their NOCs; namely:
 what commercial investment strategies are most likely tomaximize return
on investment
 how public oversight and corporate governance measures can enhance
performance incentives and reduce the most serious risks
 how much public revenue should be entrusted to the NOC to manage
in order to balance reinvestment in the sector against other public
expenditure needs.
An environment of low global oil prices poses a special set of challenges to
which NOCs must respond. Well-managed NOCs have been able to develop
projects efficiently even when prices are high andmoney flows freely. But many
companies become bloated during boom times, failing to sufficiently take
advantage of opportunities and deliver sufficient benefits to their countries.
Many of these companies face criseswhen volatile oil prices fall, as has happened
at the time of the writing of this chapter. Lean times force NOCs to cut costs and
seek efficiency gains. As such, a moment of crisis can offer an opportunity for
some NOCs to implement reforms with long-term benefits, but only if they
focus on systemic corporate governance and accountability commitments that
are robust even to the pressures of plenty that will return if prices rise again.
After this introduction, Section 15.2 provides a brief review of the key
literature on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), emphasizing a typology of differ-
ent types of NOCs and some of their fundamental characteristics. Section 15.3
constructs the central analytical lens of the piece, classifying the most import-
ant risks and modes of assessing potential rewards. Section 15.4 offers a prac-
tical response, outlining some of the strategies that have been demonstrated to
maximize the chances that rewards will be realized and to mitigate risks.
Finally, Section 15.5 provides concluding thoughts, with a particular emphasis
on the specific challenges surrounding NOC governance during times of low
petroleum prices.
15.2 SOEs: Context and Core Characteristics
There is a rich scholarship on the role that SOEs play in the management of
modern economies, and about some of the problems associated with entrust-
ing key sectors to SOEs. These enterprises are often given a privileged role in
critical sectors of the economy based on the multiple ambitions of enabling
the state to meld the management of strategic industries to policy priorities
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(particularly in highly regulated sectors); generating positive externalities that
benefit citizens; building up a targeted class of skilled managers and techno-
crats; and generating financial returns to the treasury (Megginson and Netter
2001; Victor et al. 2012).
Much of the empirical work around SOEs generally has focused on their
commercial performance vis-à-vis that of private companies, with the prepon-
derance of studies showing that private companies tend to be more efficient
and to generate stronger financial returns than SOEs (Boardman and Vining
1989; Megginson and Netter 2001; Shirley and Walsh 2000). Several inherent
factors contribute to these performance challenges, most of which, following
Shirley and Walsh, can be categorized as ‘incentive effects’ (stemming from
theweak incentives for SOEmanagers) and/or ‘information effects’ (stemming
from a weak relationship between data on performance and decisions/impera-
tives for SOE actions). Specific problems include the following:
 Mixed mandates: The goal of private-sector firms is clear: profit maximiza-
tion. SOEs are often called upon to pursue profits while simultaneously
promoting other public goods, which can impede clear strategy, hinder
rigorous performance monitoring, and create incentives to distort mar-
kets (Sappington and Sidak 2003).
 Politicized and bureaucratized decision-making: Politicians and bureaucrats—
often with limited commercial skills and experience—can play a dispro-
portionate role in SOE management by virtue of shareholding rights and,
in many cases, their appointment and remuneration powers.
 Reduced competition: Some SOEs enjoy total monopolies in their sectors;
others are subject to some competition but benefit from systemic
advantages—via access to markets, inputs, or financing. This means that
these enterprises can continue to operate (and often to dominate) even in
the presence of substantial inefficiencies.
 Difficulty in accessing replenishment capital: The fiscal relationships between
SOEs and the state are often complex and unpredictable, with SOEs some-
times being used as ‘cash cows’ by the treasury. This can make it difficult
for these enterprises to have the financial predictability to plan effectively
and address problems when they arise.
SOE efficiency problems can result in the wasting of public resources
invested in them, and poor provision of the public goods they are expected
to provide. Beyond these efficiency concerns, many SOEs have been involved
in corrupt activities and have further weakened economic governance
through self-dealing or abuse of the power they occupy at the juncture of
public oversight and market participation (Kane and Christiansen 2015).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
National Oil Companies as Instruments of Risk and Reward
301
Nonetheless, SOEs have played an important role in the management of
national petroleum sectors across the world since a wave of nationalizations
swept the Middle East and Latin America in the 1970s. Today, more than
90 per cent of the world’s top per capita oil and gas producers have an NOC,
with the major exceptions being OECD countries such as the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom (Myers 2015). At a global level, NOCs have
been estimated to control 90 per cent of global oil reserves and 75 per cent of
production (Tordo 2011).
Like SOEs in other sectors, the performance of NOCs has been chequered.
Some NOCs have generated strong financial returns and other public goods,
including innovation, stimulation of a domestic class of oil-sector technocrats,
and effective promotion and oversight of the sector. But on average, research
indicates that NOC commercial performance lags significantly behind that of
private-sector international oil companies (IOCs) on most industry-standard
measures (Eller et al. 2007; Victor 2007;Wolf 2009; see Table 15.1). Studies that
have examined NOC performance in the light of their broader range of object-
ives have presented mixed conclusions, with strong successes such as Statoil
(Norway) and Saudi Aramco balanced against failures such as Venezuela’s
Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corpor-
ation (NNPC) (Heller et al. 2014; Tordo 2011; Victor et al. 2012).
SOEs in the oil sector are subject in many cases to exacerbated versions of
the general challenges facing SOEs in other sectors, particularly vis-à-vis cor-
porate governance. Oil is a classic ‘rentier’ sector, whereby the state has the
power to manage and distribute huge flows of public wealth without facing
public pressure to stimulate innovation or maintain the consent of the gov-
erned (Karl 1997; Ross 2012). Because of the massive revenues that can be
generated by petroleum, and the complexity of the processes necessary to get
it out of the ground, NOCs often find themselves managing larger flows of
public revenues than SOEs in other sectors. Their objectives are shaped by the
state’s distributional power, the company’s own ambitions for growth, and a
swirling pool of private interests trying to gain access to this lucrative and
strategic sector. As such, many NOCs have experienced weak incentives for
efficient performance, and strong temptations for patronage. NOCs have
Table 15.1. NOC average commercial performance vs. private oil
companies, 2002–4
Revenue per employee (US$) Revenue per reserves (US$)
NOCs 1,000 5
Major IOCs 2,865 15
Other IOCs 1,629 11
Source: based on Eller et al. (2007).
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been key players in large-scale corruption scandals in countries ranging from
Nigeria to Brazil to Russia.
With some exceptions, NOCs have not been subjected to the kinds of strong
oversight and reporting requirements that promote strong corporate govern-
ance in the private sector. The Resource Governance Index, which measures
accountability mechanisms in oil- and mineral-producing countries world-
wide, found that only twenty-six of the seventy-four SOEs in its sample
demonstrated satisfactory governance (NRGI 2017; see Figure 15.1).2
15.3 Analysing Risk and Reward
15.3.1 Key Choices and Lenses of Analysis
The significant ambitions ascribed to NOCs, and their frequent failure to meet
these ambitions, point to the need for governments to engage in rigorous
analysis as they set up, structure, and manage their NOCs. This need is
particularly pertinent in some of the new oil and gas countries that are only
now beginning to exploit large reserves (examples include Tanzania and
Kenya). The question in most countries is not whether to have an NOC—the
vast majority of current and prospective oil producers, with limited excep-
tions, already have one (or several), and few countries are likely to eliminate
them. Rather, the question is what kind of NOC can best achieve the country’s
goals, and how to create the right incentives for performance.
Three questions are particularly critical. First, the government should decide
what kind of commercial mandate the NOC will be empowered to pursue. NOC
commercial mandates vary dramatically, as is appropriate given the wide
divergence in capacities and oil-sector prospects across countries (Heller and
Marcel 2011). The aspirations of Saudi Aramco are thus necessarily of a differ-
ent order of magnitude than those of a company like the National Oil Cor-
poration of Kenya; Figure 15.2 elaborates.
Second, the government should decide what, if any, kinds of non-commercial
roles to empower NOCs to carry out. While some analysts suggest that an
enterprise should refrain altogether from non-commercial activities, the real-
ity is that almost all NOCs engage in some degree of non-commercial work,
and in some cases this mixing of responsibilities has been compatible with
2 The 2017 Resource Governance Index evaluated the governance of the extractive sectors in
eighty-one countries. It assessed seventy-four SOEs across the oil andmining sectors. Each country’s
score is assessed via a 149-question survey divided into three components: value realization, revenue
management, and enabling environment. For an explanation of the overall methodology of
the index, see http://resourcegovernanceindex.org/about/methodology. The ranking for SOEs
displayed in this graphic is based on a subset of questions addressing each SOE’s transparency,
oversight, and clarity of responsibilities. See http://resourcegovernanceindex.org/data/both/issue?
category=1&region=global&subcategory=4.
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Failing Scores less than 30
Figure 15.1. State-owned enterprise governance: Resource Governance Index score


























efforts to build skills and knowledge over time (Thurber et al. 2011). Table 15.2
illustrates some of the most common tasks. The assignment of some non-
commercial responsibilities can enable a new producer to begin to increase
capacity by concentrating resources in one public institution, and can thereby
support the delivery of important public goods to citizens (Marcel 2016a).
But such assignments can damage NOCs’ commercial efficiency, by saddling
themwith costly burdens that divert resources away from the core commercial
goals. They can impede effective performance monitoring by muddying fun-
damental goals and benchmarks. And they can create conflicts of interest by
ostensibly requiring NOCs to enforce regulations against themselves or to
choose between themselves and other prospective contractors.
Third, the government should decide how to allow the NOC to finance its
mandate. These companies can be stewards of huge portions of public
revenues—in countries ranging from Azerbaijan to Angola more than half of
all government revenue passes through the hands of the NOC. This creates a
dilemma. In order to execute their commercial and non-commercial pro-
grammes, some NOCs have to spend extensively, on operating costs and
investments. The leadership of these companies often lays claim to hold on
to large shares of the revenues that they capture. But if the NOC is allowed to



















Operator of large-scale or complex upstream fields
Operator of smaller or simpler upstream fields
Major equity holder in joint venture group, but non-
operating
Manager of refineries or downstream distribution
networks
Investor or manager of subsidiaries or service
providers
Sale of government share of oil/gas
Minority equity investor












National Oil Company of
Liberia (Liberia)
Example
Figure 15.2. Spectrum of NOC commercial roles
Note: many NOCs play several of these roles simultaneously. The inclusion of a company as an
example of a particular role on this list does not imply that this is the only role the company plays.
Angola’s Sonangol, for example, is simultaneously an operator of smaller/simpler upstream fields, a
major non-operating shareholder in some fields, the manager of refineries and distribution net-
works, the owner of subsidiaries, the seller of government oil and gas, and a minority equity
investor.
Source: author’s illustration.
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treasury that reinvests the lion’s share of public gains from the sector back into
oil and gas, or spends on public goods outside of the ordinary institutional
procedures of government. This can subvert effective and accountable fiscal
management.
In making these decisions, this chapter posits that many governments
would be well served to conduct more concentrated risk–reward analyses of
available options, and to share the results of these analyses with the public.
Such an approach can lead to a better matching of strategy to the state of the
country’s oil sector, quality of its institutions, level of dependence of oil
revenues, and ability to withstand failure.
Table 15.2. NOC non-commercial roles
Role Purported justification Potential drawbacks Example
Regulatory
Leaders of efforts to draft
laws/regulations
NOC can be most
knowledgeable/skilled
government body










may be well positioned
to choose its partners




facto or de jure
enforcement of legal rules













































Cost burden, potential for
corruption
NNPC (Nigeria)
Note: Many NOCs play several of these roles simultaneously. The inclusion of a company as an example of a particular
role on this list does not imply that this is the only role that company plays.
Source: author’s illustration.
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15.3.2 Categorization of Risks
Government officials sometimes focus on the upside potential of major
investments in an NOC—and the national pride that the company can
amplify—without systematically assessing how likely the upside is to be real-
ized in practice or how costly failure would be. Following are two basic
categories of risks that countries face when investing in NOCs.
15.3.2.1 COMMERCIAL/FINANCIAL RISK
Making an investment in an NOC can mean that the government ends up
with fewer economic benefits than it would have had absent such an invest-
ment. For purposes of this discussion, it is useful to think in terms of a
hypothetical upstream oil project, and presume two stylized options. Under
the first option (referred to as the ‘British Option’) the state does not involve
an NOC in the project at all. Instead it awards a licence to a private company
and extracts financial benefits purely by taxing that company.
Under the second option (the ‘Saudi Option’), the NOC has exclusive
dominion over the project, exploring and operating the field itself (and hiring
any contractors it may need to get the job done). Here, the idea is that the
NOC will invest upfront as necessary to execute the project effectively, and
that the state will ultimately derive financial benefits via taxes, dividends, or
other transfers from the NOC to the treasury, and also from any other non-
commercial benefits that may accrue (public employment, ancillary infra-
structure, etc.).
Over the long run, if the government chooses the Saudi Option, it may hope
for stronger overall returns. By cutting out the middleman (private company),
a larger share of rents from the project can stay in the country. But in order to
generate this potential, the government needs to pay, today. It will itself have
to spend on building up a set of core competencies and staff—hundreds or
thousands of skilled technical staff members—in order to become a major
operational player (Marcel 2016b). And it will have to invest in project-specific
capital and operating costs.3 In executing a project in this manner, there are
several elements of financial risk:
 Geology: This is the most significant risk. Exploration is expensive, and
usually fails. Research by a global energy research firm showed that only
8 per cent of wells drilled in ‘frontier’ countries—those without previous
discoveries or production—yielded a commercially viable play from 2011
3 Note that if we deviate from the stylized all-or-nothing hypothetical, an NOC can defer some
of these project costs by having its interests in a project ‘carried’ through the exploration or
development stage by private partners. This reduces risk meaningfully, but the government is
still responsible for repaying its share of costs out of any revenue stream ultimately generated by
the project.
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to 2015. Even inmature oil producers, the success rate was only 36 per cent
(Myers 2016). In general, the more promising are the oil plays that exist
within a country, the better an NOC may be able to spread its geological
risk. When a state opts for an NOC to be responsible for exploration—as
opposed to assigning that responsibility to a private company—the bur-
den of any exploration failure falls on the public purse.
 Market fluctuations: Extractive industries are notoriously volatile, and
periods of low prices can devastate the returns on investments.
 Performance divergence: For the reasons discussed above, an NOC may be
less efficient than private-sector oil companies, which may mean that the
government choosing the Saudi Option will be less likely to see the
project carried through successfully to production, and more likely to
experience management inefficiencies that wipe out many of the benefits
deriving from the state’s exclusive control.
 Opportunity cost: Revenues reinvested in the oil sector via NOC projects are
not available for immediate public investment, including in growth-
promoting sectors such as infrastructure or education. Sometimes a
cycle of reinvestment lasts for years or decades, with a strong share of
NOC revenues being returned into the company in a continual bet on
future returns. Table 15.3 shows thatmany oil producers have tied up large
sums of national assets in their NOCs (Manley et al. 2016). For compara-
tive purposes, the table shows what NOC asset holdings represented as a
percentage of total government spending in that year.4 A period of low
prices or of repeated project failures canmean that years of sector revenues
are wasted without an appreciable impact on national development.
Table 15.3. Public assets held by 100% NOCs, 2014
Country (company) Total assets
(US$ million)
State assets as percentage of
annual government expenditure
Angola (Sonagol) 54,496 103
Azerbaijan (SOCAR) 30,684 135
Indonesia (Pertamina) 49,507 30
Malaysia (Petronas) 164,531 181
Mexico (PEMEX) 160,119 44
Qatar (Qatar Petroleum) 110,031 164
Venezuela (PDVSA) 226,760 104
Source: company annual reports; author’s calculations.
4 This is an admittedly crude proxy for the opportunity cost of the allocation of assets to SOEs, as
the accumulation of assets takes place over the course of years or decades. But it is listed here to
show the relative size of NOC assets in terms of the total public sector. Upcoming research by the
author examines the relationship between NOC assets as revealed in financial statements and
various measures of public assets and government activity.
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The British and Saudi options represent the two extreme poles of the
spectrum of commercial roles assigned to NOCs, and the choices that a
government makes about what kind of role the company can play. The key
is that a dollar invested in the NOC is a dollar of public funds put at risk. The
more complex a role that the government assigns the NOC (i.e. the further
towards the top the company sits among the range of options shown in
Figure 15.2), the greater is the risk that the government is undertaking with
public revenues.
15.3.2.2 GOVERNANCE RISKS
In addition to the financial risks associated with putting public revenues into
play via a national company with commercial aspirations, poor management of
(or by) NOCs can disrupt the governance of the oil and gas sector or even the
economy as a whole. These risks are elevated when the NOC is assigned signifi-
cant regulatory or quasi-fiscal responsibilities. These can take several forms.
First, a country can discourage private investment if would-be participants
in an oil market perceive that the playing field is uneven and that NOCs are
accorded special privileges. In order to generate the confidence necessary to
invest the huge sums associated with exploration and development, oil com-
panies want assurances that commitments will be honoured. Oil executives
routinely cite the fear that assets will be ‘nationalized’ (i.e. handed over to the
NOC) or that project decisions will be forced upon them midstream by NOC
partners as one of the biggest risks their companies face (Ernst & Young 2013).
At an extreme, uncertainty about excessive grants of NOC access to the best
geological resources or the power of NOCs to force project decisions can cause
oil companies to avoid a market altogether. Venezuela has been one of the
strongest recent examples of this risk—strong fears of dramatic retrenchments
of private oil company contractual rights in favour of PDVSA have made the
country too risky for some oil companies. At a minimum, oil companies price
these concerns into their assessments of the value of a project and the fiscal
terms they will accept.
Second, the enforcement of generally applicable rules can be weakened
significantly if the NOC is not subject to strict oversight. In order for its oil
sector to be managed effectively and in the interests of the public, a country
needs strong legal rules covering issues ranging from fiscal oversight to envir-
onmental protection to health and safety. Many countries have enforced
these rules weakly or inconsistently vis-à-vis the NOC, either because the
NOC enjoys formal regulatory power (and is thus in the conflicted position
of ostensibly overseeing itself) or because it exercises informal political power
that protects it from the strictures of the rules. This increases the likelihood
that oil projects will fail to deliver promised economic results or, worse, that
dangerous incidents may occur without redress. It also damages the prospects
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for the development of strong public institutions. In countries such as Nigeria,
the NOC is widely perceived to play outside of the rules, exercising power
through a tapestry of informal levers. This has dramatically hindered the
development of strong systems of financial and environmental control, result-
ing in continually disappointing financial returns from the NOC to the state
and a persistent state of conflict and environmental damage.5
Third, for the reasons cited above, NOCs have too frequently been at the
centre of large corruption scandals, many of which have spread to the broader
economy or polity. The Petrobras pay-for-play scandal is the most dramatic
recent case, but other examples abound. In Congo-Brazzaville, the govern-
ment has been accused of selling public oil through an intermediary company
controlled by the head of the NOC Société Nationale des Pétroles du Congo
(SNPC). A Norwegian company was sanctioned both in Norway and in the
United States for paying US$5 million into the accounts of the director of the
National Iranian Oil Company in order to secure access to a major Iranian
gas field.
15.3.3 Assessment of Potential Rewards
As is noted above, someNOCs have contributed extensively to their countries’
efforts to develop an efficient and profitable oil sector that delivers benefits to
their countries, including, but not limited to, extensive revenue flows. But in
order to make a country’s investment in an NOC a net-positive proposition,
the government needs to map the precise benefits that it hopes to derive from
its NOC, and the conditions necessary for those benefits to come to pass. This
step is sometimes overlooked by governments, as is the need to assess trade-
offs between different goals.
Among the benefits that NOCs can deliver to their states and the conditions
for their achievement are the following:
 Larger revenues: For countries at a relatively early stage of oil-sector devel-
opment, relying heavily on an NOC as a commercial player rarely gener-
ates greater revenues to the state thanwould relying on private companies
and taxing them effectively. Minority equity stakes do not generally
produce financial returns beyond those that could otherwise be captured
via other fiscal mechanisms (NRGI 2014). And especially during early
years, assigning responsibility to an NOC to manage oil fields itself is
5 For an understanding of the frequency and scope of oil spills in Nigeria, see theNigerian Oil Spill
Monitor at https://oilspillmonitor.ng.
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likely to result in efficiency losses as the company develops its compe-
tence from an initially low base. But over time, if an NOC succeeds in
developing itself as a skilled and efficient project manager, the state can
successfully extract a greater share of revenues deriving from production,
without having to rely heavily on private contractors. Various NOCs in
the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia have demonstrated the long-
term potential of these enterprises as effective revenue generators. In
order for this goal to be realized, a country needs a sufficient supply of
oil or gas to provide for a long enough period of production for the
NOC to build economies of scale and develop its capabilities (Heller and
Marcel 2011).
 Greater control over the pace of oil-sector development: Governments often
want to manage the development of an oil sector strategically, timing the
pace of exploration and extraction according to national macroeconomic
goals, a desire to maximize long-term production levels, or the aim of
building up national capacities/systems before extracting large quantities
of petroleum. Managing this pace of development can be difficult if a
government is working overwhelmingly with private contractors, which
are driven by their own market-oriented time frames. Planning projects
principally through an NOC can enable a government to exercise greater
control (see Lahn and Stevens 2017; Stevens et al. 2015).
 Building a nexus of domestic expertise in the sector: Countries such as Malay-
sia and Angola have used the NOC as the place where human and
financial resources are concentrated in the early stages of oil-sector devel-
opment. NOCs are often able to attract the country’s best talent, benefit-
ting from more flexible compensation systems than government
ministries. Some countries have chosen to ‘mass forces’ in the NOC as a
way to build a body most capable of developing and enforcing a strategy
for the sector. This sort of concentration approach carries a greater risk of
conflict of interest, but those risks have been deemed acceptable by
governments in many new producer countries (Thurber et al. 2011).
 Promoting local content and positive economic spillovers: Many governments
see their NOCs as the most natural champions of efforts to use the oil and
gas sector as an incubator for small and medium enterprises that service
the oil sector and that ultimately can develop into dynamic companies in
their own right. Such responsibilities can be imposed upon private/for-
eign oil companies, but embedding them in the core mandate of an NOC
is often seen as a clearer route to place local content at the core of the
business. Further, the successful development of a local content strategy
can be a key to transforming exhaustible petroleum resources into some-
thing more sustainable.
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15.3.4 Putting the Pieces Together
The various considerations that have been set out above work together to
determine the type of NOC structure and systems that will be most suitable in
any particular country context. When a government makes decisions about
how to structure its NOC, or indeed when the NOC’s own leadership sets out
its strategy, it needs ideally to examine the foregoing elements of risk and
potential reward side by side. Doing so can provide an opportunity to be
more systematic and realistic, and to tailor plans more effectively. Asking a
basic sequence of questions such as those set out in Figure 15.3, and conducting
the in-depth analysis necessary to answer those questions, can also aid effective
policymaking and execution. Figure 15.3 illustrates the basic sequence.
Inpractice, someNOCs—ranging fromcommercially sophisticatedgiants such
as Statoil and Qatar Petroleum tomore limited-mandate companies such as tiny
Staatsolie of Suriname—have engaged in this kind of strategic and systematic
assessment. However, such concerted strategic decision-making remains the
exception rather than the rule. Other NOCs have a mixed decision-making
record, executing thorough strategic planning on several aspects of their business
while occasionally bowing to the idiosyncratic demands of the political system.
And still others aremore purely reactive to the ebbs and flows of national politics
and have failed to develop coherent strategies.
15.4 Mitigating Risks and Making Rewards
More Likely to Materialize
The precise contours of the risk–reward analysis discussed above will vary
based on the characteristics of the oil endowment of each country, the quality
Top-line questions:
Why do we have an
NOC? What are the
most important goals
we think it can
achieve?
For each possible goal, ask:
• What is the likelihood of success?
• What will be the benefits of
 success (in financial terms and in
 broader terms)?
• What kinds of tools, structures, and
 systems do we need to institute in
 order to achieve the goals?
• How much will it cost in order to
 establish those
 tools/structures/systems?
• What are the particular risks that
 go along with those
 tools/structures/systems?
• What is the cost of failure?
• Can we tolerate that cost?
Figure 15.3. Key questions for NOC goal-setting
Source: author’s illustration.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
312
of institutions, and the state of economic development. But there are certain
strategies for how to manage an NOC that have been demonstrated to reduce
risks and increase the chances of success across a range of countries.
Perhaps most importantly, it is important to define the roles and responsi-
bilities of the NOC as clearly as possible. Major problems arise where the
contours of what the NOC is allowed and required to do are unclear, or
where the lines of authority between the NOC and other government agencies
are blurred. This is particularly problematic in countries where the NOC
engages in non-commercial activities. Blurred lines of responsibility and
scope can damage the NOC’s commercial bottom-line, because they saddle
the company with non-core responsibilities that lack clear limits. They also
impede good governance, by obscuring channels of accountability and requir-
ing stakeholders to navigate complex systems. Across a range of different types
of NOCs, with different sorts of mandates, the countries that have reduced
ambiguity and inefficient overlaps in responsibility have tended to see better
performance. Colombia’s Ecopetrol, for example, has over time been increas-
ingly absolved of what were once a large set of non-commercial activities, and
allowed to focus energy and resources on its economic bottom-line. Even
some NOCs with mixed mandates—such as Malaysia’s Petronas—have been
able to develop commercial units with clear mandates and benchmarks that
have kept focused on business success.
Given the tensions around revenue flows, with NOCs advocating for larger
shares of revenue flows andministries of finance pushing for these companies
to pay more to the treasury, instituting a clear system governing revenue
transfers is particularly important. When payment flows between the com-
pany and the state are subjected to the whims of the government or of
company executives, the results can seriously impede planning, both within
the company and for the national budget. In a worst-case scenario, the com-
pany becomes a state within a state that plays an outsized role in public
spending. A clear and easy-to-understand system not only enhances public
planning, but can also make it easier for the public to track the decisions that
the NOC is making on the use of public resources. The easiest systems to
comprehend are those that subject NOCs to the same rules that apply to
private taxpayers, such as in Norway and Brazil. But these systems may not
deliver adequate shares of oil revenue to the state in some countries, so where
special rules apply to the NOC, they should be transparent and easy to track.
The most successful countries have developed governance mechanisms to
promote strong incentives for effective NOC performance. These mechanisms
can broadly be grouped into three categories:
 Corporate governance tools within the NOC to promote accountable and
effectivemanagement, including strong standards for boardmembership,
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merit-based hiring and promotion, internal ethical standards, anti-
corruption training, and whistleblower protections for employees who
report malfeasance. Additionally, the conduct of rigorous and independent
audits by highly skilled, independent auditors is perhaps the most import-
ant mechanism to promote sound financial management. Examples of
companies that have implemented such tools are Malaysia’s Petronas and
several Persian Gulf NOCs.
 Intragovernmental checks and balances, such that the executive and the
legislature can hold company leadership accountable for their perform-
ance. Among these measures are the establishment of clear goals and
performance targets, and the assessment of company leadership against
those targets; consistent reporting by the NOC to its ‘shareholder’ minis-
try within government; and the requirement that the company provide
detailed reports to the legislature and appear before the legislature when
summoned. Norway and Colombia are often considered the countries
that have developed the strongest such checks and balances.
 Public reporting systems that can give citizens a clear picture of how NOCs
are managing national resources. NOCs should publish clear annual reports
with detailed financial information—including income statements, balance
sheets, and cashflow statements. The public also benefits from detailed
information about the NOC’s plans, budgets, operational activities, and
internal management policies. Several prominent NOCs—including many
in Latin America and Asia-Pacific—provide very extensive public reports.
Middle Eastern and African NOCs—including giants such as Saudi Aramco
and Nigeria’s NNPC—have had weak public reporting to date.
15.5 Conclusions
Much of the recent scholarship on NOCs has been developed with tacit or
explicit framing within the context of the high-price era, with a concomitant
focus on helping countries maximize the opportunities presented by their oil
and gas wealth via NOCs. At the time of writing, the world was ensconced in
what appears likely to be a sustained period of lower oil and gas prices. The
price fall has hit NOCs particularly hard, and across the world these compan-
ies have been forced to shelve projects, cut costs, or take on new debt in order
to keep going.
This low period in the decades-long cycle of oil-price volatility has laid bare
some of the risks inherent in government choices to invest heavily in NOCs as
a core of their sector development strategy. By doubling down on the coun-
try’s dependence on the oil sector—that is, reinvesting revenues in the sector,
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via the NOC—governments give themselves the opportunity to extract larger
shares of the benefits during boom times. But they leave themselves doubly
exposed when times are more difficult, with the negative impact being felt in
the national budget and with struggling entities needing to be propped up as
national ‘flagships’.
But in the midst of this period of crisis for many countries may lie the
opportunities for reform that can help reduce the risk of similar swings
in the future. NOCs from across the world—from major producers such as
Azerbaijan and Malaysia to countries that are not yet producing oil, such as
Liberia—have announced a range of measures to try to strengthen their
balance sheets, including reducing personnel budgets, selling their interests
in risky exploration plays, and eliminating investments in non-core or
money-losing ventures. The elimination or reduction in fuel subsidies in a
range of countries—including such seemingly unlikely places as Saudi Arabia
and Venezuela—could also prove a boon to the finances of NOCs that have
carried a heavy burden.
These responses to market challenges could have a long-term impact, help-
ing NOCs to become leaner, better managers of public resources, if they are
sustained. But that is a big ‘if ’, and past efforts to tighten NOC operations
during tough times have tended to be pushed aside by patronage and bloat
when prices rise again, reducing the benefits that accrue to the companies’
public shareholders. The key for the NOCs that have been able to remain
focused and efficient in times of plenty—including Colombia’s Ecopetrol,
Norway’s Statoil, and Malaysia’s Petronas—has been a strong commitment
to corporate governance, transparency, and oversight. If they wish to take
advantage of this period of fiscal crisis to implement durable reforms, govern-
ments and NOCs in other countries can aim for systemic reforms that commit
the companies to stronger technocratic management and internal decision-
making, tougher performance incentives and protections for whistleblowers,
and better public communication. They would also be well served to use this
moment to reflect carefully on the risk–reward calculus, and adapt strategies to
hit an optimal balance for the long term.
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16
Protecting the Environment during
and after Resource Extraction
Ruth Greenspan Bell
16.1 Introduction: Resource Extraction Has High Potential
for Immediate and Long-term Environmental Damage
Even responsible extraction of natural resources imposes environmental costs.
Digging minerals, metals, and hydrocarbons from the ground inevitably dis-
rupts the landscape. Beyond the actual mine site, extraction brings the con-
struction of roads to bring in equipment and bring products to market, power
transmission corridors in order to power the operations, facilities to house
mine workers and often their families and all the attendant services that must
be provided, and waste disposal both from the mining and from other human
activities, among a stream of impacts. The activity of building roads and then
the use of those roads and equipment introduces fuels and exhaust fumes.1,2
The mining and extraction operations themselves often use hazardous
chemicals including cyanide, sulfuric acid, and solvents to separate ore from
rocks. In addition, beyond chemicals which are considered appropriate and
for which technologies exist to capture and clean or separate, many mining
operations continue to use illegal chemicals. One example is mercury. Despite
strong evidence that mercury does not break down in the environment and
continues to cycle between water, land, and the atmosphere, travelling large
distances from the original application or breach, and building up in humans
1 Greg Jehle, a JD/MA candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center and Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, an expert in international project finance, environmental law, and
law and development, provided invaluable research support.
2 Detailed supporting references and footnotes have been removed to fit space demands; these
can be found at the UNU-WIDER website: https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/protecting-
environment-during-and-after-resource-extraction.
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and animals and in the food chain, neither regulation nor even bans are
sufficient to keep it from being used in various parts of the developing world
and in so-called artisanal mining.
Water is often an essential component of mining. The contaminated water
might be discharged or stored in large tailings ponds that can reach the size of
small lakes. As explained in more detail in Bell (2017), the impacts of water
contamination are broad and often unpredictable; weak communities have
little power against powerful mining interests.
Today, the search for valuable resources has taken mining and extraction
into increasingly remote areas of the undeveloped world, such as the Amazon
rainforest (see Kimerling 2000), reflecting the demands of the increasing
number of people on the globe with the resources and the interest in purchas-
ing upscale goods and in engaging in large-scale building (for more detail, see
Bell 2017).
The areas marked for extraction can include fragile ecosystems previously
difficult to access. For a number of reasons, the true nature of the trade-offs
between development and environmental protections may not be properly
understood.
The general point is that mining, including hydrocarbon operations,
can and likely will contaminate land, water, and air. They can cause health
problems for workers and people living near mines. They may, but do not
necessarily, create off-setting local wealth. Further, when mining operations
are opened up in natural areas, there are consequences for the local
biodiversity—impacts on organisms and species in the local ecology, the
way water is captured and stored (or not) by trees and vegetation, and on
other natural processes that support both local and distant human activity.
People and their livelihoods are displaced, and traditions and cultures dis-
rupted. In some instances, long-term interests are sacrificed for short-term
returns (Cronin 2009).
These factors illustrate the need for effective regulation to ensure that the
benefits obtained by a country by exploiting its natural resources are not
undercut and eroded, if not entirely destroyed, by an exploitation that leaves
behind irreparable damage. Regulation is here defined as ‘a process of setting
and then assuring the implementation of requirements that protect, to the
extent necessary to meet local needs and expectations, the landscape and the
people working in the mines and living in the general vicinity or dependent
on natural processes of the exploited area’. Regulation provides a broader
perspective so that immediate needs are balanced by longer-term consider-
ations, namely preservation to the extent possible of natural and other values.
It can not only address the conditions under which a country’s natural
resources are extracted and exploited but also set rules for what happens
when these resources are depleted and the companies exploiting them leave.
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16.2 Countries with Weak Institutions and Poor Success Rates
in Addressing their Other Environmental Challenges Face
Significant Challenges in Regulating Extraction
Reconciling extraction and protection of the natural world is an ongoing
challenge in the highly developed world, even in countries with well-
established regulatory systems and long-standing adherence to the rule of
law. Every day brings evidence of the complexity of holding to account
companies that pollute (see McQuaid 2009). Some impacts are obvious and
visual; we have all seen stark photos of, for example, table top removal to
extract coal. Others are more difficult to track and comprehend. When pollu-
tion enters an ecosystem, tracing its source and attributing responsibility is a
challenge, even in countries with vast resources, empowered citizens with the
tools and legal recourse to play a watchdog role, and well-functioning systems
of law (see Rich 2016).
The challenge is exponentially greater in countries of the developing world
with fragile institutions where experience in compliance and enforcement is
weak, where environmental issues are not considered a priority, and where
there are correspondingly poor success rates in addressing other environmen-
tal and societal challenges. There is a vast literature on the regulatory deficien-
cies in the developing world and many of the disasters that have ensued (see,
for example, Puvimanasinghe (2009)). The challenge of regulatory deficiency
may be further compounded by the way environmental matters are managed
in concession and extraction agreements.
Developing countries that host extraction often have the necessary formal
structures, such as environmental laws and agencies. But for a variety of
reasons—ranging from seemingly simple issues of capacity to corruption and
malicious intent—these laws and agencies are frequently either ignored,
inconsistently invoked, or in the worst cases, used as a weapon for purposes
totally unrelated to rectifying environmental harm. Russia offers examples
where environmental laws were invoked against businesses and their leaders
to discipline or punish insufficient loyalty, retrieve financial gains, or tie up
assets, rather than to stop pollution.
There are multiple explanations for weak or inconsistent enforcement.
Countries may simply lack adequate systems, reflecting insufficient resources
and/or inadequate experience or training, even if they have the will to act. In
cases where an industry is owned in part or entirely by the state, the inherent
conflict of one arm of the state prosecuting another discourages enforcement
against polluting facilities (see Bell 1994: footnotes 33 and 34).
Poland as it emerged from the Soviet bloc provides an example of a country
with inadequate enforcement tools. It could impose fines and criminal pen-
alties and threaten facility shut-downs. But these are a ‘nuclear option’ and
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when actually used, shut-downs were often merely symbolic and imposed for
only a day or two rather than correcting the circumstances that were causing
the pollution. Fines were either weak or ignored. More perniciously, where the
enterprise was state owned, fines were a line item in the industry’s annual
state-provided budget; a fine for a state enterprise would simply be offset by an
increased subsidy through the budget or by borrowing from state banks (Bell
1992). Poland, in short, was missing tools that could nudge, push, and incen-
tivize facilities to come into compliance with laws and regulations.
The depth of commitment to enforcement is another barrier. Requirements
that appear sensible on the books often languish without implementation
when only officials can bring enforcement cases. Where citizen enforcement
provisions, or meaningful opportunities for citizens to come forward with
evidence, are lacking, there is generally no one to step into officials’ shoes to
ensure that environmental requirements are met. Numerous countries includ-
ing the United States have variations on citizen involvement in environmental
enforcement. Elsewhere, ecological associations, legislative bodies at different
levels of government, trade unions, workers and/or local self-governments can
initiate enforcement actions (see May 2003). Provisions like these are particu-
larly useful when violations are taking place in remote locations, where gov-
ernment officials may be few and far between and affected citizens may be in
the best position to observe and document harmful environmental impacts.
Finally, there is the issue of corruption. The resource curse is often expressed as
the concern that exploitation of natural resources in countries with weak gov-
ernance and fragile institutions often benefits a small number of powerful
people who siphon the proceeds for their own needs (see Lawson-Remer and
Greenstein 2012). Somemechanisms for this diversion of proceeds are described
in Bell (2017). Consequently, environmental requirements and their enforce-
ment are high on the list of restraints that are jettisoned in many countries in
favour of quick profits. In power struggles over such issues, environment minis-
tries are typically among the weakest bodies in government; and environmental
regulators and the people who depend on them hardly have a chance.
The bottom line is that enforcement is essential to making laws and require-
ments work, but it should not be assumed that the existence of enforcement
agencies or paper commitments are a sufficient guarantee that pollution
control and clean-up requirements will be honoured.
16.3 Commonly Used Approaches to Work around Domestic
Legal, Institutional, and Experiential Deficiencies
Experts debate how to manage these systemic deficiencies in environmental
enforcement that parallel similar obstacles to financial and other oversight
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of extraction and its consequences. This section begins by considering the
regimes under which mineral and other rights are granted and administered,
and specifically the distinction between ‘licensing’ vs. ‘contractual’ approaches
for building in protective requirements.
‘Licensing’ is shorthand for a process whereby agreements to extract rely
on generally applicable laws to define rights and obligations. The contract
between the extraction company and the government is controlled by estab-
lished law to the extent possible. The virtue of this, as stated by the Columbia
Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), is that the process of considering
and writing laws, hopefully including public participation in the legislative
process in democratic states, ‘provides a venue for incorporating the public’s
concern for the sector and decreases the likelihood of political volatility”’
(internal citation omitted, CCSI 2015: 7). The laws apply equally, the system
is easier to administer and opportunities for corruption are more limited.
Licensing is preferable from a policy point of view because requirements are
relatively consistent across the board and transparent rather than being
ad hoc and specifically negotiated. In principle, one need only read the law
(rather than be privy to specific negotiations) to understand how the particu-
lar requirements on any one extraction operation were derived. Further,
requirements reflect policy judgements that take into account wider consid-
erations than the needs of a specific project and are hopefully formulated
through democratic processes.
Nevertheless, some countries with well-established laws have difficulty
in their implementation, and acutely so with respect to environmental
requirements. Accordingly, although the relationship between the govern-
ment and the extraction company might seem to be securely rooted in estab-
lished law/policy, in fact the parties’ obligations might be formalities rather
than tenets that guide practice (Bell 1994). The literature commonly distin-
guishes between ‘laws on the books’ and ‘laws in practice’. Weak institutions,
corruption, and lack of political will, as outlined earlier, can undermine any
kind of agreement on rights and obligations, including those that rely on
existing law.
Another weakness is the contract negotiation process itself. Many develop-
ing countries cannot match the legal and commercial sophistication of the
extractives companies, or believe they lack the bargaining power to push for
certain requirements. More damagingly, as in Poland before a hard-fought
memorandum of understanding introduced environmental expertise into
privatization teams, the country’s environmental experts are frequently
excluded from the negotiating table and sometimes are not even consulted.
If they were involved, engagement in negotiations would improve environ-
mental results as well as help build their expertise over time and make them
better negotiators and regulators.
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One means of substituting for weak institutions and deficient or even
non-existent legal structures is to negotiate contracts that specifically spell
out the obligations of the company and the government in the context of a
specific project (Affolder 2013). In this model, ‘mineral licenses and the accom-
panying rights and obligations are negotiated for specific projects with each
individual company’ (CCSI 2015: 7). These types of arrangements are clearly
more flexible, but that flexibility is also their weakness. They represent deci-
sionsmade within the context of the specific proposed project. For that reason,
it is harder to integrate more general or long-run environmental (or other)
aspirations, incorporating the wider implications of any specific development
or injury to the environment and a much longer time frame extending even
to post-extraction remediation. After all, environmental laws are, among other
things, societal decisions balancing development against preservation.
Decisions made through such contracts, involving matters that inevitably
impact the long-term health and resilience of a country are made case by case,
presumably in a less coherent fashion than would happen when policy
emerges from generally applicable laws. Additionally, when requirements
are handcrafted to a specific site and/or a specific entity, the burdens of
monitoring and implementation imposed on a fragile bureaucracy are even
greater than is the case with across-the-board laws. Accordingly, overstretched
and under-resourced environmental authorities must police the very specific
terms agreed to, which can differ project by project.
Accepting nonetheless that contracts will continue to be an important part
of setting rights and responsibilities in many countries, several organizations
have refined the contracting approach by developing guides that identify
issues and standardize solutions. These include the Environmental Law
Alliance Worldwide’s (ELAW) Natural Resource Contracts: A Practical Guide
(ELAW 2013) and the International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment’s (IIED) Investment Contracts and Sustainable Development: How to Make
Contracts for Fairer and More Sustainable Natural Resource Investments (Cotula
2010). Each offers practical tips for drafting natural resource contracts more
favourable to environmental protection and suggest ways to structure invest-
ment contracts that maximize the investment’s contribution to sustainable
development. Further details on some of these are presented in Bell (2017).
Analysts assessing the contractual approach have found it difficult to draw
clear-cut conclusions on the adequacy of this approach for protecting envir-
onmental values. On the one hand, Kimerling (2001) argued that the privat-
ization of environmental regulation of oil extraction in the Ecuadorian
Amazon through the use of contractual environmental provisions and an
environmental management plan (EMP), in lieu of robust state regulation,
represented an abdication of state responsibility and a threat to democratic
accountability. She expressed strong concerns about the lack of transparency
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in the Ecuadorian government’s dealings with the United States-based oil
company, Occidental Petroleum, and called for a ‘credible, independent and
transparent audit . . . to evaluate the company’s environmental standards and
performance’ (Kimerling 2001: 394). Her concerns about lack of consultation
with affected communities, especially indigenous peoples, predate the use of
the IFC Performance Standards, Equator Principles, and other private-sector
initiatives that have evolved in recent years and are discussed in the extraction
literature. Affolder (2013) is ultimately agnostic as to the usefulness of the
contractual approach, arguing that it is a technique of global environmental
governance that represents a particular policy choice (one that tends to favour
the growth of extractive industries). She notes the ‘contractual webs’ created
through the development of large extractive industry projects (e.g. loan agree-
ments, insurance agreements) as an example of how regulation through
private agreements can either strengthen (as in community benefit agree-
ments or the IFC Performance Standards) or undermine environmental pro-
tection at the host country level (Affolder 2013).
In part because of some of the hazards of one-off negotiations, negotiations
often now rely on model agreements and other industry codes of conduct
including the Equator Principles and the IFC Performance Standards. While
these have an aspect of being industry or lender-led initiatives, their develop-
ment responded to a growing public concern about the impacts of extraction.
Any number of activist and advocacy groups have publicized the need for
greater attention to stewardship concerns domestically within the United
States and internationally. Prominent examples include the Rainforest Action
Network in the 1980s (focused on clear-cut logging, from 1996 through 2003);
anti-extraction advocacy US-based Project Underground which published
Drillbits and Tailings to alert readers to problematic extraction operations;
and other such advocates. Eventually NGOs focused on the role of the financial
services sector as a point of control over the activity of extraction companies.
These initiatives, and incidents like the Bhopal accident discussed later, helped
accelerate a shift in the way ‘financial decision-makers perceive[d] that envir-
onmental concerns could affect their company’s profit margin’ (Jordan and
Chamberlain 2001).
This NGO engagement with the financial services sector in its role as lender
to large-scale extractive projects with potentially harmful environmental
impacts led to the creation of several private-sector (voluntary) codes of
conduct to be followed in all projects funded by participating financial insti-
tutions. These principles supplement the purely contractual approach by
indicating to governments where negotiation is appropriate (see Langer 2013).
The Equator Principles (Mongoven 2006) help participating banks and
other financial institutions (currently over seventy) to determine, assess, and
manage environmental and social risk in projects. The objective is that they
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should not provide loans to ‘projects where the client will not, or is unable to,
comply with’ the principles (Mongoven 2006). Although, in theory, the
principles should allow project lenders to serve as a lever to improve environ-
mental performance through the threat of reduced access to funds, in practice
the results have been somewhatmixed (see Lance 2013; Sarro 2012). However,
the Equator Principles have effectively given environmental and other NGOs
a voice in major international lending decisions: a major change.
Similarly, the IFC Performance Standards, a primary inspiration for the
Equator Principles, are intended to provide guidance to clients of the IFC ‘on
how to identify risks and impacts, and are designed to help avoid, mitigate,
and manage risks and impacts as a way of doing business in a sustainable way,
including stakeholder engagement and disclosure obligations of the client in
relation to project-level activities’ (IFC 2012).
These are powerful models, in part because of the status of the IFC, a
member of the World Bank Group, as the self-described ‘largest global devel-
opment institution focused exclusively on the private sector in developing
countries’, willing to ‘engage in difficult environments’ and providing ‘lead-
ership in crowding-in private finance’ (Freestone 2013). Adhering to these
principles is a requirement of obtaining IFC support and is intended to set
standards that the IFC client must meet ‘throughout the life of an [IFC]
investment’ (IFC 2012). They have widely been copied as a model for other
financial institutions (Langer 2013).
Another slice at this problem is found in the corporate social responsibility
(CSR) approach. This is a self-regulatory approach predicated in the belief
that companies can increase long-term profits, reduce business and legal
risk, and improve shareholder trust by cultivating positive public relations
and a reputation for high ethical––including environmental––standards.
This belief came out of hard experience. Episodes like the Bhopal incident
heightened corporate sensitivity about the reputational impacts of industrial
accidents and loss of life, even in faraway places. In 1984 in Bhopal, a remote
part of India, a major industrial accident with lasting consequences for local
health and safety led to close scrutiny of Union Carbide’s practices in the
developing world (Verma 2014). Bhopal was heavily covered by the inter-
national press and, whether or not justified, came to represent corporate
irresponsibility with continued argument to this day about specific responsi-
bility (see Rogge 2001).
Some companies take implementation beyond compliance and engage in
‘actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the
firm and that which is required by law’ (Wikipedia n.d.). For example, Nike
has committed to monitoring factories in its global supply chain that produce
its products under contract and that have historically subjected workers to
substandard working conditions (Connor 2010).
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In a similar vein, the ICMM, a voluntary organization of mining and metals
companies, established another business-led self-regulatory initiative in 2003.
The twenty-three member companies joined with thirty-four national and
regional mining associations and global commodity associations to establish
ten industry-focused principles of sustainable development (O’Callaghan
2011). Member companies also seek to comply and reinforce guidelines estab-
lished by other organizations including the OECD and the World Bank.
Finally, environmental requirements are often incorporated into the con-
tractual process through the conduct of an environmental (generally joined
with social) impact assessment. Environmental impact assessments first came
into use when the US Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) in 1969. NEPA requires that all proposed major actions of the US
federal government be accompanied by an examination of its environmental
impacts including direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the alternatives
being considered, detailed examination of any adverse environmental effects
that cannot be avoided, and the means to mitigate adverse environmental
impacts. Although the United States has no requirement that a project be
rejected if the EIA shows adverse environmental impacts (Hershowitz 2008),
merely requiring the analysis has often averted the worst projects and facili-
tated improvements of others.
EIA laws and policies were adopted by countries across the globe in response
to the global environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s, particularly
following the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
in Stockholm, and further accelerated through (non-binding) international
declarations such as the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment. The latter calls upon states to require EIAs for activities likely to have a
significant adverse impact on the environment (Fromherz 2013). Many of
these national laws have come to serve a somewhat different purpose than
the US model, in some cases having a licensing or even a regulatory compo-
nent (see Crippa 2008; Gray 2000).
In their application, EIA analyses ideally are intended for the ‘project design
phase’. The analysis can identify problems, consider how they might be
mitigated, and incorporate this planning into the project’s contractual struc-
ture (Kohn 2002). The difference from the US NEPA model is that these EIAs
often are used to set terms going forward, particularly to satisfy contractual
obligations to project lenders. This is quite a different role than an assessment
of alternatives for a federal decision-maker (who might be functioning in a
licensing or approval posture, for example) or to inform public review of
potential projects (Lawrence and Thomas 2004).
In the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment’s review, EIAs are used in both licensing and contract regimes. In the
former, this is mostly as a result of domestic legislation; consequently, the
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assessment is ‘evaluated as part of the approval process for granting the
license’. There is also a mixed use of EIAs with some requirements included
in mining agreements to supplement gaps in the law, in which case they can
‘provide an avenue for remedy in the case of a violation not covered under the
ESIA [Environmental and Social Impact Assessment] provisions of the law’
(internal citation omitted, CCSI 2015: 36–7).
The use of the EIA tool in contracts may be problematic in part because it
comes to substitute for missing legal elements: the EIA sometimes becoming
another issue to be negotiated in the absence of uniform requirements. Tim-
ing of the conduct of the review can also be problematic, especially if ‘only
conducted after an agreement is concluded, often making them perfunctory
exercises’ (CCSI 2015: 36).
16.3.1 How a Combination of Approaches Was Put to Work
in a Liberian Mining Contract
Special contracts with mining companies were used in Liberia to work around
the legal and institutional inadequacies in Liberia following the huge disruptions
of its brutal civil war (see Bell (2017: 9) for full details). These try to establish
workable standards and strategies for implementation, and in Liberia’s circum-
stances, it is not clear what more could be done. However, given Liberia’s
chronic regulatory capacity problems, it is also easy to be sceptical about
those contracts’ potential for putting serious environmental restraints on the
mining companies.
16.3.2 How Effective Are Voluntary Standards for Improving
Environmental Performance?
Debate rages about the effectiveness of approaches built on lending practices
and reputational considerations. Certainly, failure to commit to the Equator
Principles and the IFC Performance Standards can make certain kinds of
important financing off limits. The acid test is whether the requirements
imposed through these various means have been translated into meaningful
change on the ground in the form of genuine environmental protections.
Meyerstein (2013) concludes that the Equator Principles have been somewhat
successful in the project finance sphere. He cannot answer satisfactorily
whether this has been translated into meaningful change on the ground as
his research focuses on institutional practices rather than ultimate environ-
mental outcomes (Meyerstein 2013).
CSR and other reputational approaches depend on mutual accountability
(‘peer pressure’) and pressures from the close-watching public. Research review-
ing these has reached mixed conclusions. Hilson (2012) is dubious, concluding
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Protecting the Environment
327
that CSR’s effectiveness in any location requires a ‘foundation of robust
regulations and enforcement . . . for it to complement’, rather than replace or
undermine domestic law (Hilson 2012: 136). Oshienbo (2009) says poor imple-
mentation has made the World Bank’s environmental and social policies inad-
equate in ensuring sustainable development in the extractive industries.
Sethi and Emelianova’s (2006) fairly damning conclusion is: ‘in the absence
of standardized measures of performance, uniformity in reporting, and trans-
parency, in full disclosure, the notion of voluntary codes of conduct is ren-
dered almost worthless since it lacks any assurance of credibility and accuracy’
(Sethi and Emelianova 2006: 235).
They struggle to answer whether CSR’s objectives are lofty to the point of
being unrealistic; is CSR window dressing or even actively undermining the role
of government?While Sethi and Emelianova (2006) are not focused principally
on environmental requirements, the parallel concern would be ‘greenwashing’,
a form of spin where seemingly environmentally friendly commitments are
deceptively used to promote the perception over a more grim reality.
By contrast, Spense’s view as an economist (2011) is that it is in corpor-
ations’ and shareholders’ best interests to act in an environmentally and
socially responsible manner; especially in the absence of strong host country
environmental protection laws. Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust (2012) inter-
viewed stakeholders in the Argentine government, civil society, international
financial institutions, and mining industry who posit that the most critical
element of CSR in the mining context is ‘to do what is safe for the environ-
ment’ (Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust 2012: 191), again without consideration
of how CSR policies are translated into meaningful change on the ground.
Livermore (2014), agreeing with Dashwood (2012), concluded that ‘the
ICMM’s authority will continue to influence the CSR decisions of mining
companies and support them to be directed at developmental outcomes’
(Dashwood 2012). Livermore (2014), relying heavily on the World Bank’s
2014 report, agrees that ‘standards onlymatter to the extent they are complied
with’ but is convinced that ‘the pressure for compliance with the ICMM’s
standards is . . . amplified by factors in members’ larger political and financial
environment’ (Livermore 2014: 38). In other words, many of these analysts
believe that companies acting in their own self-interest will do the right thing.
My own experience, including as an American environmental regulator and
with considerable on-the-ground experience in transitional economies and
the developing world, makes me cautious about voluntary standards. Reputa-
tion is important but companies are rarely monoliths. Rather, they are complex
widely dispersed organizations, with numerous, sometimes conflicting perspec-
tives. Leadership can care a great deal about public perceptions but still have
reasonable differences about many of the important details concerning pollu-
tion and its generation and dissemination: for example, differences about the
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impacts of pollution and what is dangerous; after all, similar disagreements
can take place among scientists concerning what is a safe exposure level.
Agreements made at one level of the company (e.g. at HQ) might not be
translated fully into action, especially when the actual activities must be carried
out in remote places. There can be substantial differences between asset man-
agers and sustainability teams, or management and on-the-ground personnel
or, evenmore importantly, poor communication and/or oversight. Divisions of
responsibilities can result in shaky on-the-ground commitments because lines
of communication are blurred. Any number of institutional and human factors
can confound legitimately good intentions and break the chain of responsibil-
ity that is assumed by the supporters of reputational approaches. The passage of
time and possible conveyance of project ownership or assignment of a com-
pany’s rights may obscure obligations that were incurred at the time of the
initial transactions. Sometimes even good faith negotiators need the bludgeon
of enforcement to compel action.
Finally, piecemeal approaches may not address systemic issues or address
the wider significance of development (see Affolder 2013). In contrast, laws,
in the best case, attempt to think through a wider vision and write rules
consistent with that vision (see Caruso 2009). A country may strive for devel-
opment and at the same time want to preserve important domestic values: for
example, balancing agrarian vs. industrial objectives. A sophisticated regulator
might understand thatmining in a farawaymountain range has consequences
for the quality of water consumed in cities. There is a reason for independent
bodies that set and then enforce standards and obvious reasons why specific
projects should fit into this overall vision, rather than the other way around
(Sethi and Emelianova 2006: 230).
Among other things, Sethi and Emelianova point out that any code must
cover ‘issues that are of concern to the community’ not just industry (Sethi
and Emelianova 2006: 230), including a governance structure that assures
external input ‘from independent experts who have the respect and confi-
dence of all parties involved’, not just reliance on industry promises (Sethi and
Emelianova 2006: 230). Despite industry resistance to external monitoring
and independent checks on their compliance performance, theirs is not and
should not be the only relevant voice; external monitoring and compliance
verification is also necessary (Sethi and Emelianova 2006: 230).
Company CSR policies understandably are aimed at specific projects: it is
not their job to manage bigger picture issues such as longer-term impacts on a
nation’s entire biodiversity, and even less how pushing on one part of closed-
system earth might have knock-on effects elsewhere, including outside the
country boundaries. The argument for laws and general principles over CSR is
based on the need for looking through a wider and more inclusive lens and
for adding a public dimension to the inquiry.
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Approaching environmental protection through the EIA approach, either
contractually or through licensing schemes (with the dimensions of the EIA
being possibly set by law), has the virtue of injecting a greater degree of
specificity than can emerge from CSRs or voluntary codes. A comprehensive
EIA considers many factors, including all environmental impacts and a range
of alternatives to the proposed action and their own impacts (including air,
water, endangered species, historic and cultural sites, social and economic
impacts, and the costs for each alternative including mitigation). It could also
consider a financial plan for the proposed action, identifying the sources of
secured funding, a mitigation plan, and where necessary additional documen-
tation involving other relevant environmental requirements (in the United
States this can include state and local permits and reviews) (see Kohn 2002).
Even so, the EIA tool has received mixed reviews. For example, despite
Peruvian requirements that all projects submit an EIA supervised by the
Ministry of Energy and Mines, The Economist (2016) concludes that their
implementation undercuts environmental protection. The Economist quotes
an NGO that works with communities affected by mining saying that ‘people
don’t believe in the rigour of EIAs’. Local rigour in enforcing requirements is
undermined because half of a mine’s corporate income tax is devolved to
regional and local governments in the area under Peru’s canon minera. So
‘showering’ some mining districts with more money than they can spend
fosters pro-mining corruption.
Thomsen et al. (2001) recommend ‘ongoing and long-term evaluation or
monitoring of environmental and social impacts at the ecosystem level . . . to
ensure that the area’s ecological and social integrity was upheld’ for hydro-
carbon exploration in sensitive and ‘poorly explored’ ecosystems (Thomsen
et al.: 90). They fear that EIAs, as they are traditionally carried out, are insuf-
ficient to provide adequate biological and ecological information. More infor-
mation must be available for on-going project management:
managers of oil and gas exploration projects must factor in the need for ongoing
data gathering into project time frames and allow enough flexibility in the project
execution phase to take full advantage of such data. (Thomsen et al. 2001: 109–10)
16.3.3 The Limits of CSR
A wild card in the CSR discussion is the growing significance of investors from
countries with poorly established environmental requirements who do not
face the same kinds of domestic, international cultural, or economic pressures
in their overseas business activities that contributed to the development of
voluntary approaches. China is actively exploitingmineral resources in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America at the same time its domestic commitments to
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and implementation of pollution controls have been relatively weak and
questionable (see, for example, Bell 2003), raising questions about China’s
overseas environmental behaviour.
How significant is Chinese investment? Gonzalez (2012) says that China is
vying with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to
become a major lender in Latin America. Chen et al. (2015) calculate that
China’s FDI in Africa was only about 3 per cent of total continental FDI.
UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2015 (UNCTAD 2015) puts that figure
at 4.4 per cent of the total in 2013–14, behind the EU countries (led by France
and the United Kingdom), the United States, and even South Africa. Never-
theless, it is where they are investing that is important:
China’s investment is more visible in the poor rule-of-law countries because China
has invested in those locations whereasWestern investment generally stayed away
from them . . .Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, and Zimbabwe. (Chen et al. 2015)
Struggling to assess China’s influence, Tan-Mullins (2014) assesses the feasi-
bility of ‘socializing’ China towards adopting current CSR global norms, par-
ticularly given the large number of state-owned enterprises participating in
the extractive sector (and the Chinese government’s corresponding unwill-
ingness to embrace initiatives based on transparency and stakeholder consult-
ation) (Tan-Mullins 2014).
Jansson et al. (2009) are more optimistic, concluding that Chinese extract-
ive companies are receptive to the principle of transparency and general CSR
standards; positing that ‘there are, in fact, few differences in the operating
procedures between Chinese corporations per se and other international
actors engaged in Africa’. Their report focuses on transparency in general
(rather than environmental impacts) but contains useful information and
case studies about Chinese companies’ environmental practices in Africa
(including the use of EIAs) (Jansson et al. 2009).
16.3.4 Falling Commodity Prices: Some Consequences
for Environmental Regulation
Environmental controls, investor interest in accommodating local require-
ments, and country-level will to identify, agree, and implement them have
been further complicated by the so-called commodity price slump that began
in approximately 2014 (Pakiam and Katakey 2015). Until around 2012, the
unusual profits associated with the so-called super-cycle of commodity prices
were a key driver of decisions about extraction.Many countries, contrary to the
advice from several sources to use those revenues to help diversify their econ-
omies, instead became increasingly dependent on extractives. With declining
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revenues, what are the new challenges to implementation of environmental
requirements? Are countries arguably now even less likely to impose restric-
tions and/or to enforce them?Will they try to increase production or otherwise
change the rules to favour extraction companies and so try to compensate for
the impacts of the commodity price falls?
In Peru, for example, the government’s response to lower growth and tax
revenues has been toward policies to relax the conditions of mining and oil
contracts, in order to increase production (Ballivián 2013). The increased
export volume would in their view ‘compensate’ for the losses brought by
the end of the super-cycle. Campodonico (2015) finds this policy relaxation
particularly noticeable in the areas of previous consultation and EIAs.
In Bolivia, investment is now permitted in previously off-limits Protected
Natural Areas including allowing access to land owned by communities and
indigenous people to ‘encourage’ investment (Campodonico 2015).
Clearly, where these revenues are central to the functioning of a poor
country, the temptation will be to make extraction easier and less onerous.
The Economist (2016) noted ‘ironically’ that ‘the end of the boom may
increase both government and public support for mining’.
16.4 A Bigger Tool Box: Alternatives to Improve
Environmental Performance in Extraction
The general principles identified in the literature point in the right direction.
Good practice standards should provide ‘guidance on how to identify risks
and impacts . . . and be designed to avoid, mitigate, and manage risks and
impacts as a way of doing business in a sustainable way, including stakeholder
engagement and disclosure obligations of the client in relation to project-level
activities’ (IFC 2012).
Tools like contracts, lender and industry-created principles, CSR initiatives,
and EIAs each try in their own way to achieve this goal in difficult venues but
the experience of uneven results has led to even more ideas.
Oshienbo (2009) offers a mixed bag of suggestions to improve implementa-
tion of the World Bank Group’s own environmental standards. These include:
a) incorporating project borrowers’ past environmental performance into
funding decisions; b) imposing financial sanctions (i.e. fines); c) involving
independent environmental experts at all stages of project development,
including EIA review; d) training and other environmental capacity-building
at the borrower/host government level; and e) community and NGO consult-
ation. Some of this suite of recommendations are, of course, already part of the
compliance toolkit.
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Freeman (1997) argues for environmental insurance in transnational lend-
ing as ameans to improve enforcement of international environmental norms.
Unlike EIAs, insurance can both assess and enforce compliance with inter-
national environmental standards because insurance companies require as a
contractual condition that the insured adheres to specified prudent behaviours
and procedures. As with domestic insurance practices, implementation would
create a private legal regime that enforces public (environmental) values.
Many commenters elaborate on the community consent approach. Based in
part on anthropological research conducted among affected communities in
Peru, Laplante and Spears (2008) recommend engaging in consent processes
with communities and groups directly affected by extractive projects with a
view to obtaining their free prior and informed consent (FPIC). They argue
that FPIC-compliant companies will have a competitive advantage (avoiding
later community protests) with communities obtaining enforceable agree-
ments granting them control over their natural resources and environment
(Laplante and Spears 2008). Recent reporting from Peru suggests, with some
exceptions, that forms of community consent have helped prevent conflicts,
and that the lower commodity prices and resulting delays or postponements
of some projects ‘potentially offer more time for consultations’ (The Economist
2016). On the other hand, The Economist reports Colombia examples in which
prior consultation became a ‘means to extort money from companies’.
Baker (2012) proposes an expansive interpretation for the IFC’s Perform-
ance Standard 7: project developers would enter into ‘Environmental and
Social Risk Agreements’ with affected communities incorporating explicit
contractual allocation of environmental and social risks among all stake-
holders. This would help to shift environmental risks from indigenous com-
munities to project developers.
Seck would make home states responsible for exercising extraterritorial
jurisdiction over extraction activities of their nationals abroad. Jurisdiction
would be based on ‘territorial points of control’, including ‘stock exchanges,
financial institutions, and enabling corporate laws’, as well as services pro-
vided by export credit agencies and trade commissioners (Seck 2008: 188–9),
modelled on Canada’s and Australia’s extraterritorial regulation of their
extractive industries. The nexus of corporate law would impose such regula-
tions: for example, requiring all companies listed on home state stock
exchanges to comply with minimum environmental standards (i.e. consult-
ation with affected communities).
Seck’s idea can be scrutinized through a legal or a political lens. For the legal
case, Bernhard concludes that Seck’s arguments ‘alternatively raise concerns
about the implications of imposing one country’s legal regime on another or
appealing to the tenants of universal jurisdiction, which are typically reserved
for the most heinous crimes’ (Bernhard 2014: 212). Instead, Bernhard suggests
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bringing such cases to an International Corporate Criminal Court (Bernhard
2014). Looking at this suggestion through a political lens is even less encour-
aging, as incorporating such ideas would require massive amounts of political
will in the face of often powerful domestic interests. Some similarly frustrated
transparency advocates argue for the utility of Section 1504 of the US Dodd–
Frank Act, which requires extractive companies to disclose the amounts they
pay to foreign governments for licences and other approvals. However, the
future of this rule, which was made an early target of the new Trump admin-
istration, is unclear at the time of this writing (see Rubenfeld 2015).
‘Naming and shaming’ is another potential tool, relying on independent
monitors collecting information about environmental and social performance
or extracting the requisite information from CSR commitments, the Equator
Principles, the IFC Performance Standards, and the like. Equator Principles
information provides ‘ammunition [to NGOs and others who might lodge
protests or organize shaming opportunities], as well as additional avenues to
contact and interact with the project borrowers’ (Lance 2013: 198). This
strategy adds a significant public component, assuring that the information
is made available where it counts—directed to investment vehicles, share-
holders, the press, the NGO community, or concerned governments.
Sunshine on activities in far-distant places that would otherwise be hard to
track and evaluate and that might otherwise escape public notice can be a
powerful disinfectant. Williams would use this to expose multinational cor-
porations to reputational harm in the event that they fall short of their social
or environmental standards (Williams 2004). She argues that civil society
demands for CSR are changing the social and business paradigms under
which somemultinational corporations operate, and in turn are also changing
norms of appropriate industry action in environmental matters, creating
global standards of action.
The three significant constraints on naming and shaming are information
overload, the limited number of response tools for those who are outraged,
and the complexity of creating effective campaigns around information.
Naming and shaming assumes that reports will be read and will generate
actionable embarrassment for the malefactors, and particularly that there is a
motivated audience ready to act—often a huge assumption in this time of
information overload. Poor environmental practices are likely to be found in
many countries and in many types of extraction involving any number of
extraction companies and/or corrupt or distracted domestic officials. This by
definition blurs the focus.
The hope in such campaigns is that investors and consumers will be motiv-
ated to act, for example, by lobbying for new or improved laws and regula-
tions. This has worked in the regulation of forestry products with the
enactment of the Lacey Act, the European Union Timber Regulation, and
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the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition (Nogueron and Cheung 2014)
which have in turn made it easier for consumers to organize product boycotts
and move investments towards more socially responsible companies.
But successful campaigns for new laws and boycotts generally require con-
siderable organization and coordination, and they work better with a human
face or story to give life to the facts. The strategy of stigmatizing has proven
more effective in boycotting diamonds than have restrictions on purchases of
materials (such as oil or copper) that are processed and then combined with
other materials to make a variety of products (Haufler 2015).
Another approach is to tweak existing elements of the contracting tool chest
to make them more robust and trustworthy: for example, improving audits of
compliance with contract and EIA obligations and assuring that they are truly
independent, a tough task. Wara’s (2008) research on the Kyoto Protocol
demonstrated the unreliability of those so-called independent audits; name
brand auditing firms were found to have provided cut-and-paste identical
language in numerous supposedly independent reviews. Genuinely independ-
ent auditing is probably obtainable but not without considerable effort and
cost. A legitimate audit is an important enforcement tool and, when shared
with the public, can provide important feedback to a variety of stakeholders.
Another approach is to enhance the skills of domestic environmental
experts and give them a seat at the table in contract negotiations. Often, the
domestic environmental authorities are presented with a fait accompli or
asked to contribute too late in the process.
A final idea is to connect the extraction agreement and its climate-related
terms to each country’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
(INDCs). Countries that are party to the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC) articulated the steps each would take
within their own countries to address climate change. These INDCs represent
specific emissions reduction plans, taking into account domestic circum-
stances and capabilities. The UNFCCC is working on a plan to review these
INDCs and keep them current. This would tie environmental commitments to
a more general global review process that gets a fair amount of global atten-
tion. While it might seem odd to tie extraction agreements to the UNFCCC
INDC process, INDCs can encompass a variety of country greenhouse gas
control commitments.
16.5 Conclusions
The challenges reviewed above are not new. Considerable commentary over
several decades concludes with the perfectly reasonable yet frustratingly non-
specific exhortation that countries need clear and specific laws and ‘the
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development of an environmental protection ethos’. Smith and Kormos
(2001), for example, conclude that:
legislation and contracts need to establish fiscal regimes that encourage, and do
not discourage, environmentally sound mining and drilling practices and . . .bid-
ding procedures that include environmental protection criteria. . . . there must be
environmental protection provisions that specify best practices for specific pro-
jects, effective environmental protection monitoring, and investment in training
of environmental protection personnel. (Smith and Kormos 2001: 241)
The Natural Resource Charter similarly urges companies to ‘take steps that go
beyond minimum legal requirements to respect the highest environmental . . .
standards’ (NRGI 2010). The Charter’s drafters recognize ‘there is no guarantee
that rules will be followed or capable institutions will work for the country’s
benefit’. Their suggested antidote is ‘strong accountability’.
The Chatham House Report on conflict and coexistence in the extractive
industries (Stevens et al. 2013) recommends to ‘go slow’, with an emphasis on
building capacity to regulate companies and manage these complex respon-
sibilities. Indeed, ChathamHouse’s preferred option is ‘delaying development
for Afghanistan and Somalia, for example, given the combination of political
instability, conflict, and environmental stress they are currently facing’
(Stevens et al. 2013).
It is not that these recommendations (such as the first above, which is from
a book published in 2001 but could equally have been written today) are
wrong. Rather, such authors rarely explain how the results they recommend
are to be achieved in practice.
The challenges in making environmental requirements actionable, much
like other governance challenges surrounding resource extraction in fragile
countries, have no easy solutions. Lindblom’s (1959) pragmatic insight pro-
posed more than sixty years ago might be most realistic—that no single tool
can resolve deficiencies in local institutions and a lack of political will.
A process of accretion, Lindblom’s ‘successive limited comparisons’, might
be more realistic, if it builds expertise and deepens experience over time (see
Lindblom 1959: 81). Even in ideal situations, as Lindblom says:
Policymaking is a process of successive approximation to some desired objectives
in which what is desired itself continues to change under reconsideration . . .
Making policy is at best a very rough process . . . if [the policy maker] proceeds
through a succession of incremental changes, he avoids serious lasting mistakes in
several ways. (Lindblom 1959: 86)
As a practical matter, gaining incremental knowledge and learning by doing
is in fact what is happening in the real world. A variety of tools have been
developed and tested, and the best contracts draw on more than one of these.
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In the best cases, domestic skills are (or should be) developed as contracts are
negotiated. What happens after negotiation is also important—ideally a variety
of genuinely independent eyes (including independent auditors, international
and domestic NGOs, and domestic institutions) will monitor developments
and assess whether obligations are honoured. Newer agreements must learn
from what has previously been decided in order for this incremental learning
process to take place.
Finally, all of this assumes that countries do not treat the extraction con-
tracting process as a mere formality, but rather as an opportunity to fulfil a real
desire to develop the kind of local expertise and interest that will contribute
sustained attention to the environmental consequences of extraction.
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from Oil, Gas, and Mining
From an ‘All of Government’ Approach
to Partnerships for Development
Kathryn McPhail
17.1 Overview
The sustainable development objectives of low- and middle-income countries
have been set out, since 2000, in the Millennium Development Goals and,
since 2015, in the Sustainable Development Goals. Action to deliver these
goals is led by national governments. And the private sector has a key role to
play. Why? Over a similar period (1996–2014), more low- and middle-income
countries became dependent on the natural resources sector. By 2014, seventy-
two such countries obtained 30 per cent (or more) of export earnings from oil,
gas, and mining—in some cases up to 90 per cent. This export dependence is
on an upward trend, despite the recent commodities price collapse, with
sustained increases inmost countries since 1996.1 Looking ahead, investments
in oil and gas andmineralsmay need to increase atmore than double historical
rates to meet new demand (e.g. Paris Agreement) and replace existing supply.2
New investment could potentially reach $17 billion by 2030.
Work undertaken since 2000 has shown that dependency on oil, gas, and/or
mining does not automatically translate into broader-based economic and
social benefits. It requires companies to invest in lower-income countries to
1 https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/it-or-not-poor-countries-are-increasingly-dependent-
mining-and-oil-gas.
2 McKinsey Global Institute (2013).
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design and operate their projects to make a genuine contribution to the
sustainable development of their host societies. And such investments need
to be supported by appropriate host country policies to catalyse broader
economic development.
This chapter draws on detailed country case studies to identify actions
companies and governments can take so that resource-driven countries3 can
realize their full potential. It begins by focusing on the need for an agreed set
of data and analysis showing the current and potential future contributions of
the natural resources sector at the national and local levels. Many line agencies
of government have roles and responsibilities in addition to the more trad-
itional actors: ministries of finance, economy and planning, energy, and
mining. All need to engage, and work together, to facilitate an ‘all of govern-
ment’ approach, which is critical to success.4
That the evidence base to guide effective policymaking (and advocacy) is
not always widely known, shared, or indeed even agreed upon, across differ-
ent line ministries and other players, is the first challenge to overcome. This is
especially true of the forward-looking projected data that guide many policies.
This sobering fact has been demonstrated in a number of analytical country
case studies and assessments on which the chapter will draw.
The chapter next addresses a further regrettable truth that, in some coun-
tries, there is a lack of trust among stakeholders: for example, between com-
panies and civil society organizations (CSOs), between companies and
government, between government and CSOs, and between federal, state,
and municipal government. Finding ways to bring all these interests together
in various ways is an important dimension of the overall governance chal-
lenge associated with the natural resources industries. The chapter uses the
example of multi-stakeholder workshops (based on prior in-depth evidence
around the industry) to show how a robust evidence base can form the basis
for prioritizing common objectives and agreeing actions by each of the stake-
holder groups. Results can enhance the natural resources sector’s contribu-
tions, and at the same time help to build trust.5
3 For the definition of ‘resource-driven’, see McKinsey Global Institute (2013).
4 ‘All of government’ includes all of national government (the presidency and the various line
ministries) as well as all of subnational government in terms of the agencies and political-
administrative arrangements at the regional and local levels (which are particular for any given
country). Understanding this arrangement, including where/by whom policy is set and where/by
whom it is implemented, is key. In the absence of the full range of agencies and players working
together and using an agreed set of facts, sub-optimal policy outcomes can be the result.
5 My grateful thanks are given to various colleagues who worked with me, or commented on
aspects of this chapter and on other papers on which this chapter depends. They include Kate
Carmichael, Alan Roe, Tom Butler, and Catherine Macdonald. The chapter also benefitted from
comments and suggestions at an ‘Extractive Industries and Development’ project meeting hosted
by UNU-WIDER in Helsinki, 11–12 April 2016. My thanks go also to Joseph Laredo for his most
helpful editorial suggestions.
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Lastly, the chapter probes related ways to mitigate the negative impacts of
resource development and to enhance its potential positive contributions,
particularly at the local level and where the governance context is often
weak. Although ‘good governance’ is clearly critical in enhancing the benefits
of extractive industries, ‘governance’ as such is a difficult and complex topic to
pin down. Other studies in this project (for example, Dietsche 2017) set out
this very complex process. Furthermore, the common features of good gov-
ernance are impacted by the presence of large-scale natural resource invest-
ments. Hence, leadership and coordination across government must be both
horizontal and vertical: necessarily extending to the subnational level. Part-
nerships for Development can help to fill the so-called ‘governance gaps’.
In conclusion, the chapter briefly recaps the three steps outlined: (i) estab-
lishing an evidence base to facilitate cross-government coordination;
(ii) building trust through multi-stakeholder dialogue; (iii) creating Partner-
ships for Development—and considers the unfinished agenda.
17.2 Evidence Base to Facilitate ‘All of Government’
Coordination
17.2.1 Context/Issue
Why is it important that the evidence base to guide effective policymaking is
widely known, shared, and agreed? The potential economic and social contri-
butions of the mining, oil, and gas industries are manifold but poorly under-
stood and not automatic—particularly at the local level.6 In many countries,
policy makers and others do not have access to comprehensive datasets on the
resources sector’s current contribution, nor are aggregated forward-looking
data (projections) available.
The impacts of the oil, gas, and mining industries on the more visible,
national-level indicators (such as on foreign direct investment, exports, GDP,
and government revenue) are, in a growing number of low- andmiddle-income
countries,7 extremely large and significant in macroeconomic terms—see
Figure 17.1 for typical numbers in mining. In parallel, however, there are few
direct benefits at the local and community levels given the capital-intensive
nature of such investments and their inherent export orientation (Figure 17.1
also stylistically illustrates this). Yet it is here that the negative disruptions
6 This is a key finding of a multi-year research project initiated by the ICMM in collaboration
with UNCTAD and the World Bank Group, which resulted in the Mining: Partnerships for
Development (MPD) Toolkit (ICMM 2011a)—see www.icmm.com/mpd.
7 See Roe and Dodd (2017).
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from resource development are most likely to be felt. It is this disconnect
between costs and benefits as between national and local levels that is abso-
lutely central to the controversies surrounding the role of extractive industries:
such investments have an impact on local communities and their perceptions
that is often compounded by national decisions about how to use the ‘national’
resource rents.
In 2004, ICMM began the Resource Endowment initiative (REi) in collabor-
ation with UNCTAD and the World Bank Group with the specific objective of
identifying good practices in howmining can contribute to sustainable devel-
opment. The starting point was to first identify and then understand ‘success
cases’ and explanations of ‘success’ amongst some thirty-three low- and
middle-income countries that in 2004 were dependent on mineral resources.
This was done by constructing an analytical framework, which was then used
to identify the multifarious factors that seemed to help or hinder mining’s
contribution to economic and broader social development in any particular
country. This was followed by a second phase of its work, which applied the
analytical framework to a series of country case studies, in order to collect
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
60–90% of total FDI
EXPORTS
30–60% of total exports
GOVERNMENT REVENUE
3–20% of government revenues
NATIONAL INCOME
(GDP AND GNI)
3–10% of total national 
income
EMPLOYMENT
1–2% of total 
employment
Figure 17.1. Typical macroeconomic contributions of mining to low- and middle-
income economies
Source: based on ICMM (2009), reproduced here by permission.
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evidence that was then used to validate the premises on which the more
recent ‘Mining: Partnerships for Development’ (MPD) process is based. The
ICMM Toolkit itself has been fully implemented by ICMM in seven countries,8
and by third parties in another five. As part of the initiative, ICMM also
undertook the Mapping Partnerships exercise, which covered nineteen coun-
tries. Both the Resource Endowment initiative and theMPD process as a whole,
therefore, provided in-depth results on twenty-six countries.
In 2011, the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Responsible Mineral Devel-
opment Initiative (WEF 2011) conducted a global survey that involved 145
representatives from mining companies, the public sector, NGOs, academia,
and civil society in thirty-three countries. The survey concluded that the
priority is to ‘conduct rigorous and collaborative socio-economic studies’.
Two-thirds of all stakeholders considered rigorous socio-economic studies
‘very’ or ‘extremely’ helpful to advancing responsible development. This
action is valued across all countries, reflecting the benefits of a solid, reliable
fact base, regardless of national development or industry maturity.
The REi demonstrated that the prospects for positive impacts from mining
depend on a number of factors, which necessarily involve many different
government agencies. These are set out below:
1. sound national macro-economic management (which is typically the
responsibility of the ministry of economy, central bank)
2. revenue transparency (tax authorities)
3. reasonable standards of national governance (president/prime minister’s
office, attorney general)
4. responsible behaviour by natural resource companies (companies, min-
istries of resources/energy, regulatory authorities, environment, and
community development)
5. the capacity of government to design, implement, and monitor policy
provisions (ministries of planning, industry, labour, education, health,
and community development)
6. a sound mineral fiscal regime (ministry of finance)
7. implementation of key international initiatives, such as the EITI9 (all of
government, all of industry, and all of civil society), and the UN Volun-
tary Principles on Security and Human Rights (e.g. armed forces, police,
and public and private security).
8 All of ICMM’s MPD country case studies received the endorsement of host countries before
any results were published.
9 See Section 17.2.3.
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These can be further enhanced by:
8. the quality of governance at the subnational level (regional and local
institutions)
9. the quality of collaboration between government, companies, develop-
ment partners, and civil society organizations to enhance impacts.
Given the large number of government agencies (and others) involved, this
necessarily raises the question of how the roles and responsibilities are defined
and how leadership and coordination are effected to ensure that resource
investments create development. As the World Bank has noted:
The EI sector, more than many others, depends for its efficient functioning on a
complex ecosystem of governmental institutions and functions . . .The multifa-
ceted character of the sector is reflected by the involvement of a large number of
ministries and public entities whose coordination may be highly complex. Effi-
cient extractive-based economic development requires the effective cooperation
of these public entities while drawing on the specialized capacity of each. Yet,
cooperation often suffers as individual entities seek to maintain control of their
share of the extractive portfolio—and revenues. (Halland et al. 2015: 3)
Cross-government coordination is also key to realizing greater benefits from
oil, gas, and mining industries in some of the functional areas that are priority
concerns of large private-sector operations (e.g. recruitment and procure-
ment), as well as government priorities—even where these policies are not
specifically about resource development (e.g. education policy, industrial
policy, improving the enabling environment for private-sector investment).
On one side, companies may seek to address issues around procurement and
recruitment without engagement with corresponding government agencies—
just as governments may pursue education and skills development policies
that do not take into account the needs of the industry.
17.2.2 Objectives
 To develop a shared understanding of the evidence base of the potential
economic and social contribution to support informed decision-making.
 To facilitate the cross-government coordination required for successful
natural resource development.
17.2.3 Action in Support of the Objectives
17.2.3.1 SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF THE EVIDENCE BASE
From the outset, the REi was consultative and inclusive on the basis that
developing the relevant knowledge of mining’s full social and economic
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costs and benefits, and how countries can escape the so-called resource curse,
must be built on a comprehensive understanding of all stakeholder positions.
Developing a Toolkit that can be applied in a standardized way across coun-
tries, with input from all affected stakeholders, allows the identification of
good practice with broader applicability.
The WEF’s Responsible Mineral Development Initiative (RMDI) started in
2010, with the objective of identifying the key challenges facing responsible
mineral development. In 2011, the Initiative’s continuing work led to the
identification of six building blocks that together provide a constructive
framework for the mining sector and a neutral multi-stakeholder platform
for the discussion and development of ideas capable of unlocking the potential
socio-economic benefits of mining. During 2012, the RMDI focused on ‘Min-
eral Value Management’ (MVM), a perception tool it developed for enhancing
the understanding of drivers of value in mining so as to trigger frank and open
discussion on the issues that affect, unite, and divide stakeholders in the
mining sector. Similarly, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO) has surveyed public perceptions of mining on
a national scale, building on regional-scale work undertaken 2008–11.10
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which began in
2003, is an international standard to promote open and accountable manage-
ment of natural resources by publishing information on tax payments,
licences, contracts, production, and other key elements of resource extraction.
It is designed to improve accountability and public trust in the revenues paid
and received for a country’s resources. It asks companies to publish what they
pay for oil, gas, quarrying, and mining, and governments to disclose what
they receive from oil, gas, quarrying, and mining. These figures are audited by
an independent administrator and published along with contextual informa-
tion in the EITI report. In each implementing country, the EITI process must
be supported by a coalition of government, companies, and civil society
working together as a multi-stakeholder group and provides a shared under-
standing across different interests.
17.2.3.2 CROSS-GOVERNMENT COORDINATION
In China, government has taken a strategic approach to helping the nation’s
resource-oriented companies to follow standardized sustainable business prac-
tices abroad. The Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and
Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) issued Guidelines for Social
Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments in October 2014. This ini-
tiative was supported by the National Development and Reform Commission
10 See Moffat et al. (2014) for an example for Chile.
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(NDRC), working with eight government ministries (CCCMC 2014). One year
later, in order to promote implementation of the Guidelines, the CCCMC,
again supported by the NDRC, published a draft Chinese Outbound Mining
Investment Industry Social Responsibility Action Plan (CCCMC 2015).
In Lao PDR, the National Economic Research Institute (part of the Ministry
of Planning and Investment) led the MPD Toolkit analysis. All key govern-
ment agencies attended the workshop, which provided simultaneous transla-
tion into Lao, Mandarin, and English, thereby facilitating the engagement of
participants. This succeeded in bringing together a larger and broader cross-
section of key government stakeholders than had been achieved previously.
17.2.4 Early Results
This section presents case examples of efforts led by companies such as BG
Group (Tanzania) and by governments (Lao PDR).
17.2.4.1 RESULTS
In Tanzania (ICMM 2009), the national and local debate on mining has
become increasingly intense and contentious since large-scale mining
began. ICMM took the view that a starting point for dialogue would be to
analyse the evidence base regarding mining in Tanzania—for example, its
contribution to FDI, government revenues, and exports as a whole. This led
to the development of an innovative life-cycle analysis11 as part of the MPD
Toolkit. This brought companies and government together by providing, on a
pooled basis, realistic projections by the companies of their future investment
activities, human resources requirements, taxes, and other payments, thereby
allowing the government to get an understanding of the full project cycle.
A shared understanding of the potential economic and social contribution
enabled the government to plan its own role in developing the country’s
human resource needs, training, income, and expenditures, and contributed
to developing a consensus across ‘all of government’.12
11 See ICMM (2009). This analysis can help ‘all of government’ understand the choice between a
policy regime that favours, for example, high rates of growth vs. an approach consisting of raising
revenues in the short term at the risk of lowering sectoral growth in the future. By focusing on
production, government revenues, and employment over a 15–20-year timeframe, it provides
policy makers with the big picture.
12 Previously, the debate had been informed only by a very short period of historical data—
beginning with the resumption of large-scale mining investments in the late 1990s. In a May 2009
cross-government workshop supported by the Tanzanian Chamber of Minerals and Energy, the
government was able to understand better the interrelationships between decisions made in
different ministries and consider introducing a broadened and integrated sector strategy. As one
example, the Tanzania Ministry of Power’s inaction regarding mining companies’ proposal to
extend the power grid meant that operating costs remained higher and royalties lower than
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This same MPD framework successfully transitioned to the offshore oil and
gas industry in 2013. BG—a FTSE 100 exploration and production company
specializing in gas—funded a forward-looking life-cycle analysis based on a
realistically assessed 10 Tcf of deep-water offshore gas reserves, using the same
methodology. The objective was to determine how the development of lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) could impact the country’s economy, in terms of FDI,
exports, government revenues, contribution to GDP, and employment. This
provided a comprehensive picture of the potential direct, indirect, and
induced risks and benefits associated with LNG development over an
extended period of time. This enabled the government to understand better
what the future could look like and the implications for planning and imme-
diate action.
Findings were presented to senior government officials at a workshop con-
vened by the Uongozi Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Devel-
opment and chaired by the chief secretary to the president. One important
outcome was the establishment of a ‘government team of negotiators for
natural gas and oil’. These ‘twenty-five carefully picked experts from different
backgrounds [are] to ensure that all the relevant issues for building a sustain-
able oil and gas economy are addressed’.13 The team were supported by a six-
month capacity-building programme organized by the Institute of African
Leadership for Sustainable Development,14 supported by the Columbia Cen-
ter for Sustainable Investment and the International Senior Lawyers Project.
Making an agreed-upon dataset and analysis available also facilitates
informed policymaking. In Lao PDR, the government prioritized the hydro-
power sector. The application of ICMM’s MPD Toolkit (ICMM 2011a) dem-
onstrated that mining was in fact the largest industrial sector—contributing
80 per cent of FDI, 45 per cent of exports, 12 per cent of government revenues,
and 10 per cent of national income. Similar evidence has been referenced in
the UN Economic Commission for Africa–African Union’s ‘African Mining
Vision’, in Natural Resource Charter datasets, and in national government and
donor agency communications.15
might otherwise have been the case (the mining companies’ operating costs were five times the
global average for gold mining because they had to import fuel).
13 The institutions represented include the Ministries of Mining, Energy and Minerals, Finance,
Labour, and Industries and Trade, regional administrations, and local governments, The Attorney
General’s Chambers, Tanzania Electricity Power Company, Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation, the Planning Commission, the State-owned Mining Company, Prime Minister’s Office,




15 For example, a Lao PDR government official presenting key findings at the China Mining
Congress 2011, Tianjin; and World Bank Sector Policy Reviews (see Schuler and Lokanc 2015).
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A 2013 independent evaluation16 found that the majority of stakeholders
interviewed had ‘very positive views’ of the MPD Toolkit (ICMM 2011a).
‘Furthermore, there was strong support across all stakeholder groups for
ICMM to continue to apply the MPD Toolkit. The Toolkit is widely seen as a
unique tool that generates high quality data about mining’s contribution to
development and also provides concrete steps for how partnerships that
increase the opportunity for development can be established.’
17.2.4.2 CHALLENGES
A common challenge is consistency and availability of data. For example, in
Zambia, there are widely divergent perspectives and disputes within and
between different arms of government and industry about key datasets. The
MPD process in Zambia identified that in 2012, revenue from the mining
industry was 5.9 per cent of GDP and 32 per cent of tax revenue, representing
a significant increase since 2008. However, much smaller numbers from earlier
years were still being used in official communications as recently as 2013. This
is now being addressed to some degree by the Zambia-EITI process, which has
strengthened transparency on revenues from mining through its credible
multi-stakeholder process.
The importance of a national ‘champion’ to follow up and ensure imple-
mentation was a finding of the 2013 evaluation (footnote 11) of the MPD
Toolkit: ‘ICMM’s future MPDwork should revisit existing applications, ensure
recommendations are properly progressed following a Toolkit application,
and step up the delivery of Toolkit applications in new countries.’ The evalu-
ation noted that independently commissioned studies have used the MPD
Toolkit methodology in a further seven countries and, in order to scale up,
regional partners should be considered to deliver additional applications and
support in-country implementation.
17.3 Building Trust through Multi-stakeholder Dialogue
17.3.1 Context/Issue
This section will address a further regrettable truth that, in some countries,
there is a lack of trust among stakeholders: for example, between companies
and CSOs/NGOs (e.g. in Ghana), between companies and government (e.g. in
Tanzania and Zambia), between government and CSOs/NGOs (e.g. in Lao PDR
and Mongolia) and between federal, state, and municipal government (e.g. in
Ghana, Brazil, and Peru).
16 Independent Evaluation of ICMM Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit (CSRM
2013).
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The WEF noted: ‘In 2012, significant resource-related disagreements flared
up in almost every significant mining region, from Mongolia to Chile and
from South Africa to Indonesia. Some, notably in South Africa, escalated
sufficiently to migrate from the financial to the news sections of the national
and global media.’ This was the genesis of the Responsible Mineral Develop-
ment Initiative because ‘events of the last few years have heightened the need
for stakeholders involved in mineral development to find common ground to
understand each other’s needs, perceptions, and priorities’ (WEF 2013: 6).
The same WEF report highlighted the importance of national dialogue
platforms. It found that these have the potential to ‘offer consistent, inclusive
dialogue and collaboration among stakeholders on a countrywide sector basis.
The aim is to enable responsible development, find synergies and align stake-
holders, and devise action plans for longer-term working partnerships. It
should mean that every project begins with structures for engagement
throughout its life cycle already in place.’ Sixty-nine per cent of all stake-
holders surveyed considered that a national dialogue platform would be
‘very’ or ‘extremely’ helpful. Responses were strongest where it was felt that
a platform could significantly enhance dialogue, particularly if there were
limitations in existing national infrastructure.
17.3.2 Objectives
 Create a neutral space to voice different perspectives on the impacts of
mining, oil, and gas.
 Identify challenges and opportunities (e.g. conflict management, man-
agement of revenues, economic linkages, local development) as input for
policy development.
 Develop a shared understanding of, and accountability for, responsible
investment.
17.3.3 Action in Support of the Objectives
17.3.3.1 CREATE A NEUTRAL SPACE TO VOICE DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES
Dialogue processes are important as a way to convene local stakeholder opin-
ions in the formulation of specific policy recommendations. Such views can
best be identified and assessed through an inclusive on-the-ground process.
The examples below are drawn from a series of multi-stakeholder workshops
held in several countries as part of ICMM’s MPD process.
Multi-stakeholder dialogue processes at the subnational level are equally
important. In Peru, beginning in 2012, copper and zinc prices fell dramatically
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and local employment at mine sites dropped, as did the government’s local
and regional budgets. Consequently, at the subnational level, a number of
mining companies realized that they needed to work with local government
in taking the lead on promoting development. Despite significant expend-
itures in the past, the local populations remain poor, with low Human Devel-
opment Index rankings. Antamina (a mining company in Peru) developed
‘The Multi-Stakeholder Development’ approach to focus on building dialogue
with local government and other stakeholders. This also reduced the potential
for special interests to derail development processes. Within this framework,
Antamina, the local governments, and stakeholders are addressing:
1. how to obtain a sufficient share of mining taxes and royalties for local
governments from the central government
2. how to build capacity for planning and implementing development
activities
3. how to respect the rule of law and put in place transparent processes and
accountability to end corruption by local governments.
17.3.3.2 IDENTIFY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The disconnect mentioned earlier—between costs and benefits as between
national and local levels—which is absolutely central to the controversies sur-
rounding the role of extractive industries, is evident in a number of countries.
In Ghana, while new mining investment (from the mid-1980s) had helped
to turn around the national economy and reduce poverty at national and local
levels, local communities did not perceive that they were receiving sufficient
economic benefits. Companies also needed to improve their management and
delivery of broader economic contribution. A 2008 workshop was explicitly
structured to tackle some of the main challenges highlighted by the research
(ICMM2008b). It was informed by amapping exercise of existing initiatives in
Ghana against six priority areas. These had been identified as benefitting from
collaboration or partnerships between governments, companies, and others
that seemed to have the greatest potential for enhancing the social and
economic returns from mining. That mapping exercise found that there
were a lot of partnerships and initiatives around poverty reduction, but far
fewer for regional development planning and revenue management—
although both of these activities critically impact the effectiveness of what is
done in the other areas. As a result, disputes between communities and
companies were more numerous and more confrontational than they needed
to be (ICMM 2008b).
The success of the 2008 Ghana workshop was due in part to broad and
comprehensive consultations by the research team over a four-month period,
with a wide range of stakeholders in Accra (and the localities of Tarkwa), in
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Ahafo, and to a limited extent also in Obuasi (where earlier project fieldwork
had been concentrated). These consultations were designed to obtain a wide
range of views about the strengths and weaknesses of present arrangements
for mining in Ghana. The number of invitees was intentionally limited and
focused in order to ensure the best possible debate on the day. It was the
agreed wish of the meeting that workshop minutes be circulated also to
organizations and individuals who were likely to play a significant policy-
influencing role. The summary notes were posted on the websites of the
Chamber of Mines and ICMM.
In Zambia, the issues and opportunity areas identified during ICMM’s
November 2013 workshop included: (i) the need for reliable data to support
a better informed debate; (ii) scope for an improved investment climate in
Zambia to support greater local content and job creation; and (iii) scope for
more effective social investment by mining companies, through improved
coordination between companies and with the priorities of local government.
17.3.3.3 DEVELOP A SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR, RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT
Negative impacts on local communities are often concentrated in the imme-
diate vicinity of a mining or oil and gas operation. In many countries,
resources available to communities to seek redress are more limited at the
subnational than at the national level, in part due to weak government
capacity and limited fiscal resources. This can lead to growing discontent at
the local and community levels, which in turn can percolate up to the
national level and undermine support for the industry.
There aremany practical tools for understanding andmanaging community
relations around large-scale investments, based on recognized international
good practice. IFC’s CommDev17 is focused on enhancing benefits to com-
munities by providing documents, tools, case studies, training materials,
presentations, and resources produced by the IFC as well as by others, to
guide how benefits from infrastructure can be shared with local communities.
The World Bank’s EI SourceBook, which identifies key levers for enhancing
success in the natural resource industries, also includes links to many other
guides and case studies for action at the subnational level. ICMM’s Commu-
nity Development Toolkit gives practical guidance on how to responsibly
address issues of community engagement, develop baseline studies, set up
community-level agreements, foster their implementation, and establish dis-
pute resolution mechanisms (ICMM 2012a).
17 https://commdev.org/.




Efforts to build trust via multi-stakeholder dialogue processes have been led by
NGOs (Myanmar), ICMM (Ghana, Lao PDR, and Brazil) and industry (Peru).
17.3.4.1 RESULTS
In Myanmar, a consultation draft of a pioneering oil and gas sector-wide
impact assessment (SWIA) formed the basis of multi-stakeholder workshop
consultations. The dual objective was to:
1. discuss the key draft findings and ensure their relevance and complete-
ness (i.e. have key issues been missed or misunderstood?)
2. allow multi-stakeholder participation in developing recommendations
for actions by the government and companies and other stakeholders
(local and foreign). The purpose was to improve both the outcomes of oil
and gas projects for the benefit of Myanmar society, and the framework
for responsible investment.18
Following publication19 in 2014, the Myanmar Centre for Responsible
Business (MCRB) held a ‘Multi-StakeholderWorkshop on Community Engage-
ment in the Extractive Industries’ in Yangon in January 2015 to discuss inter-
national best practice in strategic community investment and engagement,
including how to handle grievances. The workshop was attended by over 100
representatives from government departments, oil, gas, and mining compan-
ies, and CSOs from across Myanmar, as well as international NGOs and donor
organizations. These workshops were a complement to the multi-stakeholder
dialogue on revenue transparency taking place as a result of Myanmar’s
candidacy for the EITI. On the objective of building trust, the director of the
MCRB said: ‘our assessment found that engagement, information, and genu-
ine two-way communication by business with stakeholders, particularly local
communities and national NGOs, has historically been almost completely
absent in Myanmar, leading to mistrust, misunderstanding, and occasionally
conflict.’
17.3.4.2 CHALLENGES
In Brazil, an MPD workshop was held in Brasilia in 2012 and attended by
120 people, representing a broad cross-section of government, industry, and
18 See www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/news/oil-and-gas-swia-draft-for-consultation.html.
19 Institute for Human Rights and Business, Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business, The
Danish Institute for Human Rights: Sector Wide Impact Assessment: Myanmar Oil & Gas Sector
Wide Impact Assessment, 2014, http://www.myanmar-responsiblebusiness.org/swia/oil-and-gas.
html.
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civil society (ICMM 2012b). Discussion focused on the ability of public insti-
tutions to scale up and replicate company-initiated partnerships. Three chal-
lenges were identified:
1. Brazil has a complex system of public revenue management at all three
tiers of government, namely federal, state, and municipal. There is a
significant overlap of responsibilities between these three tiers. A graph-
ical description that indicates the complexity of these arrangements is
shown as Figure 2 in McPhail (2017). One consequence of 1988 fiscal
decentralization was huge revenue variations across municipalities.
2. Municipal government has limited capacity to allocate and spend funds
effectively. Often the challenge is not lack of funds.
3. National government policies often do not seek opportunities to link oil,
gas, and mining operations into the region as a whole. This will require
leadership thinking through a bigger regional economic integration pic-
ture, which in turn requires clearly defined public- and private-sector
roles. For example, the public-sector education system’s chronic under-
supply of scientists and engineers with skills that are useful to industry
constrains participation in the opportunities that mining creates. Tax-
ation incentives to encourage companies to invest are only a ‘sticking
plaster’ on a system of education in need of overall reform.
Dialogue platforms inviting participatory problem-solving around resources
development are increasingly common. A recent example is the CSO-ledGroupo
de Dialogo operating at national level in some Latin American countries.20
At the global level, the OECD’s globally convened Policy Dialogue on Natural
Resource-based Development21 is a multi-interest group that has identified
a useful ‘Operational Framework on Public–Private Collaboration for Shared
Resource-based Value Creation’.22 This provides a strong framework for pro-
gress to the next step: country-specific evidence to be collected and debated
in-country as a basis for building trust and consensus around action needed.
17.4 Partnerships for Development
17.4.1 Context/Issue
This section explores how to mitigate the negative impacts of resource devel-
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The REi found that there are certain common features of governance struc-
tures and institutions across better performing mining countries. Where these
institutions are in place, economic development—and, in some cases, the
social development of these countries—has been enhanced by new sustain-
able private-sector activities that complement the impacts of mining itself.
Some of these features are shown in Figure 3 of McPhail (2017), which depicts,
in general terms, the link between natural resource extraction and economic
and social development. This simple formulation shows that the minerals or
the oil and gas industries cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of a
country’s institutional and governance structures. Their presence has an
impact on these structures and calls for leadership and coordination across
the different ministries and agencies with companies and others. This illus-
trates the multifaceted nature of ‘good governance’. Where this is missing,
Partnerships for Development can help fill the so-called governance gaps.
Why partnerships? Where the features shown in Figure 3 (McPhail 2017) are
weak or missing, in-depth research has shown that resource governance can be
strengthened through partnership. For example, there is a role for development
partners in supporting developing host countries that embark on prescribed
reforms. The private sector has a critical role to play in generating incomes and
employment. CSOs can work directly with local communities and can demand
accountability. Faith-based groups can communicate costs and benefits of nat-
ural resource development to citizens and help manage expectations.
Given these different roles and responsibilities of resource governance
between the many actors involved, mainstreaming partnerships will require
ongoing engagement and dialogue. Partnerships cannot always provide magic
bullets, or be deployed in all situations. They can drive action and enhance
accountability.When combined with clear goals, such as theMDGs/SDGs—as
represented in top-down policy recommendations—they can enhance devel-
opment outcomes.
Partnerships can also help to uncover the highly local contextual factors
driving the economic and social impacts of resource projects. For example,
ICMM research findings confirm the negative impacts around operations, and
cover a large number of issues. This suggests the need for better local know-
ledge and evidence about the impacts of such projects, which will depend on
close engagement with local actors (partnerships) (ICMM 2008a, 2008b).
Often much of the failure to capture equitable benefits from resource extrac-
tion among developing countries is due not to the absence of top-level policies,
but rather to the absence of capacity to effectively implement these policies
and hold policy makers to account. This can apply at both national and
subnational levels. For example, where companies provide social investment
(e.g. health, education, and infrastructure), capturing the full benefits from
such investments may be undermined if the regional development planning
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processes are weak. Experience has shown that partnerships—including those
involving industry as well as donors and civil society—complement central
government policy in enhancing capacity to deliver benefits.
ICMM’s MPD work suggests that there are six recurring themes where
partnerships can be used to enhance development outcomes: poverty reduc-
tion, revenue management, regional development, local content, social
investment, and disputes resolution.
17.4.2 Objectives
 Enhance economic and social outcomes by filling national and local
governance capacity gaps.
 Strengthen accountability.
 Uncover local contextual issues that, if unchecked, can create social
tensions and political pressures.
17.4.3 Action in Support of the Objectives
17.4.3.1 ENHANCE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL OUTCOMES
BY FILLING GOVERNANCE CAPACITY GAPS
With regard to the subnational level, this partnership challenge has been
taken up at the local and regional levels by a number of resources companies,
with promising early results.
In Colombia (ICMM 2015), the government in La Guajira was responding
in only a limited way to the needs of communities. One of the mining
companies, Cerrejón, decided that, rather than respond individually to local
demands, it would focus on engaging with the local as well as the central
government. Through its Institutional Strengthening Foundation, Cerrejón
provided technical assistance to the planning committees and local officials to
improve planning, management, implementation, and evaluation. This has
also helped municipalities to overcome their fiscal deficits. There is now
improved accountability due to a focus on improving reports to the central
government on the use of financial resources by La Guajira. Progressively, the
municipalities have improved their performance, and these mining-affected
local administrations are now at the top of national rankings. The La Guajira
Department occupies second place in performance.
17.4.3.2 STRENGTHEN ACCOUNTABILITY
Between 2008 and 2012, the Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) supported gov-
ernments and CSOs in Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Peru to improve
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subnational mineral revenue management (Pellegrini and Venugopal 2013).
Early results that it documented included:
 improved revenue tracking and facilitated investment in sustainable
development. In Peru, the Arequipa and Piura regional governments
used RWI’s forecasting tool to accurately predict their entitlements and
formulate multi-year budgets. Overall regional government spending
effectiveness (the percentage of the allocated budget that is actually
spent) increased from 89.2 per cent in 2009 to 93.7 per cent in 2011 in
Arequipa, and from 79.9 per cent in 2009 to 84.5 per cent in 2011 in Piura.
 the development of lasting mechanisms for participation and accountabil-
ity. Work in Indonesia led to the creation of multi-stakeholder steering
committees that promoteoil industry transparency inBlora andBojonegoro.
In both districts, these multi-stakeholder groups were formally acknow-
ledged and the government allocated funds from local budgets to support
their continued operation. In Nigeria, the RWI-funded Bayelsa Expenditure
and Income Transparency Initiative (BEITI) developed a multi-stakeholder
platform to track state revenues, transfers, and expenditures.
17.4.3.3 UNCOVER LOCAL CONTEXTUAL ISSUES
In Zambia, an emerging priority for action was improved mining company
investment in the social areas. The dialogue process agreed that this is a
primary responsibility of companies, which should also collaborate both
across the industry and with key stakeholders, including communities and
local government. Both CSOs and mine managers noted that successful out-
comes are contingent on government’s contribution: for example, local
authorities require improved financial and technical resources to develop
stronger local development plans. In the absence of these plans and partner-
ship with other stakeholders, company social investment has no clear frame-
work in which to operate and cannot deliver real local benefits.
17.4.4 Early Results
This section presents case examples of efforts to identify partnerships in
several countries and briefly considers where the challenges remain. Efforts
highlighted here have been led by the mining industry alongside government
and development partners (Brazil, Ghana, and Lao PDR).
17.4.4.1 RESULTS
In Brazil (ICMM 2012c), Vale and other large mining companies (such as
Alcoa and Hydro) are working strategically and in partnership to drive positive
developmental outcomes in south-east Pará—one of the least developed
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regions of Brazil. All major mining companies in the state are committed to a
broad range of voluntary and mandatory initiatives to help address the chal-
lenges of infrastructure, human capacity limitations, and public administra-
tion constraints in their areas of operation. Vale’s approach to economic
development of the regions in which it operates is the most highly formalized
and involves all levels of government.23
Priorities are set in a matrix of intersecting processes:
 consultation with, and agreement from, the environmental licensing
process
 voluntary in-depth socio-economic diagnostic studies conducted to pro-
vide regular forward projections of demand (e.g. for schools and other
public services) based on expected futuremining investment, the induced
future demand for public services that may result, and deficits in capacity
to meet these demands
 connecting municipalities with federal government agencies through a
‘Public–Private Social Partnership’ framework (see Figure 17.2).
This is collated in ‘Letters of Agreement’ that Vale signs with all municipal-
ities where it operates, setting out the roles and responsibilities of different
actors in delivering social projects. These are public documents that enhance
both the accountability and the commitment of all partners. Vale’s social
investment framework illustrates the power of combining mandatory and
voluntary processes of stakeholder alignment.
In Ghana, the Chamber of Mines and the Minerals Commission organized
a May 2009 workshop to follow up on a 2008 multi-stakeholder workshop
action plan, which had prioritized compensation payments and small-scale
mining (ASM).24
Although local content was not prioritized in the 2008 Ghana workshop,25
nevertheless a partnership was formed between the Ghana Minerals
Commission, the IFC, and the GhanaChamber ofMines to assess local supplier
development needs and create linkages betweenmines and the local economy.
23 See ICMM (2012b).
24 Less progress appears to have been made on engaging companies in the implementation of
District Development Funds (DDF)—where there was already good coordination between donors
and local governments for budget support to the districts both for project financing and for
capacity-building; as well as on the transparency agenda. The 2008 workshop noted that this
had been developed well in Ghana already but not nearly enough had been done to provide the
relevant information down to local levels of society. The initial EITI reports in Ghana highlighted
that many payments by companies and distributions by national government were not being
made according to the requirements, or not being properly accounted for and used at a local level
(GHEITI 2015).
25 ICMM (2007) finds that of the US$110 million spent annually by the company on local
procurement, 47 per cent was sourced in Ghana, while in Peru, of the total annual spend of
US$229 million, almost 78 per cent was sourced in Peru.
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The objective of the partnership is to build the capacity and productivity of up
to thirty-five suppliers over three years. The result is expected to be an increase
in the share of items produced and bought in Ghana by identifying twenty-
eight new production lines.
Results to date are slow in coming. In 2014, ICMM was invited to return to
Ghana and conduct a forward-looking analysis of mining’s future contribu-
tions. The analysis indicated that, recent efforts to enhance local procurement
notwithstanding, there had been little change in the proportion of company
procurement spend in Ghana over the decade. The prize is clear. Increasing
local procurement by 25 per cent across certain categories would create about
US$50million annually in value-added to the economy. Indirect employment
would be even further increased. An April 2015 multi-stakeholder workshop
again prioritized local content, with calls for a national action plan.
17.4.4.2 CHALLENGES
No matter how well intentioned (or well funded), no individual stakeholder
(including a national government and a company) can ‘go it alone’ in seeking
positive outcomes. For companies, a failure to engage broadly through part-





































- Letter of Agreement with Municipal Government
- Vale Social Investment Management Plan
- Selection of partners to implement projects
Figure 17.2. Vale Foundation social investment framework, Brazil
Source: ICMM (2012c: 52); reproduced here by permission.
26 Roe (2016).
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impressive contribution to the economy since 2000, yet the role of mining has
been underrated and often criticized. One possible explanation is the lack of
linkages. Did companies miss the opportunity to seize a vision that mining
can be used as a focal point for broader economic development? The location
of the major mine investments is in a broadly contiguous area around the
southern part of Lake Victoria and is shown graphically in McPhail (2017:
Figure 5). The very close proximity of millions of dollars of mining activity
could have supported a significant cluster of new economic activity if the
companies had first worked together—and then engaged with the govern-
ment to ensure that policies supported broader cluster development.
Developing a shared objective and maintaining collective action is a huge
challenge when different stakeholder interests have markedly different time
horizons for decision-making. For example: extractive companies in their
forward-looking projections can take a 20–100-year time horizon; indigenous
peoples take a multi-generational perspective; governments face a 3–5-year
electoral cycle; investors look to quarterly results; communities often have
an immediate need for jobs. And prices are constantly changing. Measuring
and tracking progress and attributing results across different partners
(which can be required by investors—whether donors, government agencies,
or companies) is difficult both conceptually and methodologically.
Some of the most interesting data on local economic and social impacts
in the ICMM Lao PDR study27 resulted from the innovative use of biannual
household surveys by the companies operating the country’s two large-scale
mines. MMG Sepon undertakes two yearly household surveys of thirty-four
villages around the mine site with a total population of 8,500. Quantitative
information includes population growth, food sources, household posses-
sions, and income, and qualitative opinions are sought on land use and
operations of the mine. The surveys found that the average annual per capita
income in the villages had increased considerably since 2001. Specifically, it
grew from US$64 in 2001 to US$436 in 2009/10. Interestingly, per capita
income increased despite a rapidly growing population. For example, the
number of inhabitants in the immediately affected communities doubled
from around 1,100 in 2001 to 2,200 in 2009/10.Moreover, income inequalities
declined over the same period. Looking across villages, the Gini coefficient in
2001 was 27 (meaning that 27 per cent of the total income would need to be
redistributed to attain perfect equality across villages). By 2009/10 it had fallen
to 12 per cent. Looking within villages, in every case the Gini coefficient fell
from 2001 to 2009/10 (on average from 50 per cent to 34 per cent). This is a
significant fall in the Gini coefficient. The remaining inequality within the
27 ICMM (2011b).
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villages is largely a function of family structures—where there are elderly
couples and young couples with multiple infant children who have not yet
benefitted as much as families with adults of working age.
17.5 Conclusions
Work over a decade shows that investments in the natural resources sector do
not automatically result in broad-based development, which requires:
 comprehensive understanding of the sector’s full economic and social
impacts—positive and negative, quantitative and qualitative, national
and local—and the existing sector governance framework
 a vehicle for sharing this understanding across government and stake-
holders, to (i) recognize the complexity of sector governance and (ii)
explore how to diversify their economies from, and citizens’ expectations
of, dependence on the sector
 a platform for developing collaborative partnerships between govern-
ment entities, companies, development partners, and CSOs to fill gaps
in the governance framework.
This is an unfinished agenda. At the national level, for example, coordin-
ation within government, industry, or others, and between these players, is
often embryonic. The MPD Toolkit provides some tools to achieve this. What
are the best leadership and coordinationmodels? There are recent examples of
ways to improve intra-government coordination, effectiveness, and learning
in Peru28 and in China (CCCMC 2014). Many Chambers of Mines or Energy
can lack technical and outreach capacity and need strong engagement and
support from company members.
At the national and regional levels, a key priority of many governments is
infrastructure development. However, there are few examples of shared-use
infrastructure (roads, railways, power plants, etc.) either within countries or
across borders. The World Bank considered the potential and challenges of
power–mining integration in the sub-Saharan Africa context (Banerjee et al.
2014). The challenges highlighted include aligning incentives (regulatory and
commercial), commodity price volatility, and political instability.
28 For example, in Peru, the Humala government came into office in 2011 and prioritized an
approach to improving social cohesion that centres on achieving greater coordination between
government entities and horizontal accountability across the public sector. A new Ministry
of Development and Social Inclusion was conceptualized to improve the inter-ministerial
coordination and the efficiency of existing social and other public policies. In addition, a
presidential decree created a National Office and a High Commissioner for Dialogue and
Sustainability, situated in the Prime Minister’s Office (see ICMM 2013).
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At the global level, the three steps set out in this chapter could support
implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agree-
ment on Climate Change. In December 2015, 195 nations signed an agreement
to combat climate change and implement ‘nationally determined contribu-
tions’ towards a low-carbon future. This is to be achieved by keeping the global
temperature rise this century to below 2°C, and driving efforts to limit the
temperature increase even further to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The
Paris Agreement came into force in November 2016 in one of the fastest
ratification processes in climate negotiation history. It provides a framework
for country-driven action by ‘non-state actors’, including cities, states, and
regions, companies, and investors.
References
Banerjee, S. G., Z. Romon, G. McMahon, P. Toledano, and P. Robinson (2014). ‘The
Power of theMine: A Transformative Opportunity for sub-Saharan Africa’. Washington,
DC: World Bank. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/
21402.
CCCMC (2014). ‘Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Invest-
ments’. Beijing: CCCMC. Available at: http://www.eic.cat/promocio/normativa/
new_xina/Draft_Guidance_PublicConsultation_ENG_20140310.pdf.
CCCMC (2015). ‘Chinese Outbound Mining Investment Industry, Social Responsibil-
ity Action Plan (2016–2018)’ (Draft). Beijing: CCCMC.
CSRM (2013). Independent Evaluation of ICMM Mining: Partnerships for Development
Toolkit. Brisbane: Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, University of
Queensland.
Dietsche, E. (2017). ‘Political Economy andGovernance’, WIDERWorking Paper 2017/24.
Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
GHEITI (2015). Annual Activity Report for Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initia-
tive. Accra: Ministry of Finance, Government of Ghana.
Halland, H., M. Lokanc, and A. Nair (2015). ‘The Extractive Industries Sector: Essentials
for Economists, Public Finance Professionals, and Policy Makers’, World Bank Studies.
Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
bitstream/handle/10986/22541/The0extractive0s00and0policy0makers.pdf.
ICMM (2007). ‘Peru Country Case Study—The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using
Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development’. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2008a). ‘Ghana: Sowing the Seeds for Action. Action Learning through Part-
nerships. The Challenge of Mineral Wealth: Using Resource Endowments to Foster
Sustainable Development’, Spotlight series 11. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2008b). ‘Peru: From Boom to Broad-based Development? The Challenge of
Mineral Wealth: Using Resource Endowments to Foster Sustainable Development’,
Spotlight series 12. London: ICMM.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
364
ICMM (2009). ‘Mining in Tanzania: What Future Can We Expect?’ London: ICMM.
ICMM (2011a). ‘Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit’. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2011b). ‘Utilizing Mining and Mineral Resources to Foster Sustainable Devel-
opment of the Lao PDR’. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2012a). ‘Community Development Toolkit’. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2012b). ‘The Mining Sector in Brazil: Building Institutions for Sustainable
Development’, Spotlight series 17. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2012c). ‘The Mining Sector in Brazil: Building Institutions for Sustainable
Development’, Report. London: ICMM.
ICMM (2013). ‘Responsible Mining in Peru’. London: ICMM.
ICMM(2015). ‘Maximising the Potential Benefits of Mining: Understanding Local
Government Capacity Issues’, MS, report and tool. London: ICMM.
McKinsey Global Institute (2013). Reversing the Curse: Maximizing the Potential of




McPhail, K. (2017). ‘Enhancing Sustainable Development from Oil, Gas, and Mining:
From an “All of Government” Approach to Partnerships for Development’, WIDER
Working Paper 2017/120. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Moffat, K., N. Boughen, A. Zhang, J. Lacey, D. Fleming, and K. Uribe (2014). ‘Chilean
Attitudes toMining: Citizen Survey 2014 Results’. Australia: CSIRO. Available at: https://
www.csiro.au/en/Research/Mining-manufacturing/CSIRO-Chile/Other-initiatives/
Chilean-attitudes-to-mining.
Pellegrini, M. and V. Venugopal (2013). ‘From Conflict to Collaboration: Lessons
Learned from RWI Work at the Sub-national Level’. New York: Revenue Watch Insti-
tute. Available at: www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/From%20Conflict%
20to%20Collaboration%20-%20SHORT20131203.pdf.
Roe, A. R. (2016). ‘Tanzania and Extractives—Structural Change: Another Twist?’
WIDER Working Paper 2016/79. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Roe, A. R. and S. Dodd (2017). ‘Dependency on Extractive Industries in Lower-income
Countries: The Statistical Tendencies’, WIDER Working Paper 2017/98. Helsinki:
UNU-WIDER.
Schuler, P. M. andM. Lokanc (2015). ‘Zambia Economic Brief: MakingMiningWork for
Zambia’, Issue 5.Washington, DC:World BankGroup. Available at: http://documents.
worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/06/24646516/making-mining-work-zambia-zambia-
economic-brief-making-mining-work-zambia.
WEF (2011). ‘Responsible Mineral Development Initiative Report’. Geneva: World
Economic Forum. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/responsible-mineral-
development-initiative.
WEF (2013). ‘Responsible Mineral Development Initiative: Mineral Value Manage-
ment: A Multidimensional View of Value Creation from Mining’. Geneva: World
Economic Forum.
World Bank Group (2016). EI SourceBook. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at:
www.eisourcebook.org.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Enhancing Sustainable Development
365




OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi





The mining industry’s boom–bust pattern is well recognized. During the last
twenty years, the swings have been particularly extreme: the 2002–12 super-
cycle was followed by a precipitous fall.1 By late 2016, recovery seemed
evident. 2017 has been marked by much global uncertainty and has seen
fluctuations, depending on commodity. Societal attitudes towards mining
are nested in these swings. However, they are more fundamentally governed
by the evolution of two factors: (1) deeply held values related to human and
ecological well-being, and (2) the perceived role of various human activities
(such as mining) in contributing or not to that well-being.2
Through the past fifty years, the mining industry has found itself subject to
increasing levels of criticism, accusations of unfairness, and resulting regula-
tory and public scrutiny. The industry has been ill prepared for these ‘perfect
storm’ conditions and for many, it has brought discomfort and a defensive
reaction; see Hodge (2017) for a more detailed discussion of these trends.
At the turn of the millennium, the industry mounted an unprecedented
initiative. This was the Global Mining Initiative, with its flagship project,
Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development. Over two years, multi-interest
1 See Humphreys (2015: 1) for a clear description of mining’s 2002–12 super-cycle.
2 The ideas presented in this chapter have evolved over the last thirty years, and along the way
many people have contributed, including Al Freeze, Ron Rice, David Brooks, Alex Michalos, Britt
Banks, and numerous friends and colleagues with whom I have shared professional assignments.
Though these others remain unnamed here, I am deeply appreciative of the push and pull of debate
along the way. The following reviewed this chapter, offering many helpful comments: Tony
Addison, Chris Anderson, Toni Aubynn, Jim Cooney, Robert Court, Lois Craig, Rodrique
Djahlin, Liesel Filgueries, Bob Gibson, David Humphreys, Anne Johnson, Mike McPhie, Lee
Merkhofer, Alan Roe, Andrew Roman, Ian Thomson, and Mark Wade. Much of the richness is
due to their input, while the weaknesses that remain are solely due to the author.
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discussions about mining practices were convened across the world. Many
thousands participated in an examination of mining practices. An action
plan for improvementwas developed and the International Council onMining
and Metals (ICMM) established to serve as a change agent in its implementa-
tion and further development (MMSD 2002).
As part of this evolution, a remarkable number of initiatives in addition to
many changes in formal law and regulation in countries across the world have
been mounted to improve industry performance. Table 18.1 lists forty-five
such initiatives, nine from within the industry, thirty-six from outside.
There may be others. The majority of these are multi-interest collaborations
involving companies, civil society organizations, and government.
The obvious question that arises is whether all this effort is making any
difference. Is mining and metals’ contribution to human and ecosystem well-
being more aligned to the values and expectation of society as a result? These
questions are largely unaddressed: there is no accepted, systematic way to
assess and track a mine operation’s contribution through the full project life
cycle, let alone the whole industry. Given this gap, it is not surprising that
industry champions and detractors disagree, sometimes vehemently, on the
nature ofmining andmetals’ contribution to host communities and countries.
Questioning of the legitimacy of current project approvals processes continues
for communities, governments, and project proponents alike. Filling this
gap is the challenge taken up by this chapter—how to understand, assess,
and track mining’s contribution to human and ecosystem well-being over
the full project and product life cycles. As will be seen, the task is far from
trivial: the ecological, social, cultural, political, and economic setting of
mining is global and complex, and requires a synthesis of many perspectives.
A values-driven conceptual foundation is offered that addresses: (1) both
ends andmeans; (2) inputs, outputs, and results; and (3) not only the substance of
decisions and actions (the what), but also the process used in implementation
(the how). Importantly, a four-part generic assessment cycle is introduced that
explicitly links measurement, story, synthesis/judgement, and communica-
tion. Central to the approach is a conceptual shift from the current deeply
entrenched practice of focusing on the identification and mitigation of nega-
tive impacts (or effects) to a ‘higher test’ based on the achievement (or not)
of a net positive contribution to human and ecosystem well-being over the
long term.
Implementation will build on more traditional environmental and social
impact assessment including cumulative effects assessment. However, contri-
bution analysis will require a significant evolution in the culture of decision-
makers, proponents, and assessment participants.
Some important steps towards contribution analysis have already been taken
by communities, by governments, by companies, by academia. In sum, a start
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Table 18.1. Forty-five initiatives aimed at improving the performance of the mining and
metals industry over and above the formal legal system
a. Multi-interest performance-enhancing initiatives within the industry
Date Initiative
1991–2001 1. International Council on Metals and the Environment; 29-company
international coalition aimed at strengthening mining’s environmental
performance.
1992–4 2. Multi-interest Whitehorse Mining Initiative; Leadership Accord to govern
mining practices
2000–2 3. The Global Mining Initiative (GMI) with its central element, the Mining
Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) and subsequent creation
of the ICMM
2003–ongoing 4. ICMM Principles and Sustainable Development Policy framework (with
further position statements: 2003—Mining and Protected Areas; 2003/5/
6/9—Transparency and Mineral Revenues; 2004/10—Mining: Partnerships
for Development; 2006/9/11—Climate Change; 2008/13—Mining and
Indigenous Peoples; 2010—ICMM public reporting first completed
including independent assurance and consistent with GMI reporting
requirements)
2003, 2009–ongoing 5. Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) e3 Plus, a web-
based inventory of recommended good practice for environmental and
social management of mineral exploration projects
2004–ongoing 6. Towards Sustainable Mining initiative of the Mining Association of Canada
2006–ongoing 7. Principles of Enduring Value established by the Mining Council of Australia
based on the ICMM Principles, revised in 2015
2009–ongoing 8. Aluminium Stewardship Initiative
2011–ongoing 9. Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI) Smelter Program (CFSP)
b. Performance-enhancing initiatives outside the industry aimed at influencing industry practices
Date Initiative
Broadly focused, multi-interest initiatives from outside the industry
1976–2011, ongoing 1. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Annex to OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises
1995–ongoing 2. AccountAbility AA1000, Assurance Standard
1997–ongoing 3. Social Accountability SA8000
1998–2000; 2014–15,
ongoing
4. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in
2000 and then the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in
2015
1999–ongoing 5. Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI)
2000–ongoing 6. United Nations Global Compact (First Leader’s Summit convened in
2004) (voluntary initiative based on chief executive officer (CEO)
commitments to implement universal sustainability principles (human
rights, labour, environment, anti-corruption) and to take steps to support
United Nations goals)
2000–ongoing 7. United Nations Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(designed explicitly to guide extractive industry companies in
maintaining the safety and security of their operations within an
operating framework that encourages respect for human rights)
2000–ongoing 8. Global Reporting Initiative (mining supplement issued in 2011)
2001–ongoing 9. FTSE4 Good Index
(continued )




b. Performance-enhancing initiatives outside the industry aimed at influencing industry practices
Date Initiative
2002–4 10. Extractive Industries Review by the World Bank Group concluding that
extractive industries can contribute to poverty reduction and that World
Bank Group involvement can positively influence industry standards
2003–ongoing 11. Equator Principles established in 2003, revised in 2006 (a risk
management framework, adopted by financial institutions, for
determining, assessing, and managing environmental and social risk in
projects)
2003–ongoing 12. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) principles agreed on in
2003; Tripartite (governments, companies, and civil society
organizations) International Advisory Board established and six key
criteria established marking the beginning of implementation in 2005;
Secretariat established in 2007. Current ‘Standard’ launched in 2013
2004–ongoing 13. Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)
2006–12, ongoing 14. International Finance Corporation Principles and Guidance on Social
and Environmental Sustainability established in 2006, revised in 2012
2006–ongoing 15. Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA)
2007–ongoing 16. Devonshire Initiative
2009–ongoing 17. Equitable Origin, EO100™ Standard
2010–ongoing 18. Responsible Mineral Development Initiative, RMDI (WEF)
2010–ongoing 19. Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) Dialogue (The Forests
Dialogue)
2010–ongoing 20. Natural Resource Charter launched (a set of principles for governments
and societies on how to best harness the opportunities created by
extractive resources for development); now part of the NRGI
2013–ongoing 21. OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas
2015–ongoing 22. Responsible Mining Index, under development by the Responsible
Mining Institute
Issue or commodity focused multi-interest initiatives from outside the industry
2001–ongoing 23. Global Business Coalition on HIV–AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—GBC
Health
2003–ongoing 24. Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)
2004–ongoing 25. Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP)
2004–ongoing 26. Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM)
2005–ongoing 27. Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) of the World Economic
Forum
2005–ongoing 28. Responsible Jewellery Council
2005–ongoing 29. International Cyanide Management Code (ICMC) for gold mining
2005–ongoing 30. Diamond Development Initiative (DDI)
2011–ongoing 31. Public–Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade
2011–ongoing 32. Solutions for Hope
2012–14 33. Conflict-Free Tin Initiative
2013–ongoing 34. Better Gold Initiative
2016–ongoing 35. Newmining code from the World Initiative of Mining Lawyers (WIOML)
2016–ongoing 36. World Bank Social and Environmental Framework
Source: this compilation builds on those compiled in Resolve Solutions Network and the World Economic Forum (2016).
There may be others.
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has been made. But significant distance remains on the path ahead. This
chapter attempts to go beyond that start.
18.2 Conceptual Foundation
As with most aspects of human activity, in the arena of mining–society rela-
tionships, it is not only what is done that matters, but also how it is done. For
assessing contribution, both substance and process are essential considerations.
In the paragraphs below, a conceptual foundation for each is summarized.3
18.2.1 Substance
The origins and definitions for ‘sustainability’, ‘development’, and ‘sustain-
able development’ that are used in this chapter are provided in Box 18.1.
In summary, the three definitions described in Box 18.1 translate to the use
of a value set that is best stated as ‘parallel care and respect for the ecosystem
and people within’ (Hodge et al. 1995: xiii). To judge mining’s success at
achieving a positive contribution requires testing mining for its compatibility
with that value set.
The higher test of achieving a ‘positive contribution to sustainability’ was
first articulated by Gibson (2000, 2002). MMSD North America (2002: 7)
points out:
The above ‘positive contribution to sustainability’ criterion is different from,
though built upon, the ‘mitigation of adverse effects’ criterion that is the focus
of traditional environmental and social impact assessments. The implications of
the shift are twofold. On one hand, the positive orientation opens the door to a
much fuller treatment of the benefits that result from mining activities than has
traditionally been the case with impact assessment approaches. On the other, the
same positive orientation sets the assessment bar higher.
These assertions do not negate the fact that mining causes impacts, or that
human and/or ecosystem well-being might be degraded, and permanent eco-
system or social change might occur. However, when the full life cycle of
projects/operations and products is considered, a net positive contribution to
human and ecosystem well-being should be realized. If not, the mining/
mineral activity will not be contributing positively to sustainability.
3 More detail can be found in Gibson (2000, 2002), Gibson et al. (2006), Hodge (1995, 2011,
2017), Hodge et al. (1995), and MMSD North America (2002).
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From an engineering design perspective, the achievement of a positive
contribution to human and ecosystem well-being over the long term serves
as a kind of two-dimensional design criterion. From the perspective of ‘results-
based management’, achievement (or not) of human and ecosystem well-
being is the result or ‘end’ that is to be sought and designed for, and whose
achievement (or not) is to be tested over time, and publicly reported on.
MMSD North America (2002) points out that these ideas veer sharply away
from seeking a ‘trade-off ’ between human and ecosystem well-being. There
are obviously many small trade-offs in any practical application: between
interests, between components of the ecosystem, across time, and across
space. And Gibson et al. (2006: 130–41) propose a carefully considered set of
six rules for dealing with such trade-offs. However, in an overarching sense,
Box 18.1 APPLIED SUSTAINABILITY: ORIGINS AND THREE KEY DEFINITIONS
During the 1980s, the United Nations Secretary General convened three linked inter-
national enquiries. Willy Brandt, former chancellor of West Germany, was asked to lead a
review of North–South inequities (Brandt Commission on North–South Issues 1980);
Olaf Palme, former president of Sweden, was asked to lead a review of international
security (Palme Commission on Security and Disarmament 1982); and Gro Harlem
Brundtland, prime minister of Norway, was mandated to integrate the results and
collaboratively develop a strategy that would reduce North–South inequities while
increasing international security (WCED 1987). Brundtland called her strategy sustain-
able development. It is this concept that provides the anchor for this chapter.
Three key definitions
The following three definitions serve as the starting point of this discussion.
Definition 1. Sustainability: the persistence of certain necessary and desired charac-
teristics of both people and the enveloping ecosystem (of which people are a part) over
a very long time—indefinitely (modified from Robinson et al. 1990).
Definition 2. Development: to expand or realize the potentials of; bring gradually to
a fuller, greater, or better state (modified from Daly 1989).
Definition 3. Sustainable development: an ongoing process in which humans take
actions leading to development (as described above) that meets the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs. This is the classic Brundtland Commission definition which has stood the test of
time (WCED 1987). It elegantly captures the idea that humankind is on a continuous
quest for certain necessary and desired characteristics of both humans and the
enveloping ecosystem over a very long time—indefinitely. The needed test of achiev-
ing success is whether or not human actions (such as mining) contribute positively to
human and ecosystem well-being over the long term—thus meeting current without
compromising future needs.
A full discussion of the underlying ideas and implications of these definitions is provided
in Hodge (2011, 2017) and MMSD North America (2002).
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the idea of sustainability calls for both human and ecosystem well-being to be
maintained or improved over the long term. One without the other subverts
the concept.
Contributing positively to that ‘two-dimensional’ improvement provides
the conceptual starting point for assessing the substantive aspects of mining’s
success. Figure 18.1 draws these ideas together to provide the fundamental
conceptual framework for assessing contribution.
In Figure 18.1, the two upper bubbles show the sought results or ends and the
lower bubble captures the means. The central bubble summarizes essential
considerations: (1) both process and substance; (2) both short- and long-
term time horizons; and (3) the effectiveness of systems that are in place to
facilitate continuous learning.
The means we have at our disposal include: (1) actions within the formal
economy; (2) actions outside the formal economy (a broad range of unpaid
work (e.g. housework) and volunteer activities); and (3) governance systems
which span all the written and unwritten rules—sometimes entrenched in
law, sometimes not. In assessing these means for a mine, these ‘means’
activities must be assessed for the benefits they offer to people and ecosystems
and the stresses (costs and risks) that are imposed.
Figure 18.1 is a broad systems analogy of the results-based management














Figure 18.1. Conceptual framework for assessing contribution
Source: Hodge (2014a).
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For any organization (company, community, civil society organization, govern-
ment) or society, each of these is important for different reasons:
1. inputs to establish commitment for action and set the needed level of
resources (budget)
2. outputs/outcomes to track the success or not of meeting commitments and
holding those responsible to account
3. results/ends to test whether the overall goal and the specific objectives are
being met—and if not, to signal a need for adjustments.
Combined with an effective feedback mechanism, these processes together
facilitate continuous learning and performance improvement so efficiencies
can be achieved over time.
In contribution analysis, the concept of sustainability is seen to be much
more than environmental protection in another guise. It is a positive concept
that addresses both: (1) achieving well-being for people and ecosystems; and
(2) reducing stress or mitigating impacts.4 Or, as articulated by Gibson et al.
(2006: 165), ‘the aim is to deliver multiple, lasting, mutually re-enforcing gains
rather than just mitigation of environmental damage’. Dietsche (this volume)
similarly calls for a transition to focus on the positive, not just the negative.
Figure 18.2 translates the concepts of Figure 18.1 into the form of a high-
level hierarchical system. It maps elements from the most general (above) to
more detailed (below). At the lowest level, each element can be further disag-
gregated. Note that such a hierarchical form does not imply that the most











































Figure 18.2. Assessing contribution—hierarchy of data and information
Source: author’s illustration.
4 Hodge (1995); Hodge and Taggart (1992); Hodge et al. (1995); NRTEE (1993); Prescott-Allen
(2001).
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proposed by ecologists Gunderson and Holling (2009), the most important
element at any given time may turn up anywhere in the ‘hierarchy’. For
project-level application, the above general conceptual approach translates
into four questions:
18.2.1.1 MEANS ASSESSMENT
1. What is the project’s contribution to human well-being over the full
project life cycle, taking into account the full suite and distribution of
benefits, costs, and risks?
2. What is the project’s contribution to ecosystem well-being over the full
project life cycle, taking into account the full suite and distribution of
benefits, costs, and risks?
18.2.1.2 ENDS ASSESSMENT
3. What is the resulting state and distribution of human well-being (recog-
nizing that there are other contributors)?
4. What is the resulting state and distribution of ecosystem well-being
(recognizing that there are other contributors)?
Figure 18.2 diaggregates these four questions in a high-level hierarchy of
data and information thatmust be considered. In fact, this hierarchy is generic
and would apply to all scales and foci of analysis, though the details of each
would vary depending on the scale, boundaries of enquiry, and application.
Human well-being is categorized by ‘decision-makers’.5 This approach is
particularly useful because: (1) if the well-being of these four decision-making
groups is high or is threatened together or individually, it closely reflects the
overall state of human well-being (regardless of scale from local through
regional to national); (2) each of these groups or interests (to varying amounts
depending on a given society) plays a critical role in bringing change and
improvement; and (3) data and information are often gathered and stored by
these categories.
Ecosystem well-being is disaggregated in four parts: (1) land, (2) water,
(3) air, and (4) biota (living organisms). This categorization is useful in that
it reflects the regulation of human activity and the organization of many
relevant departments of government, business, and civil society organiza-
tions. However, ecologists have rightly pointed out that such a compartmen-
talization of the ecosystem does not effectively capture the state of structure,
5 This categorization was first suggested by Alex Michalos (personal communication 1992), the
founding editor (in 1972) of the Journal of Social Indicators Research. It was adopted by the
Sustainable Development Reporting Task Force of the Canadian Prime Minister’s National Round
Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE 1993).
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function, and diversity. Nor does it address systemic flows (e.g. of energy,
nutrients, and materials) within the ecosystem or the holistic nature of the
ecosystem itself. It is thus deficient from an ecological perspective. Another
option is to use this categorization (to facilitate a link to governance and
decision-making) but include an additional form of analysis and synthesis
that speaks to ecologists’ concerns.
The third, means or activity assessment, captures the benefits, costs, and
risks produced by the project. Here it is articulated as both ‘support for’ well-
being and ‘stress on’ well-being. Human activities always generate some bal-
ance of ‘support’ and ‘stress’ (the positive and the negative) that add up to
some degree of contribution to human and ecosystem well-being. Not to be
forgotten, however, is that the natural ecosystem not only provides the nour-
ishment needed by human society but also generates significant stress
from extreme natural events such as drought, extreme rainfall, earthquakes,
tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and explosive diseases (Berger 2007).
Assessing benefits includes not only the typical measured quantities (jobs
and taxes) but also the citizen/societal perspective on the very fabric of their
family and community lives. Many of these aspects are outside the market
economy but contribute massively to well-being. Examples include house-
work, volunteer/not-for-profit activities, cultural activities, and so on thatmay
be touched (positively or negatively) by the project. A useful description of the
nature and richness of volunteer/not-for-profit activities is provided by the
United Nations/Johns Hopkins University classification of not-for-profits
(United Nations 2003).
An approach that greatly facilitates navigation of this maze can be borrowed
from the auditing profession who use concrete and specific questions for
which answers can be sought in practical terms. This approach is championed
in the 2003 multi-interest work Seven Questions to Sustainability: How to Assess
the Contribution of Mining and Metals Activities (MMSD North America 2002).
Figure 18.3 provides the high-level seven-question framework that emerged in
the MMSD North America work.
For each question, an ideal answer is offered and then data and information
sought that facilitate assessing how close to the ideal is being achieved. A full
detailing of the approach described above is provided in MMSD North
America (2002), including a catalogue of various sub-elements, indicators,
and metrics. A synthesis of the answers to all seven questions can then serve
as the foundation for a multi-interest assessment of contribution based on
overlapping values.
To be effective, the process of assessing contribution needs to be ongoing
from project inception through the full life cycle, not simply to be undertaken
once to obtain a legal or social licence to operate. A concrete assessment and
reporting schedule is required that matches the project time horizon. This
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ongoing process of assessing and reporting facilitates the continuous learning
and adjustment that is so essential—see Buckley, McCulloch, and Travis
(Chapter 27, this volume).
Figure 18.4 shows the mine project life cycle by phase and level of activity.
The different phases are marked by significant variations in activity levels and
different implications for human and ecosystem well-being, all of which
needs careful and rigorous consideration. It is only since the millennium
change that this full project life cycle has been integrated into the thinking
of the industry and regulators.
18.2.2 Process
Assessing process effectiveness is an essential part of contribution analysis.
Below, the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’, introduced by Rawls (1971, 1987)
some forty years ago, is offered as a conceptual starting point for doing so. In
the context of a mining operation–community relationship, a state of over-
lapping consensus would be achieved if community, company, and govern-
ment each agreed on the same way forward based on their own perspective
and moral position (Wenar 2013). In other words, it would be a consensus










be maintained or improved?
3.
Environment.
Is the integrity of the environment
assured over the long term?
4.
Economy.
Is the economic viability of the project or
operation assured, and will the economy
of the community and beyond be
better off as a result?5.
Traditional and
Non-market Activities.
Are traditional and non-market activities in
the community and surrounding area accounted for




Are rules, incentives, programs, and





Does a full synthesis show that the
net result will be positive or negative in
the long term, and will there be
periodic reassessments?
Figure 18.3. The MMSD North America framework: ‘seven questions to
sustainability—how to assess the contribution of mining and minerals activities’
Source: MMSD North America (2002); reproduced here by permission.
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Because it is based on each interest’s own beliefs and values, it is each
interest’s best option. Such a consensus stands in stark contrast to a comprom-
ise that arises through an explicit trade-off or ‘deal’ in the face of others’
power. The weakness of such deals is that a power shift can trigger a loss of
social stability if the position of one of the parties to the ‘deal’ changes. Such
a shift can occur when a change in ownership of a mining property or
operation leads to reneging on company–community agreements made
between the community and the former owner.
In summary, a values-based, overlapping consensus offers greater and
longer-lasting stability and security, exactly what applied sustainability con-
cepts call for. It is true that an ideal state of overlapping consensus will not
always be possible to achieve or, once established, to endure. However, it is the
best route to social stability that a free society can hope to attain.
In practice, success can be assessed by comparing the reality on the ground
with this Rawlsian ideal. A scale can be created with the ‘ideal’ providing an end-
point and current success scored accordingly. The ideal may not be achieved,
Mining investments, 30–100 year horizon
Indigenous peoples, multi-generation
























































Figure 18.4. The mine project life cycle with indicative activity levels
Source: Hodge (2011), ICMM (2012); reproduced here by permission.
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but continuous improvement towards that ideal can be sought as learning takes
place. Clearly the scaling process emerges as a key to implementation.
Undertaking such an assessment collaboratively with all interests (commu-
nity, company, government thus bringing different values to the table) provides
a special opportunity to develop a sense of respect, trust, integrity, fairness,
justice, authenticity, and overall security for community, company, and govern-
ment that the right thing will be done in the right way. In short, the assessment
process itself can be used to re-enforce social stability and strengthen a sense of
security for all interests.
Relationships and values evolve over time. Thus, a collaboratively-built,
values-based assessment is not a task that can be theoretically addressed in a
licensing hearing and then set aside when approval is received. Continuous
effort by all parties through the full project life cycle is essential.
Examples of successful ongoing engagement can be found in ICMM’s
‘Mining Partnerships for Development’ initiative (ICMM 2016). Another is
the Ahafo Social Responsibility forum in Ghana, now in its tenth year of
seeking overlapping consensus in mining-related issues (Anderson, personal
communication, 2016). See also discussion in McPhail (Chapter 17, this vol-
ume). Not surprisingly, broad consensus-seeking engagement of key interests
is one of the success factors that has emerged in achieving a ‘social licence to
operate’.6 Effective engagement is now a central component of most mining
law and regulation; it is a key part of every progressive company’s policies. At
the same time and despite powerful examples of success, many examples of
ineffective engagement processes across the mining industry continue to
occur. An evolving compilation of examples of good and bad practice would
greatly facilitate learning.
18.3 Generic Assessment Cycle
In recent years there has been much emphasis devoted to generating clear
measured indicators of change. This interest has been felt within many aspects
of human endeavour, including mining. It has been reinforced by the com-
mon saying ‘you manage what you measure, so best measure what you want
to manage’. In fact, the real challenge is not simply to measure but to under-
stand and track change or success with rigour and integrity using all themeans
available—including but not limited to measurement. And while there is
6 The ‘social licence to operate’ is a concept first proposed by James Cooney, vice president of
Placer Dome Inc. in 1997. See Joyce and Thomson (2000) for an early treatment of the proposition
and Owen and Kemp (2013) for a useful cautionary critique.
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power in measurement, measured indicators serve as only one element of a
more complex generic assessment cycle (Hodge 2006). Figure 18.5 shows that
cycle and its four essential elements: (1) story; (2) measurement and indica-
tors; (3) judgement; and (4) communication.
18.3.1 Story
Many aspects of contribution have not been or cannot be measured. But they
are known about by those who carry the institutional and community mem-
ory. Real insight emerges through the ‘story’ that these people can offer. And
importantly, seeking the stories of various interests offers a powerful and
respectful means of engagement.
Over the past several decades, there has been a major resurgence of interest
in story as a key element of policy development, decision-making, and
organizational behaviour—for example, see Denning (2001) and Fischer and
Forester (1993). However, formal quality control techniques of ‘story’ remain
less developed than for measurement.
Gathering stories requires strong listening and hearing skills, often inter-
cultural in scope. These capacities have not typically been strengths of the
mining industry. In general, the technically oriented people who comprise
most of mining industry personnel have a high comfort level with numbers
and counting, and a low comfort level with storytelling, particularly when the
issues to be described range into social, cultural, political, economic, and
environmental concerns that are outside their immediate training—but
1. STORY
To engage all stake-















Figure 18.5. Generic assessment cycle
Source: Hodge (2006); reproduced here by permission.
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critical to understanding the values of community and government, and
therefore critical to any operation.
In many communities, the multi-generational livelihoods brought by min-
ing are important not only because of jobs, wages, and cash contributions to
local charities and organizations, but more importantly because of the stabil-
ity, respect, and confidence they bring to families and the community during
and after the life of themine. There are many examples of where this strength-
ening of community fabric and the psychological security based on hope in
the future combined with the absence of fear far outweighs the significance
of what may be only short-term mining income. While this side of mining’s
contribution defies capture in easily measured indicators, over the long run it
may be more important than all the ‘quantities’ that are typically measured in
the annual reporting cycle demanded by managers and investors. To get a
sense of this part ofmining’s contribution requires building relationships with
people so they will share their true feelings based on a mutual sense of respect
and integrity.
At the same time, storytelling includes the dark side—the negative experi-
ences. And mining, like every facet of human activity, has its share of nega-
tives. These might include loss of life from accidents or poor design, labour
strife and violence, environmental disaster, unintended contribution to a
substance-abuse culture or the spread of sexually transmitted disease, the
wrench of ill-prepared-for closure, or overall community discontent about
lost land uses, displacement of people from their lands, unassigned responsi-
bilities, lack of accountability, and unfairness in the distribution of mining-
related benefits, costs, and risks. By honestly sharing the bad along with the
good stories, a sense of honesty and integrity can be earned that contributes to
finding solutions to these challenges while building the long-term trust that
is so essential. A significant barrier to such openness and transparency is the
attitude of legal advisers that any admission or apology that might infer
liability—even by association—is to be avoided.
18.3.2 Measurement
In the broad sweep of history, trying to capture the nature of change over time
has been a topic of interest since at least the ancient Greeks. However, the last
half of the nineteenth century and through the twentieth century saw an
increasing focus on counting. Lewis Mumford (1934) voiced a concern about
this when he wrote:
The new attitude toward time and space infected the workshop and the counting
house, the army and the city. The tempo became faster, the magnitudes became
greater; conceptually, modern culture launched itself into space and gave itself
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over to movement. What Max Weber called the ‘romanticism of numbers’ grew
naturally out of this interest. In time-keeping, in trading, in fighting, men counted
numbers, and finally, as the habit grew, only numbers counted.
Even Albert Einstein added a note of caution with a sign hung on his Princeton
University office door that read: ‘Not everything that can be counted counts
and not everything that counts can be counted.’
The specific role of ‘measured’ indicators is to provide a firm ‘backbone’ for
assessing contribution. They serve to: (1) confirm and give confidence to the
observations that are often first recognized through ‘story’, and (2) provide
counter-intuitive insight that can trigger whole new perspectives. However,
the overall power of counting can only be realized by seeing it as part of the
larger generic cycle that is needed to recognize, track, record, and understand
change and, in the context of this chapter, the contribution of mining and
metals activities.
18.3.3 Synthesis and Judgement
In tracking contribution, whether the scale be that of the project, organization,
community, industry, or political jurisdiction, the greatest challenge is to bring
together the power of both qualitative and quantitative analysis—story and
measurement—in a synthesis that can be respected across all interests.
Even when ‘measured’ indicators have been compiled and nested in the
story of place or issue, the task remains of weighing the elements and judging
the significance of the gathered evidence. This means establishing the relative
significance of both measured indicators and articulated story and combining
the result in a synthesis that allows an overall assessment of contribution and
progress. This task is far from trivial. It is the classic problem of combining
apples, oranges, and socks.
Gibson et al. (2006: 165–79) offer a set of criteria drawn mainly from the
environmental assessment literature (which includes social and economic as
well as ecological effects) for assessing the significance of a project’s effects.
However, they point out that little of the available literature on this topic has
been developed with sustainability criteria in mind.
There is much relevant experience in courts of law across the world where
significance must be assigned to different pieces of evidence and those pieces
weighed to draw a judgement.7 Critically, ‘reasons for decisions’ are carefully
developed and made public to serve as a continuously growing body of know-
ledge from which to draw. In this way, continuous learning concepts can be
7 A similar ‘weight-of-evidence’ approach was adopted long ago by the government of Canada
for addressing a broad range of social and environmental issues; see Canada (1993).
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applied to the assessment processes. An important result is the enhancement
of people’s sense of integrity in and trust for such assessment processes.
18.3.4 Communication
All is for naught without effective communication of assessment results.
Communication is a two-way process. So the starting point of this is listening,
not telling—listening to the stories, listening to what is important to others
and, through that, developing a sensitivity to others’ culture and values. If
that is done, the chances of being able to then tell in a way that will be heard is
greatly enhanced.
18.3.5 Explicitly Bringing Values into ‘Technical’ Assessment
and Decision-making
The generic assessment cycle described above is dependent on careful and
rigorous application of each component. An ongoing challenge, however, is
the integration of values—often those held by indigenous people, community
members, and government representatives—into the technical assessment
and decision-making process. One powerful technique available to do this
is ‘multi-attribute utility analysis’ which comes from the field of ‘Decision
Analysis’. It has been taught in engineering and operations research
programs for many years and applied in major industries to best characterize
risks when making high-stakes decisions. However, it has only rarely been
used to address sustainability-driven decisions and the kind of contribution
analysis championed in this chapter. An example application involving an
assessment of closure options of a major mine project is detailed in IRP (2007)
and Hodge and Merkhofer (2008), and summarized in Hodge (2017: Box 3).
A second example is detailed in Ben-Eli et al. (2004) which describes how
alternatives were assessed for managing high-level nuclear waste over the
long term in Canada.
The technique involves careful definition of objectives, specification of
alternatives, identification of the hierarchy of factors, uncertainties, and rela-
tionships that influence the performance of each alternative under each
objective, rigorous assessment of performance using carefully crafted per-
formance scales, weighting the importance of each objective, synthesizing
the result, and lastly, completing a sensitivity analysis. The whole process is
completed collaboratively and may include periodic ‘negotiations’. It is a
powerful approach to assessment and decision-making that effectively com-
bines the facts, judgements, and probabilities provided by the technical
experts with the value judgements provided by the participating interests.
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18.3.6 Need for an Interdisciplinary Team
Each aspect of the assessment cycle requires a special skillset. Further, those
expert in storymaynot be expert inmeasurement, and neithermay be proficient
in synthesis, weighing evidence, and making judgements about significance.
Further, none of these groups are necessarily effective at communicating. The
inevitable conclusion is that a multidisciplinary team is essential for success.
18.4 The Tough Challenge of Attribution
A mining/metals operation is one of many contributors to the state of social,
cultural, economic, and ecological conditions at a given location. Other
industries (large and small), government facilities, and households all play a
role. In fact, a significant issue that commonly arises is when boundaries of
responsibility between community, company, and government become
blurred. When there is such confusion and multiple interests share responsi-
bility for social and ecological conditions, a central question is then how to
apportion contribution—positive and negative—among interests.
For measurable indicators such as the following, clear-cut answers to the
attribution issue can be established, provided accurate statistical systems are in
place and maintained:
 standard project key performance indicators—production cost numbers
relative to the expected mine life, financial numbers tracked by company
management
 supplies and services drawn from the local community and region
 employment numbers (primary, secondary, tertiary)
 household members associated with employees and their participation in
community activities
 payment of taxes, royalties, licences, and fees
 contributions to local infrastructure, charities, and a range of civil society
organizations (sport, cultural, recreational, advocacy, education)
 discharges of contaminants to surface or groundwater
 loss of biodiversity in a region.
Unfortunately, the above numbers do not get at the feeling of a community
about the presence of a mining project, their sense of fairness about the
distribution of benefits, costs, and risks, and, most importantly, the feelings
of a community about itself—its own sense of current and future security
and well-being. This part of contribution can only be accessed by talking to
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people and drawing out their stories in a way that is acceptable to local
cultural norms.
On this front, all interests—company, community, and governments—are
at an early stage of learning about how best to proceed. There is no formula to
draw on for apportioning contribution on this front when it is essential to do
so—only the use of common sense and courtesy in processes of open and
collaborative assessment that are marked on all sides by respect and integrity.
18.5 Steps towards Contribution Analysis
This section describes three concrete examples of steps that have been taken
towards contribution analysis.
18.5.1 The 1997–2002 Assessment and Approval of the
Labrador-based Voisey’s Bay Nickel Project Based on
Assessment of Projected Contribution to Sustainability
Assessment and approval of the massive Voisey’s Bay nickel project occurred
through a landmark environmental assessment process. For the first time,
‘contribution to sustainability’ was used as the basic test of acceptability.
Details of this process are provided in Voisey’s Bay Mine and Mill
Environmental Assessment Panel, 1997. The panel determined that progress
toward sustainable development would require:
1. the preservation of ecosystem integrity, including the capability of nat-
ural systems to maintain their structure and function and to support
biological diversity
2. respect for the right of future generations to the sustainable use of
renewable resources
3. the attainment of durable and equitable social and economic benefits.
Adoption of the sustainability-based decision criteria based on achieving a
net positive contribution changed how the main issues were addressed, how
the project was designed, and what was approved. Further, it shifted the focus
from the mitigation of negative effects during the life of the mine to attaining
net gains over the long term. Critically, it entrenched a collaborative and
ongoing process for monitoring and reporting on project performance against
the sustainability-based criteria. Now in 2018, the project is well into oper-
ation. A strong foundation has been established for long-term success, but the
critical test will come when it enters the closure and post-closure phases.
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18.5.2 A First Nation’s Assessment of Mining’s Contribution:
Past, Present, and Future
In the spring of 2003, the Tahltan First Nation, whose territory covers some
100,000 km2 in north-western British Columbia set out to:
1. assess the relationship—past (say, fifty years ago), present, and sought
future (including specific actions for various interests)—between them-
selves, their land, and the mining industry, taking into consideration
activities on their traditional territory from exploration through oper-
ation, closure, and post-closure
2. build a strategy to guide that relationship in the future.
To guide this assessment, they used the ‘seven questions to sustainability’
assessment framework (MMSD North America 2002) described in Figure 18.3.
The full process and results are described in Tahltan Nation and the
International Institute for Sustainable Development (2004).
The facilitated, but community-driven, process involved collaboratively
assessing past, current, and sought future experience for each of (1) explor-
ation, (2) operation, and (3) closure/post-closure activities in (or projected to
be within) their traditional territory. Available data and experiential anecdotes
of elders and others in the community where compiled as a starting point for
the assessment.
The Tahltan Nation made it very clear that they were prepared to support
mining activities if: (1) mining interests and government respected their values
and concerns; and (2) a fair distribution of benefits, costs and risks, responsibil-
ities, and accountabilities could be achieved. The collaborative assessment pro-
cess combined with the seven-question framework provided a means to fairly
and openly treat not only direct and indirect employment and local procure-
ment of services, but also more sensitive and difficult issues that included:
1. innovative collaborative approaches to the overall management/
co-management of mining-related activities
2. how to move towards a fairer distribution (considering all participating
interests) of all benefits, costs, and risks
3. more effective approaches for addressing environmental and health/
social/cultural implications of mining/mineral activity that in their
view continue to receive inadequate attention.
18.5.3 Strengthening Mining’s Contribution to Poverty Alleviation
In November 2015, the United Nations General Assembly adopted seventeen
Sustainable Development Goals. Highest priority among these is poverty
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alleviation. This example weaves together threads of two thought processes
that focused on strengthening mining’s contribution to poverty alleviation.
In September 2013, the Vatican’s Pontifical Council on Peace and Justice
convened a day of reflection involving some twenty-five individuals drawn
from the mining world and fifteen from the Church and related civil society.
Stemming from this initiative, the Integrity of Creation Working Group, of
the Justice, Peace and Integrity of Creation Commission of the International
Union of Superiors General, convened a second meeting a few days later. It
involved some twenty individuals representing fifteen religious orders of the
Catholic Church along with the president of the ICMM. In both cases, the
focus of discussion was on how the contribution of mining could be strength-
ened for host communities and nations (Hodge 2014).
The Integrity of Creation Working Group met again in May 2014, this time
focusing entirely on the priority issue of mining’s role in poverty alleviation.
They did so recognizing: (1) the potential significant and positive results of
a contribution from mining on this front; and (2) a sense that to gain trust,
the mining industry needs to send a concrete signal that it is not simply
continuing ‘business-as-usual’ on the poverty alleviation front, despite many
fine words being expressed to the contrary.
Simultaneously with these events, Jim Cooney, a former vice president of
Placer Dome Inc. (a large Canadian gold-mining company that subsequently
merged with Barrick Inc.) was also reflecting deeply on mining’s role in
poverty alleviation. He recognized that poverty has both an absolute and a
relative dimension. And while mining contributes demonstrably to economic
growth in host countries and local areas of operations, it also tends to widen
the income gap. This is because mine-generated wealth is more likely to be
directed into the hands of those with the greatest ability to capture and
capitalize on that wealth. For their part, not only are the poor less able to
take advantage of it, but the greater numbers of poor compared to rich means
that the share of wealth that is captured is diluted. In short, the rich get richer
faster than the poor get richer. This widening income gap can lead to a sense of
growing poverty among the poor (Cooney 2014).
Cooney outlined four simple steps for mining companies that would greatly
strengthen mining’s contribution to poverty alleviation:
1. Develop a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of poverty
around their operations.
2. Work collaborately with others to narrow the income gap in local com-
munities and seek a more equitable and sustainable distribution of the
benefits from mining.
3. Regularly assess the changes in the income gaps in local communities,
and if widening is evident, adopt corrective interventions.
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4. Embrace a Poverty Action Plan for the marginalized, working with local
civil society institutions that can assert and advance the best interests of
the marginalized.
The Integrity of Creation Working Group adopted these steps as the core of
an action plan. In addition, they called for: (1) ensuring that all subsidiaries
and service providers were included in the envelope of any given operation,
and (2) industry participation in the four-year, nation-by-nation United
Nations’ Universal Human Rights Periodic Review (Integrity of Creation
Working Group 2014).
Strengthening mining’s contribution to poverty alleviation rather than
serving to exacerbate it is central to the idea of sustainability. The action
plan itself is nothing more than what any company would do to address
other priorities.
18.6 Progress Made, Progress Needed
The examples in Section 18.5 provide strong evidence for the evolution under-
way towards the use of an integrated and ongoing assessment of success
at strengthening mining and metals’ contribution to human and ecosystem
well-being. The elements needed for assessing contribution are available,
the conceptual foundation is clear, and effective practice of various steps along
the way has been demonstrated. In short, much progress has been made. How-
ever, the full step has not yet been taken. The task urgently needs addressing.
Most companies, communities, and governments are not yet driving
decision-making with an assessment of the full contribution of a project
through its full life cycle, even though the practical benefits of doing so are
clear. Instead, they continue to focus their attention on the identification and
mitigation of ‘impacts’—the negatives of human activity—generally at a fixed
point in time such as at licensing or when an accident occurs. Bizarrely, it is
like making a cost–benefit analysis thinking only about part of the costs. This
limited perspective is contributing to the ongoing tensions that exist between
communities, companies, and government.
The chapter makes the following seven assertions:
1. Contribution assessment must be driven by the interlinked ideas of
sustainability and sustainable development. At the core is a value set
best described as parallel care and respect for people and the enveloping
ecosystem, particularly over the long term.
2. Following ideas of results-based management, assessing contribution
should similarly be based on understanding and tracking: (1) human
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well-being (result), (2) ecosystem well-being (result), and (3) the support
generated, and the stress imposed, by the activity on human and ecosys-
tem well-being (means).
3. To be consistent with the ideas of sustainability and sustainable devel-
opment, a project should achieve a net positive contribution to human
and ecosystem well-being over the long term.
4. At an operational level, achieving a ‘net positive contribution to human
and ecosystem well-being over the long term’ should be adopted as the
fundamental two-dimensional criteria for designing, constructing, oper-
ating, and closing mining operations. Thus, it should be similarly used as
the test for project approvals and ongoing success. The shift will require a
change of culture on all sides.
5. For effective assessment of contribution, a generic assessment cycle
should be used involving compilation of insight from both story and
measurement, a rigorous form of synthesis and judgement, and careful
communication that includes listening and respectful sharing of results.
6. Contribution has both substantive and process dimensions. Both must
be addressed.
7. Contribution analysis for mining must span the full project and product
life cycles. Significant unknowns are inevitable; a commitment to con-
tinuous learning and adaptive management is essential.
Extractive industries are bridging activities that are taking us from now
into the future (MMSD North America 2002). They are not ‘sustainable’ in
and of themselves but their contribution to human and ecosystem well-being
should be—and needs to be tested for, tracked over time, and with so many
unknowns, a learning culture instilled if we are to achieve the kind of insights
for low- and middle-income countries that this project is seeking.
References
Anderson, C. J. (2016). Personal communication. Principal, Yirri Global LLC, Greenwood
Village, Colorado.
Ben-Eli,M., J. Neate, J-A. Facella, A.Hodge, T. Isaacs,W. Leiss,M.Margolick, K.Moshanas
Cole and F. Roots (2004). ‘Assessing theOptions: FutureManagement of UsedNuclear
Fuel in Canada’, NWMO Assessment Team Report, June. Toronto: Nuclear Waste
Management Organization. Available at: https://www.nwmo.ca/~/media/Site/Files/
PDFs/2015/11/04/17/33/1092_9-1assessingtheoptions_nwmoass.ashx?la=en.
Berger, A. R. (2007). ‘Where Is Sustainability When Landscapes Change Rapidly?’
LESTARI Public Lecture. Bangi: Institute for Environment and Development
(LESTARI), University of Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Towards Contribution Analysis
391
Brandt Commission on North–South Issues (1980). North–South: A Programme for Sur-
vival. London: Pan Books.
Canada (1993). Canada’s Response to Recommendations in the Sixth Biennial Report of
the International Joint Commission. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada.
Available at:www.ijc.org/files/tinymce/uploaded/documents/reportsAndPublications/
Canada_s%20Response%20To%20The%20Sixth%20Biennial%20Report.pdf.
Cooney, J. P. (2014). ‘Mining within the Context of a “Preferential Option for the
Poor” ’, paper presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Institute of
Mining and Metallurgy (CIM), March.
Daly, H. E. (1989). ‘Sustainable Development: From Concept and Theory towards
Operational Principles’, paper presented at the Hoover Institution Conference, Popu-
lation and Development Review. Also published in H. Daly (1991). Steady State
Economics, 2nd edition. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Denning, S. (2001). The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-era
Organizations. Woborn, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann.
Fischer, F. and J. Forester (1993). The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Gibson, R. (2000). ‘Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to Sustainability as the
Central Criterion for Reviews and Decisions under the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act’, Journal of Environmental Law and Practice, 10(1): 39–54.
Gibson, R. (2002). Specification of Sustainability-based Environmental Assessment Decision
Criteria for Determining Significance in Environmental Assessment. Hull, Quebec:
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.
Gibson, R. with S. Hassan, S. Holtz, J. Tansey, and G. Whitelaw (2006). Sustainability
Assessment: Criteria and Processes. London: Earthscan.
Gunderson, L. H. and C. S. Holling (2009). Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in
Human and Natural Systems. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Hodge, R. A. (1995). ‘Assessing Progress toward Sustainability: Development of a Sys-
temic Framework and Reporting Structure’, PhD dissertation, School of Urban Plan-
ning, Faculty of Engineering, McGill University, Montreal.
Hodge, R. A. (2006). ‘Tracking Progress toward Sustainability: Linking the Power of
Measurement and Story’, Mining Engineering, 58(9): 63–8.
Hodge, R. A. (2011). ‘Mining and Sustainability’, in P. Darling (ed.), SME Mining
Engineering Handbook, 3rd edition, 1665–88. Englewood, CO: Society for Mining
Metallurgy and Exploration Inc.
Hodge, R. A. (2014). ‘Bridging the Language of Mining, Sustainability, and the Social
Doctrine of the Catholic Church’, unpublished discussion paper prepared for the
Integrity of Creation Working Group and the Pontifical Council for Justice and
Peace, The Vatican. London: ICMM.
Hodge, R. A. (2017). ‘Towards Contribution Analysis’, WIDERWorking Paper 2017/19.
Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.
Hodge, R. A. and L. Merkhofer (2008). ‘Faro Mine Closure, Assessing the Alternatives:
An Application of Multi-attribute Utility Analysis’, Final Report of the Faro Closure
Assessment Team. Whitehorse: Assessment and Abandoned Mines Branch Depart-
ment of Energy Mines and Resources, Government of Yukon.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
392
Hodge, R. A. and I. Taggart (1992). ‘Reporting on Sustainability: Human Well-being
within Ecosystem Well-being’, unpublished report prepared for the Policy and
Research Committee, Ontario Round Table on Environment and Economy,
Toronto.
Hodge, T., S. Holtz, C. Smith, and K. Hawke-Baxter (eds) (1995). Pathways to Sustain-
ability: Assessing Our Progress. Ottawa: National Roundtable on the Environment and
the Economy. Available at: http://www.publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_
2016/trnee-nrtee/En134-2-11-1995-eng.pdf.
Humphreys, D. (2015). The Remaking of the Mining Industry. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
ICMM (2016). ‘Mining: Partnerships for Development Toolkit’. Available at: www.
icmm.com/mpd.
Integrity of Creation Working Group (2014). ‘Statement on the Impacts of Mining:
Solidarity for the Common Good and Poverty Reduction’, unpublished note. Rome:
Integrity of Creation Working Group.
IRP (2007). ‘Review of the Remediation Alternatives for the Anvil Range Mine Com-
plex’, final report prepared for Deloitte and Touche Inc., Faro Mine Closure Planning
Office (FMCPO), Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC), Yukon Government, Selkirk
First Nation at Pelly Crossing, Kaska Tribal Council represented by the Ross River
Dena Council. Whitehorse: IRP.
Joyce, S. and I. Thomson (2000). ‘Earning a Social Licence to Operate: Social Accept-
ability and Resource Development in Latin America’, Canadian Mining and Metallur-
gical Bulletin, 49(1037): 49–53.
MMSD (2002). Breaking New Ground: Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development.
London: IIED.
MMSD North America (2002). Seven Questions to Sustainability: How to Assess the Contri-
bution of Mining and Metals Activities. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustain-
able Development. Available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2002/mmsd_sevenquestions.pdf.
Mumford, L. (1934). ‘The Monastery and the Clock’, in D. L. Miller (1986). The Lewis
Mumford Reader. New York: Pantheon Books.
NRTEE (1993). ‘Toward Reporting Progress on Sustainable Development in Canada:
Report to the Prime Minister’. Ottawa: National Round Table on the Environment
and the Economy. Republished as Part I in Hodge, T., S. Holtz, C. Smith, and
K. Hawke Baxter (1995). Pathways to Sustainability: Assessing Our Progress. Ottawa:
National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy.
Owen, J. R. and D. Kemp (2013). ‘Social Licence and Mining: A Critical Perspective’,
Resource Policy, 38(1): 29–35.
Palme Commission on Security and Disarmament (1982). Common Security:
A Programme for Disarmament. London: Pan Books.
Prescott-Allen, R. (2001). The Wellbeing of Nations: A Country-by-Country Index of Quality
of Life and the Environment. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Rawls, J. (1971 [1999]). A Theory of Justice, revised edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Rawls, J. (1987). ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies,
7(1): 1–25.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Towards Contribution Analysis
393
Resolve Solutions Network and theWorld Economic Forum (2016). ‘Voluntary Respon-
sible Mining Initiatives: A Review’. Geneva: WEF Forum. Available at: http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/Voluntary_Responsible_Mining_Initiatives_2016.pdf.
Robinson, J. G., G. Francis, R. Legge, and S. Lerner (1990). ‘Defining a Sustainable
Society: Values, Principles, and Definitions’, Alternatives, 17(2): 36–46.
Tahltan Nation and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (2004).
‘Out of Respect: The Tahltan, Mining, and the Seven Questions to Sustainability’,
report of the Tahltan Mining Symposium, 4–6 April 2003. Winnipeg: International
Institute for Sustainable Development. Available at: www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/natres_
out_of_respect.pdf.
United Nations (2003). Handbook on Non-profit Institutions in the System of National
Accounts. New York: United Nations. Available at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
publication/seriesf/seriesf_91e.pdf.
Voisey’s Bay Mine and Mill Environmental Assessment Panel (1997). ‘Environmental
Impact Statement Guidelines for the Review of the Voisey’s Bay Mine and Mill
Undertaking, 20 June 1997’. Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.
Available at: www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=0A571A1A-1&offset=2&
toc=show.
WCED (1987). Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development. London: Oxford University Press.
Wenar, L. (2013). ‘John Rawls’, in E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, winter 2013 edition. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/
entries/rawls.




The Role of Governance and International
Norms in Managing Natural Resources
James Cust
19.1 Introduction
Countries rich in natural resources face a series of development challenges. As
custodians of resource wealth, they must make difficult policy choices to
maximize the benefits for citizens. However, many of these choices are shaped
or constrained by the institutional or governance context.1 The high rents
often associated with resource extraction place a premium on effective policy
but can also act to exacerbate weaknesses in governance. The resource curse
describes what can happen when the interaction of governance and resource
wealth goes wrong.2
Good or bad governance has great repercussions for poverty and inequality
within resource-rich countries. However, it can also have spillover effects,
affecting governments, companies, investors, and citizens both inside and
outside of producing countries. These externalities give rise to a public goods
problem—good governance of natural resources may have a larger benefit
than the private benefit captured by any national government or single
administration. Further, according to various theories of the resource curse,
the private benefits accruing from conducting bad governance may be greater
still for a small group of elites.
1 This chapter follows the definition of institutions and governance used by much of the
literature on this topic, from North (1990); as institutions defined as the rule of the game in a
society, constituting laws, norms, policies, and codes of conduct.
2 I thank Tony Addison, Alan Roe, Alexis Ballesteros, David Manley, David Mihalyi, and
participants of the UNU-WIDER ‘Extractives for Development’ workshop in Helsinki, May 2016,
for helpful comments, and staff at NRGI for their inputs.
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In response to these externalities a variety of international norms and
initiatives have emerged. They cover a range of aspects of resource govern-
ance, but typically have commonality in their aim to codify successful
historical experience and best practices around effective policy design and
implementation. Further, they may seek to guide decision-makers in their
choices, and, in some cases, to provide external standards as accountability
mechanisms that countries can bind themselves to.
This chapter provides a review of different types of governance codes and
standards for extractive-sector performance and the role of international
efforts to support governance reforms. The chapter offers some critical reflec-
tions on the conceptual foundations as well as the practical experience of these
efforts. Specifically, it examines government-targeted approaches including
the EITI, the Kimberly Process, the Natural Resource Charter (NRC), and the
Africa Mining Vision (AMV).
While oil and minerals prices have fallen from the sustained highs of the
commodity price super-cycle of the 2000s and first half of the 2010s, the stakes
remain high for LICs andMICs. Historically almost 90 per cent of mineral and
oil investments have taken place in upper-middle and HICs. However, by
2030 an estimated US$11–17 trillion of new investment is needed in mineral,
oil, and gas projects in LICs (Dobbs et al. 2013). Research suggests that as
investment has moved towards the Global South, the role of institutional
quality has increasingly come to the forefront of investors’ minds and has
shaped the pattern of investments around the world (Cust and Harding 2014;
Arezki et al. 2016). As well as shaping investment choices, governance and the
quality of institutions also shapes outcomes, and is generally considered to be
the crucial determinant in whether a country succumbs to the resource curse
or not (Barma et al. 2012; Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006).
The chapter provides a critical review of governance initiatives targeting
governments as the key agents of change. We find a mixed picture of success,
where uptake has been strong, for example, in terms of the number of coun-
tries engaging with or signing on to normative frameworks. However, evi-
dence for causal impact remains weak and sometimes limited to anecdotal
evidence. We offer some critical reflections on the challenges these initiatives
have faced and potential ways forward to build on the lessons and achieve-
ments of the past decade.
19.2 What Is the Rationale for Improving Governance
in Resource-rich Economies?
Natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals present a unique set of policy
dilemmas to government. The potential for large revenues or rents arising
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from their extraction means that big government, in a fiscal sense, is hard to
avoid. In nearly all countries, governments are charged by their citizens to
manage resource wealth on their behalf, which invariably entails contracting
resource companies and taxing the revenues derived from the extraction
process. Governments receiving these sizeable tax receipts must then navigate
a series of policy choices on how to manage and distribute these revenues to
maximize economic development gains, while minimizing the risks of mis-
appropriation, patronage, and plunder. Getting it wrong can mean countries
succumbing to the so-called resource curse—see Ross (2014); van der Ploeg
(2011); also Dietsche, Chapter 6, this volume.
Getting it right, and creating outcomes that are robust to politics, has
proved challenging. Putting the right rules and government institutions in
place is a difficult task, and one that is exacerbated by the challenge of doing
so in a highly politicized context. Political cycles can often endanger reform
agendas, and populist politics can create pressures for wasteful spending
or inequitable distribution strategies; see Collier (2017) and Bawumia and
Halland (Chapter 11, this volume). The record in recent years has not been
good (Venables 2016).
However, governance does matter: a wide range of empirical studies dem-
onstrate the important role for institutional setting, policy choices, and good
governance in shaping the risks and rewards associated with resource wealth
(e.g. see Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006). This can operate via
private-sector channels, whereby good governance can reduce the risks or
lower the operating costs faced by investors. Similarly, good governance can
ensure prudence and efficiency in the managing of resource revenues for the
ultimate benefit of citizens, such as via fiscal rules, SWFs or expenditure
policies. Countries that have successfully navigated these challenges include
Chile, with fiscal rules; Norway, with its savings fund; and Botswana, with its
promotion of broad-based human development in spending choices.
How we should define good governance, and what actions matter in this
regard, are widely debated.3 A definition taken from the Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators provides an expansive basis for understanding governance: the
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This
includes: (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and
implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.4
Countries with relatively weak governance—such as a lack of constraints on
executive power—run the heightened risk of various resource curse challenges.
3 This is an issue discussed in greater detail in Dietsche, Chapter 6, this volume.
4 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/WGI/#faq.
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First, elite capture prior to deals, or signing poor deals with extractives
companies, can limit the overall scope for revenues received by government.
This in turn will limit spending options and otherwise implicitly subsidize
extraction by private agents. Upon receipt of revenues governments may be
at additional risk of elite capture, myopic fiscal policies, and dilemmas regard-
ing the inter-generational equity of spending and saving decisions. In the
worst cases, resource wealth in the context of poor governance can exacerbate
corruption and drive conflict.
There is a growing consensus in the academic literature of a conditional
resource curse (Torvik 2002, Mehlum et al. 2006; Robinson et al. 2006), mov-
ing beyond the earlier unconditional view of the resource curse (Sachs and
Warner 1997, 2001; Auty 1994, 2001). By this, it is meant that conditional on
the overall level of governance in a country, resources can result in either a
curse or a blessing. This stands in sharp contrast to the conventional resource
curse hypothesis, where the impact of resources is attributed unconditional
blame for the economic under-performance of the average country defined as
resource-rich.
According to the conditional variant of the resource curse hypothesis, below
some critical governance threshold, resources may be more likely to lead to
negative outcomes relative to a counterfactual of no-resource discovery. On
the other hand, countries enjoying strong prior institutions are more likely
to be able to harness resource wealth for long-term prosperity. For example,
Collier and Goderis (2008) show that while the first few years of commodity
price booms benefit resource-rich African countries, the long-term effects
reduce output by around 25 per cent relative to the counterfactual. They
estimate that for a resource-rich country to benefit from its newfound wealth,
it must possess the governance levels and institutional quality equivalent to
Portugal in the late 1980s. The alternative scenario increases the prospect of
plunder and mismanagement (Collier 2010). Indeed, recent empirical work
has argued that critical thresholds exist in polices and institutions that deter-
mine whether resource abundance leads to perverse political choices (Casselli
and Tesei 2016) and whether major oil discoveries lead to short-run growth
disappointments or not (Cust and Mihalyi 2017).
19.2.1 The Emergence of Governance Initiatives
The international community has built various rules and guidelines, with
notable successes, originating from the challenges faced in OECD countries,
such as the Basel standards for banking, and theWTO for trade (Collier 2008).
Recent years have seen the wider creation and adoption of codes and
standards that are more obviously of relevance to the specific challenges
faced in development and by developing countries. Examples include the
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International Court of Justice, the international monitoring of elections, as
well as environmental codes and more recently best practice guidelines for
the extractives sector.
Since the beginning of the most recent commodity price super-cycle, start-
ing in roughly 2002, a multitude of guidelines, codes, best practice manuals,
scorecards, and assessment tools have been proposed.5 Many of these have
explicitly targeted the governments of resource-rich countries, seeking to
provide them with additional tools to navigate policy choices and otherwise
act to improve governance in the resource sector.
A pioneer in the extractives sector was the Kimberly Process Certification
Scheme (KPCS). This international certification and monitoring initiative
emerged in response to concerns around resources being used to trigger and
sustain violent conflict, in the hope of regulating the trade of so-called blood
diamonds. Subsequent to KPCS, the most widely adopted has been the EITI,
initiated in 2002, which encourages action by both government and compan-
ies to release information about the tax revenues received and paid in the
course of extraction.
Since KPCS and EITI, others have followed such the NRC and the AMV. In
some cases, these movements have spawned legislative steps, such as US
resource revenue transparency legislation in section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank
Act 2010 (Dodd–Frank 2010), which, while repealed under the Trump admin-
istration, has led to similar actions across the European Union, Canada, and
Norway.
The codes and standards discussed in this chapter share several common
features. They seek to support domestic political institutions and policy
makers via normative benchmarks or thresholds for countries to meet. For
example, the EITI and KPCS give you member status if you meet their stand-
ards, which are commonly applied across the globe. NRC and AMC provide
principles that countries can integrate into their own reforms but which they
are not required to adopt in part or in full. NRC and AMV are more wide
ranging, speaking to the entire chain of decisions countries face when seeking
to harness their resource wealth. EITI and KPCS, for example, have been more
focused on specific challenges or areas of weakness in the governance of
resources. All, however, speak to the role and actions of government in the
process of resource exploitation, and as the custodian of resource wealth on
behalf of a country’s citizens.
Beyond good governance initiatives there are a plethora of efforts relating to
corporate standards, such as the ICMM Principles laying out good practice
guidelines formining companies, and IFC Performance Standards for companies
5 An extensive list of these is included in Hodge (2017).
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receiving IFC financing. Others address pressing environmental and social risks.
While important, these lie beyond the scope of this chapter.
19.3 What Are the Governance Challenges Posed
by Resource Wealth?
Resource wealth creates several additional challenges for developing countries
and their governments; it makes governing harder, it makes strengthening
institutions harder still, and in the meantime it can erode institutions, poten-
tially fuelling a move towards autocracy.
First, the presence of resource wealth may make aspects of governance
harder, regardless of the institutions the country inherits prior to discovery.
Drivers of this challenge arise from the rents or revenue windfalls associated
with resource extraction. Such rents can often be a magnet for elevated public
expectations of public service delivery. These expectations may be hard to
fulfil, particularly within time frames that may not align closely to the pro-
duction life cycle of the extractive sectors. Relatedly, resource extraction
and rents raise difficult challenges of balancing inter-temporal and inter-
generational priorities. The non-renewable nature of such resources makes
the inter-temporal trade-offs much sharper than is the case with the proceeds
from other public assets. Finally, populist policies can become more tempting
and viable when large revenue windfalls are available for distribution, even at
the expense of these inter-temporal trade-offs. Combating such populist ten-
dencies is a difficult task for governments of all stripes and competencies.
Second, improving institutions is made more challenging in the face of
resource wealth, especially for countries possessing relatively weak institu-
tions at the time of discovery. And yet, strengthening institutions over time
remains a core component of driving prosperity. Resource wealth can make
governance reforms harder to implement and ultimately less likely to succeed
or survive political cycles and changes of government. This is due to the
increased vested interests around current ways of managing the sector, com-
pounded by the scale of rents available to those engaged in the sector—either
via the private or public sector. Furthermore, any reforms that seek to disrupt
these vested interests may face forceful challenges and ultimately be over-
turned when governments change (or, in the worst cases, are overthrown).
Third, resource wealth can serve to erode the very institutions that need to
be strong and strengthened during the period of resource exploitation. Gov-
ernments seeking to meet public expectations or political commitments for
increased spending, including on public goods, may be tempted to pressure
central banks to play a more political role—such as occurred in Ghana after its
discovery of oil in 2007; see Bawumia and Halland (Chapter 11, this volume).
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Such pressure can undermine the independence of such institutions, weakening
their strength to pursue their main objectives of monetary prudence and price
stability more generally. Similarly, resource windfalls can create pressure to
flout fiscal rules and other checks and balances on government spending that
might not otherwise have been tested. In some cases, institutional quality can
actually deteriorate in the face of resource wealth (Ross 2001).
19.4 What Is the Rationale for Codes and Standards?
The resource sector—and the various challenges discussed above—exemplifies
why there is a potential role for standards and codes that are overseen by
various external agencies such as the EITI. The special characteristics of the
resource sector and how it relates to political and economic institutions mean
that the potential usefulness of codes and standards is higher than elsewhere
in the economy.
First, due to the scale of government revenues in resource-dependent coun-
tries, the demand for overseas development assistance (ODA) may be lower
than for countries otherwise similar in income or poverty characteristics. Aid
tends to be associated with institution-building—at least in its intent with
respect to multilateral aid and bilateral aid from OECD Development Assist-
ance Committee (DAC) donors. By contrast, inflows of resource revenues have
little institution-building imperative (including better regulation of the sector
itself) and therefore may be more open to abuse and less likely to generate
such outcomes.6 Taken together this means conventional channels of support
via aid flows are less useful to resource-rich countries, while less conventional
global public goods such as codes and standards may now be relatively more
valuable.
Second, the governance challenges and risks posed by resource extraction
mean that there is likely to be a premium on getting rules and safeguards
in place early (and preferably prior to exploration and exploitation) when
policy decisions may already have been made that influence whether the
resource sector has a positive or negative economic (and social) impact over
the longer term. Making a bad rather than a good deal in the very early stages
of developing a resource sector can cast a long shadow—with negative conse-
quences persisting far into the future. Here, therefore, guides that address
what lessons other counties have learned, or standards that reflect expertise
6 It is important to note that both resource revenues and ODA as sources of external financemay
be seen to delay or deter governments building a tax base among the general population, which in
turn may weaken the social contract. Authors such as Besley and Persson (2013) argue for such
mechanisms.
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on how a country might proceed can be valuable at a time of competing
interests, especially if a country has little prior experience of navigating
these new interest groups and new technical challenges.
Third, the process of exploiting resource wealth is far from smooth: the
number and size of deposits discovered and then exploited is ‘lumpy’; many
yearsmay elapse between investments, so that current policymakers have little
accumulated experience. Such time frames are compounded by the number
of economic agents involved (who may have considerably more experience
than governments), all implying that governmentsmay have very few ‘rounds
of the game’ in which to ‘experiment’ and get policy right. This limits the
opportunities for learning by doing, and for mid-course corrections based on
experience. These characteristics of the sector magnify the ex ante value of peer
learning as well as drawing from international and historical experience.
Finally, good or bad resource governance has spillovers both internationally
and inter-generationally. The social benefits to good national resource gov-
ernance may exceed the gains to any individual government administration.
Meanwhile bad governance can lead to regional instability, expropriation of
international investors, or disruption in resource supply chains relied upon by
resource-importing countries and consumers worldwide. Such features create
a case for provision of global public goods in the form of efforts to bolster
strong governance in resource-exporting countries. Here there may be a par-
ticularly high payoff to investments in such public goods; if such tools can
avert bad policy choices early in the cycle of resource exploitation, the impact
on poverty reduction and economic growth may substantially dwarf the
initial cost of such efforts.
19.4.1 The Policy Makers’ Dilemmas
Policymakers also face a series of dilemmas. Policymistakes during a boom are
costly, but with slow feedback loops. For example, the policy lessons from the
1970s commodity boom only emerged once that boomwas over in the 1980s.
Likewise, the full implications and lessons from the recent commodity price
super-cycle may not be fully known for several years, limiting the ability of
governments to react and respond in a timely manner. This is especially the
case in those countries where the resources profile is limited in duration to a
decade or two. Strengthening governance is a slow process. The payoff to
reforms likely exceeds the length of the political cycles of many countries
under the normal conditions of multi-party democracy, leading to delay and
underinvestment in the necessary institution-building. Furthermore, the
needs of the private sector may run counter to citizen priorities. Decision-
makers must grapple with how to balance these trade-offs: for example, the
trade-off over the speed of the investment and the jobs and revenue it brings,
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versus the need to protect the rights of the community as well as the natural
environment and future generations.
Given this context, external codes can bring credibility and rigour. They can
provide a general reference for best practice. This in turn can lower the costs of
understanding and information by helpfully collating experience and view-
points into a single location, for governments to then draw upon. This can be
particularly valuable for governments in countries with weak technical cap-
acity in key ministries; they do not have to start from scratch when a well-
developed body of knowledge and practice and associated technical guidance
is available to them. Furthermore, by providing a general reference that draws
on international expertise and experience, these external codes can provide a
credible source for best practice—thereby cutting through politicized domes-
tic arguments and allowing every country to benefit from countries which
have followed a similar but earlier path.
In addition to providing a useful point of reference, external codes can
also provide a potential anchor for political commitment. Decision-makers
can ‘bind themselves to the mast’ of an external code, or codes, thus restrict-
ing their own government’s or successive governments’ ability to deviate from
particular policy choices. In technical jargon this can help overcome the time-
inconsistency associated with many policy dimensions of resource
management.
External codes can seek to induce changes in government behaviour––such
as the EITI which requires countries to make transparent the tax receipts and
other information associated with the extractives sector. However, such steps
are not costless—they can upset interest groups or even impose direct ‘costs’
on elected officials who may find channels of earning illicit money harder to
access. Such costliness can operate as a positive feature rather than as a
limitation; in the language of political economy scholarship, it acts as a signal
of ‘type’, whereby the ‘cost’ of compliance is greater for politicians engaged in
corruption, compared to the honest politicians who are not. Thus, the sig-
nal––such as signing up to EITI––can be observed by voters who can then infer
that honest politicians are more likely to pursue such steps since it is less
‘costly’ for them to do so. This may help build political coalitions that support
honest politicians, leading to real improvements over time.
19.5 What Is at Stake?
The governance challenges of harnessing non-renewable resources begin with
the decision to open the country for exploration and prospecting, and then
span all the way through to choices around the spending of revenues and to
the development path of the country beyond the lifetime of the resource
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wealth. Furthermore, the challenges relate to the public sector, to the private
sector, as well as to the role of international companies and to cross-border
challenges. Guides such as the NRC discuss the trade-offs and choices coun-
tries face (Cust and Manley 2014). Historical experience points to both suc-
cesses and failures at each stage of the so-called decision chain, beginningwith
the decision by a country to explore and extract, through to how the proceeds
will be used to support sustainable development.
First, normative guides typically point to the high cost of failure. Policy
missteps and mismanagement of extractive wealth has carried a significant
price for some developing countries. Between 1997 and 2002, for example,
around US$4.2 billion of revenue ‘disappeared’ in Angola—more than the
country’s total ODA receipts for that decade (IMF 2012). For the period
2007–10, the IMF found US$32 billion in unaccounted government funds,
equivalent to a quarter of Angola’s annual GDP. Despite its oil wealth, Angola
ranks 148th on the Human Development Index. Similarly, numerous reports
of missing money emerge from Nigeria on a regular basis. Between 2010 and
2012 the Africa Progress Panel (2013) reported a missing US$6.8 billion lost
because of corruption and mismanagement of fuel subsidies. Meanwhile,
the Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force identified losses of US$29 billion
(FMPR 2012).
On the other hand, key policy levers can yield big benefits when they are
implemented well. The opportunities for gains are no less significant in rev-
enue and public expenditure management, when prudent and sometimes
technically complex policies are pursued. Codes and standards can help cap-
ture successful policies or reforms, spreading their lessons elsewhere. One
example of a policy success was in Mexico. The government was able to save
$5 billion in potentially lost revenues during a price dip in 2009 by means of
careful hedging against future oil prices (Thomson 2012). This amount was
equivalent to 7 per cent of the government’s revenue, and just under half of
total FDI (US$11.4 billion). Nigeria’s reform of public procurement delivered
similarly major benefits in the efficiency of public spending. Prior to 1999 the
government lost an average of about US$300 million each year from corrupt
practices in public procurement (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007).
Since the reform of the procurement system the federal government has
saved an estimated US$1.5 billion over the period 2001–7 in the form of better
contract prices, while the initial prices quoted by various government con-
tractors have also declined significantly.
The stakes are high but the potential gains can be higher. Between the late
1960s and 2000, Botswana, for example, has recorded an average growth rate
of 7 per cent per annum. This has supported average growth in primary school
enrolment of 4.8 per cent per year, every year. In contrast, the DRC collected
only US$92million inminerals’ taxes and tariffs on estimatedmineral exports
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of US$2 billion in 2008 (Bauer and Quiroz 2013). Cameroon has been esti-
mated to collect roughly 12 cents on the dollar for its oil; Norway 78 cents on
the dollar (Bauer and Quiroz 2013). Such gaps may emerge from different
hidden costs to companies, arising from political risk or instability. On the
other hand, governments may be able to catch more revenue via better-
negotiated deals or fiscal terms.
19.6 Examples of Codes and Standards
During the recent commodity super-cycle a wide range of external codes,
standards, and best practice guides were created and recommended for adop-
tion by resource-rich counties. Some have focused on economic policy-
making, such as the AMV or NRC. Others have focused on anti-corruption
and transparency, such as EITI, while a final category, such as the ICMM
Principles or the IFC Performance Standards, have concentrated on the private
sector’s role and responsibilities as an effective development partner to
government. Our focus in this chapter is on the codes, standards, and best
practice guides addressed primarily to governments and to those engaged in
policymaking and design.
19.6.1 The Benefits of Transparency
Transparency’s benefits as a potential pathway to increased accountability
are widely espoused. Indeed, much effort has been put into changing the
transparency behaviours of key actors in the resource sector such as govern-
ments and operating companies. There is good evidence that behaviour
change has occurred. However, scientific evidence for the impact of changing
transparency—such as the role it may play in delivering a reduction in cor-
ruption and conflict or increasing accountability—has proved elusive.
International voluntary standards such as the EITI have proved effective in
changing practices around the disclosure by governments and companies of
payments made for resources. Between 2003 and 2008, over 150 companies
and their affiliates reported under the EITI process in Africa, covering over
US$130 billion in revenues paid to governments. Such efforts have spurred
binding ‘publish what you pay’ legislation now passed in Norway, Canada,
and the European Union and new listing requirements now required on the
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. TheDodd–Frank Act (section 1504) which (before
its repeal in 2017) required disaggregated reporting of payments would have
applied to 90 per cent of the world’s largest internationally operating oil and
gas companies, as well as eight of the world’s ten largest mining companies.
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Some of the best evidence we have is related to transparency and the cost of
capital. Glennerster and Shin (2008) find that countries that choose to become
more transparent experience lower borrowing costs. Henisz et al. (2014) find
that close to two-thirds of the market capitalization of twenty-six publicly
traded gold mining companies are a function of on-the-ground stakeholder
engagement practices and political risk, whereas only 37 per cent is a function
of the value of gold they control.
19.6.2 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EITI was created on the back of growing civil society pressure for transparency
in the resource sector. The idea was first floated by Tony Blair, the then UK
prime minister, at a conference on sustainable development. A coalition of
international and domestic NGOs took shape in 2003, and operated under the
name of Publish What You Pay. The formation of EITI followed soon after.
EITI’s original mission and mandate was to help alleviate corruption, both
perceived and real, in the extractive sector, by revealing to the public the
amount companies were paying in taxes to government and to reconcile
those numbers against what governments reported receiving.
The first countries announcing their intention to join EITI came in 2003. To
achieve EITI ‘compliance’ countries had to successfully complete Reconcili-
ation Reports which compiled company disclosureswith government reported
receipts and reconciled the two sets of information. This was conducted by
an independent administrator.
In 2013 a new EITI Standard was adopted which updated the rules of the
initiative, broadening the focus to encompass a wider set of transparency
measures. The initiative has seen a broadening of focus to include transpar-
ency on other dimensions of resource sectors including more contextual
information about sectors, production, contracts, beneficial ownership of
licences, and so forth.7 Between 2003 and 2017, some fifty-two countries
announced implementation; and are at various stages towards compliance
with the rules of EITI.8 Of those, forty-six have published revenue numbers
in some form, while the number of fully ‘compliant’ countries stood at
twenty-six in 2016.
19.6.2.1 HAS EITI HAD A POSITIVE IMPACT?
Measured in terms of uptake EITI has become a widespread standard for
resource-rich countries. This has led to behaviour change in many as EITI
7 https://eiti.org/document/standard.
8 The withdrawal of the United States from EITI in late 2017 has subsequently reduced this
number to fifty-one, see https://eiti.org/explore-data-portal.
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reports contain published revenue numbers that would otherwise not be
available in the public domain in the same form.
While setbacks such as the 2017 withdrawal of Azerbaijan and the United
States demonstrate that backsliding can occur, new countries continue to join.
The swelling number of members indicates a strong appetite and momentum
for signing up to EITI’s goals. The number of countries publishing revenue
numbers is also high, reflecting more than mere tokenism in the intention
to implement EITI rules. However, evaluating positive attributable impacts to
EITI is a tricky task and one that a burgeoning number of evaluations are
attempting to take on.
There are several examples of potentially attributable impacts of EITI
membership—that is, those that would not have occurred in EITI’s absence.
For example, Nigeria’s 2005 EITI report shows that over US$500 million in oil
taxes had not been collected or had gone missing; this is more than seven
times the amount the government spent on agriculture that year (EITI 2008).
In 2012, a Nigerian EITI report uncovered $800 million in discrepancies
between what companies said they paid and what the government received,
an amount exceeding the individual budgets of the ministries of health and
education. Of the US$800 million, US$560 million proved to be a shortfall
in company payments (EITI 2012). According to De Sa (2013) EITI reports
between 1999 and 2008 identified a loss of US$2.6 billion in revenues and a
failure by oil companies to pay US$9.9 billion in royalties. These findings have
enabled Nigeria to recover US$2.4 billion to date. In Tanzania, the EITI ana-
lysis showed that companies paid lower taxes for extraction than the with-
holding tax paid on income payments to employees in 2008. These findings
are supported by other anecdotal stories. For example, the interest spread
on Nigerian government bonds (above US Treasury bonds) dropped from
13 to 6.9 per cent between 2002 and 2003 and continued to decline steadily
through 2006 as Nigeria implemented the EITI and adopted strong transpar-
ency measures.
EITI’s supporters argue that examples of discovered discrepancies—which
are potentially recoverable—may alone justify EITI’s global financial expense,
as well as the political capital expenditure it entails. However, such isolated
cases are hard to falsify or evaluate scientifically—for example, how much of
these discrepancies could and would have been found by other less costly
means remains unknown. A further challenge posed for those seeking to
evaluate the impact and success of EITI is the lack of a clearly articulated
theory of change—an expression of how EITI might be expected to make its
impact and therefore to identify some measures of success or failure more
rigorously.
A useful activity would be to ground future EITI activities and strategy in
a framework that facilitates both rigorous testing of impact, but also the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Role of Governance and International Norms
407
potential for falsification of the underlying and implicit theories of impact.
The expansion of the EITI Standard may offer opportunity to stagger rollout
of certain reporting features, allowing for an experimental testing of impact
between countries.
19.6.2.2 HAS EITI IMPROVED THE AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION
ABOUT PUBLIC REVENUE FROM EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES?
One metric by which EITI might reasonably be evaluated is a proximate
operational measure of success such as the actual availability of published
government revenue data from extractives. A metric such as this may not
connect directly to impacts or outcomes, but might be a good gauge of the
healthiness of the initiative, especially in a sector where policy impacts and
desired outcomes, such as reduced corruption, are likely to be very hard to
measure directly and may in any case take a long time to manifest themselves.
The availability of published government revenue data from countries
adopting EITI is one of EITI’s core requirements, and a chief mechanism by
which EITI may, in principle, achieve its impact. As noted earlier, forty-six
countries had by 2015 published government revenue numbers in some form
during the period under review. A key question is whether this is a big number
or a small number relative to what information may already be available via
other means. Other questions are what additional value such publishing
might bring, if any, and whether it is likely that such additional disclosures
may have an impact on behaviour.
The case of Africa is a good example to examine in addressing these ques-
tions since this is a continent characterized by relative opacity in the extrac-
tives sector and poor data collection systems in some countries (Jerven 2013).
Taking 2010 as a sample year, for which there is coverage from three different
sources, we see resource revenue figures within sub-Saharan Africa from
twenty-one countries in EITI reports, eighteen countries in IMF research,
and twelve countries in the International Centre for Tax and Development
(ICTD) database, with only limited overlaps.9 For additional analysis, includ-
ing comparisons for 2014, please also see Mihalyi and Fleming (2017).
This implies that EITI is reaching countries that otherwise do not have
available data. Additionally, it improves our picture of government revenue
data for the Africa region as a whole. However, there are several caveats to
consider. First, these revenue numbers remain non-comparable across coun-
tries due to inconsistencies in the EITI reporting formats. Steps are now being
taken to align reporting fields with the IMF Government Finance Statistics
9 http://www.ictd.ac/datasets/the-ictd-government-revenue-dataset.
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(GFS) methodology and may yield greater consistency across countries and
time.10 The second challenge is data quality, which remains a challenge in
EITI reporting countries due to the approach of self-reporting and reconcili-
ation; this does not align to IMF data collection standards that would make
such data suitable for inclusion in official statistics. Finally, the reporting is too
infrequent and unpredictable to lend itself to time-series analysis or compari-
son for EITI reporting countries, although progress is beingmade to reduce the
time lag of reporting. Sierra Leone andMyanmar, both EITImember countries,
have latest data available only from 2014 in 2018.
The IMF and World Bank are yet to include EITI reported numbers in their
statistical databases, while few governments currently report EITI revenues as
part of their official government statistics. It is hoped that improvements
to methodological consistency and alignment, alongside improvements in
timeliness and data quality, can elevate EITI data to a status equivalent to
that of the data from international institutions. Until this happens it remains
a significant unfulfilled potential that EITI is yet to provide resource revenue
data considered sufficiently authoritative to gain widespread usage.
19.6.2.3 HOW HAS GOOD GOVERNANCE EVOLVED
IN EITI ADOPTING COUNTRIES?
Adoption of EITI does not occur in a vacuum. As such it is worth reflecting on
the wider governance environment surrounding EITI. Various hypotheses
around EITI adoption have been considered. For example, it might be argued
that adoption is associated with a reforming government, in which case we
might expect to observe other governance indicators improving concurrently
to EITI. This would not necessarily imply causality from EITI, but may be
reflective of the more positive governance steps being taken at the same
time. In contrast, we might hypothesize that EITI implementation could be
accompanied by backsliding on other governance indicators, whereby gov-
ernments use such initiatives as an international ‘fig leaf ’ of reform, mean-
while neglecting more impactful or costly reforms, or even reversing good
governance progress.
Kaufmann (2014) analyses trends in various Worldwide Governance Indi-
cator variables pre- and post- entry as a EITI member country. His observed
trends do not show any strong evidence for backsliding, nor do they show
significant improvement in two broad-based measures of governance: voice
and accountability, and the control of corruption. If anything, this provides
more support for the hypothesis that EITI adoption is not part of a broader
reform package but may even be used domestically to delay or substitute for
10 https://eiti.org/document/eiti-summary-data-template.
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alternative domestic reforms. This in turnmay give pause for reflection on the
way EITI may complement or substitute for other reforms and whether one
might expect improvement in other indicators to be associated with its adop-
tion as a broader metric of success.
19.6.2.4 REFLECTING ON THE FIRST DECADE OF EITI
Various studies have been conducted with the objective of evaluating the
success and impact of EITI. These have ranged from qualitative studies with
a focus on operational and managerial performance, through to quantitative
studies seeking to identify evidence for cross-country trends or impacts result-
ing from EITI’s adoption.
Most recently, Rustad et al. (2017) have examined the objectives and suc-
cesses of EITI. They note that ‘in many ways the EITI has succeeded in terms
of reaching its institutional goals and some of its operational goals, in particu-
lar when it comes to producing annual reports. The EITI has through
several measures engaged the civil society groups, particularly through the
Multi-Stakeholder Group, but seems to have failed to empower the public to
hold the governments and companies to account.’ However, they caution
that evaluations of EITI may not have thus far used the right criteria to
measure success.
As noted in a recent GIZ review of EITI (GIZ 2016) a number of authors
express concern regarding the lack of results-based monitoring and evaluation
systems and/or demand their improvement (e.g. EITI Scanteam 2011, MSI
Integrity 2013, and Scanteam 2015). The same GIZ study concludes that it
was difficult to establish the views held by stakeholders outside of those
directly participating in the initiative. Supporting evidence for the EITI’s
impact is largely either anecdotal or based on the perceptions of stakeholders
belonging to the ‘in-group’—those NGOs, donors, private-sector actors and
other experts involved via either the EITI board or membership of EITI multi-
stakeholder groups, or otherwise engaged in extractives transparency directly.
As noted earlier, over the period 2003–17, fifty-two countries announced
implementation and have reached various stages towards compliance with
the rules of EITI. Of those, forty-six have published revenue numbers in some
form, while the number of fully ‘compliant’ countries stood at twenty-six in
2015. This constitutes a significant scaling up of the initiative as a truly global
effort, spanning fragile states, LICs and MICs, as well as high-income OECD
countries. EITI’s expansion accompanies, andmay in part be responsible for, a
spreading norm of transparency in the extractives sector. For example, con-
tracts are increasingly being disclosed. This trend began before its inclusion in
the new EITI Standard as a reporting recommendation; however, it has
received wider momentum since its inclusion. While it remains only a recom-
mendation rather than a requirement under EITI, many hope that its presence
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in EITI may further raise the profile of this emerging norm and help it spread
to other jurisdictions.
Many evaluations and commentators praise EITI for its role in providing
a platform for dialogue among stakeholders in countries where other avenues
for such dialogue may have been difficult or even impossible. Rich and
Moberg (2017), drawing on their experiences running the EITI international
secretariat, highlight the multi-stakeholder platforms created under EITI as an
important component and strength of the initiative. Providing a platform for
citizen dialogue was not the primary aim of EITI; however, it may constitute
a valuable ancillary benefit and could yet emerge as its key contribution to
improving governance.
An emphasis on promoting transparency in poor governance environments
may be risky according to leading academics researching the role of govern-
ance in economic development. Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) note that
marginal reforms of the resource sectors such as EITI might even make things
worse. One issue they point to is that the feasible path out of poverty for most
countries with poor institutions is a messy one involving much compromise
and many bargains. In such circumstances, a feasible model of developmental
patrimonialism may well involve tolerating some amount of extraction of
resource rents and other aspects of patrimonialism by the elite in exchange
for allowing institution-building elsewhere in the state: for example, allowing
the development of other fiscal bases such as a value-added tax and perhaps
the building of a bureaucracy that can be a constraint on worse abuses in the
future. In certain circumstances Acemoglu and Robinson argue that ‘an obses-
sion with the application of EITI might be counter-productive’.11
Looking ahead, experts are now increasingly pointing to the challenge of
‘managing expectations’ and to the task of building an informed citizenry
(Collier 2017) to hold government accountable and to demand good govern-
ance in resource-rich countries. Here a norm of transparency, platforms for
dialogue, and a vibrant civil society that can help citizens understand choices
made in their extractives sector may all prove invaluable tools in the
challenges ahead.
19.6.3 The Regulation of Conflict Minerals
One of the resource curse mechanisms identified in the research literature is
the role of conflict. Here resources may act as a trigger but also as a means of
sustaining the financing of conflict, thus contributing to both conflict inci-
dence and duration (Berman et al. 2017; Collier andHoeffler 2004; Ross 2014).
11 http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2013/9/12/what-could-be-wrong-with-extractive-industries-
transparency.html.
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Valuable minerals produced by small-scale mines, so-called point source
minerals, can be easily appropriated by despotic governments, warlords, and
militia, compared to resources such as oil which requiremore capital-intensive
and technically sophisticated extraction, or agricultural products which have
relatively few rents associated with them, and where any rents are more
geographically disbursed. Furthermore, minerals with high value to weight
ratios are also well suited to illicit trade and can be used to buy arms. As such,
certain minerals are particularly susceptible to being connected to conflict
(Lujala et al. 2005). These include gold, diamonds, silver, coltan, gemstones,
and some other precious metals. Most famously, ‘blood diamonds’ financed
armed conflicts in West Africa and led to the establishment of the Kimberley
Process, a cooperative venture between governments, the diamond trade, and
NGOs, under which the conflict-free origin is certified.
The KPCS was established by the UN in 2003. It is supposed to ensure that
revenues from the diamond trade are not financing violence by rebel move-
ments and undermining legitimate governments. KPCS also requires member
countries to collect and publish data on mining and international trade in
diamonds. In addition to the Kimberley Process, governments and the inter-
national community have sought other means to decouple resources and
conflict via a variety of policy mechanisms and market instruments. The
United States was the first to legislate (the Dodd–Frank Act); but the European
Union is following closely behind. In 2010 the United States passed the Dodd–
Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act which included
provision 1502 aimed at stemming the trade in conflict minerals (a broader
definition than in the diamond trade covered under Kimberley). Here the rules
put the onus on companies rather than via a certification scheme, with the
objective to improve supply-chain management to ensure minerals were not
being sourced from conflict-affected regions, in particular the Eastern DRC
and neighbouring countries.
What has happened? Since the introduction of these schemes, the buyers of
valuable minerals have been deterred from sourcing their raw materials from
the DRC and neighbouring countries. This has reduced demand in these
countries which has impacted the ability to finance conflict, but may have
also harmed livelihoods for miners and their families. Further consequences
have included a deterrence effect for sourcing from artisanal miners, whomay
be less able to validate their supply chains compared to larger-scale mines or
traders. Debate continues as to whether the improvement in security has been
significant, and if it has, whether it exceeds the damage to livelihoods of some
of the poorest people in the world (Seay 2012; Parker et al. 2016). The OECD
Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas may also support efforts to mitigate
the trade in illicit minerals and conflict minerals.
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19.6.4 Best Practices and Economic Policy Guides for Policy Makers
Several initiatives have focused on the challenges faced by policy makers with
particular reference to the economic governance of resources such as the
African Union’s AMV (African Union 2009) and the NRC (Cust and Manley
2014). They have focused more on the synthesizing and sharing of knowledge
based on historical experiences and expert consensus on how countries might
act to make the most of resource wealth. However, like standards-based clubs
such as EITI, they also face some of the same shortcomings, including com-
plex and untested theories of change as well as measures of success that are
hard to conceptualize or quantify.
19.6.4.1 AFRICA MINING VISION
Created by the members of the African Union (AU) in 2009, the AMV12 is a
policy framework designed to lay down principles for individual countries to
harness their mineral wealth for economic development.13 It is intended to
provide a rubric for promoting broad-based benefits from mineral exploit-
ation, and to help shift the sector beyond enclave development to becoming
a more integrated sector to the rest of the economy. An action plan followed
in 2011 that laid down the need for a specialist agency to oversee continental
implementation of the AMV and nine clusters of activity across different
policy priorities.
The AMV covers various policy considerations along the mineral value
chain, from issues around exploration and project development, through
taxation and safeguards, to revenue management, downstream value add-
ition, and linkages to the rest of the economy. The AMV emphasizes
resource-driven development, pointing to the potential positive benefits
from resource exploitation in contrast to the more pessimistic view of
resources’ impact on prosperity identified in the academic literature on the
resource curse. The AMV does, however, note the centrality of good govern-
ance to achieving the goals laid out, including support for transparency and
certification schemes, thus internalizing the conclusions of the conditional
resource curse thesis; namely that conditional on getting governance right,
resource wealth can be a blessing (van der Ploeg 2011; Ross 2014).
Country Mining Vision (CMV) is the mechanism by which the AMV is
intended to be translated into practical policy prescriptions at the country
level. Intended to bring together dialogue among different stakeholders (gov-
ernment, industry, and civil society), the CMVs are intended to be an inclu-
sive and deliberative policy-setting process. The AfricanMineral Development
12 http://www.africaminingvision.org/.
13 The AMVwas developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa on behalf of
the African Union Commission and was universally adopted by AU Heads of State.
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Center was created to support the implementation of CMVs. Eight years after
its inception, questions remain over the slow pace of implementation, and
whether it is meeting the purposes for which it was created (Ushie 2017).
Despite being endorsed by all fifty-four member states of the AU, by early 2017
only one country, Lesotho, has fully adopted the AMV through the develop-
ment of a CMV. Oxfam points to the lack of engagement with civil society as
one of the shortcomings of the approach.
19.6.4.2 NATURAL RESOURCE CHARTER
The NRC,14 launched in 2009, is an exercise to synthesize best practice lessons
from country experience and academic research. The twelve precepts of the
NRC identified the key ‘links in the chain’ countries needed to get right to
successfully transform subsoil resources into economic prosperity, without
compromising sustainability.15 The Charter recognizes the fragility of the
process of resource exploitation and that any weak link in the chain could
push countries onto a pathway towards the resource curse. It therefore empha-
sizes a holistic policy perspective towards addressing gaps and key shortcom-
ings to ensure the whole process is managed carefully (Cust 2013).16 In
addition, it emphasizes the important role of an authorizing environment
that spans traditional government ministries, noting that the challenges of
resource wealth span ministries of energy, minerals, finance, and environ-
mental agencies, tax administration and those responsible for national devel-
opment strategies.
Spanning issues from exploration, contract negotiation, taxation, revenue
management, and investing for sustainable development, the Charter identi-
fies key recommendations as well as policy trade-offs that countries need to
consider. It does not provide a one-size-fits-all prescription, but rather a com-
pilation of the policy ingredients that have proved successful in different
country contexts. The precepts capture the high-level general principles of
successful resource management that can be achieved via different means.
The NRC empathizes the role for both careful policy design and engagement
with an informed citizenry. It recognizes the need for governments to get
decisions right early and continuously, but that the only longer-term protection
14 https://resourcegovernance.org/approach/natural-resource-charter.
15 The Charter was led by a distinguished Oversight Board, chaired by Ernesto Zedillo, the
former President of Mexico, and accompanied by Mo Ibrahim, Shengman Zhang, Luisa Diogo,
and Abdulatif Al-Hamad. Its content and recommendations were developed and maintained by a
Technical Advisory Committee chaired by Michael Spence, Nobel Laureate in Economics, and
joined by leading academics and practitioners including Paul Collier, Tony Venables, Karin
Lissakers, Joseph Bell, Bob Conrad, and Michael Ross.
16 In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted the author of this chapter served as the
founding staff member and led the secretariat of the Natural Resource Charter during 2009–13.
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against the resource curse comes from an environment of accountability to
citizen demands and responsiveness of the state.
The implementation of the NRC at the country level is applied via the NRC
Benchmarking Framework. This toolkit provides the means for countries to
self-assess against the twelve precepts of the NRC to identify policy gaps and
shortfalls. This then allows the formulation of a policy action plan that can
help countries lay out the policy priorities. The NRC benchmarking frame-
work has now been applied in a range of resource-rich countries—including
Nigeria, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, and Myanmar. In 2013, the NRC was merged
with the Revenue Watch Institute to form NRGI—NRGI is now a leading
organization in the field of improving the governance of natural resource
wealth in developing countries. It is also the main implementing agent for
the NRC; however, it also provides an open licence for other NGOs and
governments to use the benchmarking toolkit independently.17 As with
other good governance efforts during this period, causal attribution of the
benefits to countries using the NRC have proved difficult to articulate and
quantify. Further, some countries that pursued and integrated the principles
espoused by the NRC in their own reforms—such as Ghana in its prudent
approaches to oil revenue management legislation in the period following
2009—have since proved less able to protect the country from negative price
shocks and populist spending pressures than many had hoped.
19.7 Critical Reflections
The purpose of the international codes, standards, and initiatives discussed
here is to foster and support the adoption, implementation, and embodiment
of policies and institutions for the good governance of extractive resources.
Good governance is widely agreed to play a fundamental role in determin-
ing the economic performance of countries; however, less is known regarding
the steps and time it takes for a country to move from a situation of weak
governance to one of stronger governance. In the case of resource-rich coun-
tries, this challenge is exacerbated by the role such resources play in shaping
and distorting economic and political incentives. Indeed, extractive resources
can fuel a situation where governing well is made harder by the rents they
provide to governments. This in turn can create incentives that serve to
undermine or weaken institutions, such as circumventing checks and balances,
or fostering a culture of corruption and patronage. In turn, the resources that
17 https://resourcegovernance.org/analysis-tools/tools/natural-resource-charter-benchmarking-
framework.
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are hard to govern may also make other political and economic reforms harder
and less likely to succeed.
Various proposals have been advanced for normative measures that may
help countries strengthen governance of the resource wealth, while avoiding
policymissteps that have beenmade in other countries. These include increas-
ing transparency in the resource sector (EITI), creating supply-chain checks
against minerals sourced from conflict (Kimberley Process), and pursuing
policy choices and development strategies that have proved robust in other
settings (NRC, AMV).
It might be unreasonable to expect good governance initiatives to yield
large and observable effects in a relatively short space of time. It might even
be unreasonable to expect them to succeed with a high degree of probability.
Neither factor invalidates the importance of their pursuit; the payoffs might
be slow to emerge but are potentially large when realized even with a low
probability of success in any given country. However, the extent of the
challenge, or the pace of underlying change, should also not preclude a
rigorous approach towards measuring and reporting impact, as well as articu-
lating a testable and falsifiable theory of change.
While tangible success on changing policy and embedding best practice has
been hard to identify, this does not imply the focus is incorrect. Given the time
profile of extraction—requiring upfront policy choices that determine the path
for years to come—the need for urgency is inherent. The policy choicesmade by
governments today can have long-lasting repercussions for current and future
generations. Therefore, efforts to support improved policymaking today, even
in the context of other institutional weaknesses, may be justified on the
grounds of these long tails of effect and the magnitude of money involved.
19.7.1 Downsides of Codes and Standards
However, such external guides can have downside risks too. Successful policies
and institutions as operated in one setting are not always straightforward to
replicate in other contexts; indeed, in some cases what has proven successful
in one countrymay prove inappropriate or unsuccessful in another. Countries
must carefully navigate the path between what lessons can reasonably be
drawn from international experience and what is likely to be feasible and
effective in a domestic setting. Doing so in the face of strong political and
populist pressures unleashed by resource wealth can be especially difficult.
Learning what works, and what does not, also takes time. Given the uncer-
tainty associated with any given reform or policy action to improve govern-
ance, a learning process is likely to play an important role. There is, however, a
high opportunity cost to initiatives that require significant investment of
money—sometimes donor aid—and political will.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
416
A recurring concern regarding successful governance initiatives is their
ability to learn from and adapt and respond to emerging evidence and chan-
ging circumstances on the ground. The Kimberley Process has struggled with
controversy around its effectiveness in stemming the flow of conflict dia-
monds, but has also struggled to update definitions of conflict diamonds
given the evolving role of diamonds thatmay be profiting state actors engaged
in conflict. The EITI has likewise faced challenges in terms of expanding scope
and whether reforms to the standard agreed centrally are feasible or desirable
for all member countries to adopt. The link from some improvements in
transparency to better development outcomes or increased accountability
remains tenuous and hard to identify.
19.7.2 Looking Ahead
Norms ranging across transparency, competitive licence allocation, getting
the right saving–spending balance, and building strong institutions for checks
and balances such as fiscal rules and accountability bodies, are spreading
internationally. The pace of their adoption and retention can feel slow, but
such governance reforms are likely to take time and are at constant risk of
backsliding and being undermined in the face of price declines, such as those
seen after 2011, and rising populism. There is emerging praise for the role
governance initiatives have played in creating spaces for civil society dialogue,
while a greater shift towards open data that are accessible and used by domestic
actors may further entrench ideas of public scrutiny and debate around how
the resource sector is governed.18
In addition, the gradual spread of the ‘good governance’ norms, the process
of learning about what works and what does not, is well underway. Several
countries have recently experienced resource booms for the first time, and
some of these are learning their own lessons of what to avoid in the future.
Similarly, international initiatives have the advantage of being able to share
and spread lessons and experiences with relatively low transaction costs as
such reforms to the global approach can permeate quickly to the country level:
one example is the new EITI Standard.19
Finally, the end of the recent super-cycle of commodity prices, and the
prospect of potentially permanently lower prices for fossil fuels due to global
18 More recent developments in the space of resource governance have included the creation of
the Resource Governance Index (NRGI) which ranks countries according to normative measures of
good governance. Additionally organizations such as the World Bank and Inter-Governmental
Forum have been developing their own tools to support governance in resource-rich countries.
19 This centralized reform of EITI rules had almost immediate implications for all fifty-plus
participating countries, which would now be expected to work towards compliance with the
new, more expansive, reporting requirements rather than the rules they originally signed up to.
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decarbonization, creates potential positive opportunities for improved
governance. First, low prices reduce the rents that have fuelled rent-seeking,
supported vested interests, and spurred populist promises and elevated expect-
ations. Second, fiscal budgets are squeezed so there is increased incentive to
tighten governance loopholes and crack down on corruption and other forms
of waste. Further, many governments are now looking to take steps to end fuel
subsidies and to correct other ‘poor’ governance choices during high price
periods, such as a lack of savings provisions and bad deal-making. The pause
in new foreign investment into extractives in some countries buys those
countries time to continue the process of institution-building to prepare for
future new investments, extraction, and revenues.
The future may, however, look quite different from the past when it comes
to the governance of extractive resources. First, commodity prices may not
recover to the same highs seen during the super-cycle, or the length of such
price cycles may not match the recent one. Second, the opportunity for
greenfield developments (in terms of non-resource-rich countries entering
resource richness) is shrinking as many new producers entered the market
during the recent boom. This may have led to the locking-in of poor policy
choices and weak institutions that may be harder to fix for next time, not least
since vested interest groups have had the chance to entrench their positions.
Finally, the urgent threat of climate change and technological breakthroughs
in carbon-zero technologies mean that the demand and hence the price for
fossil fuels (coal, but also oil and gas) may never recover, or the period of
higher prices may be curtailed in the near future by technology substitution.20
Similarly, depletion of resources during this boom may mean that some
countries have few new deposits left to develop.21
As such, developing countries may have to prepare themselves for a post-
extractive future, one where the diversification of the economy and a
strengthening of governance may be no less vital, and may even prove easier
in the absence of such large resource rents. For those countries rich in fossil-
fuel resources, the gradual decarbonization of the global economy may have
long-term implications for their economies. While those specialized in min-
erals and metals may see strong demand extending long into the future, the
temporary slowdown in demand across some of these commoditiesmay create
a prime opportunity for reflection and lesson-learning, and ultimately an
opportunity to strengthen governance.
20 The link between the climate change agenda and the situation facing extractive industries
(both mining and oil and gas) is discussed in detail in Addison, Chapter 22, this volume, who also
explains the important differences that are likely to apply to minerals as opposed to fossil fuels.
21 However, many have significant resources left untapped. Among fossil-fuel-rich developing
countries, the median time to depletion exceeds forty-five years at current rates of production.
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Oil and Gas Companies and the Management
of Social and Environmental Impacts
and Issues
The Evolution of the Industry’s Approach
Kathryn Tomlinson
20.1 Introduction
In the 1990s, the environmental and social impacts of extractive industries on
communities increasingly became debated in various forums, and extractive
companies facedmounting criticism in themedia and fromNGOs, academics,
and wider civil society. In the oil and gas industry, this situation partly came
about due to the high-profile negative impacts of certain oil and gas oper-
ations, such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska (1989), the clash between
Royal Dutch Shell (Shell) and Greenpeace over the disposal of the Brent Spar
oil rig in the North Sea (1995), the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was
campaigning against Shell in Nigeria (1995), and BP’s and Talisman’s alleged
complicity in security-related human rights abuses in Colombia (1997) and
Sudan (1999) respectively. In the mining sector, it was cases such as the
tailings dam failure of BHP’s Ok Tedi mine in Papua New Guinea (1984),
Placer Dome’s Marcopper mine in the Philippines (1996) and the subsequent
ongoing pollution, and the conflict in Bougainville sparked by Rio Tinto’s
mining operations (1989) that drew the most attention and criticism. As a
result of these cases and others, damning reports were published and targeted
actions undertaken, such as the picketing of companies’ head offices, service
stations, or shareholder meetings.1
1 This chapter represents a social practitioner’s perspective on social and environmental
performance in the oil and gas industry. In terms of methodology, although I refer to the
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Specific campaigns against oil and gas companies started to gain wider
momentum during this period. The criticisms levelled at the industry covered
a wide range of issues, including allegations that oil wealth fuelled corruption
and conflict, and propped up repressive governments;2 suggestions that the
companies were either complicit in or benefitted from human rights abuses
committed by host governments and security forces (such as in the Shell
Nigeria and BP Colombia cases);3 complaints about negative environmental
impacts from oil and gas projects (such as oil spills and flaring), leading to
environmental damage, and health and livelihood impacts on local commu-
nities;4 and rising awareness of the wider environmental question of the
industry’s role in climate change and how it collectively approached the
subject, including allegations that the industry was actively promoting cli-
mate change denial. Within the wider ‘resource curse’ debate, it was pointed
out that although oil and gas projects were generating vast sums of wealth for
low- to middle-income countries, many communities affected by these pro-
jects, such as in Nigeria or Angola, continued to live in poverty, and had in fact
become worse off than previously due to the presence of oil and gas projects.
Finally, many critics of the industry decried what they saw as a lack of
transparency in the industry, and a propensity for active corporate lobbying
against social and environmental legislation.5
As the campaigns against the industry intensified by the late 1990s, some
companies started to respond to the criticisms, and began to address social and
environmental issues in their operations. Since then, broadly speaking, there
has been an evolution of the management of social and environmental issues
in the extractive industries, from a general neglect of these issues coupled with
ad hoc philanthropy to a risk management approach modelled on specific
international standards. Today, the principles of social and environmental
management in the extractive industries can be broadly summarized as ‘do no
harm’ and ‘provide benefits’ at the local community level, and a number of
tools and approaches have been developed and are variously implemented
academic literature on corporate social responsibility in the oil and gas industry, the chapter is
largely based on a review of primary materials such as company sustainability reports and NGO
reports, as well as my own observations and experiences of working within the extractive
industries, including many conversations with colleagues in the oil and gas industry, over the
last ten years. I would particularly like to thank Ramanie Kunanayagam for sharing with me her
ever-insightful perspectives, which have helped shape my views on social performance in the
industry over the years, as well as my arguments for this chapter. I would also like to thank Alan
Roe for his feedback on earlier drafts. I am extremely grateful to Evelyn Dietsche for reading earlier
drafts of the chapter and giving me very helpful editorial and content feedback, which helped
strengthen the chapter. Last but not least, I would like to thank my husband, Ronald Ranta, for
reading and commenting on various drafts, as well as holding the fort while I was immersed in the
writing.
2 See e.g. Global Witness (1999).
3 See e.g. The Economist (1997); Human Rights Watch (1999).
4 The Economist (1997); Human Rights Watch (1999). 5 See e.g. Christian Aid (2004).
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across the industry to address these two high-level aims. This chapter focuses
on the evolution of themanagement of social and environmental issues in the
oil and gas industry specifically, with some comparisons with the mining
industry. It also presents how the industry has responded to external criti-
cisms around social and environmental issues, and how it is now approaching
the management of these issues.6 The chapter examines some of the key
international standards that have shaped this area, breaks down what the
management of social and environmental performance actually means in
practice, and looks at some of the gaps and ongoing debates in the implemen-
tation of social and environmental performance in the industry. Ultimately,
the chapter argues that the area of social and environmental performance
in the oil and gas industry is often misrepresented in the broader literature
under the umbrella term ‘corporate social responsibility’, which in turn has
led to general misunderstandings around the drivers of this management area,
as well as of the nature of social performance itself.
20.2 The Initial Industry Response
Faced with mounting criticism from NGOs and activists, by the late 1990s
oil, gas, and mining companies had come under increasing pressure to reform
the ways they operated. At the time, most large Western extractive companies
had some kind of internal corporate environmental policy and management
system in place, but very few had explicit social performance policies or
were strategically managing social and community issues (McPhail and Davy
1998: 57). Interestingly, in responding to this pressure the mining industry
took a different trajectory from the oil and gas industry. At the time, several
chief executive officers (CEOs) of international mining companies decided
6 It is worth noting that it is difficult to speak about the oil and gas industry as a whole, as it can
be roughly divided into international oil companies (IOCs) and national oil companies (NOCs).
The IOCs comprise seven ‘supermajor’ publicly owned multinational companies (ExxonMobil,
Chevron, BP, Shell, Total, ENI, and ConocoPhillips), and numerous medium-sized to small
independent oil and gas companies (e.g. Hess, Marathon, OMV, BG Group, Anadarko, Tullow,
Woodside). Currently the largest oil and gas companies in the world based on revenue are made up
predominantly of NOCs (e.g. Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, PetroChina, Petrobras, Sinopec, Kuwait
Petroleum Corporation), and these are increasingly competing with IOCs in oil and gas
development. However, it is mainly IOCs that have experienced external pressure from NGO
campaigns, adverse media reports, and shareholder activism, and as a result it is predominantly
IOCs that have pushed and developed the agenda of social and environmental management.
NOCs, on the other hand, have often been used by governments as vehicles for local
development, and therefore tend to have a view that equates social performance with corporate
philanthropy (e.g. PEMEX in Mexico, PDVSA in Venezuela, Petrobras in Brazil, and Saudi Aramco
in Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, in my experience, there is a variety of practices and conceptions of
what social and environmental management in oil and gas operations should look like.
Nevertheless, this chapter will look at some of the broad trends in the industry, whilst also trying
to point out the differences in policy and practice.
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that their industry needed to address the issues of mining and sustainable
development in a more coordinated manner (Littlewood 2000). As a result of
this decision, nine of the major mining companies grouped together to form
the Global Mining Initiative (GMI), to spur a major study of mining and
sustainability entitled ‘Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development’
(MMSD). The aim of the MMSD project was to carry out a comprehensive
survey of the sector and identify a path towards more responsible behaviour
and improved reputation (MMSD 2002). The GMI eventually led to the cre-
ation of the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), which was
founded in 2001 to improve sustainable development performance in the
mining and metals industry (Franks 2015). The ICMM was set up as a CEO-
led industry association with a mandate based on the core recommendations
of the MMSD project, and over the years it helped both to standardize the
mining industry’s approach to social and environmental issues and to pro-
mote good practice norms through the development of industry standards
and good practice guidance (see Hodge 2017 for a more in-depth discussion
of the mining industry and sustainability).
The oil and gas industry, on the other hand, did not collectively respond to
these external pressures. No comprehensive sustainable development review
of the industry took place, and there was no industry-wide response to sus-
tainable development issues, let alone one led by company CEOs. Though
there was already a global oil and gas industry association for environmental
and social issues called IPIECA,7 its influence on the industry was limited.8
Indeed, during this period, change around social and environmental manage-
ment amongst IOCs was mainly being led by individual companies, in par-
ticular Shell and BP, while the rest of the industry lagged behind on these
issues. Utting and Ives (2006) have elaborated on this issue of the ‘leaders’
versus the ‘laggards’ with regard to social and environmental management in
the oil and gas industry. They argue that this difference in approach, between
proactive IOCs such as BP and Shell, and others such as Exxon, Chevron, and
Total, can be explained by a complex mixture of differences in the pressures
7 When IPIECAwas originally set up in 1974, the acronym stood for the International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association. However, in 2002 IPIECA stopped using the
full title and now only refers to itself as ‘IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for
environmental and social issues’.
8 IPIECA was formed in 1974 following the launch of the United Nations Environment
Programme, and its mandate was, and continues to be, to help ‘the oil and gas industry improve
its environmental and social performance by: developing, sharing and promoting good practices
and solutions; enhancing and communicating knowledge and understanding; engaging members
and others in the industry; working in partnership with key stakeholders’ (http://www.ipieca.org/,
accessed 28 December 2016). Unlike the ICMM, IPIECA has not developed binding standards or
policies for members, and it is not CEO-led. It also works on a significantly smaller budget, with
membership fees a fraction of those of the ICMM. As a result, the extent to which IPIECA has
driven good practice in social and environmental performance in the industry is questionable.
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applied to companies by NGOs, which tended to focus on specific countries
and companies at the expense of others—such as Shell in Nigeria—and the
pressures exerted by shareholders and governments, as well as by internal
leadership (Utting and Ives 2006: 23–6). As with many of the mining com-
panies that spearheaded the GMI, Shell and BP’s approach to social and
environmental issues in the late 1990s was driven by their experiences of
social and political crises in Nigeria and Colombia respectively, and of the
resulting civil society pressures, as well as by internal senior leadership.9
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the oil and gas industry mainly focused
on improving health and safety, and to a certain extent environmental per-
formance. There was very little focus on social performance and impacts on
communities other than the usual philanthropic community development
projects and donations. From the late 1990s, Shell and BP started to engage
more with external stakeholders, in particular various civil society groups and
NGOs, as well as to set up internal social performance units to drive better
social management throughout the business. Themandate of these new social
performance departments was to push for better social performance through-
out the business to ensure impact management, proper consultation with
local communities and more widely impacted stakeholders, and more sustain-
able community social investment projects linked to the business (see e.g.
Fossgard-Moser 2005). With regard to environmental management, the new
approach involved tackling and engaging with wider environmental issues
beyond local permitting regulations, such as climate change, gas flaring, and
biodiversity. Notably early compared with its peers, in 1997 BP became the
first oil and gas company to publicly recognize the risks of climate change and
push for industry to take a role in finding solutions.
In terms of company standards, Shell took the first step in 1997 to update its
business principles to include commitments to manage its social impacts and
be a ‘good neighbour’ to the communities in which it operated. In 1999, after
the merger with Amaco, BP updated its business policies to include commit-
ments on ethical conduct, employees, relationships, and health, safety, and
environmental performance. Both companies publicly expressed their sup-
port for human rights, and also took an active role with the UK and US
governments and various human rights NGOs in bringing about one of the
9 John Brown, CEO of BP between 1995 and 2007, was known to promote the importance of
good corporate citizenship, and during his tenure at BP took a very involved leadership role in
pushing for better social and environmental performance in the company (Bader 2014). Within
Royal Dutch Shell, Mark Moody-Stuart, chairman of the company between 1998 and 2001,
reportedly believed that ‘sustainable development and financial performance are inextricably
linked’ (The Independent 2000).
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key voluntary human rights standards for the industry, namely the Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPs).10
In effect, Shell and BP during this period started to shift the field away from
a ‘business as usual’ approach—characterized by the attitude that a company’s
role is to focus on its core commercial business, comply with local laws, pay its
taxes, and provide a few ad hoc benefits to local communities—to a ‘good
corporate citizen’ approach. This new approach was characterized by the view
that strict legal compliance is often not enough, and that social and environ-
mental impacts can be complex and multifaceted, necessitating more compre-
hensive management focused on impact management, benefit enhancement,
and relationship-building with external partners. Part of this approach
involved developing internal corporate codes of conduct and establishing
corporate functions dedicated to what became known as ‘social performance’
issues, as well as publishing annual reports detailing how they were managing
social and environmental issues, joining various international initiatives
aimed at improving social and environmental standards in industry, and
engaging more openly with some of the NGO critiques.
20.3 Laggards Catching Up: The Impact
of International Standards
Despite the variations in initial company responses to social and environmen-
tal management in the oil and gas industry, most IOCs eventually started
to take the same direction in their approaches. This incremental change
across the industry can be partly explained by companies influencing each
other’s behaviour, as well as by growing societal expectations around com-
pany conduct, and an emerging group of social and environmental profes-
sionals sharing and implementing practice across the industry. However, the
development of international norms has played a major role in pushing the
wider industry at least partly along the same trajectory as BP and Shell took in
the late 1990s.
10 Established in 2000, the VPs were designed as a set of voluntary principles specifically for the
extractive industries, with the aim of guiding companies in maintaining the safety and security of
their operations within an operating framework that encourages respect for human rights (http://
www.voluntaryprinciples.org, accessed 28 December 2016). The VPs initiative is a tripartite multi-
stakeholder group, currently made up of ten governments, thirty extractive companies, and
thirteen NGOs. As of 2016, all of the five major international oil and gas companies are
signatories of the VPs (Shell, BP, Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and Total), as well as a number of large
to medium-sized international oil and gas companies (Conoco Phillips, Hess Corporation,
Marathon Oil, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, Repsol, Statoil, ENI, Pacific Exploration &
Production Corporation, Premier Oil, Seven Energy, Woodside Energy, and Tullow Oil), but no
national oil and gas companies.
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In the last fifteen years, a number of international standards related to the
management of social and environmental issues in the extractives or the
business sector more widely have been developed, more often than not
through multi-stakeholder processes. For example, the above-mentioned VPs
are a standard that has widely shaped the way IOCs manage the security of
their operations. Similarly, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, developed over several years and unanimously approved by
the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, have arguably led to most major and
medium-sized IOCs developing internal human rights policies and focusing
more on their community grievance mechanisms. But the standard that has
had the most impact on the oil and gas industry and how it approaches social
and environmental issues is the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
Environmental and Social Performance Standards.
The IFC Performance Standards came about as the result of years of pressure
from civil society on the IFC, as well as controversy around IFC projects such
as the Pangue Hydroelectric project in Chile (Franks 2015: 4). Building on the
World Bank Social and Environmental Safeguard Policies and the recom-
mendations of the independent review report on the Pangue Hydroelectric
project, the Performance Standards were developed in the first part of the
2000s, formally published in 2006, and updated in 2012. Applying to IFC
private-sector clients operating in emerging markets, there are eight IFC Per-
formance Standards: Assessment and Management of Environmental and
Social Risks and Impacts; Labour andWorking Conditions; Resource Efficiency
and Pollution Prevention; Community Health, Safety, and Security; Land
Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; Biodiversity Conservation and Sus-
tainable Management of Living Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples; and
Cultural Heritage. These standards cover most aspects of the management of
social and environmental issues facing oil and gas projects from early project
development through to construction, operation, and closure.
The Performance Standards can be seen as ground-breaking for their
time, presenting for the first time a comprehensive set of environmental and
social standards, which detailed real steps a private-sector project needs to
take to manage its environmental and social risks and impacts. Importantly,
these standards went beyond the vague policy statements of guidelines such
as the Global Compact. Overall, the IFC Sustainability Policy, as embodied in
the Performance Standards, can be summarized as ‘do no harm’ and ‘enhance
positive development outcomes on the ground’ (IFC 2012: 2). Since their
inception, the IFC Performance Standards have become the international
best-practice benchmark for social and environmental risk management in
the extractive sector, widely referred to by social and environmental practi-
tioners, even for projects that are not seeking IFC funding. Furthermore, the
Equator Principles—an environmental and social risk management framework
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adopted by most major international banks and applied to private-sector
projects seeking financing from these banks—are modelled on the IFC Per-
formance Standards, therefore furthering the influence of these standards. As a
result, the IFC Performance Standards have become a significant contributing
factor to a gradual shift towards wider adoption of social and environmental
risk management amongst IOCs, and a majority of IOCs now model their
internal environmental and social standards on the IFC Performance Standards
to a certain extent.
The growing interest of mainstream investors, from both international
banks and private equity investment funds, in environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) investment criteria to assess oil and gas firms’ activities is
an additional factor in shaping the industry’s approach to social and environ-
mental issues (BSR 2012; Crosse and Horaks 2014). In particular, investors
with a long-term focus on investments such as pension funds and SWFs have
been increasingly integrating ESG criteria across their portfolios and applying
pressure on IOCs to improve their performance in this regard (BSR 2012). The
recent example of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund putting pressure on
ExxonMobil and Chevron to report in more detail on the risks of climate
change, and in 2013 threatening to sell shares in IOCs operating in Equatorial
Guinea because of the clear lack of benefit to the local populations, is a case in
point (Doyle and Fouche 2016; Fouche 2013).
The overall approach to social and environmental management amongst
IOCs today is therefore one of risk management based on the overall aim to
‘do no harm’ and ‘provide benefits’ to local communities. What we have seen
in the multinational oil and gas industry, over a trajectory of twenty years or
so, is a gradual shift from a ‘business as usual’ approach—characterized by very
little engagement with the social arena other than through philanthropy and
small social investment projects in neighbouring communities, and a legal
compliance approach to environmental management—to an environmental
and social risk management approach modelled on various international
standards. Most IOCs today are members of the VPs; have human rights
policies or statements that claim to be consistent with the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples; have social and environmental policies and management frameworks
modelled to a certain extent on the IFC Performance Standards; and adhere to
international environmental and health and safety standards.11 Section 20.4
looks at what this approach actuallymeans in practice, and at some of the gaps
and issues that have emerged in its implementation.
11 e.g. ISO 14001 and OHSAS 18001.
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20.4 Environmental and Social Performance in the Industry
Today: The Realities and Problems of Practice
Environmental management in practice broadly entails impact identification
and management. Most IOCs (in common with mining companies) will
prepare environmental impact assessments (EIAs) early on in project develop-
ments, and then implement environmental management plans to manage
environmental issues throughout operations.12 Specifically, the major IOCs
report that they implement measures to limit impacts on and protect bio-
diversity in areas where they operate; minimize water consumption and dis-
charges; implement preventative measures to avoid spills, and measures for
rapid spill response in case of spills; reduce damaging air emissions such as
volatile organic compounds that have negative impacts on human health;
and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to address the risk of
climate change through improved energy efficiency in operations, as well as
reduced flaring, venting, and fugitive emissions.13 Some companies, such as
ExxonMobil and Statoil, report that they are actively exploring carbon cap-
ture storage techniques as well. In terms of quantifiable data, all of the major
IOCs report on the volume of operational spills, GHG, and other emissions
from gas flaring and refineries, water use, and waste disposal. From a health
and safety perspective, the common approach across the industry is to
implement policies and management systems, and to report annually on
fatalities, injuries, and process safety incidents. In sum, in terms of actual
performance outcomes, it is clear from the data that the environmental and
health and safety performance of large IOCs has improved over time, with
overall reductions in fatalities, oil spills, freshwater consumption, and air and
GHG emissions.14
However, despite this overall improvement in environmental and health
and safety performance in IOCs, there are clearly still ongoing environmental
issues and unmitigated impacts amongst IOCs as well as across the industry as
whole. Furthermore, the push to find new resources is leading companies to
engage in higher-risk types of operation in more remote places, such as deep-
water drilling, or drilling in the Arctic. These types of operation usually
involve the potential for more significant environmental impacts. The 2010
BP Deepwater Horizon rig explosion and subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of
12 BP (2015); Chevron (2015); ENI (2015); ExxonMobil (2014); Royal Dutch Shell (2015); Statoil
(2015); Total (2014).
13 BP (2015); Chevron (2015); ENI (2015); ExxonMobil (2014); Royal Dutch Shell (2015); Statoil
(2015); Total (2014).
14 BP (2015); Chevron (2015); ENI (2015); ExxonMobil (2014); Frynas 2010; Royal Dutch Shell
(2015); Statoil (2015); Total (2014).
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Mexico is a high-profile example demonstrating this problem. This particular
environmental and health and safety disaster resulted in eleven fatalities and
the largest offshore oil spill in US history. Subsequent investigations demon-
strated a history of cost-cutting and risk-taking beneath the rhetoric of
improving environmental and health and safety performance (Lyall 2010;
Morrison 2014: 5–9). Recurring oil spills, such as in Russia or the Niger delta,
and ongoing gas flaring in the Niger delta and other parts of sub-Saharan
Africa, are other examples of poor environmental performance in the industry
(Greenpeace Russia 2014; Luhn 2015). The fact remains that although the oil
and gas industry has improved its environmental performance over the last
couple of decades, in large part due to the development and tightening of
national environmental regulation as well as increased public scrutiny, it
remains an industry with significant negative impacts on the environment,
in particular with regard to oil spills and GHG emissions.
In terms of social performance, the general practice amongst IOCs is one of
managing social impacts at the local community level through social impact
assessments (SIAs) and social impact management plans, with a particular
focus on critical issues such as impacts on indigenous peoples, resettlement,
or cultural heritage. This overall approach to social performance also includes
consulting and engaging with communities in a systematic manner, and
providing benefits through community development projects (termed in the
industry ‘social investment’ (SI)) or local content programmes. However, it is
difficult to ascertain actual social performance across the industry in these
areas, as there is a general lack of social indicators in company and project
reporting, and when these do exist they tend to be ‘process’ rather than
‘outcome’ focused. For example, in terms of social data, IOCs only report on
annual SI expenditure, which gives no indication of how effective these SI
projects actually are, or how well they are managing their social impacts.
Other than SI expenditure, the rest of social reporting tends to focus on case
studies or processes, which do not necessarily give a good overall indication of
the strength of social performance in the industry, or of actual outcomes.
Although IOCs have clearly come a long way in their approach to managing
social risk at the community level, a number of issues and trends are emerging
that point towards implementation failures, as well as shortcomings in this
social risk management framework of social impact mitigation and manage-
ment, community consultation, and social investment.
SIAs, for example, are now commonly implemented by IOCs in early project
development, as a tool to manage social risk as well as part of larger EIAs to
gain local environmental permits. The underlying philosophy of SIAs is to
minimize negative impacts and enhance positive impacts, through ongoing
social impact management (Vanclay and Esteves 2011: 5). For example, in a
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typical oil and gas project, an SIA might seek to minimize potential commu-
nity resettlement by moving planned project infrastructure to different areas,
and maximize potential jobs available to local community members by advis-
ing the implementation of a local content policy. The social element of impact
mitigation and planning was historically omitted from national permitting
processes. However, in the last decade more countries have mandated SIA as
part of the EIA permitting process (although the level of requirements on the
social side still tends to be much lower than on the environmental side), and
SIAs are mandated in most projects that seek international financing.
Nonetheless, the implementation of SIAs has been widely criticized by
NGOs and communities as ineffective. One of the problems with SIAs is the
lack of common methodology or criteria, creating a lack of consistency and
often of quality, a view backed up by Bruce Harvey in his foreword to a book
on emerging trends in SIA (Harvey 2011: xxx). Other issues include a lack of
information disclosure and consultation with impacted communities during
the SIA process; a failure to adequately deal with cumulative impacts or
positive impact enhancement measures; and regular omission of wider macro-
economic and institutional issues, such as the distribution of taxes and royal-
ties (Harvey 2011; Vanclay and Esteves 2011). Ultimately, as Vanclay and
Esteves argue, SIAs too often become box-ticking exercises, with little real
analysis or integration of the SIA into cross-functional social management
plans (Vanclay and Esteves 2011). Finally, SIAs in the oil and gas industry are
usually only developed for new project developments, leaving many older
operations—developed before SIAs became the norm—without adequate
impact management procedures.
A related emerging issue is a common failure of oil and gas proponents to
engage in meaningful consultation or proper information disclosure with
impacted communities. On the one hand, consultation with communities is
much more common and systematic in extractive projects now than in
previous decades, when government arguments of ‘national interest’ pre-
vailed and the exclusion of local communities from project decision-making
processes was the norm (Harvey 2011: xxviii–xxix). Most IOCs have made
public commitments to engage in an ongoing manner with impacted com-
munities, through both formal and informal mechanisms; and the import-
ance of consultation to gain a company ‘licence to operate’ is commonly
accepted across the industry. Furthermore, there is a growing trend of gov-
ernments developing legislation around community consultation, particu-
larly in the cases of extractive projects (e.g. Bolivia’s Consultation and
Participation law in the case of hydrocarbon projects), with which compan-
ies have to comply. The IFC Performance Standards and other international
financing standards also stress the importance of community consultation in
all project phases.
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However, despite these advances, oil and gas companies frequently fail to
consult properly with communities, and as a result consultation processes are
often seen not to be meaningful (Wilson et al. 2016). It is clearly as a result of
these failings that NGOs pushed for the promotion of ‘meaningful consultation’
throughout the draft Environmental and Social Standards in a recent review and
update of the World Bank Safeguard Policies (Wilson et al. 2016: 9). The World
Bank definition of ‘meaningful consultation’ stresses that consultation should
take place early and throughout the project cycle, be inclusive and free from
coercion, and provide timely disclosure of relevant and understandable infor-
mation (Wilson et al. 2016). Similarly, it could be argued that the push from civil
society organizations for companies to apply processes of ‘free, prior, informed
consent’ (FPIC) to all communities, rather than just to the indigenous commu-
nities from whose rights FPIC derives, is another example of the increasing
dissatisfaction with current practices of consultation in oil and gas projects.15
Finally, ongoing criticisms of company SI projects still prevail. This is not
new, and various academics have written about the problems of company SI
projects over the years (e.g. Frynas 2003; Frynas 2005; Hilson 2012; Utting and
Ives 2006). The problems highlighted have ranged from the outright failure of
SI projects, to their inadequacy to address truly sustainable development
challenges, to SI projects creating tensions and conflicts within communities
(Utting and Ives 2006: 20). Many authors have ultimately questioned whether
companies should be engaging in community development projects at all (e.g.
Hilson 2012). However, the fact remains that in MICs and LICs, communities
are often marginalized from an already weak public administration system. As
a result, companies are usually expected to step into the gap and contribute to
local community development. Not only is this widely expected by commu-
nities themselves, it is now increasingly becoming mandated by national
governments in permitting requirements or production-sharing contracts
(McNab et al. 2012).
Broadly speaking, over the last two decades, IOCs have gradually changed
their approach to community SI, from ad hoc philanthropic donations to an
approach that has sought to deliver better development impacts at the local
level (Kunanayagam and Dietsche 2014; McNab et al. 2012). This approach
involves developing partnerships with delivery-oriented NGOs or develop-
ment organizations to implement projects (Kunanayagam and Dietsche
2014; Utting and Ives 2006: 20). One of the objectives of this newer approach
for companies has been to use SI ‘to mitigate social risk, protect their corporate
social licence to operate, and address growing societal expectations’ at the
15 See e.g. Oxfam’s campaign for FPIC from all communities affected by extractive projects (Katz
2015). See also Tomlinson (2017) for an overview of the extractive industry’s approach to FPIC.
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local community level (McNab et al. 2012: 2). However, one of the drawbacks
of this approach is that the industry has failed to deal with the social risks it
faces through wider resource governance issues around poor macroeconomic
performance and rent-seeking in many LICs and MICs (Kunanayagam and
Dietsche 2014: 23–4). As a result, even the best thought-out SI projects actu-
ally often fail to meet growing societal expectations of benefits from oil and
gas projects.
Although most IOCs have improved the transparency of their payments to
governments and the management of bribery and corruption through mem-
bership of the EITI, as well as through compliance with legislation such as
the UK 2010 Bribery Act, national regulations developed on the back of
Chapter 10 of the EU Accounting Directive, and/or the US Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, increasing transparency is only the first step towards improving
government accountability and public policies (Kunanayagam and Dietsche
2014: 24). Kunanayagam and Dietsche, amongst others, suggest that the way
to address these problems is for companies to take amore strategic approach to
SI based on four elements: an upfront macro and micro socio-economic and
political analysis; a strategy to seek areas of investment ‘where public policies
authorities are currently not sufficiently addressing the drivers of social risks
and opportunities’; delivery of SI projects through ‘delivery-oriented develop-
ment partners’; and implementation of pilot SI projects to test the ground for
the potential to leverage and scale up these projects through collaboration
with government and donor agencies (Kunanayagam and Dietsche 2014: 25).
This type of ‘strategic SI’ is slowly being taken up by some IOCs, has more of a
direct link with the business of oil and gas, and usually includes projects that
aim to enhance local content through supplier or skills development initia-
tives. However, most IOCs have yet to fully grasp the overall strategic import-
ance of this type of approach to SI, particularly for gaining not only the local
community ‘licence to operate’ but also, in many LICs and MICs, the govern-
ment and wider society ‘licence to operate’.
IOCs’ approach to social and environmental management has evolved over
the last twenty years, leading to developing practice and improvements in
performance. All IOCs today publicly claim to be managing social and envir-
onmental issues, and report on how they are doing this in practice through
their annual sustainability reports. However, despite this overall improvement
in performance, gaps in the implementation of standards and poor practices
still continue in the industry. This section has broken down what social and
environmental management means in practice, and has discussed some of the
gaps and issues that are emerging. Section 20.5 looks at how social and
environmental management in the oil and gas industry is often misunder-
stood, leading to a lack of understanding of the nature and drivers of social
and environmental performance.
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20.5 Moving beyond Corporate Social Responsibility
and Common Misunderstandings
In academia, and among NGOs and policy makers, the extractive industries’
approach to dealing with the social and environmental aspects of corporate
operations has generally been categorized under the umbrella term ‘corporate
social responsibility’ (CSR).16 The overall idea of CSR is that companies should
behave responsibly towards society and contribute to sustainable economic
development, and that they can expect to achieve this by adhering to various
voluntary standards (i.e. self-regulation). Over the years, there have been a
number of academic articles and NGO reports outlining some of the problems
of CSR in the oil and gas industry.17 By and large, the criticisms have been that
although CSR programmes in companies have had some positive impacts,
they are often little more than badly thought-out community development
programmes with a corporate public relations aim, for an industry that is still
having negative impacts on communities and the environment, and that is
actively resisting any kind of regulation of its activities (e.g. Christian Aid
2004; Hilson 2012).
One of the problems around much of the writing on CSR in the oil and gas
industry is that not only are the drivers of CSR commonly misunderstood and
misrepresented, but what the oil and gas industry is actually doing in terms of
environmental and social management also does not fit with the concept of
CSR. More often than not, CSR is conflated with community social develop-
ment programmes, therefore omitting the important aspect of management
of impacts. A recent World Bank study on the extractive industries sector, in
which ‘social safeguards’ in the extractive industries are equated with sharing
the benefits of projects at the local level through community development
funds, is a case in point (Halland et al. 2015: 82). As discussed in this chapter,
corporate contributions to community development (or social investment)
are but one aspect of social performance in the oil and gas industry.
Another common misunderstanding is that the term CSR has come to be
equated with ‘voluntary’ self-regulation, as opposed to formal regulation. One
of the main criticisms of CSR is that since it is a voluntary approach, compan-
ies cannot be penalized for poor or absent implementation. In fact, some
NGOs have even critiqued CSR’s entire raison d’être as a corporate-led
approach ‘to promote self-regulation as a substitute for regulation at either
national or international level’ (Christian Aid 2004: 5). According to some
16 It should be noted that there is no single agreed definition of CSR and the term is often used to
describe a number of different approaches, from corporate philanthropy, to corporate partnerships
in community development, to the broad management of social issues. See e.g. Christian Aid
(2004); Frynas (2005); Frynas (2010); Hilson (2012).
17 See e.g. Christian Aid (2004); Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012); Hilson (2012).
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authors, this situation is compounded in developing countries where ‘the
drive to legislate and enforce regulations is lacking’, as opposed to the situ-
ation in developed countries (Hilson 2012: 136).
However, this is not an accurate overall depiction of the field of social and
environmental management in the oil and gas industry. Although some
companies in certain instances have no doubt lobbied against certain pieces
of environmental or social legislation (such as corporate lobbying against the
US Alien Tort Claims Act), the drivers of social and environmental perform-
ance in the industry are often not entirely voluntary. For example, there is a
growing body of national legislation around community consultation and
mandated company social investment in Latin America and Africa,18 and
companies are increasingly having to comply with national legislation around
environmental and social issues, as well as with international standards to
access financing. Furthermore, increasing community expectations and pres-
sure are also pushing companies to manage these issues from a risk perspec-
tive, in order to gain their ‘social licence to operate’. Therefore, the simple
dichotomy between voluntary self-regulation and mandated regulation is not
in fact an adequate way to understand the complexities of the field of social
and environmental management in the industry.
One of the main aims of this chapter has been to give an overview of how oil
and gas companies are actually approaching and implementing social and
environmental performance across their operations. It is only by unpacking
and ultimately discarding terms such as CSR, and by truly examining what oil
and gas companies are actually doing in social and environmental manage-
ment, that one can begin to answer the question of whether and how compan-
ies can generate positive and sustainable economic and social outcomes for
local populations, or perhaps more importantly—considering the state of per-
formance across the industry—why they are failing to do so in many instances.
While implementing strong social and environmental performance can be
challenging and complex, the tools for implementation are there, and are well
articulated for the industry. For environmental performance, this involves
implementing EIAs and management plans, and ultimately minimizing and
avoiding the well-known environmental impacts of oil and gas operations
around air emissions, oil spills, water discharges, and water consumption. For
social performance, these involve implementing SIAs and social management
plans, engaging in ameaningful manner with stakeholders, and implementing
strategic investment projects that address both macro and micro socio-
economic issues in partnership with government, donor, or NGO parties. To
successfully implement these tools and achieve good social and environmental
18 See e.g. Otto (2017).
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performance, a company needs strong and engaged leadership, qualified and
experienced professionals to implement the work programmes, mandatory
standards, well-designed management systems, and a clear assurance process
to drive performance across the company.
The question therefore remains: why is performance still so uneven, both
across IOCs and within individual companies? Part of the answer may lie in
the challenges of driving good performance across a large multinational com-
pany and poorly developed internal management processes. While most IOCs
have environmental management systems that are usually quite clearly articu-
lated, social management systems and standards can be a little vague, and
often are not performance-based. This potentially leaves different arms of a
company with too much autonomy to implement social performance accord-
ing to their own interpretations, with only limited checks possible from any
assurance framework. However, despite gaps in management frameworks,
poor environmental and social performance often ultimately comes down to
senior leadership.
Although social and environmental management in the oil and gas industry
is now largely about risk management and legal compliance, the manner in
which a company approaches this is fundamentally down to leadership and
culture. It is no surprise that one of the main reasons that BP and Shell took a
proactive approach to social and environmental issues, at a time when most
other IOCs were not doing so, was largely due to internal leadership. It is also
widely known that when these engaged leaders stepped down, the emphasis
on social and environmental performance changed; see, for example, Bader
(2014); Morrison (2014: 7). The presence of strong social and environmental
performance in a company is almost always because the person put in charge
of these areas has been given a clear mandate by, and has a direct link to, the
CEO and/or the board. Unfortunately, industry leadership on these issues
today is uneven, and too often IOCs are seen to be taking a legalistic or public
relations approach to solving complex social and environmental conflicts.
Chevron’s approach to the Texaco oil pollution lawsuit in Ecuador is a telling
example. It is interesting that in Daniel Franks’s account of the formation of
the CEO-led GMI and the subsequent MMSD project in the late 1990s, he
recounts that initially the CEOs of the different mining companies present
were broadly split into two camps: those who thought that the solution to the
growing anti-miningmovement was to ‘sell’ a better message (i.e. better public
relations), and those who thought that the problems were more fundamental,
and that systematic poor social and environmental performance in the indus-
try had to be addressed (Franks 2015: 8). This same tension—between selling a
better message and actually addressing poor performance and taking a more
sustainably driven strategic approach—remains an ongoing and unresolved
issue in the oil and gas industry today.
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20.6 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to give an overview of social and environmental
management in the oil and gas industry. It has outlined the evolution of
IOCs’ approaches over the last twenty years, and has reviewed what social
and environmental management amongst IOCs means in practice, and what
some of the emerging issues are today. The chapter has argued that much of
the academic writing looking at social and environmental performance in the
oil and gas industry uses the outdated concept of CSR. This is a concept that is
no longer widely used by social and environmental practitioners in the indus-
try, and one that also leads to misunderstandings of what social and environ-
mental management actually consists of, and of what the drivers behind its
application are. The complexity and variety of these drivers—ranging from
compliance with international standards to the need to access financing, to
local legislation, the risks of the trend of developing local legislation, reputa-
tional issues, and gaining a ‘social licence to operate’—is the reason why the
portrayal of social and environmental management in the industry as a
‘voluntary’ approach is somewhat inaccurate and misleading. While it is
clear that the manner in which a company chooses to approach social and
environmental management remains at least partly voluntary and is usually
dependent on leadership and culture, no oil and gas company today can
operate without addressing these issues to a certain level. This is particularly
compounded by the growing national trend to develop social and environ-
mental legislation related to extractives. As a result, oil and gas companies
increasingly have to balance international standards, local legislation, and
growing community expectations. It is precisely because of this reality that
companies need durably strong internal policies and management systems, as
well as adequate human and financial resources to manage these challenges.
The chapter also describes how, despite a certain variety of approaches
between IOCs in addressing social and environmental issues, the broad
trend across the industry is to approach these issues through a risk manage-
ment approach, broadly modelled on international standards such as the IFC
Performance Standards and the VPs. Overall, this risk management approach
entails an underlying philosophy of ‘do no harm’ and ‘provide local develop-
ment benefits’. However, although IOCs have clearly evolved their approaches
and performance in relation to social and environmental impacts and issues,
actual performance is still uneven across the industry, with many instances of
unmitigated social and environmental impacts, and a lack of sustainable devel-
opment benefits for many local communities affected by oil and gas projects.
While some of this poor performance comes from the challenges and com-
plexities of implementing good social and environmental performance and
driving standards throughout a large company, the usual root cause of poor
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performance lies in a lack of senior leadership engagement on these issues,
leading to companies that either avoid international best practice in social and
environmental performance, take unnecessary risks to increase profits, or lack
the internal capacity to implement standards and approaches.
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21





The extractive industries are a major source of revenue for many resource-rich
economies around theworld, and are central to their economic growth and social
development. Many studies have revealed that the extractive industries have
different impacts upon men and women, in a variety of ways. It is important to
try tounderstandthose impacts and todeterminewhethermitigationpolicies and
programmes are needed. Further, the full social benefit of resources development
can only be realized if women and girls are able to participate as fully as males in
all aspects of resources activity and consequent economic development and
social progress. This requires that the principles of gender equality are embedded
within policies and practices applied to resources and associated development.
In recognizing that women’s participation and gender equity is a precondi-
tion for achieving the best development outcomes, some extractive industries
companies have committed to integrating gender equality, inclusion, and
women’s economic empowerment into aspects of their operations, but others
have not. Examples are provided that demonstrate what leading companies
are doing to integrate gender concerns into their corporate and social/com-
munity policies. This chapter considers how widespread these practices are
and whether they are effective or need improvement.
21.1.2 Content
Research for this chapter encompassed a survey of the wide-ranging literature
that discusses matters of gender in the extractives sector over the past
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
five years or so. Several themes have emerged from that survey, and these form
the basis for the discussion in the rest of the chapter, with a section focusing
on each. These main themes are:
1. the understanding of gender in the extractives sector and how this has
changed over time
2. the gendered impacts of the extractive industries and whether women
are, indeed, passive victims of the sector rather than active participants
3. the nature of extractives-associated sex work and gender-based violence
in various settings
4. women’s role in resisting the expansion of extractives projects
5. industry efforts towards achieving gender balance and equity in the
sector.
This chapter is not based on primary research, although it is informed by
fieldwork and interviews that the author has undertaken for other research
over many years. It is primarily a synthesis of the most important evaluations
of the situation of gender in the extractives sector as undertaken by an
impressive array of scholars and practitioners, many of whom have under-
taken primary fieldwork and have also made recommendations for improving
women’s status. It includes an assessment of industry efforts and a summary
of recommendations for future action.
21.2 The Many Facets of Gender and the Extractive Industries
There is a wealth of literature about women and gender in the extractive
industries published over the last five years, and much that goes further
back. The more recent articles analyse a variety of different issues and geo-
graphical locations and are often unrelated to each other, although a number
of common themes emerge from the entirety of the scholarship. Some articles
deal with the negative impacts experienced by women in extractive industries
project areas; others deal with women’s active engagement in the extractives
field and the choices they make to improve their position in life; some focus
on informal mining (artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)), while many are
concerned with large-scale industrial extraction projects. Certain analyses
demonstrate that the business case for diversity in the workplace is funda-
mentally harnessed by the industry to perpetuate the status quo—which is of a
highly masculinized sector—while presenting a modern and acceptable face
to society. Much of the research features statistics and indicators about
women’s involvement in extractive industries, both formal and informal,
and whether the numbers are increasing towards any semblance of equality;
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still others describe women’s participation in battles against extractive pro-
jects in many different countries. Other articles discuss the persistently mas-
culine culture of the extractive industries, which continues to work against
gender equity despite efforts to transform it. The disparate nature of the
scholarship makes it difficult to distil a clear picture of ‘gender and the
extractives’ as a single topic. However, this variety also lends a great richness
to the field and reveals the many facets of women’s interactions with and
activities in and around the extractive industries.
21.2.1 Women and Gender: What Do We Mean?
Gender is a complex and contested term and tends to be assumed to be
‘natural’, in the sense that men are seen as ‘masculine’ and women as ‘femin-
ine’, and we all think we knowwhat that means.1 In discussions of gender and
the extractive industries, the term ‘gender’ is often used synonymously with
women. Academics writing about women and the extractive industries prefer
to use the term ‘gender’ to indicate that they are referring to a cultural con-
struct, not a biological descriptor; in practice, most of these articles are refer-
ring only to women—the gender of men is not considered. A very few scholars
(Laplonge 2014, 2016; Mayes and Pini 2014) have recently started to point out
that this conflation of the term ‘gender’ with women is enabling the industry
to remain highly masculinized in spite of considerable efforts to achieve
‘gender balance’ and ‘gender diversity’.2
It is important to describe the actions of women in and around the extrac-
tives sector, both currently and historically. So, much of the discussion in this
chapter focuses on women, although the discussion about recommendations
for change will return to the discussion about gender, including masculinity.
21.2.2 Aspects of Gender in the Extractives Sector
Although many scholars describe the masculinity of the extractives sector,
Lahiri-Dutt (2015) posits the development of a ‘feminization of mining’. She
bases this on the increasing presence of women in the formal mining sector,
the large numbers of women involved in the growing informal mining
sector, and an evolving debate on the nature of sex work associated with
mining settlements. All of these are themes that recur throughout the litera-
ture and are discussed at greater length below. She makes a strong case for
1 SeeMacdonald (2017: 2–5) for a fuller discussion of the scholarship on gender constructs in the
extractives sector.
2 In this chapter, gender equality is defined as providing equal chances and opportunities to
women and men, and gender equity as the process of being fair to both men and women (which
might require compensation for past disadvantage in order to level the playing field).
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recognizing women’s agency in the mining sector, thereby moving beyond
the portrayal of women as victims of the negative impacts of mining: an
opinion shared by a number of other scholars, such as Mahy (2011),
O’Faircheallaigh (2013), and Bryceson et al. (2013a, 2013b). This is an import-
ant contribution to the debate about gender in the mining sector.
Women have been active in the mining sector in various ways and in many
countries for a very long time. Geographically, the presence of women in the
extractives field has varied from place to place. Lahiri-Dutt and Burke (2011)
demonstrate the essential roles played by Asian women miners throughout
history, specifically in Japan and India. Although they describe the many
challenges and obstacles that have existed and continue to exist for women,
they nonetheless paint a compelling picture of Asian women’s active role in
mining history. Murillo (2013) concludes that women were essential to the
development of the Mexican silver industry in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries. Although she was unable to find evidence that women
actually worked in mines, she demonstrates that they were crucial to the
supporting economy. It is quite common for observers to comment upon
the supportive roles played by women around extractives projects, often
because they are not able to be directly involved, but Murillo takes the case
further with her conclusion that the historical Mexican silver mining industry
would not have been able to exist without women’s actions.
O’Faircheallaigh makes a strong case for the recognition of indigenous
women’s influence in the development of agreements withmining companies
in both Canada and Australia, especially at the end of the twentieth century
and the beginning of the current one. However, he notes also that many
scholars have tended to overlook this, stating that the ‘dominant view in
the academic and activist literature is that women are bypassed in agreement
negotiations, and as a result are often excluded from the benefits of mining
while continuing to experience its economic, social, and environmental costs’
(O’Faircheallaigh 2013: 1790). Although he concedes that women are some-
times (but not always) excluded from negotiating teams, for a variety of
reasons, he contends that they are usually actively involved in processes
leading up to the formal negotiations, influencing the shaping of agendas
and objectives of negotiations and in the institutional structures that imple-
ment the provisions of agreements, thus ensuring that matters of importance
to them are not forgotten. In his experience as a legal adviser to various
aboriginal groups in Australia and Canada before, during, and after their
negotiations with resource developers, he has observed that women exerted
significant power over the negotiations and the content of the agreements. He
gives examples of how indigenous women have ensured that gender equality
provisions were included in agreements, particularly concerning income dis-
tribution, and also that sufficient attention and resources were allocated to
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sustainable investments and the recognition of and respect for cultural tradi-
tions. He notes that indigenous men did not oppose these measures, but that
it was women’s influence that insisted upon them.
Thus, although the extractive industries are very largely masculine, none-
theless women have played and continue to play a wide range of significant
roles in the sector. Although there are negative impacts of extractives projects
upon women, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, it is important to also
acknowledge the strong and active roles taken by women in the mining and
oil and gas industries throughout history.
21.2.3 Gendered Impacts
Many discussions of the impacts of the extractive industries state that these
effects are differentiated by gender and are more likely to affect women
negatively than they do men. For example, the following statement from
the World Bank’s 2009 guidance volume on gender and the extractive indus-
tries states that:
Men have most access to the benefits, which consist primarily of employment and
income, while women and the families they care for are more vulnerable to the
risks created by Extractive Industries, which consist of mostly harmful social and
environmental impacts. (Eftimie et al. 2009: 1)
While much of the discussion in this chapter emphasizes the ways in which
women are actively engaging with the extractive industries in order to derive
benefits from them, it is important to also note that there are detrimental
impacts coming from the sector that seem to fall disproportionately
upon women.
One of the main ways in which women are negatively affected by extrac-
tives projects is in the impacts of involuntary resettlement and also by envir-
onmental damage. The loss of land and waters that they rely upon to grow
food for their families when they are forced to move by an extractives project
will typically have a greater impact upon the women of a community, as they
frequently take the greater responsibility for subsistence farming. In a similar
way, as women are often the most fully engaged in subsistence farming
activities, they are also most affected by any pollution arising from extractives
projects, because they are more directly exposed. Men are also affected by
displacement and environmental damage but, as noted by the World Bank
above, they often have better access to alternative incomes and the ability to
move to other locations to seek alternative and often better opportunities.
In the case of an iron-ore mining area of Goa in India, D’Souza et al. (2013)
describe the detrimental effects of badly managed physical displacement of
subsistence farming families, when men took the little compensation paid by
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the companies but wasted it on short-term personal consumption, while the
women lost the land on which they could grow food for their children. They
also lost access to clean water, necessitating much more time-intensive efforts
to obtain water for the home. These negative impacts, among others, were
shown to take a great toll on women’s social and physical well-being, as
well as their economic situation. This case study, which focused on the
health impacts of mining on women, showed that poorly mitigated impacts
of extractives projects can have major deleterious effects upon women and
their families.
A number of articles (Mukherjee 2014; Omeire et al. 2014) describe the
way in which indigenous women in developing countries (here India and
Nigeria) are disproportionately affected by mining and oil and gas projects
because they lose access to forest, fields, and fisheries, which they have previ-
ously used for food to feed their families. Men may receive compensation and
jobs when an extractives project moves into their area, but women generally
do not, so there is no replacement for their lost incomes. Articles by Omeire
et al. (2014) and Oluduro and Durojaye (2013) assert that in the Niger Delta
women are also more affected by pollution and gas flaring because their
livelihoods are dependent upon the land and the water, so they are more
exposed. They also say that the loss of land-based livelihoods drives more
women to sex work in the absence of alternatives. Some of these outcomes are
not actually well demonstrated—they are merely stated, but there is clearly
some basis for the claims.
Other scholars have researched the varied roles that women have played in
the extractives sector in Africa, most often in informal mining, but some have
also looked at women in the formal sector. For example, Lauwo (2016) pre-
sents an interesting post-structuralist analysis of the essentially masculine
mining discourse, even when discussing gender balance, and then relates it
to the poor performance of gender equalitymeasures in the Tanzanianmining
industry. This theme, of the disconnect between rhetoric and reality, occurs
throughout the literature, and is observed from a number of theoretical per-
spectives. Mayes and Pini (2014) demonstrate that the use of gender equity
targets and discussion of the business case for diversity in the Australian
extractives industry discourse are actually effective in maintaining the status
quo: perhaps an unintended consequence. The business case, central to these
efforts, incorporates a normative role for women, namely that of an idealized
‘civilizing’ woman, but fails to mention equality. Instead, women’s difference
is used to ensure that the mining space remains male. Indeed, the public
efforts at ‘gender balance’ are used as a rationale for resisting regulation and
structural change. Lauwo’s effort at radical post-structuralist feminist analysis
arrives at the same conclusion—that talk of gender balance in the Tanzanian
mining industry bears no significant result (Lauwo 2016).
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21.2.4 Gender-based Violence and Sex Work
Much of this section on sexual relationships around extractives projects is con-
cernedwith the ASM sector, but not all. Studies by Lockie (2011) in Australia and
Cane et al. (2014) in Mongolia focus on large-scale mining projects. Mahy’s
(2011) Indonesian research was also concerned with the impacts of a large-scale
rather than an artisanal mining project. These examples apart, the cases referred
to in this section focus on ASM. That is not surprising, as the informal mining
sector is reputed to provide many more opportunities for women than does the
formal mining sector, which is heavily masculinized. That is not to say that the
ASM sector typically treats women fairly, or that there is any form of gender
balance or equality operating there. Just the same, there is muchmore scope and
flexibility for women to participate in the economic benefits associated with
informal mining, so it is important to discuss gender relations in the ASM
context. Much of the work available for women in mining areas involves sexual
aspects, but not all of it. Further, a growing list of scholars is demonstrating that
the sex work associated with mining is often a preferential choice for women
workers, rather than a case of victimization.
Mahy (2011) and Bashwira et al. (2014) point out that mining-related pros-
titution can benefit women who choose to earn money in this way and that it
is crucial not to assume that all women taking up this profession are ‘victims’
of mining, especially in the ASM sector. Mahy’s research among women sex
workers near a large mine in Indonesia revealed that they should be viewed
neither as victims nor as heroines, but rather as ‘women who are pursuing a
livelihood opportunity within their wider socio-economic context’ (Mahy
2011: 53). She points out that, for many of the women, their income-earning
capacity and lifestyle options are greater in the mining town than they would
have been in their home villages, and this includes a variety of work possibil-
ities for single women, among which sex work is often the most lucrative,
especially for those with limited education. The range of options may be
limited, but engaging in sex work in a mining settlement can be a rational
livelihood choice rather than a question of force or victimization.
In a far more conflict-ridden setting, that of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), two separate teams of scholars—Bashwira et al. (2014) and Kelly
et al. (2014)—criticize the use of the high incidence of gender-based violence
(GBV) as a reason for controlling women’s ability to access income in the ASM
sector. They particularly oppose the tendency of development programmes,
implemented by donor agencies and NGOs, to promote women’s exit from
the mining sector as the best means for protecting them from violence and
exploitation. They argue instead that programmes to improve women’s situ-
ation within the industry would be more beneficial. They agree with Mahy
that women’s agency and active engagement in the mining sector need to be
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recognized and understood better by policy makers. Given the paucity of
alternative means of income and the choice of many women to become
involved in the ASM sector as an attractive livelihood alternative among the
limited options available, they claim that legislation aimed at protecting
women by excluding them from mining areas is actually counterproductive.
They state that ‘instead of serving as an instrument to protect women miners’
health, it is currently being abused as a tool to consolidate themale-dominated
nature of the ASM industry in eastern DRC’ (Bashwira et al. 2014: 112). They
exhort policy makers to work at empowering women within the industry,
tackling gendered power relations and structural inequalities rather than
excluding women from the field.
Some of the most interesting recent scholarship documenting the ‘complex
interplay of competing sexual desires, emotional needs, social status, daily
practicalities, and economic security objectives’ (Bryceson et al. 2013a: 50) of
women in informal mining settlements has been produced by Bryceson et al.
(2013a, 2013b) in Tanzania. They reject the assumption that most women’s
roles in these communities revolve around prostitution, and have instead devel-
oped the term ‘wifestyles’ to describe the many different relational forms pur-
sued by women and men in these places. Through their fieldwork, they have
concluded that women seek to become steady girlfriends or wives of miners, as
this status provides some material and emotional security, in exchange for a
range of domestic services. Although many of these relationships are not long
term, in the light of the fluid nature of mining work and settlements, some
certainly are. This in turn highlights the need to avoid blanket statements about
women’s welfare in artisanal mining settings. Another key point they make is
that the relationships in ASM communities are financially and emotionally
interdependent, and of benefit to both men and women, as long as they last:
What is important to stress is that it is not only women depending on men’s
income. Miners, constrained by erratic income-earning, fall back on girlfriends/
wives’ income-earning as well. It remains to be seen who provides the bulk of
shared income but whatever the case, the income exchange is likely to be vital for
continued habitation in the settlement. (Bryceson et al. 2013a: 51)
Reflecting upon Tanzanian women’s views of themselves and their life choices
(‘wifestyles’) is an essential part of understanding the role of gender in the
ASM sector. Perhaps the strongest point made about women’s agency and
choices by Bryceson et al. is that:
Women in Tanzanian mining settlements generally do not perceive or portray
themselves as victims of sexual oppression. No longer subject to the control of
their elders, they have migrated to the mining settlements, engaged in sexual
relationships, and pursued productive and reproductive paths of self-making in
or out of relationships with men. (Bryceson et al. 2013b: 102)
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This research demonstrates the inadequacy of statements assuming that
women engaged in a range of relationships and activities in communities
surrounding mining settlements are victims, as prostitutes or in some other
way. Some may be, but many women choose to engage in this sphere as their
best chance for self-advancement at a certain stage of their lives.
Bashwira et al. (2014) suggest the mainstreaming efforts of the Mongolian
government and the Swiss Agency for Development Co-operation (SDC) in
the Sustainable Artisanal Mining Project as a good example of how to improve
gender equality in ASM communities. This deliberate approach to include
women in training to build their capacity is anticipated to yield better results
than the approach of finding alternative income sources as was proposed in
the DRC case (Purevjav 2011: 209). The SDC project website (www.sam.mn)
notes that more than 40 per cent of Mongolian ASMworkers who registered in
social and health insurance schemes in 2015 were women, although they
accounted for only 30 per cent of registered ASM miners, indicating that
women were embracing opportunities to improve their living standards
while engaging in artisanal mining. Although the issues are different between
the formal and informal sectors, Cane et al. (2014) reported in a study of GBV
undertaken in communities in the proximity of two large-scale mines in
southern Mongolia, that the Mongolian government and a private mining
company entered into a partnership to make the mining area community a
safer and more family-friendly place (Cane et al. 2014: 35), thus altering the
gendered behaviour status quo.
In-depth studies of GBV in relation to extractives projects are not yet
common, but are likely to increase in importance as current campaigns
about gendered violence in mining-focused countries like Australia and
Canada gain currency, along with rising expectations that companies must
act to ensure human rights in their spheres of influence, as promoted by the
Ruggie Principles (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights 2011). Often, all that is available in the public domain are
news articles and announcements of company programmes, such as those
made by the Canadian gold miner Barrick in response to authenticated alle-
gations of sexual assault against community women perpetrated by its secur-
ity forces at two of its mines, one in Papua New Guinea and one in Tanzania
(Barrick 2011a, 2011b).
One of the limited examples of detailed research was undertaken by Lockie
in Queensland; he found that intimate partner violence was no worse in
mining towns than in the general population, but that other factors, such as
family finances and alcohol and drug use, were far more likely than mining-
related elements to exacerbate family and sexual violence (Lockie 2011). By
contrast, Cane et al. found that the social changes provoked by the transient
populations associated with mine-related transportation and the temporary
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population growth during construction led to an increase of domestic vio-
lence and sex work. The preponderance of men spending long rostered
periods away from their families contributed to anti-social behaviour and
increased GBV (Cane et al. 2014). Both studies conclude that much more
work needs to be done on the subject of GBV in mining areas, as their own
work is just the beginning. As different results have been found in different
contexts, it is certainly clear that additional research is still required and also
that generalizations based on what we already know may be misleading.
21.2.5 Women’s Resistance to Extractives Projects
One important sphere in which gendered modes of action seem to predom-
inate is that of environmental activism against extractives projects. Much
of the literature discusses the gendered representations that commonly
occur among women anti-extractives activists. This is often labelled as ‘eco-
maternalism’, or the belief that women, as mothers and nurturers, care more
about conserving the planet than do men, and are therefore more prepared to
fight for it. In a mining context, the literature reveals the important but
previously understudied role of women as anti-mining activists in Andean
Peru and Ecuador. Jenkins (2014) highlights the active role played by women
in the anti-mining campaigns there, based on their acute concerns about the
environmental degradation of the land and waters that they rely upon to grow
food for their families. For many women activists, their engagement has
entailed great personal sacrifice and risk. They experienced significant oppos-
ition from within their own families, especially from senior men, but also
intimidation from pro-mining groups, both within their communities and
outside, and from mining companies (Jenkins and Rondón 2015).
Andean women continued with their activism in spite of this high level of
pressure, as they had become used to ‘experiences of violence, harassment,
and intimidation which have become part of their daily lives over a number of
years’ ( Jenkins and Rondón 2015: 419). This echoes the experiences reported
by the US women shale energy activists described below. The Andean women
activists also share the ‘eco-maternal’ perspective of their North American
sisters. As Jenkins records when discussing the Ecuadorian women activists,
in ‘explaining their activism, the women identify themselves with Pacha-
mama, reflecting broader (and by no means unproblematic) eco-feminist
maternalist tropes of women as Earthmothers and guardians of nature’
(Jenkins 2014: 451). This use of Pachamama—the indigenous Mother Earth
figure of Ecuadorean culture—can be seen as strategic essentialism, appealing
to a strong cultural basis as justification for their actions.
Another example of this occurs in the shale energy industry, which has
catalysed a high level of resistance amongwomen in the United States.Willow
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and Keefer (2015: 114) observe that women activists opposing hydraulic
fracturing in Ohio are ‘fashioning a new (but still highly gendered) relation-
ship to motherhood’. Women activists they interviewed stated that political
action had become more important than traditional care-giving tasks in order
for women to protect the future of their families. They explained that women
were used to being disempowered in their personal lives and therefore having
to stand up to authority figures, who no longer impressed them. Having less to
lose from the system, they were more likely than men to challenge it. They
had come to view activism and care-giving as complementary goals. This self-
portrayal of women as ‘eco-warriors’ enables them to represent their non-
traditional, even anti-social, behaviour as good mothering, giving strength
to their movement (Willow and Keefer 2015). Although clearly an essentialist
position, presuming that all women are better than all men in some respects,
this self-empowering depiction of women’s abilities to force social and eco-
nomic change has emerged as a strong gender model in certain extractives
contexts.
Similarly, in the Niger Delta, women have played very specific and active
roles in the resistance movement fighting the oil and gas extraction industry:
roles that prescribe clear limitations for women’s actions, although these
actions are crucial for the cultural and practical survival of the male soldiers
(Oriola 2012). On one hand, post-menopausal women play an essential spir-
itual role in performing cleansing rituals for male insurgents in the Delta’s
creeks, and supply them with various herbal preparations designed to protect
and sanctify the warriors. On the other hand, non-menopausal women are
forbidden from entering the creeks as they are believed to defile the area with
their presence. Oriola states that the Delta insurgents do not seem to perpet-
rate sexual violence against women, unlike the Nigerian security forces, so
perhaps the strong belief in women’s spiritual potency, for good or evil, has
influenced the behaviour of the male insurgents towards women. He also
states that female Delta insurgents do not engage in prostitution, although
other women ‘for instance, professional prostitutes and girlfriends or sex
partners of male insurgents’ (Oriola 2012: 550) are encouraged to undertake
‘soft prostitution’: that is, to befriend oil workers and security service officers
in order to gather intelligence. Women insurgents are also active in smuggling
arms and ammunition and ‘benefit from the gender stereotypes and chivalry
displayed by security operatives’ (Oriola 2012: 549). Although this range of
specific gendered roles had given women in the Niger Delta insurgency a
range of positive positions, Oriola admits that this freedom disappeared
once the insurgents were offered an amnesty by the state. Thereafter,
‘women’s participation in the insurgency and the rehabilitation exercise
seems devalued and relegated to the fringes’ (Oriola 2012: 551). Women
insurgents were not offered rehabilitation programmes until after their male
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counterparts and were often viewed with suspicion in their home communi-
ties, as they had transgressed traditional gender boundaries and no longer
behaved in the ways expected of women. So, although the insurgency had
provided some women with opportunities for unprecedented freedom of
action, they were later punished for this liberty, and not rewarded as heroes
like their brothers were.
Presenting a highly critical view of the effects of oil development upon
gender equality, Etkind (2014) describes the Russian oil oligarchy as petroma-
chismo and claims that it is gender discriminatory, as well as anti-human rights
in many ways. He agrees with Ross’s (2008) finding that oil-fed development
decreases women’s employment opportunities, stating that the ‘synergy
between the oil and gas trade and security services creates a hypermasculine,
cynical, and misogynistic culture: petromachismo, as I prefer to call it’ (Etkind
2014: 161). He also highlights women’s activism:
Promoting archaic values of aggressive masculinity, the post-Soviet overreliance
on natural resources and security services denies the role of women as the critical
drivers of human capital. Victims of the regime, they become leaders of the
resistance. At the turning points of the protest movement, rebellious femininity
confronts the overbearingmasculine state, with symbols of female sexuality acting
as powerful, liberating political messages. (Etkind 2014: 167)
One of the examples he refers to is that of the radical Russian women’s rock
group, Pussy Riot, notoriously jailed for performing a protest song in a Russian
Orthodox cathedral in 2012. Etkind demonstrated the inherently anti-
feminist stance of the Russian state when he noted that the judge, a woman,
commented when making her judgment, that: ‘Though feminism is not a
crime, it is incompatible with Orthodoxy, Catholicism, or Islam . . . Feminists
violate the sphere of decency and morality’ (Etkind 2014: 167). Of course, the
Pussy Riot ‘Punk Prayer’ does not refer to the oil business, and Etkind does not
clearly demonstrate a link between the extractive industries and Russian
chauvinism, which may well be cultural as Rorbaek (2016) asserts that chau-
vinism in oil-rich Muslim countries is. Etkind does, however, emphasize that
one of the largest employment sectors in Russia is the security industry
(including the armed forces and police), which employs about 10 per cent of
the population, almost all male, revealing an inherent ‘hypermasculinity’
already existing in the Russian state. A similar condition certainly seems to
exist in Russia’s oil and gas sectors.
By contrast, Rorbaek (2016) has challenged the assertion that a ‘resource curse’
in theMiddle East has had a negative influence upon women’s rights bymaking
it easier to confine women to the home—an idea advanced by Ross in 2008.
He concludes instead that it is Islamic culture that is detrimental to women’s
rights and that although the possession of oil wealth may bolster the degree of
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repression of women, it does not actually cause it. He cites Afghanistan and
Pakistan as examples of repressive Islamic regimes which do not possess oil
wealth. Thus he concludes that, although the eleven OAPEC3 nations are def-
initely oil-rich and repressive, so too are many other Muslim countries without
similar wealth. So he argues the explanation must be more than economic, and
he analyses historical and cultural reasons for his findings.
Whether or not it is possible to prove that the oil industry, whether in the
Middle East or in Russia, leads to increased repression of women, it is clear that
the presence of large-scale oil development is certainly not bringing about an
increase in gender equity and sexual equality in these host countries. This begs
the question of whether oil companies should be making greater efforts to
bridge the gap by working towards gender equality themselves when host
states are clearly not doing so. Although it may be that the cultural subjuga-
tion of women in Islamic countries has resulted in less female activism than is
apparent elsewhere, which may benefit extractives companies, their human
rights policy commitments should lead them to encourage host governments
towards greater gender equity. If the industry provided more positive oppor-
tunities for women worldwide, it is possible that their motivation to oppose it
might be lessened.
21.2.6 Industry Efforts towards Gender Balance
In spite of much research producing general agreement about what needs to
be done to make the extractive industries more gender-balanced and equal,
andmajor efforts by a number of resources companies to try to implement the
recommended changes, there has not been much visible improvement, with
female employment rates still not exceeding 20 per cent even in the more
advanced economies. See Macdonald (2017) to view available statistics on
women’s participation in the sector and for further detail on the gender pay
gap and gender segregation by occupation. Some of the more radical scholars
(Laplonge, Mayes, and Pini) claim that industry efforts to date have done little
more than perpetuate the status quo while making cosmetic changes around
the margins. By frequently restating its commitment to gender equality pol-
icies and programmes, the extractives sector arguably can avoid regulation or
intervention even if the actual results of its actions to date are negligible.
In Laplonge’s view, gender ‘is not about what men and women are; rather it
needs to be seen as what men and women do’ (Laplonge 2014: 36). This then
enables a discussion of behaviour rather than nature, which can lead to
options for cultural change. His research has shown that women in mining
3 i.e. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
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‘often consciously make an effort to not act like girls when on site’ (Laplonge
2014: 70) and women managers in mining do not like to associate their
success with feminism or women’s rights for fear of alienating their mostly
male colleagues. Williams et al. also found this in the American oil and gas
industry when they discovered that women managers were actually subcon-
sciously discriminating against the promotion of women in their departments
for fear of appearing gender-biased in favour of women. They observe that in
such a situation ‘the only way to prove one is neutral and objective is to hire a
white man for a position’ (Williams et al. 2014: 455). Thus, although many of
the women geoscientists interviewed stated a preference for having more
women and greater opportunities for women in their industry, most of them
were opposed to any form of preferential policies for women in case it under-
mined the positions that they themselves had achieved.
Laplonge and Mayes and Pini both criticize the belief that women will
‘civilize’ the workplace, stating that there is no proof either that this works
in practice or that women want this responsibility (Mayes and Pini 2014;
Laplonge 2014). Laplonge notes that there is often an assumption that if the
numbers of women in the workplace reach an arbitrary ‘critical mass’, often
stated to be 30 per cent, then the cultural balance will be tipped. He argues
that there has never been any proof that the critical mass assertion is true,
therefore women should not bear the sole responsibility for bringing
about this cultural change (Laplonge 2014). Mayes and Pini describe the
assumption that women will change the workplace and work behaviour by
their very presence and innate femininity as an expectation that they will
perform ‘unpaid civilizing work’ (Mayes and Pini 2014: 542). Laplonge
declares that the only way to truly effect cultural change in the extractives
sector that may eventually lead to sexual equality in employment is to chal-
lenge both male and female gender stereotypes and the associated sets of
behaviour, an approach that would be supported by Mayes and Pini.
21.3 Conclusions
For the enhancement of gender equality in the ASM sector, Kelly et al. propose
efforts ‘to promote rights and education to ensure safe and fair working
conditions for those doing work in and around mining tunnels’ (Kelly et al.
2014: 103). In their view, campaigns and programmes should target the
education of government and customary leaders in how to assist women
miners to organize and represent themselves, rather than trying to persuade
them to leave the industry they have chosen. Better medical services, espe-
cially for those engaged in transactional sex, would benefit women workers, as
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would microcredit services. These practical programmes have been recom-
mended to improve women’s status in the ASM sector.
On the formal extractives side, although efforts have been put into increas-
ing the representation of women in leadership positions, especially on boards,
these efforts have yet to bear much fruit.4 PWC’s studies over the past three
years have produced the following conclusion:
Mining is still perceived by both genders to be a male-dominated industry where
women do not possess equality of opportunity to advance. The only way that an
organisational culture change of this nature can be effective is if it is led from the
top. The boards and executive teams ofmining companies need to understand and
champion the business imperative to promote and support women within their
organisations. They need to drive cultural change within their own companies to
create amore profitable and sustainable industry. (WIM (UK) and PWC 2015: 11)
It is doubtful that sufficient change will emerge from these worthwhile but
only advisory research efforts, and the researchers themselves estimated that it
would take decades to achieve notable change at the current rate (WIM (UK)
and PWC 2015: 10–11). One of the leading movements for corporate gender
transformation in Australia is called Male Champions for Change, but only
one mining company representative, from Rio Tinto, has become engaged
with this group, and even in that case not at CEO level. This demonstrates a
general lack of commitment to change from the top of the extractives sector.
While it is true that change can only occur if driven by management, change
at the top is not necessarily reflected by change throughout an organization,
and the expectation of the PWC study that the achievement of 30 per cent
women on extractives company boards will bring about a transformation is
not supported by evidence (Laplonge 2014). Nor are the common statements
by successful women that women themselves must bring about change.
Continuing efforts to recruit more women certainlymake the industrymore
appealing to them. Company efforts to make more positions available to
women in the full range of extractives occupations, at equal pay, will surely
be of benefit to some women. However, these corporate initiatives can only
bring about superficial changes to the masculine nature of the extractives
sector without there being a root-and-branch, industry-wide cultural trans-
formation focused on men as much as women. Laplonge accuses the industry
of refusing to ‘investigate the practices of masculinity which dominate in the
4 A few women have reached positions at the top of major extractives companies, but very few.
Cynthia Carroll was CEO of AngloAmerican plc from 2007 to 2013, when she stepped down,
leaving Kay Priestly, CEO of Turquoise Hill Resources, as the only woman CEO in the top 100
resources companies. Cheryl Carolus, of Gold Fields Limited, was the sole female chair of a major
resources company in 2015. In the larger group of the top 500 resources companies women fared a
little better, with twelve being CEOs, an increase from seven in 2014 (PWC 2015: 11).
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business of mining and which continue to ensure that most women . . .will
find it hard to succeed in this industry’ (Laplonge 2014: 70).
Thus, what is needed is change at the top, driving cultural change through-
out each extractives organization and primarily focused on the men who
make up the majority of the workforce. Some work has been done in this
field, and theWestern Australian government has sponsored the development
of a training course along these lines (Department of Mines and Petroleum
2012). Others may want to follow this example. Fundamentally, unless the
men who run the extractive industries decide to make these changes, which
will not be easy, there is unlikely to be much improvement in the gender
balance of the sector in the foreseeable future.
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Climate Change and the Extractives Sector
Tony Addison
22.1 Introduction
Climate change is one of the world’smost complex and urgent global problems;
indeed, many would argue that it is the greatest challenge.1 Climate change
adaptation and mitigation are fundamental to the evolution of our economies
and societies over the rest of the twenty-first century and beyond. The extractive
industries are in many ways at the heart of the climate change challenge. The
extractives sector must support national and international efforts to respond to
climate change, by adjusting exploration and production to shifting patterns of
demand for energy and minerals—as policies and new technologies encourage
progress along low-carbon pathways.2 None of this is easy, and success is not
assured.3
This is a large topic, and the task of this chapter is to set out some of its main
issues as they relate to the extractives sector. The next section summarizes
some of the technologies and policies that shape our energy future. Adoption
of renewable energy technologies is accelerating, but without major techno-
logical breakthroughs fossil fuels will continue to dominate the immediate
energy future. The chapter then discusses three vital issues for the transition:
natural gas as an energy bridge; carbon sequestration; and energy efficiency.
After that, the chapter considers the policy dilemmas inherent in the ‘stranding’
1 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides the most exhaustive review
of the state of research on climate change through its three Working Groups on the Physical
Science Basis (WG 1); Impact, Vulnerability, and Adaptation (WG 2); and Options for Mitigating
Climate Change (WG 3). See https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/.
2 While the chapter uses the shorthand terms ‘low-carbon pathways’ and ‘net zero-carbon’
future, emissions of other greenhouse gases such as methane must be cut as well.
3 I thank John Drexhage and Nadia S. Ouedraogo for their comments, contributions, and
suggestions. Any errors remain my own.
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of fossil-fuel resources, and the responses to climate change by extractives
companies. The chapter’s second half considers the implications for minerals
and metals of the transition to low-carbon pathways. The evidence points to a
conclusion that achieving a ‘net zero-carbon’ future will be considerablymore
materially intensive than existing fossil-fuel technologies. While low-carbon
pathways offer considerable opportunities for developing countries with the
right mineral resources, there are major concerns as well, including the distri-
bution of the benefits within what are often highly fragile nations. The
chapter concludes that with greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reaching their
highest ever levels, recent progress in sustainable development and poverty
reduction is in imminent danger, posing a great challenge for the extractive
industries and their host countries.
22.2 Looking to the Energy Future
Peering into the energy future is fraught with difficulties (see Stevens,
Chapter 4, this volume). Forecasts by fossil-fuel and mining companies have
been repeatedly wrong (especially on prices) despite their strong incentives to
get forecasting right. The authoritative forecasts of the International Energy
Agency (IEA) are regularly revised to incorporate the impact of new develop-
ments in technologies and markets. The governments of resource-abundant
countries frequently stick to erroneous assumptions (especially in their revenue
projections) long after the markets have turned, and despite the vital import-
ance of the extractives sector to their economies and public finances.
This is an especially difficult time to look ahead. While technology continu-
ally shapes the energy future, the world is now in an era of ‘renewables
acceleration’ driven by falling costs.4 For solar photovoltaic (PV) the IEA’s
2017 estimate for capacity growth to 2022 is one-third higher than its 2016
estimate (IEA 2017a). Renewables now account for almost two-thirds of the
world’s additional (net) power capacity (IEA 2017a). By 2022, renewables
could be providing 30 per cent of global electricity generation, ahead of
natural gas, and equivalent to the total power consumption of China, India,
and Germany (IEA 2017a).
But such a fast growth in renewables still leaves fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas)
with a dominant, if reduced, share of global energy production. Innovation in
battery storage is the game-changer to watch. The power from renewables
such as solar, wind, and tide fluctuates. Cheaply capturing and storing
4 On uncertainty and carbon pathways, see Hughes et al. (2013) and Usher and Strachan (2012).
Rhodes et al. (2014) discuss the drivers of energy innovation, and the respective roles of the private
and public sectors.
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their energy in large-capacity batteries would eliminate this drawback. The
technology of ‘flow batteries’ holds promise for large-scale storage. But they
remain expensive (pricey vanadium is used). Grid energy storage together
with the shift to electric vehicles now underway will require lots of cobalt,
lithium, and other materials to the benefit of the producing countries (see
later discussion). Research will eventually replace the expensivematerials with
cheaper alternatives, heralding a new era of large-scale (and cheap) grid stor-
age. But we are not there yet.
Public policy also shapes the energy future; regulations, taxes, and subsidies
have profound effects on incentives. Fossil-fuels subsidies amount to billions
of dollars annually. Estimates of their annual size range from US$200–500
billion and upwards, depending on whether subsidies to production are
included, or just those to consumption.5 When environmental externalities
are accounted for, fossil-fuel subsidies amount to trillions of dollars. One IMF
study calculates that if all the externalities of fossil fuels are included (such as
harm to human health) then fossil-fuel subsidies amounted to US$5.3 trillion
in 2015, equivalent to 6.5 per cent of global GDP (Coady et al. 2017). In sum,
fossil-fuel subsidies far exceed subsidies to renewables in power generation,
which amounted to US$140 billion in 2016 (Shirai and Adam 2017).
Coal is abundant and relatively cheap, and historically the price has not
reflected its many negative environmental externalities. Coal accounts for
well over half of all electricity generated in China and India (IEA 2017b).
Globally, about US$750 billion was invested in new coal power plants in
2000–10 alone. Hundreds of coal-fired facilities could still be operational in
the coming decades, and more than 2,400 new coal-fired power stations are
already planned for construction by 2030 (van Breevoort et al. 2015). Coal has
been called the ‘zombie fuel’—dying, but far from dead. Proponents of ‘clean
coal’ even argue that carbon sequestration, discussed later, will breathe new
life into the use of this fossil fuel.
That coal will be around for a long time, even in a much-reduced role, is a
worrying scenario for human health let alone planetary health. More than
half the world’s deaths from ambient air pollution occur in China and India,
and coal is a big culprit.6 Irrespective of climate change mitigation, the
5 On themethodologies for measuring fossil-fuel subsidies see McCulloch (2017). Estimates vary
depending on whether consumption and/or production subsidies are counted. Some eleven
European countries and the EU itself provided at least €112 billion in annual subsidies over
2014–16 towards the production and consumption of fossil fuels (Genc ̧sü et al. 2017). Production
subsidies at the US federal and state levels were US$20.5 billion in 2015, with 80 per cent going to
oil and gas, and 20 per cent to coal (OCI 2017: 5). Broadening the definitions of subsidies to include
the harm that fossil fuels do to the environment and human health (respiratory illnesses etc.)
yields much larger estimates (Coady et al. 2017).
6 Lancet Commission on Pollution and Health (http://www.thelancet.com/commissions/
pollution-and-health).
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leaderships of China and India want to cut air pollution, and are now willing
to trade some growth for cleaner air. Emissions of nitrogen dioxide and
sulphur dioxide (the major air pollutants) from gas-fired plants are a fraction
of those of coal-fired plants (de Gouw et al. 2014). Stronger environmental
regulations are squeezing the use of coal to the benefit of gas. China, which
consumes half the world’s coal, has cut its own production (by an amount
equal to the total production of South Africa, the world’s fifth largest coal
exporter) and is curbing imports as well (IEA 2017b). China is today respon-
sible for around half the global take up of solar PV, as it increasingly switches
to renewables (IEA 2017b).
Carbon pricing shifts incentives in electricity generation away from coal
and towards natural gas (which emits much less CO2 than coal in power
generation) and, best of all, towards renewables. The UK’s ‘carbon price sup-
port’, a tax paid by its coal and gas generators, helped reduce coal’s share to a
record low of 2 per cent by mid-2017, when the United Kingdom had its first
day without coal-fired power generation since the Industrial Revolution (Aur-
ora Energy Research 2017). Some forty national and twenty-five subnational
jurisdictions now put a price on carbon, a doubling over the last decade
(World Bank/ECOFYS 2017: 2). Official carbon pricing covers some 15 per cent
of the world’s GHG emissions (World Bank/ECOFYS 2017: 2). This will rise to
around 25 per cent when China introduces a national carbon market by the
end of 2017, making it the world’s largest scheme. In Canada, the federal
government plans to introduce a carbon-pricing regime to support existing
provincial carbon-pricing initiatives.
Both regulation and market-based instruments like carbon pricing alter
business behaviour. In its principles for climate change policy design, the
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) states that: ‘without a
clear price signal, members’ ability to plan andmake sound decisions is at risk’
(ICMM (2011: 4).7 As more key mining jurisdictions move to carbon-pricing
systems (e.g. Chile and South Africa) companies will need to adjust their
operations accordingly.
The 2015 UN Paris climate agreement opens a new chapter in the global
energy future, one in which the shift from fossil fuels to renewables should
accelerate.8 However, progress is not assured. In 2017 President Trump
announced US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, a decision that is,
7 The ICMM (2011) principles for climate change policy design were re-affirmed by ICMM
members in 2015 prior to the Paris Climate Conference. For the oil and gas industry, IPIECA
(2015) also affirms the importance in climate policy of long-term price signals and market
certainty. In expectation of increased regulation on emissions (and carbon pricing), more
companies are using an internal carbon price in their business planning (CDP 2017: 5).
8 The Paris Agreement was reached at the 21st session of the Conference of Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 2015.
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however, ‘open to review’ and one that faces strong domestic opposition at
state and city government levels (meanwhile other signatories remain com-
mitted, notably the EU, China, and India). Although the European Union’s
emissions trading scheme (ETS) was the world’s first and most comprehensive
scheme, the price for its carbon credits is now too low to deter Europe’s heavy
emitters: gas has not replaced coal on the scale initially expected in Europe
(Stern 2017). Australia has scrapped its carbon tax, replacing it with a weaker
ETS-style scheme. The United Kingdom’s carbon price must now rise, other-
wise coal-fired power generation will return. Some fossil-fuel companies con-
tinue to lobby against increased regulation, carbon pricing, and, indeed, the
Paris Agreement itself.
22.2.1 Natural Gas, Carbon Sequestration, and Energy Efficiency
Even under very optimistic scenarios for emissions reductions, fossil fuels will
still be in use for many decades while renewables grow their market share as
the costs of the technologies fall. This tension between climate goals and the
pace of technology could be eased by three sets of measures: the first is heavily
promoted (natural gas), the second is untested at scale (carbon capture and
storage (CCS) or ‘carbon sequestration’) and the third has very wide support
(energy efficiency).
Champions of natural gas, including (not surprisingly) the producing com-
panies and the countries with the resource, argue that it is a vital ‘energy
bridge’ from the era of hydrocarbons to the low-carbon future. High efficiency
gas-powered plants using combined cycle technology (CCGT) emit less than
half as much CO2 as the typical coal-fired plant per unit of energy produced
(de Gouw et al. 2014). Gas is now the fastest-growing fossil fuel (IEA 2017c).
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is showing especially strong growth: forty coun-
tries now import LNG, up from seventeen a decade ago (BP 2016). New gas
producers, like those in East Africa, have high hopes of selling LNG to Asia,
especially to China as it moves on from coal.
However, the notion of gas as an energy bridge is contested. The main
constituent of natural gas is methane (CH4). This is emitted into the atmos-
phere via deliberate venting as well as from leaky gas wells and pipelines (with
corroded iron pipes and other old infrastructure leaking more). Methane is a
more potent GHG than CO2, and contributes about 17 per cent of radiative
forcing (the warming impact on climate) (NOAA 2016). Whether gas has a
better climate footprint than coal depends on how much methane emissions
can be reduced. A methane leakage rate of 1.3 per cent of gas production
(the EPA’s leakage estimate for the US) is associated with a 46 per cent emis-
sions reduction (when efficient gas plants substitute for coal power) whereas a
5 per cent leakage rate (found in other US estimates) implies only a 24 per cent
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reduction (Lazarus et al. 2015: 4). After reviewing the US evidence, Brandt
et al. (2014) conclude that methane leakage is substantially underestimated.
Shale gas is of special concern; Howarth (2015) concludes that whenmethane
emissions are properly measured, the greenhouse footprint of shale gas
exceeds that of conventional gas, coal, and oil.
The necessary technology exists to cut methane emissions (Balcombe et al.
2017). US regulation is now tighter, and the US industry has successfully
reduced its methane emissions (Schwietzke et al. 2016). Is this feasible else-
where, especially in Eurasia and the Middle East which account for around
half the world’s methane emissions? Gould andMcGlade (2017) calculate that
it is cost-effective to avoid three-quarters of current global methane emissions
(in part because captured methane can be sold). If gas is to act as an energy
bridge, then a great deal hinges on putting methane abatement measures in
place globally, especially for shale gas.
There are additional concerns around natural gas that call into question the
optimism of its champions. These include the environmental costs of its
extraction (local pollution from shale gas ‘fracking’ is a worry) and a concern
that switching to cheap gas, with all its attendant investment in production
and distribution infrastructure, will delay the adoption of near-zero-carbon
technologies. Some modelling exercises find only a small reduction in CO2
emissions and indeed, in some scenarios, an increase in climate forcing
(McJeon et al. 2014). Several studies argue that gas can only act as a bridge
fuel (to displace coal) until around 2030 (a shorter time than many policy
makers expect); renewables must then take the lead if the world is to achieve
the target of keeping the increase in global temperature within 2°C above its
pre-industrial level (the 2DS goal) (Banks and Taraska 2013).9
We are left with a conundrum: how to maintain energy supplies while
keeping to global emissions goals? Carbon sequestration and improved energy
efficiency might both help.10
Advocates of carbon sequestration see it as a transitional mitigation tech-
nology allowing the continued use of fossil energy (particularly gas) as the
share of renewables grows. More controversially, proponents of coal see it as
means to keep, and indeed grow, coal’s share in energy generation. This is a
major concern for critics of CCS: by keeping coal alive, CCS could divert
resources from clean energy technologies—CCS will absorb a lot of resources
9 The 2DS goal was adopted at the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change (in 2010). To keep the rise in the global temperature
within 2°C above preindustrial levels, the concentration of atmospheric GHGs must be stabilized
within 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent by 2050.
10 Space limitations preclude a full discussion of carbon sequestration and energy efficiency. The
reader is instead referred to Sovacool et al. (2016) and Sovacool (2017).
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as it has large initial investment costs—and reduce the incentive to adopt
renewables and improve energy efficiency.
Many climate models find that CCS will be essential to achieving inter-
national targets (IPCC 2014: 82). Industrial sectors such as iron, steel, and
cement have few if any alternatives for achieving deep emission reductions
(Florin and Fennell 2010). Their technologies have already seen large gains in
energy efficiency (DECC 2015). Moreover, the production of cement, chem-
icals, and steel, as well as petroleum refining, generate significant additional
CO2 emissions as a by-product of the chemical reactions inherent in the
industrial process; these cannot be eliminated (ZEP 2013).
How much could CCS achieve in emissions reduction? Much is unknown.
On some estimates, CCS could deliver 13 per cent of the cumulative reduction
in emissions required by 2050 to meet the 2DS goal (IEA 2015a). But for the
present, CCS projects are mostly small scale, and there are strong concerns
regarding operational safety and risks in transporting large volumes of lique-
fied CO2. Fundamentally, there is little experience with long-term CO2 storage
and certainly no proof that storage can be managed or safely guaranteed for
centuries.
In sum, CCS will have a role in the industrial sectors. In the power sector,
CCS may have a role in coal decarbonization in the short term—provided it
does not delay the energy transition—and perhaps a vital role in decarboniz-
ing natural gas use in the medium and long term, as gas replaces coal in
electricity generation. But at what scale this occurs is uncertain for technical,
economic, and legal reasons.
Continuing to improve energy efficiency will therefore be imperative if 2DS
is to be met: it must have one of the biggest roles in reducing emissions,
especially in construction, industry, and transport (IEA 2015b; UNEP 2011).
Some US$14 trillion in energy efficiency investments are needed up to 2035
(IEA 2014). This implies more demand for theminerals andmetals that go into
the technologies that achieve greater energy efficiency; in lighting and tem-
perature control in buildings and in public transport, for example. This
demand will be additional to that for energy storage and electric vehicles.
We return to the implications for the mining sector later in this chapter.
22.2.2 Stranded Assets
Cutting methane emissions from gas infrastructure, together with carbon
sequestration and improved energy efficiency, will reduce some of the pres-
sure to leave fossil fuels unused and ‘in the ground’. Nevertheless, a radical
readjustment in the world’s GHG emissions to meet the Paris commitments
will render a substantial portion of the known stock of fossil-fuel reserves
unusable, and they will become, in effect, ‘stranded assets’ (Cust et al. 2017;
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van der Ploeg 2016). One much-cited study concludes: ‘Our results suggest
that, globally, a third of oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of
current coal reserves should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to
meet the target of 2°C’ (McGlade and Elkins 2015: 187).
Fossil fuels are of growing concern to the investment community. Norway’s
SWF (which invests the country’s oil wealth); the heirs to the Rockefeller oil
fortune; French bank BNP Paribas; the World Council of Churches; and
universities such as Stanford are among the investors and public and private
organizations that are selling all or part of their fossil-fuel investments (coal
mining, oil and gas extracted from shale and tar sands, and Arctic oil and
gas exploration and production feature in the disinvestments). This does not
for the present deprive fossil-fuel companies of capital as environmentally
insensitive investors will buy the assets. But disinvestment does reinforce the
political message that action on climate change is urgent.
Eventually fossil-fuel companies will face a rising cost of capital as the value
of their assets declines, the consequence of ever-cheaper renewable energy. As
we discussed earlier, firm implementation of the Paris Agreement will make
obsolete billions of dollars of existing and planned investments in oil, gas, and
coal as these resources are stranded. For the largest publicly traded oil and gas
producers, Carbon Tracker Initiative (2017) reckons that one-third of poten-
tial capital investment up to 2025 could become obsolescent. This has become
a concern for financial regulators as well.11
Large adjustments must be made by fossil-fuel companies, but even more so
by countries with the oil, gas, and coal resources. Companies can gradually
shrink the size of their businesses, and diversify into renewables: ‘companies
could, if they wanted to, run down their existing reserves in less than
15 years . . .most countries must wait 45 years on average to liquidate their
fossil-fuel wealth (Cust et al. 2017: 47–8). Countries can only convert their
resource wealth into revenue once it is developed and produced. This becomes
tougher for countries with high production costs as prices weaken and they
become less attractive to companies (relative to lower-cost producers). Their
dreams of large revenues to finance ambitious economic and social develop-
ment plans may never be fulfilled.
Consider natural gas for instance. At present, the global market is glutted.12
As a result, companies are keenest on long-standing low-cost suppliers like
Qatar with its large reserves as well as new and large low-cost producers like
the United States (whose exports, supplied by the shale gas boom, could
11 The Bank of England has a task force on climate-related financial disclosures (https://
www.fsb-tcfd.org). See also Zenghelis and Stern (2016).
12 After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Japan’s import price for LNG tripled between the
millennium and 2012, but by 2017 it was back around its 2000 level.
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match Qatar’s). Existing producing countries, and the companies operating in
their jurisdictions, are keen to grow their exports while it remains remunera-
tive to do so. New producers such as Tanzania, which hopes to develop LNG
for export to Asia, are entering a buyers’ market for gas. One consequence is
that a more attractive tax package is now necessary to encourage companies to
invest than in the years of high prices when countries expected a revenue and
foreign-exchange bonanza.13
Prices could recover, but international climate action and the shift to
renewables are strong headwinds for producers of fossil fuels. Governments
would be well advised to reduce their dependence on revenues from oil and gas
(and especially coal) by broadening their tax bases and systems of tax collection
to raise more non-resource revenues (Addison et al. 2018). They also need to
build fiscal buffers by savingmore revenue in readiness for unexpected earnings
shocks, including future breakthroughs in renewable energy technologies
that eat into the market shares of oil, gas, and coal. Some fossil-fuel-rich
countries also have reserves of those metals and minerals that are in high
demand as the world transitions onto low-carbon pathways (see the discus-
sion in Section 22.3). Developing these would help reduce their existing
over-dependence ononeor two fossil fuels for revenues (and foreign exchange).
Above all, investing resource revenues into high value-added activities in agri-
culture, manufacturing, and services will diversify the economies of countries
with abundant fossil fuels. This in turn requires an active ‘industrial policy’
(Dietsche,Chapter 7, this volume).Noneof thiswill be politically or technically
easy but countries need to be well prepared to take the necessary action.
Phasing out generous subsidies to consumers of gasoline and other fuels as
well as subsidies to exploration and production will further reduce the expos-
ure to carbon-market risk of fossil-fuel-abundant countries (Cust et al. 2017).
This is also politically difficult, as consumers, the transport sector, and busi-
nesses are used to cheap fuels, while state-owned oil and gas companies are
vigorous champions of more investment in their sector. Low-income coun-
tries (LICs) and middle-income countries (MICs) will need financial and tech-
nical assistance to adjust (including accelerated investment in renewable
energy). So far, aid donors have done little to encourage development partners
to cut fossil-fuel subsidies (McCulloch 2017). The United Kingdom’s DFID, for
instance, gives twice as much support to projects relating to fossil fuels as it
does to renewables (Wykes and Scott 2017: 4).
Given the internationally agreed temperature target (2DS etc.), there will
come a time when humanity has used up its cumulative GHG budget (IPCC
2015). That could be within a few decades. Caney (2016) poses three vital
13 Scurfield and Manley (2017) assess Tanzania’s options in the current global gas market.
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questions: (i) For a given GHG budget, how is it decided which producing
countries have the best case to continue production? (ii) Do the countries with
unused fossil fuels merit compensation? (iii) If so, who should pay? From the
perspective of distributive justice, LICs and MICs have a stronger case for
continuing to produce than do high-income countries (HICs), which owe a
good portion of their present prosperity to the use of their own fossil-fuel
resources.
Politically, it is hard for LICs and MICs to agree to strand their fossil fuels.
Their resource revenues are generally much larger than any aid flows, and ‘aid
fatigue’ prevails among donors—so full compensation (including that from
new streams of climate finance) may not appear credible to them. Many of
today’s largest producers of fossil fuels are HICs. The United States is now the
world’s third largest oil producer, and is closing fast on the leading oil and gas
exporters, Saudi Arabia and Russia. President Trump is also trying to revive the
US coal industry. Would any US administration agree to curtail US fossil-fuel
development for the benefit of poorer countries like Mozambique (which has
natural gas and abundant coal)? Whether wealthy or poor, every fossil-fuel-
abundant country wants to avoid catastrophic climate damage. Yet political
short-termism works against HICs taking on the burden of responsibility and
stranding their own fossil-fuel reserves. In sum, distributive justice would
favour an international agreement. But in its absence, resolution of the ques-
tion of which countries get the revenues, and which are left with the stranded
fossil-fuel assets, will be left to hard global politics—in which the LICs have
the least power.
22.2.3 Implications for Extractives Companies
In a warming world, extractives companies must adapt their operations to
higher temperatures and rising sea levels, and more frequent droughts, floods,
heatwaves, and storms (ICMM 2013a). Every stage of the extractives cycle is at
risk from physical damage as well as breakdowns in supply chains and vital
public services: the exploration and discovery of resources; the construction of
the infrastructure to exploit the deposit; the operation of the asset over its life
(often spanning decades); and the reclamation of the site at closure and after.
Other climate risks include disrupted supplies of power, water, materials, and
equipment to the site, and delays in transporting products to refiners, manu-
facturers, and end-markets. Companies operating in politically fragile nations,
where the state has only limited capacity to respond to disaster, are most
vulnerable to extreme weather events. Disasters constitute commercial risks
for companies and economic risks for host countries (especially to the public
finances when revenues are lost from production stoppages).
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Mines, oil/gas rigs, and associated infrastructure require engineering
excellence and high-level risk management, not least in extreme and iso-
lated environments. The extractive industries now have the tools to assess
their risks.14 Effective risk management requires an ecosystem perspective
that is unique to each location. Mining as well as oil operations inevitably
disrupt the landscape, and potentially stress the ecosystem in ways that
accentuate its vulnerability to climate change (and thereby endanger the
livelihoods of local communities). Land degradation can also compromise
the structural integrity of mine sites as well as oil and gas wells together
with their supporting water and energy and transport infrastructure (ICMM
2013a). For these reasons, some companies have stepped up the protection
of the ecosystem around their operations, as well as to meet their sustain-
ability objectives.
Inevitably, there are business and financial consequences: higher operating
costs (to raise safety margins); unplanned capital expenditures (to climate-
proof older infrastructure); as well as reputational and financial costs arising
from litigation, regulatory non-compliance, and adverse publicity (ICMM
2013a, 2013b). These will affect the value of both private and publicly listed
companies. Consequently, there is more pressure on extractives companies to
incorporate climate risk into their strategic plans, environmental and social
impact assessments, safety management systems, and engineering practices.
That pressure comes from within the industry itself (and industry associ-
ations), host governments (including sector regulators who must protect the
public interest), campaigning NGOs (both national and international), and
increasingly from investors such as pension funds, as well as regulators of
financial markets.
Minimizing mining’s footprint is important since forest clearance for min-
ing and associated infrastructure contributes to GHG emissions (and biodiver-
sity loss). Some mining companies are investing to ‘green’ their operations by
use of renewables to power their operations and measures to reduce their
carbon footprint. The use of renewable energy, particularly solar PV and
wind power, is scaling up inmining projects, notably in Canada and Australia.
However, there are many GHG emissions from mining, particularly in trans-
port, that are not under the industry’s direct control (ICMM 2013b). This is a
major challenge to the industry given the expected scale of mining’s expan-
sion over coming decades.
14 On corporate risk management and climate change in the oil and gas industry see IPIECA
(2013) and in mining see (ICMM 2013a). Though not climate related, the Exxon Valdez and
Deepwater Horizon oil spills, as well as the Samarco (Beno Rodriques) tailings-dam collapse,
illustrate the damage that major accidents can cause.
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22.3 Impact of a ‘Net Zero-carbon’ Future
for Minerals and Metals
Achieving the necessary reduction in emissions alongside the UN Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) represents a massive and unprecedented chal-
lenge. The five areas where emission reductions will be most critical are in:
power; transportation; buildings; industry; and land-use management. Con-
structing the necessary new technologies and infrastructures requiresminerals
and metals for non-carbon power providers (hydro and nuclear), renewable
power technologies (wind turbines, solar PV, and tidal power), zero-emission
buildings, hybrid/electric transportation vehicles, and alternative transporta-
tion modes (especially rail). To reach a ‘net zero-carbon future’ the IEA esti-
mates that annual investments in low-carbon technologies and energy
efficiency need tomore than double by 2020 to US$790 billion and to increase
by about six times to reach US$2.3 trillion by 2035 (IEA 2014).
It is difficult to exaggerate the potential implications for the growth in
demand for key minerals and metals if the world does move successfully
towards clean energy and onto low-carbon pathways (IRP 2017). The most
comprehensive and recent assessment is provided in a study undertaken by
the World Bank with support from ICMM (World Bank 2017). This predicts
future demand for metals in the transition to a low-carbon future, based on
the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspective (ETP) scenarios (IEA 2015b). The IEA
study examines the implications for renewable technologies of meeting the
2°C (2DS), 4°C (4DS), and 6°C (6DS) goals for global temperature warming
(IPCC 2014). Renewables (solar, wind hydropower, biomass etc.) rise in
the ETP scenarios from 14 per cent of the present energy mix to 18 per cent
in the 6DS scenario, and 44 per cent in the 2DS scenario (IEA 2015b).
The World Bank study concentrates on wind, solar, and energy storage
batteries as they are critical to future energy supplies in a carbon-constrained
world, while recognizing that there are many other important technologies
and transmission systems (including power, transportation, buildings, indus-
try, and land-use management) (World Bank 2017). It identifies what mater-
ials will be required, and howmuch, as these technologies are scaled up under
the various climate goal scenarios (especially 2DS). Of course, forecasting
metals demand is highly contingent, not least on intra-technology choices
(which types of wind technology are adopted, for example) and whether the
Paris Agreement holds.
For mineral-abundant counties and mining companies, the World Bank’s
main conclusion has great significance: ‘The report clearly shows that the
technologies assumed to populate the clean energy shift—wind, solar, hydro-
gen, and electricity systems—are in fact significantly MOREmaterial intensive
in their composition than current traditional fossil-fuel-based energy supply
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systems’ (World Bank 2017: xii). This is a striking result. Inevitably the
demand for metals for use in low-carbon technologies is much greater under
the ambitious 2DS scenario than the 4DS scenario; this is especially so for
aluminium, cobalt, iron, lead, lithium, manganese, and nickel.
Similar conclusions emerge from other studies. Vidal et al. (2013) examine
the material requirements necessary for the world to achieve 100 per cent
renewable energy by 2050, a target of the World Wildlife Fund for Nature
(WWF 2011). Vidal et al. (2013) conclude that the material requirements of
solar and wind installations greatly exceed those of conventional energy
infrastructure. Relative to an equivalent installation from traditional (fossil-
fuel) energy technologies, renewable technologies require fifteen times more
concrete, ninety times more aluminium, and fifty times more iron, copper,
and glass. To reach the WWF goal, this would mean 3,200 million tonnes of
steel, 310 million tonnes of aluminium, and 40 million tonnes of copper; this
amounts to an increase of 5–18 per cent in annual production over the next
forty years (Vidal et al. 2013).
Clean energy is very demanding ofmaterials, a message underscored by Kleijn
et al. (2010) who explore potential resource constraints in a hydrogen-centred
economy with a scenario whereby renewables generate all energy. This study
estimates an increase in iron/steel production of six times to service wind
turbines and forty times should specially constructed pipelines be required. If
electricity is the main carrier/transmitting agent for clean power, it would mean
an increase of copper production by seventy times from its current levels.
Wind technologies require copper, iron ore (steel), and neodymium (Kleijn
et al. 2010: 2790). For solar PV and concentrated solar power systems (CSPs) it is
expected that demand for the ‘rare earths’ could substantially exceed production
capacity, thereby encouraging the development and adoption of synthetic sub-
stitutes (Kleijn et al. 2010: 2789). Smart grid systems integrated with solar and
wind installations will raise the demand for base metals even further.
In the case of zero-carbon vehicles, strong growth in fuel cells implies
dramatic growth in platinum demand and production (possibly exhausting
current reserves) and neodymium production levels would need to increase by
200 per cent (Kleijn et al. 2010). Lithium, copper, nickel, and platinumwill see
considerable demand growth under a net zero-carbon scenario for transport
(García-Olivares et al. 2012: 567). CCS at scale will require significant amounts
of nickel and molybdenum (Kleijn et al. 2011: 5647).
22.3.1 Supply Concerns
Themetals required for a low-carbon future are experiencing increasing demand
and higher prices. The evolution of the future pattern of demand will depend
upon the mix of technologies adopted and how these evolve over time as new
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scientific breakthroughs are made. Finding cheaper substitutes for the most
expensive metals in batteries is a pressing concern (Dawkins et al. 2012).
Increasing recycling can reduce some of the pressure on supplies. Creating a
closed-loop or ‘circular’ material economy can save energy (compared with
producing new material from ore, biomass, or oil) and contribute to reducing
GHG emissions. Increasing rates of steel recycling would reduce the demand
for primary steel production and save about 75 per cent of emissions for every
ton of scrap recycled (Climate Strategies 2014: 5). There are, however, many
technical challenges in recycling (Reck and Graedel 2012). Moreover, the
potential for recycling is constrained by the volume of material available
(Allwood et al. 2013; Pauliuk et al. 2013). The availability of material from
end-of-life products is limited by the time delay between initial production
and the discard of products. If the global demand for materials and metals
continues growing, then recycling will no longer be able to create a closed-
loop or ‘circular’ material economy. Older developed economies (like the UK)
could possibly operate a closed-cycle for steel, whereas emerging economies
such as China and India cannot do this until their stocks have grown further
(Müller et al. 2011).
Consequently, there is an extremely promising development opportunity
for mineral-abundant countries and an excellent commercial opportunity for
many miners. Investors in metals have taken note and speculation drove
the price of lithium up by 80 per cent in 2016, and cobalt’s price rose by
80 per cent over 2017 (making it the year’s best performing financial asset) as
investment funds accumulated large stockpiles in anticipation of growing
demand. Cobalt and lithium were already in demand for smartphone and
laptop batteries; and demand is now growing even faster—stimulated by electric
vehicle manufacture and associated battery technologies, which are expected to
result in a 39 per cent growth in cobalt demand through to 2022.15 China is
central to this dynamic: 80 per cent of its cobalt imports are used to manufac-
ture rechargeable batteries (USGS 2017: 53). Car makers are trying to lock in
cobalt supplies, but in 2017 Volkswagen failed to secure five years of supply at a
fixed price.16 As grid-storage technologies become commercially viable theywill
add greatly to the demand for cobalt, lithium, and other metals.
22.3.2 Development Impacts and Concerns
Our knowledge of the scale and distribution of the world’s mineral and metal
resources remains patchy. This is especially so for the rare earths; there are no
15 ‘Five Charts That Matter for Investors’, Financial Times, 12 October 2017.
16 ‘VW Fails to Secure Long-term Cobalt Supply for Electric Vehicles’, Financial Times (15
October 2017).
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data on production and reserves for Africa and, in the developing country
group, only Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, and Thailand have data (World
Bank 2017: 50, citing the USGeological Survey). Fromwhat we do know, Latin
America is especially well placed for the low-carbon energy transition. It has
many of the mineral resources central to the transition, notably lithium for
batteries; Chile and Argentina (the world’s second and third largest producers,
respectively) together with Bolivia constitute Latin America’s so-called ‘lith-
ium triangle’. India has iron and steel and titanium, Indonesia, Malaysia, and
the Philippines have bauxite and nickel, while Oceania’s small islands also
have resources (New Caledonia’s has 10 per cent of the world’s nickel reserves,
for instance). For the rare earths, China has the largest production and reserves
with Australia coming a distant second in production (World Bank 2017: 50).
Africa is mineral rich, and its metals will see growing demand from the
energy revolution. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has between
47 per cent and 60 per cent of the world’s cobalt reserves, and supplies more
than half the world’s total production (USGS 2017: 53).17 There are at present
no other sources of cobalt that match those of the DRC. Despite considerable
mining investment over the last decade, Africa’s potential remains largely
untapped. Africa’s shares of world production are often far below its shares
of world reserves; Guinea, for example, has 26 per cent of known bauxite
reserves but accounts for only 6.5 per cent of global production (World Bank
2017: 26).
In sum, the developing world is potentially well placed to benefit from the
material needs of the various low-carbon pathways. However, there are at least
four concerns (in addition to uncertainty around the Paris Agreement, as well
as the difficulty that countries face in managing resource booms in general).
First, those countries and companies expected to meet increasing demands
for base and rarer metals and minerals face an uphill task in reducing their
own GHG emissions and the material footprint of their operations (discussed
earlier in this chapter). Increasing extraction and production levels, as well as
decreasing ore grades, imply that the relative GHG, energy, and water inten-
sity of operations will also increase. Increasing the share of renewables in the
power supplied to mines, and in the transport system which serves them, will
be vital. Achieving this greatly depends on shifting the host country’s power
system towards renewable energy.
Second, countries withmineral wealth cannot enjoy the associated earnings
and revenues unless they mine. Here there is a marked gap between the
success of emerging economies like Brazil, Chile, and China, with their high
levels of production relative to reserves, and those of the LICs (and some
17 The DRC’s cobalt reserves are reported as 60 per cent of total world reserves in many sources,
but the USGS figure is 47 per cent (Yager 2014).
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MICs) where the gap between their reserves and production is often very wide
(Guinea’s bauxite is an example). This requires large investments, supporting
infrastructure (especially reliable power systems and good railways and ports),
and a supportive and stable policy framework. This is sadly lacking in many
countries.
Third, who will benefit in the producing countries from any resource boom
resulting from the low-carbon transition? Some 42 per cent of the reserves of
metals and minerals required for a clean energy future are in countries with
‘good’ or satisfactory resource governance, while 37 per cent are in countries
with weak scores according to analysis by Tilley and Manley (2017) which
runs the World Bank (2017) data against the NRGI’s Resource Governance
Index. The countries with weak scores are often fragile states, with high pov-
erty rates. Global poverty is falling, yet many resource-rich countries are excep-
tions, including mineral-rich countries like the DRC, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
In these countries both the number of poor people, and their share of the total
population, are rising (Ferreira et al. 2017). The DRC’s resources include cop-
per, cobalt, and nickel—all essential to clean energy technologies—but the
country’s politics are highly unstable and exclusionary, and over 60 per cent
of the population is poor (Nanivazo andMahrt 2016: 421–45). Zimbabwe is the
world’s fifth largest producer of lithium, with deposits which may be among
the world’s largest (USGS 2017: 101). Yet Zimbabwe’s mineral wealth has
enriched its ruling elite and funded an oppressive security apparatus (Global
Witness 2017). Will any lithium boom play out differently? It seems unlikely
until Zimbabwe’s politics improves.
Fourth, it would be unacceptable if scaling up mining to facilitate the low-
carbon transition results in large environmental and social costs around mine
sites and for local people. The supply chain for cobalt is especially worrying, as
it relies on the DRC which provides over half the world’s supply. A handful of
industrial miners dominate the DRC’s cobalt mining sector, which is attract-
ing more foreign investment.18 Environmental damage together with human
rights abuses in unregulated artisanal mining (including child labour, lack of
workplace safety, and forced relocation of villages) are widespread (Amnesty
International 2016; Frankel 2016; SOMO 2016). To curb the funding of Con-
golese militias, US law requires companies registered with the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and which sell products containing gold,
tantalum, tin, or tungsten, to disclose whether these are sourced from theDRC
or adjoining countries (subject to independent audit).19 While cobalt is not
implicated in militia-funding, many campaigners (and some companies)
18 China Molybdenum bought the Tenke copper and cobalt mine in the DRC in 2016.
19 This is a provision in the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
passed into law by Congress in July 2010.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Climate Change
475
argue that cobalt’s inclusion in the list would help to curb human rights
abuses in the DRC’s mining (Frankel 2016).
Batteries for electric vehicles, together with themuch larger batteries of grid-
storage, require far more cobalt than IT devices. The renewable energy, electric
vehicle (and IT industries) all face a serious dilemma, as their technologies
greatly depend on the DRC’s cobalt. A leading battery maker, LG Chem,
stopped buying DRC-sourced minerals, including cobalt, in 2015.20 Car
manufacturer Tesla is trying to replace DRC cobalt with North American
supplies for its electric cars. This will be difficult as combined Canadian and
US production is less than one-sixth of the DRC’s, and the DRC’s reserves are
more than three times those of Australia, which has the second-largest
reserves (USGS 2017: 53). Battery makers are searching for substitutes (nickel
is favoured, but iron, manganese, and silicate may be feasible). Research
results are promising, but moving from the laboratory to commercial manu-
facture is some years ahead. Meanwhile, the technologies underlying the
renewables (and information) revolutions depend on a mineral supplied by
one of the world’s most fragile nations.
Cobalt is only one example of the many important minerals that are
sourced from fragile states. Embedding these supply chains in a proper frame-
work of governance and transparency (that also avoids environmental dam-
age and human rights abuses) is essential if this resource wealth is to serve
inclusive development and help countries end their fragility (Ali et al. 2017).21
Strengthening state effectiveness and accountability is essential as well
(Addison and Brück 2009: 15–30). Weak resource governance deters the
investment necessary to develop the sector and provide the revenues (e.g.
Zimbabwe’s output of lithium is far below other producing countries, despite
its having much larger reserves). Fragile states like the DRC risk missing
the many development benefits of a future in which low-carbon pathways
generate a rising demand for their metals and minerals.
22.4 Conclusions
In 2016, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 reached their highest level in
800,000 years, and atmospheric methane also reached new highs (WMO
2017). Since 1990 there has been a 40 per cent increase in radiative forcing
by all GHGs (NOAA 2016). To avoid more than a 2°C temperature rise will
require GHG concentrations to not exceed more than 430–450 ppmv; this
20 Apple is also working to reform its cobalt supply chain (Frankel 2016).
21 The OECD has a set of guidelines on responsible supply-chain management in conflict-
affected countries (OECD 2013). Other actions are outlined in RESOLVE (2010).
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means that GHG emissions must peak within the next few decades and the
world must then achieve zero net-emissions (IPCC 2015).
The shape of the energy future and of the societies that it underpins, as well
as the prospects for producers of fossil fuels and manufacturers of low-carbon
technologies (and the metals and minerals that go into them), depend on a
myriad of decisions by private and public actors, whose decisions interact.
Billions of dollars of private investment in extractives (together with invest-
ments in renewable energy, electric vehicles, energy-efficient buildings etc.)
hinge on the parties to the Paris Agreement fulfilling their commitments and
supporting the transition with publicly funded research—thereby encour-
aging the private sector to shift decisively towards delivering low-carbon
pathways for economies and societies. This includes companies in the extrac-
tives sector who need to reduce their carbon footprint while, in the case of
miners, increasing the production of the metals and minerals essential to the
technologies of the low-carbon future.
The cost of renewables is falling at an unexpectedly fast pace yet fossil fuels
will dominate power generation for many more years, even as societies
improve their energy efficiency. Eventually, much of the world’s remaining
reserves of fossil fuels must remain unused (unless there is amassive scaling up
of carbon sequestration, which is itself problematic). Many of the LICs and
MICs still hoping for rapid prosperity based on their oil, gas, and coal reserves
face the stranding of these assets in a carbon-constrained future. Although
there may be scope for prioritizing their supplies while maintaining a fixed
global carbon budget, this requires an international agreement that will be
tough to achieve.
At the same time, those LICs and MICs which have reserves of the materials
and metals essential to the construction of wind, solar, electricity transmis-
sion, and public transportation face a brighter future than that of fossil-fuel
producers. If international climate action, including implementation of the
Paris Agreement, is robust then minerals and materials that should see sus-
tained demand-growth include: copper, nickel, high-grade steel, aluminium,
zinc, molybdenum, platinum, chromium, cobalt, lithium, silver, and a range
of rare earths. Renewables have a much greater need for metals and materials
than fossil-fuel power generation. This represents a promising market oppor-
tunity for producing countries. However, they will face great challenges in
simultaneously meeting their Paris goals (to reduce their own GHG emissions)
and their SDG goals (to reduce the material footprint of their economic
activities). International assistance is vital, especially for the poorer countries.
The story of extractives and climate makes for a complex and intriguing
narrative. Success is vital to humanity’s continued progress and to reducing
the dangers posed by climate change to sustainable development, to poverty
reduction—and to humanity’s very existence.
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Framework
The Channels for Indirect Impacts
Alan Roe and Jeffery Round
23.1 Introduction
The direct economic impact of the mining and oil and gas sectors in general,
and of a new project in these sectors in particular, is fairly well established. For
a new project this would form part of the project proposal and appraisal.
However, the full consequences, macroeconomic or otherwise, are subject to
some uncertainty and speculation, not least because any extractives project is
costly and non-marginal, and so is likely to impact on a (national or local)
economy in many and various ways. In this chapter we consider the possible
direct and secondary impacts, and in particular the various channels of effect.
Only by identifying these channels in their entirety do we gain an under-
standing of the range of likely economic and social impacts and thereby find
ways of estimating their significance. There is then a basis for formulating
sound policy responses to promote the positive effects and to mitigate any
negative effects.1
We begin in Section 23.2 with a generic overview of the channels of effect,
which serves as a framework for later discussion. The social and economic
consequences of extractives activities arise from two principal channels: first,
the industry channel, and secondly the public spending channel (AfDB and
BMGF 2015a, 2015b). The industry channel traces the income-generating
1 Thanks are due to the participants at the UNU-WIDER conference in April 2016 who offered
valuable comments, and especially to Jim Otto. Our thanks go also to Merl Storr for most helpful
editorial suggestions. An extended version of this chapter appeared as a WIDER Working Paper
(Roe and Round 2017).
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and employment-creating consequences of all the spending that stems from
the activity (investment and operations) through the economy. The public
spending channel captures the effects of spending the (likely) significant tax
and other government revenue generated by the activities (ICMM2014b; Otto
2017). The industry channel is discussed in more detail in Section 23.3 below,
and the public spending channel in Section 23.5.
Primary effects via these two channels potentially lead to secondary effects.
These may be substantial and could be at least as large as the primary effects.
In the case of the industry channel, some of these effects have been referred
to as upstream and downstream effects (including backward and forward
linkages), usually in the context of indirect effects on other production activ-
ity. But they may also spill over into final demand linkages and other
economy-wide effects via employment and income generation. The direc-
tion and magnitude of these effects are complex, and are difficult to deter-
mine ex ante. There have been several attempts to do this empirically; the
results are obviously specific to projects, economies, and circumstances.
Section 23.4 presents some selective results from applied work in the context
of mining activities.
Finally, the second channel—public spending—is elaborated in Section 23.5,
where we briefly set out the possible direct and indirect effects on human
development via the public spending channel. Unlike the industry channel,
the effects here are less dependent on behavioural mechanisms and instead
are heavily policy dependent,2 so it is much more difficult to ascertain
outcomes or to derive sound empirical estimates of general applicability.
Hence much of our discussion on this matter is of a conceptual nature.
23.2 Channels of Impact
The extractives sector (mining and oil and gas) in some low- and middle-
income economies is often significant, although there are vast differences
in the sector’s contribution to the major economic aggregates (gross domestic
product (GDP), exports, fiscal revenues, etc.), both in comparison with
other sectors in individual countries and in comparisons across countries
(ICMM 2014b).
Based on accumulated stylized facts3 the extractives sector dominates for-
eign direct investment (FDI) in many lower-income mineral (and oil and gas)
2 The secondary industry effects are also influenced by policy, of course, but unlike in the public
spending channel, behavioural and technological mechanisms play a substantial role.
3 These stylized facts are based on a series of country case studies undertaken by
the International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) over the past ten years in a variety of
mining countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Roe and Round 2017).
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economies (60–90 per cent of FDI); it constitutes a large share of exports
(30–60 per cent); mineral taxation is often a significant share of total tax
revenue (3–20 per cent); but perhaps surprisingly, the sector typically gener-
ates a small share of the country’s GDP and GNI (about 3–10 per cent of GNI)
relative to other sectors. Mining and oil and gas activities are highly capital
intensive, and employment in the mine (or oil field) is typically small relative
to the size of its GDP contribution; hence direct employment also tends to be a
small share of total national employment (generally only 1–2 per cent of total
employment). These broad features are typical of the sector, although pre-
sented in this way they mask several channels of wider economic impact
which need to be examined in more detail.
Over the life cycle of a typical mining project4 several phases can usefully
be distinguished: exploration, site design and construction, operation, and
finally closure and decommissioning. Each phase will create a distinct and
potentially quite different direct economic impact. For instance, the explor-
ation phase usually requires a relatively small number of highly skilled and
technical personnel, possibly expatriate, with few local inputs. Hence the
direct macroeconomic impact of this activity on the economy is probably
relatively small. Similarly, in the closing down and decommissioning phase
there will be little or no appreciable economic output, engaging a reducing
and ultimately low level of employment, although the decommissioning and
post-closure costs might be substantial. The phases that have the most signifi-
cant direct economic impacts are the construction and operating phases,
although the nature of the activities involved in each phase may involve
quite different direct effects. Clearly, the stage a project has reached within
its life cycle will make a huge difference to the initial and overall impacts it will
have on the economy (ICMM 2014b).
To illustrate the structure and paths of influence in the wider economy,
Figure 23.1 shows in simple schematic form the principal channels of
economy-wide impact of a mining or oil and gas activity. Note that here we
focus on the expenditure flows (in constant prices)5 and leave possible price
effects to one side for the moment, even though price changes could affect the
size and hence the total influence of the expenditure flows. The direct spend-
ing arising out of extractives activities in all phases is shown in the first entry
in the first row of Figure 23.1. This direct spending constitutes procurement of
goods and services, employment (the payment of wages and salaries), and
infrastructure spending. This initiates the ‘industry activity’ channel (AfDB
and BMGF 2015b). The figure shows the ultimate impact on living standards
and human well-being. It shows that a primary impact on living standards
4 For more detail see Roe and Round (2017) and ICMM (2014b: 7).
5 e.g. the prices in a given year, such as the initial year of the project.
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derives from the incomes generated by extractives activity thereby directly
benefitting households.
The other major direct outcome of extractives activities arises from the
revenues accruing to government in the form of taxes, royalties, and other
fiscal revenues (Daniels et al. 2010; Otto 2017). This initiates the public
spending channel. The revenues generated are likely to be significant, thus
bolstering the financial inflows for government spending. However, they are
not evenly spread over the life cycle. These tax revenues when they arise can
be used to fund a wide range of policy initiatives, both inside and beyond the
mining and oil and gas sectors, including those related to economic promotion,
to social and human development projects, and to social protection at local
and regional levels. It is for governments to design and implement the desired
policy initiatives (AfDB and BMGF 2015a, 2015b).
Figure 23.1 also shows expenditures and initiatives directly by extractives
companies on community and social programmes, usually made independ-
ently (or partly independently) of central or local government. These include
spending on schools, health centres, and community buildings in rural areas,
where mines and extractive companies are often located.
The resulting impacts of extractives via the channels of impact do not stop
at the initial direct spending effects. Secondary effects stem from the direct
spending effects, and do so via both the industry activity channel and the
public spending channel in potentially different ways. In particular, the direct








































Figure 23.1. Extractives activities and development: the main channels
Source: authors’ illustration based on ICMM (2014b).
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effects via backward and forward linkages and can also trigger further induced
effects through spending out of the incomes generated. By contrast, the
indirect effects via the public spending channel may arise because of induced
incomes created by the government’s spending to support broader develop-
ment. Thus, in Figure 23.1 the box showing the ultimate effect on living
standards includes the total effect on incomes (direct, indirect, and induced)
arising from the increase in economic activity.
Conceptually, it is relatively straightforward to estimate the short-term sec-
ondary effects of mining (or oil and gas) activity via the industry channel—as
we shall demonstrate in Section 23.4. However, it is far less straightforward to
estimate the dynamic and long-term effects. The best one can do is to identify
possible consequences and seek evidence of their existence either directly
or from previous studies. The public spending channel will also generate
secondary effects that are both short and long term. These effects are short
term in the sense that they rely on existing capacity to stimulate output,
employment, and income. They are long term in the sense that public spend-
ing today can increase future capacity and so stimulate economic growth, or
improve productivity, or make permanent improvements to social or eco-
nomic institutions and infrastructure. Of course, there is also evidence that
the secondary effects may not always be positive. The term ‘Dutch disease’
emerged in the late 1970s. Corden and Neary (1982) formalized the problem,
and Auty (1993) and Sachs and Warner (1995) produced evidence that
resource-rich economies tend to grow less rapidly than resource-scarce econ-
omies. This evidence, which is reviewed elsewhere in this volume, has been
the subject of much subsequent debate, and has prompted a search for policies
that have positive secondary outcomes. This is the main hallmark of what Di
Boscio (2010) has called the ‘post-global’ or ‘sustainable development’ model
(see also Lahn and Stevens 2017).
23.3 Industry Channel: Downstream and Upstream
Multiplier Effects
As a general observation, much of the new mining activity in lower-income
economies takes place in more remote areas, away from existing urban areas,
where the existing economic activity is most likely based on agriculture (or
forestry, etc.). The new mining activity will lead to new communities, and
often to new satellite production activities as a consequence. These arise from
the creation of production linkage effects, which Hirschman (1958) referred to
as ‘backward’, ‘forward’, and ‘final demand’ linkages. Characteristically, in
most developing countries the manufacturing and tertiary base is often quite
weak. Hence many of the inputs into production (during both construction
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and operation) have to be imported.6 However, the supply requirements for
mining activity do create opportunities for existing domestic firms to sell to
the mine, and also for new firms to enter upstream, in the short to medium
term (backward linkages). Likewise, there may be downstream effects (forward
linkages). Much mineral processing (e.g. smelting, refining, or material fabri-
cation) usually takes place initially near to the final market rather than near
to the mine, which means that many mineral products are exported in their
raw (or crude) form. However, in time investment can diversify7 from mining
per se and new profit-making opportunities arise domestically, thereby creat-
ing forward linkages within the domestic economy. Auty (2004) cites many
examples of this evolutionary process, whereby mining has proved to be the
catalyst for a diversified industrial region. These include the West Midlands
(UK), Witwatersrand (South Africa), Ciudad Guayana (Eastern Venezuela),
and Western Australia, amongst many others. It is therefore important to
see the emergence of upstream and downstream effects as part of an evolution,
a dynamic process of economic development. In achieving this, investment in
transport and power infrastructure is especially critical if the objective is to
achieve local processing that is competitive.
Direct final demand linkages from mining activity are less likely. Mining
products will not enter into the consumption bundle of households or gov-
ernment directly, nor will it form a part of fixed capital formation. The bulk of
output that is not processed domestically will be exported. The principal final
demand linkages will arise from spending out of incomes generated: thus they
are more likely to be a secondary rather than a primary effect.
As well as considering extractives activity in the context of the whole econ-
omy, there is also an important regional dimension to all of this. The impacts of
extractives activity are unlikely to be distributed across the whole economy.
Many of the direct effects will be heavily localized (due to agglomeration
economies, and to the proximity of labour), although some of the secondary
effects will be more widely spread throughout the economy.8 Di Boscio (2010)
has described how the pattern of regional development associated withmining
activity has evolved and changed over time. He has described how pre-1970
mining activity followed the regional or ‘strong local linkage’ model, where
mineral ventures facing high transport costs were highly labour intensive
and generated significant upstream (and often downstream) benefits. This
has been supplanted by a more recent global or ‘weak local linkage’ model,
characterized by lower transport costs and high capital intensity (with lower
6 This is true of goods but less so of services, many of which can be obtained locally.
7 Östensson (2017) discusses how sometimes this does not happen.
8 In some (conflict) countries mining often takes place illegally, and this affects the nature and
distribution of the activity and of any income generated.
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labour requirements), tending to generate lower upstream and downstream
benefits. Hence the tendency has been for strong localization of the primary
effects to be perpetuated, even with the evolution of mining technology and
the changing economy-wide context. Di Boscio (2010) suggests that the global
model has been supplanted by the sustainable development model since
the 1990s.9 This reflects the industry’s desire to develop an approach that is
more sustainable in socio-economic terms. It implies that companies are now
more likely to engage with the communities and government, and the effects
and benefits are likely to be more widely spread than hitherto. However, there
is a limit to how much benefit can be distributed locally, including via job
creation, if governments are unwilling or unable to invest enough in support-
ing local infrastructure and institutions.
All of these primary and secondary effects will be subject to further multi-
plier responses. Hence, as well as identifying the primary effects of mining
activity, there is a question as to how these multipliers might be estimated.
23.4 Estimates of Impact Multipliers for Mining Activity
23.4.1 Measuring the Size of Secondary Impacts
The measurement of secondary impacts of mining activity has proved to be a
difficult challenge. Studies (e.g. ICMM 2013, 2014a; Mogilevskii et al. 2015;
OPM 2009) have been carried out in the context of either a newmining project
or an existing mining enterprise, or as an assessment of the contribution of
a mining industry to the economy as a whole. The most obvious method
of estimating secondary effects is to apply informed judgement and rules of
thumb. Of course, in the absence of reliable economy-wide data this might
be the only possible approach, but themajor downside is that it is quite difficult
to test assumptions, so a more robust formal approach is usually preferred.
Three principal methodologies have been used to assess secondary eco-
nomic and social impacts. They are: input–output (or multiplier) analysis,
computable general equilibrium modelling, and econometric modelling.
The first two methods may be described as ex ante (simulation) methods,
whilst the latter is an ex post method that is finding increasing favour in
project analysis. However, they ought not to be viewed as alternatives; they
have quite different objectives and serve different purposes.
Input–output (I–O) and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models
have been the dominant approaches to date for estimating impact multipliers
via the industry channel for mining activity. We do not attempt to provide
9 See Hodge (2017) on the meaning of ‘sustainability’.
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a comprehensive review of either the methods or the results.10 Rather,
we highlight two studies for illustration, and refer briefly to the results of
some other studies. It is not possible to arrive at definitive general conclusions,
as the results are bound to be heavily conditioned by economy-specific factors,
as well as by the methodology employed.
23.4.2 Input–Output (I–O) Modelling
Input–output (I–O) modelling is well known and is described in more detail
elsewhere (Roe and Round 2017) but we do need to establish two key pieces
of terminology to assist present discussion. First, we should distinguish
between three commonly used multipliers: output, income, and employ-
ment multipliers. The principle is the same for each: a multiplier is defined
as the ratio of the total outcome divided by an initial (direct) outcome.
For example, the output multiplier is the total gross output (of a particular
sector, or of the economy as a whole), taking into account economy-wide
interdependences and responses, that results from a unit initial change in
gross output of, say, mining.
Second, we have to distinguish between Type I and Type II multipliers.
Type I multipliers take account only of the inter-industry independence: these
generate the direct and indirect effects (the input–output multipliers). Type II
multipliers additionally take account of the Keynesian income–expenditure
effects: the direct, indirect, and induced effects. Thus for the purpose of using
the results to estimate total economic impacts, only the Type II multipliers
are of practical significance.
We now illustrate the use of this methodology in the context of a study
of the mining sector in the south-eastern Pará region in Brazil (ICMM 2013).
The full study was concerned with investigating the social and economic
impact of mining at the national and local levels, as represented in a case
study of Vale, Brazil’s largest mining company in south-eastern Pará.11 Both
Type I and Type II multipliers were calculated. As regards the Type 1multiplier
for mining the results showed that a R$1 increase in the demand for output of
mining is likely to lead to R$1.2 of output in the south-eastern Pará region as a
whole. This is a small increase, but it is similar to the multipliers for all other
sectors. All the multipliers are low because the industry linkage in such a
relatively small region is low. The Type II multipliers which include the effects
of household spending out of income generated are inevitably larger. The
multiplier for mining is 2.3. This means that, taking account of the spending
10 A discussion can be found in Roe and Round (2017: Sections 4 and 5).
11 Filgueiras et al. (2017) examine other aspects of the Brazilian/Vale case.
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effects of households out of the income created by the increased production
activity a further R$1.1 of output is generated by mining in the south-eastern
Pará region. Clearly, the multipliers for mining only apply in the operational
phase, when there is mining output. But during the construction phase the
multiplier effect will be a combination of the output multipliers of sectors
stimulated by these local procurements.
The input–output multipliers show equilibrium outcomes with no explicit
time dimension. However, the model is often used to estimate the equilibrium
outcomes of a series of annual primary effects. While the results do not
show the time profile of the incidence of effects, they can be used to show
the total effects in relation to the time profile of the primary impacts. This can
be illustrated in relation to a study for Romania (OPM 2009). It showed
both the direct and estimated total contribution to Romania’s GDP arising
from the Rosia Montana Gold Mine Corporation over a projected eighteen-
year period. This covers two years in construction (2011–12) and sixteen years
of operation (2013–28). In this case the direct contribution to GDP in the two
years of the construction phase is lower than that anticipated during the
sixteen years of the operation phase. Although there is variation year on
year, the estimated total effect on GDP from the construction and operational
phases of the gold mine is an additional 2.0 to 2.5 times the direct contribu-
tions (i.e. a multiplier of between 3.0 and 3.5). However, the indirect and
induced contributions shown for each year of the projection will not neces-
sarily all materialize in that year; there will be lags as the repercussions work
their way through the economic system.
Bocoum (2000) has utilized input–output multipliers to undertake a com-
parative study of the impacts of mining activities in countries at various
stages of development and in different kinds of mining-related sectors. She
harmonized input–output tables for Australia, the United States, and Chile, and
distinguished sectors for mining, mineral processing, mineral and energy
manufacturing, and energy production. The results are reported in terms of
Hirschman total linkages,12 although they are based on (Type I) output multi-
pliers and (Type II) income multipliers (not reported). The main results of her
study are:
 The type of mineral activity affects the size and nature of the secondary
effects (multipliers).
 Energy (coal, oil, and gas) extraction shows a relatively small direct con-
tribution to GDP, although it is important in terms of total multipliers.
12 Total linkages (TL) are defined as the sum of backward (BL) and forward (FL) linkages. A sector
with a BL or FL greater than 1.0 is considered ‘strong’, so a sector with a strong BL and FL and a TL
greater than 2.0 is considered to be a ‘key’ sector.
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 The overall contribution of non-ferrous mining to output and income is
generally low, but it has strong linkages with domestic industries such as
energy and other mineral-related activities.
 Non-metallic mining, with the diversity of its output, has the potential
for stronger linkages than metallic mining.
 Mining services have strong backward linkages.
 Petroleum and coal transformation generate strong forward linkages.
 The agricultural and industrial chemicals sector is important in terms of
output and income and total linkages.
IDC (2013) used the input–output methodology to explore the linkage
between the mining and manufacturing sectors in South Africa. Based on
2012 data, the Type II output multipliers for the sector were estimated to be
about 2.0. IDC (2013) also reports the changing structure of South Africa’s
mining sector between 1980 and 2012. It is now much more diversified, with
gold becoming a diminishing proportion of mining sales. The backward and
forward linkages with the manufacturing sectors remain strong.
Rayner and Bishop (2013) applied the input–output methodology to obtain
a ‘broad measure’ of the boom in natural resources in the Australian economy
from about 2004 to the end of the decade. They used a sectoral context in
which they distinguished between ‘resource extraction activity’ (coal, oil, gas,
iron ore, etc.) and ‘resource-related activity’ (business services, construction,
etc.). Based on an input–output table, the total direct contribution of the
resource sector to Australian GDP in 2011–12 was 11.5 per cent. On the
basis of Type I multipliers, they estimated that a further 6.5 per cent of GDP
was attributable to resource-based activity (an implied Type I multiplier of
1.57). If the wage link had been included, then the Type II multiplier would
have been well in excess of 2.0.
Finally, a recent large-scale input–output study for the United States (NMA
2012) considered the economy-wide contributions of US mining. Based on a
large regional input–output table for 2012, the study is an exemplar of its kind.
Themining sector includes three subsectors: mine operations, mining support
activities, and transport of output from the mine. This underlines one of the
problems of comparability across studies—how exactly the ‘mining’ sector is
defined. Using this broad definition of mining activity, the study estimates
that the sector contributed 0.64 per cent of US GDP in 2012. But based on a
calculation of Type II multipliers, taking account of backward linkages and
induced effects, the contribution to GDP rose to 1.4 per cent. The implied
Type II multiplier for the sector and for the United States as a whole is 2.2. The
variation in the multipliers for different branches of mining across US states is
considerable. However, focusing on the results for the mining sector as a
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whole, the Type II multiplier for California is 4.7, and for New York and New
Jersey even higher (9.4 and 11.6 respectively). These values would imply that
there is a huge secondary effect of mining activity in these states. But in all
cases where the multipliers are very high, the direct contribution of mining to
GDP, in the state and nationally, is quite modest. Nevertheless, this does
suggest that upstream effects might be significant when economic activity is
broadly based and well developed.
23.4.3 CGE Modelling
Relatively few CGE-based studies to assess mining activity per se are available
in published work, but two examples will help to illustrate what can be
achieved with this approach. A main feature of CGE models is their ability
to deal with price shocks and changes in relative prices. For example, unlike
I–O models, the real exchange rate effect of Dutch disease can be captured in
CGEs. The models are complex and there is often a great deal of specificity in
terms of data, assumptions, and model specifications, which makes compari-
sons difficult to manage.
Downes et al. (2014) attempted to estimate the effects of the mining boom
in Australia over the decade from the mid-2000s. The ‘boom’ encapsulated a
tripling of the world price of mining exports together with a sharp increase in
investment inmining. Their objective was to assess the impact of these shocks
on living standards, and to investigate whether the economy experienced
negative effects due to Dutch disease. Their overall assessment was that,
because of the requirements by mining for manufactured goods, the negative
effects due to Dutch disease were not strong. However, their results show that
manufacturing output was about 5 per cent below what it would have been
without the resource boom. Also, overall living standards were significantly
higher than they would have been without the boom, although there were
differences across household groups depending on which sectors created their
incomes. For example, households relying on income generated in import-
competing industries did less well. The study showed that the boom benefit-
ted households as a whole in different ways: higher employment, higher real
wages, and lower average tax rates. Unlike the I–O methodology, CGEs show
the role of prices, which may precipitate both negative and positive effects of
seemingly positive shocks.
An unrelated study by Tourism Research Australia (2013) also carried out a
CGE model-based study of the impact of the mining boom on tourism. Many
of its key aggregate results were broadly similar to those of Downes et al.
(2014), but it found a wide variation of outcomes at a state-wide level. In
terms of contributions to GDP, there were losers as well as gainers from the
mining boom.
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In a classic example of this genre, Mogilevskii et al. (2015) assessed the
impact of the Kumtor gold mine on the economic and social develop-
ment of the Kyrgyz Republic. The authors adapted a dynamic CGE model
developed by the World Bank, and calibrated it to data for the Kyrgyz
economy. Kumtor is the largest enterprise in Kyrgyzstan, so its impact is
highly non-marginal. The aim of the study was to estimate not only the
direct contributions but also the multiple secondary effects in the context
of the country’s long-term development. Mogilevskii et al. simulate three
scenarios in terms of gold production and then estimate the effects on
the main macroeconomic variables. There is little disaggregation within
the model to facilitate a detailed impact analysis. Also, the results are
heavily conditioned by the model assumptions (i.e. the model ‘closure’
rules), where in particular the labour market clearing assumption is quite
simple. Mogilevskii et al. conclude that there is little scope for increased
employment in the mining enterprise, and that a main benefit of Kum-
tor is its substantial contribution to the government budget and social
spending.
CGE simulation models permit several policy-relevant extensions to be
added to the basic framework. For example, there are examples where the
likely distributional (or gender or environmental) consequences of extrac-
tives projects/policies have been examined. Andersen and Faris (2002) exam-
ined the possible consequences for the economy of Bolivia of an increase in
natural gas sales to Brazil. As part of their exercise they demonstrated that,
while there would be a likely increase in wages and incomes of all groups in
society (and hence the policy would be good for growth and poverty allevi-
ation), there would also be an increase in inequality: smallholders and
informal-sector workers would not benefit by as much as those in the formal
sector. Likewise, in an interesting series of studies of large-scale mining in
Mongolia, based in part on CGE models, Kahn et al. (2011) report on the
significant gender differences in the benefits (and costs) accruing from the
mining boom. In that example, less than 10 per cent of the workforce in
extractives was female (and these were employed mainly in service support
roles), whereas most of the risks (health, social, and family disruptions) were
borne by women.
The assessment of environmental consequences of extractive industries
is an ongoing issue—to prevent, mitigate, and control the environmental
damages and negative social impacts, improve environmental management,
and ensure compliance with environmental standards. There will be primary
and secondary environmental effects, which again can be captured via simu-
lation models: both I–O and CGEmodels can be used to do this. Thiele (1999)
used a basic CGE model for environmental policy evaluation of the South
African mining sector. The results, linking sectoral outputs to hazardous
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waste (air emissions, waste water, and solid/liquid waste), are indicative of
how the models might be developed further.
23.4.4 Econometric Modelling
The ex post econometric approach was originally used byMoretti (2010) in the
context of estimating the long-term employment multiplier at the local level
in the United States. Specifically, he quantified ‘the long-term change in the
number of jobs in a city’s tradable and non-tradable sectors generated by an
exogenous increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector, allowing for
the endogenous reallocation of factors and adjustment of prices’ (Moretti
2010: 9). The estimation was based on time series census data for 2001–11.
In common with the CGE approach (and unlike I–O), because it uses data on
‘initial’ employment and ‘eventual’ employment, effectively themethod takes
into account endogenous price changes.
Fleming and Measham (2014) applied this approach in order to estimate
local job multipliers of mining in Australia. The application of the economet-
ric methodology was fairly straightforward: the data were drawn from data on
employment changes for two five-year periods, 2001–06 and 2006–11. The
application of the Moretti methodology yielded estimates of job elasticities at
the sectoral level. Using census data to determine base year employment
shares, the authors then calculated local job multipliers. Although it is pos-
sible for elasticities to be negative, implying that job increases in mining
might lead to job losses in other sectors, virtually all were positive, and
seven were found to be statistically significant. These included elasticities for
wholesale and retail trade, transport, financial services, real estate, and other
services; construction was close to being significant too. Most of these imply
job multipliers that are greater than one (i.e. they are greater than 2.0 in
concordance with the I–O multiplier definition of multipliers). Elasticity esti-
mates for manufacturing were positive, although agriculture was slightly
negative (neither was statistically significant). All of this implied that mining
had significantly positive secondary effects in terms of employment across
almost all sectors of the economy.
The Moretti approach has also been used by Moritz (2015) on data for a
more geographically focused mining region in northern Sweden. Due to data
limitations, his industrial sector definitions are far more aggregated, and the
results are generally not statistically significant. Except for ‘government
services’ all of Moritz’s multipliers are positive. However, they are slightly
lower than those obtained by Fleming and Measham for Australia; this may
be due to the fact that the Swedish regions are smaller and the industrial
spread is narrower. Overall, the positive secondary effects of mining activity
are confirmed.
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23.5 Public Spending Channel
23.5.1 Direct Impacts on Human Development
The second principal channel through which mining activity impacts on
human development is the public spending channel. Typically, between
15 per cent and 20 per cent of the production value of mining activity accrues
as taxes and other revenue to government (ICMM 2014b), perhaps even more
in the cases of some kinds of extractives (e.g. oil and gas). These revenues
create the funding which can be used by government to enhance human
development in two broad ways:
 Directly, through spending on social sectors: for example, current spend-
ing and capital spending on health and education facilities, as well as on
social protection programmes including cash transfer schemes.
 Indirectly, through spending to enhance economic growth and develop-
ment: that is, by boosting capacity in the economy for further income
generation and social investment.
‘Human development’ is open to wide interpretation and definition. It is
often defined in terms of three dimensions: health, education, and living
standards. Living standards are usually measured in terms of a money-metric
criterion, such as real per capita income. Thus ‘living standards’ are mainly
determined by incomes generated in production directly or indirectly, and
these are predominantly governed by outcomes through the industry channel
discussed previously. However, the living standards dimensions through
health and education and other social spending can be strongly influenced
through the public spending channel.
AsWitter and Jakobsen (2017) argue elsewhere the case for investing natural
resources revenues in social sectors is strong.13 They identify several main
channels for potential beneficial impacts. The authors also note that inclusive
growth also requires attention to low-income households. A growing body of
evidence indicates the potential benefits of cash transfers: these help to tackle
poverty in the short run, improve social cohesion, boost local economies, and
build human capital in the long term. However, Witter and Jakobsen (2017)
also point to a risk of natural resource revenue flows, which have a propensity
to distract from results-driven questions (‘What do we want to achieve?’),
leading instead to a focus on expense-driven questions (‘We have funds,
what should we spend them on?’). In order to try to address this risk, AfDB
and BMGF (2015c) have developed a framework of analysis that identifies the
13 However, that case does rest on the assumptions that these sectors are given a high priority in
the national government’s development plans, especially in lower-income countries, and that this
spending has the potential to lead to high economic returns.
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key questions that can be used to inform investment decisions in the social
sectors and so help to produce coherent results.
The ex ante decisions for governments in this area are difficult to make.
Similarly, the ex post effects on outcomes for human development via the
public spending channel are difficult to assess. For this purpose it is possible to
use indicators such as income per capita or consumption per capita, which are
both outcome measures. But it is more usual to use input measures for health
and education—such as school enrolment, hospital visits, or bed occupancy.
More broadly, any increase in public spending on education and health that is
clearly facilitated by revenues generated by mining activity can itself be seen
as a useful indicator of a potential enhancement of human development.14
23.5.2 Indirect Effects via the Public Spending Channel
For many developing countries, the start of a mining- or oil-related activity
takes place at an early stage of development (and inmany cases it has preceded
political independence). Many argue that resource extraction should be seen
as a helping hand to achieve the eventual transformation and socio-economic
development of the economy, and not as an end in itself (see also Lahn and
Stevens (2017), who see transformation and diversification as a key aim of the
policy for extractives). Additional public revenues generated from the extrac-
tives sector can clearly provide governments with the means to help to facili-
tate this process of transformation, diversification, and development in
various ways (AfDB and BMGF 2015b).
23.5.2.1 INVESTING IN INFRASTRUCTURE
Most LICs, particularly in Africa, are known to have huge infrastructural
deficits—a gap between the infrastructure that they need and that which
they actually have in place. These deficits in turn constitute a serious brake
on growth, irrespective of whether the country concerned has the advantage
of natural resources wealth. However, the availability of additional public
revenues from extractive resources provides an opportunity to at least make
a dent in such deficits. Whilst there is no guarantee that an improvement in
capacity and infrastructure will have a positive impact, there are some
obvious ways in which such spending can help to generate benefits by
enhancing economic growth. Prime examples are improvements in access
to the electricity grid, communications, roads, and transport networks.
However, Henstridge and Page (2012) caution that the benefits from such
investments are not automatic. For example, if construction faces bottlenecks,
14 Although this does, of course, assume that the money is reasonably well spent and not
wasted.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Channels for Indirect Impacts
499
then any new investment could force up costs and prices, thereby reducing
output more generally for any increase in nominal investment.15 Further,
the scale of the available resource revenues in most country cases may be
small relative to the size of the infrastructure deficit. Hence those revenues
need to be used judiciously, and often in partnership with larger sums from
private investors, if they are to make any real impact on the infrastructure
problem.
23.5.2.2 INVESTING IN STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
AND ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION
AfDB and BMGF (2015b) cite Chile, Indonesia, and Malaysia as examples of
countries that have successfully managed the transformation from economies
that were heavily resource-based to those that are now more broadly based.
These transformations were, at least in part, the result of a strategic view and
subsequent public policy actions taken and associated public spending in each
country. The well-known danger here is that of poor selection of the new
strategic industries for the future. The availability of large resource revenues
can all too easily be used to provide public support to industries whose basic
commercial viability is lacking and where eventual financial failure may
therefore be the outcome.
Apart from big-ticket strategic actions, other examples include public
investments to help strengthen an economy’s smaller firms via either tech-
nical guidance or financial support; the creation of special economic zones;
new training initiatives targeted at new emerging industries; and other
improved productivity-enhancing initiatives via research and development
and enterprise development. In this regard, ongoing work by Sutton (2009
onwards) and associates on ‘enterprise maps’ is noteworthy. These are inven-
tories of profiles of leading companies in each major industry in selected
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, designed to trace the origins of current
industrial capabilities. The aim is to help potential investors, as well as policy
makers who are concerned with fostering industrial development, to identify
promising targets to link more fully into the supply chains of local extractive
companies and their overseas associates. So far five countries have been pro-
filed, spanning industries in agribusiness, manufacturing, and construction.
As presented here, the decisions about the ‘best’ use of additional public
revenues from extractive industries come down to an apparently simple choice:
providing direct help to boost local living standards in the short term, or
investing public funds in broader development initiatives for the longer term.
In practice those decisions—mediated as they are through messy budgetary
15 They report, for example, that there is some evidence that the marginal costs of construction
in Uganda rose in 2010–11 as a result of rapid public investment.
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processes that are themselves impacted by political considerations and serious
informational deficits (e.g. howmuch revenue may be available in each future
year)—will rarely be taken in any clear and scientific manner. However, wise
and well-organized governments will do their best to use such frameworks as
are available to guide their thinking and to weigh the choices available to them
with the greatest possible care. In particular, there is also a strong case to try to
link the benefits of the two public spending routes by embedding decisions
about them within a clear set of economic and industrial policies that build
explicitly on the stimulating effects that are certain to come from mining and
other extractives projects.
23.6 Conclusions
The social and economic impacts of the extractive industries in a development
context are potentially wide-ranging. In this chapter we have set out the
framework and channels of impact, identifying two principal channels,
namely the industry channel and the public spending channel. Of these, the
public spending channel is perhaps the best known, most discussed, and best
documented. The effects on humanwell-being through this channel are direct
and easily understood: they stem from the spending of tax revenues on public
projects, especially on health, education, and community projects. This chan-
nel is also fundamental to the case that host governments make for extracting
more tax revenue from mining activities. But the industry channel—being
generally much larger—can also have major impacts on broader economic
areas as well as human development and well-being via the generation of
income and the increase in domestic economic activity. This chapter has
shown that a good deal of this income generation is secondary. It is funda-
mentally dependent for its magnitude on the existing economic structure of a
country and how this structure might develop in future, and this in turn is
influenced by economic and industrial policy as well as by public spending.
Governments need to address this potential, and their own role in realizing it,
with as much seriousness as they lobby for more tax revenue to spend on their
own account.
Here we have focused much attention on the industry channel, setting out
the various ways in which the secondary effects can be (and have been) ascer-
tained and ultimately measured. Formal methods have relied on economic
models which fall into two broad categories: ex ante and ex post models.
Ex post models—although currently popular for assessing historical conse-
quences (e.g. non-mining jobs that result from new jobs in mining)—are not
so effectivewhen applied ex ante. But even the ex antemodels are only as good as
the data and model specifications that are employed. The capacity to do this
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modelling work—and to collect the data—needs to be embedded in a sustained
institutional setting, rather than being generated in one-off efforts.
The overarching conclusion from this chapter is to reinforce the case for a
dedicated economic and industrial policy to accompany mining and extrac-
tives projects, so that the strongest possible social and economic benefits will
flow via both the industry and public spending channels. It is all too easy to
overlook especially the induced effects that are more diffuse and so less visible
than the other types of mining impacts.
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Extractive industries generate some revenue streams that do not go to the state
or the operating enterprise but end up with a multitude of economic subjects
in host countries. As seen from Figure 24.1, employment, procurement, and
infrastructure typically account for a significantly larger share of spending
than government revenue. The recipients of this spending are employees
and providers of equipment and inputs. In addition to providing income to
the local/national population, extractive industry procurement and employ-
ment usually also contribute to building skills, which may raise incomes
beyond the life of the project.
The portion of total extractive industry spending that is local or national
depends on a number of factors, most of which can be influenced by govern-
ment policy. The aim of local content policies is to raise the proportion of
spending that goes to recipients in the host country and/or in the area
immediately surrounding the extractive industry site.
Section 24.2 sets out the scope of the chapter and sketches the background
to the policy debate around local content. Section 24.3 discusses corporate
behaviour with respect to procurement. Section 24.4 describes and assesses
policies for promoting local procurement, using some examples. Section 24.5
reviews practices and cooperation concerning multiple uses of infrastructure,
and Section 24.6, finally, attempts to formulate some general conclusions.
24.2 Scope and Background
Although the term ‘local content’ is often used in a wide sense, covering
employment of locals and corporate social responsibility activities as well as
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
purchases from national suppliers, in this chapter, the focus is only on pro-
curement of goods and services from national suppliers.
Local content policies in the context of extractive industries have attracted
increased interest in recent years. This may be the result of disappointment
with the results achieved in more ‘traditional’ policy areas, particularly maxi-
mization of government fiscal revenue. Partly, it is certainly also the result of a
realization on the part of policy makers of the potential development effects
from local content policies. Thus, recent regulations are moving towards a
stronger emphasis on local content and most countries with a significant
extractive industry have included local content in their legislation or as a
condition in exploitation contracts.
The intellectual roots of the policies, which emphasize the importance of
establishing and strengthening various types of linkages, can be found in
theories about supply chains and clusters.1 The concept of linkages is particu-
larly important.
The International Study Group on Africa’s Mineral Regimes, whose work
laid the foundation for the African Mining Vision, identifies:
two main groups of linkages. The first includes backward/upstream linkages
(to the mine) and forward/downstream linkages (to beneficiators or processors of















Figure 24.1. Average distribution of spending in extractive projects
Source: author’s estimates.
1 A business cluster is a geographic concentration of interconnected businesses, suppliers, and
associated institutions in a particular field. A supply chain is a system of organizations, people,
activities, information, and resources involved in moving a product or service from supplier to
customer. Supply chain activities involve the transformation of natural resources, raw materials,
and components into a finished product that is delivered to the end customer. See, e.g., Porter
(1998) and Kaplinsky and Morris (2001).
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organizations providing technological, human resource, and infrastructure inputs)
and lateral migration linkages (development of alternative uses of generic technolo-
gies used in the industry).
(Economic Commission for Africa and African Union 2009: 102)
Local content policies are concerned with backward linkages. However, where
the theories attempt to describe and explain the processes by which industries
are established, the policy formulations rest on the conviction that these
processes can be influenced by governments, in particular that governments
can, by promoting linkages, support the evolution of a more diversified econ-
omy, less dependent on exports of natural resource products.
A common reference when discussing linkage policies and industrialization
based on natural resource exploitation is the Nordic countries along with
Australia, Canada, and the United States. Researchers have argued that the
natural resource sector has driven knowledge intensification and industrial
growth in these countries (Wright and Czelusta 2004).
However, this inspiration from the older examples is questionable for sev-
eral reasons that have to do with globalization:2
 Transport costs and tariffs are generally lower than they were when the
countries mentioned industrialized. Local suppliers are therefore more
exposed to international competition, which makes it more difficult to
build backward links.
 For the same reasons, processed products are also exposed to international
competition, which complicates the establishment of forward links.
 Processes are now standardized and mechanized, which means that the
advantage of low local labour costs is relatively less important.
 Skilled and specialized labour is widely available andmobile, so specialists
can easily be recruited from other countries, reducing the need to train
locals to fill skilled jobs.
 Access to state of the art technology is easy, which reduces the need for
local innovation and adaptation of technology to local conditions.
Against this background, it would seem more appropriate for efforts to
devise industrial policies based on linkages to build on the experiences of
countries that have succeeded more recently in transforming from natural
resource dependent to industrialized economies. Section 24.4 will discuss
several examples.
2 Power (2002) disputes both the importance of extractive resources to the economic
development of Australia, Canada, and the United States and the validity of comparisons with
today’s mineral-dependent developing countries.
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24.3 Local Procurement: The Corporate Perspective
24.3.1 Corporate Procurement
Before going into details about the factors that guide corporate procurement it
is useful to recall some of the differences between oil and gas on the one hand
and non-fuel mining on the other, not least because some of these differences
determine procurement processes. These differences relate mainly to different
structures of costs and to certain differences in how production is organized:
 Typically, in large-scale mining capital costs amount to some 25–50
per cent of the total costs of production. By contrast in oil and gas
operations they will normally amount to at least 75 per cent of the total.
 Mining operations typically use unskilled labour for construction and
related activities and this can result in such labour becoming a significant
part of total costs, especially since local content in service delivery is
proportionately quite high.3 By contrast, in oil and gas operations
unskilled labour is rather more concentrated on tasks that are less directly
connected to operations, such as catering or security.
 Large mining companies typically use and operate specialized equipment
and associated technology obtained from a small number of companies.
By contrast, in oil and gas operations it is common for a third-party
service company to be both the user and sometimes the owner of the
equipment, so large parts of exploration and extraction work are carried
out by third-party companies rather than by the oil or gas company
holding a concession or contract.
 A final important difference is that the equipment and associated tech-
nologies utilized in extracting oil and gas are highly specialized and very
high cost, and they also have few possible uses in other industries, mean-
ing that there are high entry barriers to companies aspiring to produce
such equipment. By contrast, a lot of the equipment and the technologies
used in mining operations have more than one use and are cheaper
to supply. This means that entry barriers for potential suppliers are lower
and that some suppliers can follow a gradual process, moving from act-
ing as agents for other equipment suppliers to later carrying out some
repairs and maintenance, to then producing spare parts, and to finally
becoming equipment suppliers in their own right.4
3 e.g. a report by the Chamber ofMines of Zambia and ICMM (2014) concluded that almost all of
the services purchased by Zambian mining companies are obtained from local suppliers. This is in
sharp contrast to the percentage of goods procured locally.
4 The experience in Zimbabwe is instructive since it demonstrates that linkages do not
necessarily have to be built on a narrow sectoral basis. Small-scale mining companies in that
country developed know-how because financial necessity forced them to source spare parts and
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A starting point for a discussion of local content is to recognize that most
extractive companies have good reasons to form close relationships with local
suppliers. Using such suppliers reduces transport costs and waiting times, and
it may be easier to build trust and long-term cooperation with a nearby
supplier in order to shape the development of products, services, and pro-
cesses than to deal with an overseas supplier. This being said, large extractive
companies with activities in several different countries often find it conveni-
ent to use the same supplier for a given type of equipment. This may be the
case in particular for equipment that requires training to operate, that has to
fit with other pieces of equipment, or that meets specifications included in
contracts concerning insurance or other matters where the company’s respon-
sibility is engaged.
Local content in the extractive industries is typically low, although much
higher for services than for goods. Figure 24.2 shows typical local content
shares for mines in developing countries.5
A distinction should be made between outsourcing to foreign original
equipment manufacturers (OEM) and outsourcing to proximate suppliers
that can deliver services such as catering, cleaning, security, and facilities








Figure 24.2. Shares of total procurement in mines in developing countries, per cent
Source: author’s estimates.
maintain equipment for their own operations. Eventually, they began selling their services to other
companies (Haglund et al. 2014a).
5 Although percentages may differ, by and large, they are much the same in most developing
countries. The reason for this is that the industries producing equipment for extractive industries
are often dominated by a few companies with several producing units, either in countries where
demand is very important or in their countries of origin. Accordingly, since all of these suppliers are
rarely located in the same country, it is rare to see a figure above 30 per cent of local value added
even in large and advanced economies.
6 As a result, between a quarter and half of all staff on a mine site may belong to contractors.
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may provide after-sales services requiring the hiring and training of nationals,
while locally owned and managed firms may qualify for long-term service
contracts.
The general trend towards greater outsourcing has been supported by the
emergence of global supply chains. There are three drivers of this trend:
(i) falling transport costs, partly due to improvements in logistics; (ii) falling
transaction costs due to improved information and communication technolo-
gies as well as liberalized financial regulations facilitating international pay-
ments; and (iii) reduction of trade barriers, particularly large reductions in
tariffs on manufactured goods.
A final trend shaping procurement decisions in the extractive sector con-
cerns broader changes in the international institutional environment.
Strengthened legislation concerning corruption may have led companies
to be concerned about risks when dealing with local suppliers.
The origins of an extractive industry company’s procured goods and services
can usefully be split into the following categories according to their local value
added (Haglund et al. 2014b):
1. Direct imports. No direct linkages beyond benefits to the national econ-
omy through customs duties.
2. Domestic procurement with minimal value addition in the host country. This
includes goods coming through agencies that act as importers for inter-
national suppliers. The agencies provide varying but generally low levels
of services, often limited to stockholding.
3. Domestic procurement with moderate-to-high value addition in the host coun-
try. This category includes suppliers of inputs that are at least partly
manufactured in the host country. It also includes manufacturers of
OEM goods, where themanufacturing takes place abroad, but the product
is distributed through branches in the host country. These branches serve
to provide a range of services such as installation, operating support, and
after-sales service. Lastly, it includes the services (transportation, main-
tenance) where the value addition takes place largely in-country.
The third category is obviously the one that is of most interest from the
point of view of productive linkages.
The company’s approach to selecting suppliers will be guided by company
policies as well as by local legislation. In environments where public informa-
tion about suppliers is not easily available, trust and the track record of a firm
become particularly important, as do the processes used by companies to
actively search for suppliers. When procuring smaller contracts, mining
companies often send an inquiry to only a handful of previously successful
suppliers, creating barriers to entry for other (potentially more capable) firms
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
510
(Haglund 2010). This is partly due to short timeframes facing purchasing
managers, who fall back on what they know best and so on existing trusted
relationships (Hanlin and Hanlin 2012). Having a track record becomes
particularly important in cases concerning complex inputs that are critical
to the operation of a mine.
In evaluating suppliers, Kaplinsky and Morris (2001) have argued that firms
consider a series of Critical Success Factors (CSFs), representing the particular
features of a good or service that is required by the company. If a larger share of
activities is outsourced, a correspondingly broader range of factors will be
included among the CSFs. The CSFs include price, quality, ability to provide
to scale, flexibility, speed of delivery, reliability of delivery, trust, and innov-
ation, and may be reflected in process and product standards (AFDB and
BMGF 2015).
For inputs that are critical to the production process, CSFs include timely
supply and conforming to adequate standards. These CSFs are likely to be more
important than price, which is why such products may command higher mar-
gins. High margins are also a characteristic of more complex products, which
typically require higher product and process standards. Procurement bymining
companies (and by oil and gas companies) can thus be structured along two
dimensions as in Figure 24.3: criticality and complexity (Mjimba 2011).
In addition to the challenges of developing specific capabilities that meet
the demands of mining companies, would-be suppliers also face a range of
more general challenges embedded in their operating environment. These are
challenges that are systemic in nature, reflecting the existing policy,
High Complexity
Low Criticality High Criticality
Low Complexity
• Tax advice
• Work boots and clothing
• Janitorial service
• Drill sample containers





Figure 24.3. Supplier matrix and selected supplies to mining companies
Source: Mjimba (2011), reproduced with permission.
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institutional, and socio-economic framework of the countries in which they
operate. Examples of key aspects of the enabling environment include
(Haglund et al. 2014b):
 Access to public skills and small and medium enterprise (SME) support pro-
grammes. As the mining sectors in many resource-rich countries have
boomed, shortages in many semi-skilled professions have appeared and
skilled individuals are frequently lured away by higher-paying industrial
firms. This situation presents a disincentive for smaller companies to
invest in building skills, as there is no way of assuring that individuals
will remain within the firm.
 Infrastructure services. The ability of a domestic SME to be competitive
depends on the availability of a range of infrastructure services: for
example, reliable supply of utilities (water and electricity) and affordable
telecommunications.
 Availability of local inputs at stable prices. Where inflation is persistently
high, this will undermine the competitiveness of domestic suppliers.
 Adequate and predictable institutions to support the private sector. Transparent
and simple licensing procedures and independent courts help to provide
assurance that property rights will be enforced.
 Access to finance. Companies need timely access to finance in order to
expand and grow. The ability to access finance depends on the existence
of a competitive banking sector as well as having collateral that is accept-
able to lenders.
24.3.2 Supplier Development
In order to overcome the constraints just described, extractive industry com-
panies engage increasingly with suppliers through a process of proactive
upgrading and support. In particular where supply is considered critical for the
operation of the mine, companies will frequently support the supplier through
provision of capital, training, and information. However, supplier develop-
ment and upgrading typically focuses on firms that are already in the supply
chain. Suppliers that gain access to contracts with the lead firm are thus more
likely to receive ongoing upgrading support and thus entrench their position
further. Lead firms may utilize one or more of the following types of assistance
(Haglund et al. 2014b):
Provision of finance. Companies may support SMEs through joint financing
mechanisms. Other initiatives include partnerships with commercial banks or
non-traditional forms of collateral (e.g. by providing invoice factoring, invoice
discounting, optimization of payment terms). For example, under the INOVE
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
512
supplier development programme, which was introduced by the Brazilian
mining company Vale in 2008, invoice factoring and working capital loans
are provided through Vale in a partnership with commercial banks. This
responds to the difficulties faced by suppliers in meeting Vale’s 90-day pay-
ment terms (ICMM 2013:55).
Provision of information and supply chain policies. Support may include provi-
sion of data on expected future demand as well as the product and process
standards required by the firm, in order to help with pre-qualification.
For example, mining companies can optimize payment terms and put in
place policies that require primary (so-called ‘Tier 1’) contractors to pay sub-
contractors without delay. Other approaches include sharing of supplier data-
baseswith Tier 1 contractors so the latter canmore easily partnerwith localfirms.
Barrick Lumwana is a large copper mine in Zambia’s Solwezi district.
Its Local Contractor Development (LCD) programme aims to engage local
SMEs and micro-businesses as suppliers in the mine’s value chain. After two
to three years in this supplier development programme, participant businesses
are expected to ‘graduate’ to the open market. (The Practitioner Hub for
Inclusive Business undated).
Provision of training/capacity-building. There is some evidence that small
firms often benefit more from management training rather than process
upgrading—suggesting that an understanding of business management
must precede upgrading of technical processes. To encourage capacity-
building of domestic suppliers, lead mining firms sometimes require that
Tier 1 contractors provide training to local suppliers, including mentoring,
health and safety standards, accounting, and finance. Mining companies can
support Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) certification, for example, by
including suppliers in company HSE training:
The Diavik Diamond Mine in Canada’s Northwest Territories has applied an
integrated approach to local training, employment, and procurement, where the
mine seeks to expand the skills of Aboriginal employees engaged in entry-level or
semi-skilled positions through its own apprenticeship and professional develop-
ment programmes. In addition, a community and government partnership
administers a series of work force development programmes. (ICMM2010: 48–9)
Although the mine did not meet its Aboriginal employment commitment,
reaching 34 per cent instead of the targeted 42 per cent in 2008, this was not
an issue, since the absolute number of people was far higher than the original
estimate (Östensson and Roe 2013).
Provide support for product testing and development. This includes joint product
development/testing as well as support whereby the lead mining firm inspects
raw material quality or provision of feedback on product quality to suppliers
to enable learning over time.
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24.3.3 Some Conclusions
The international extractive industry is highly capital and skill intensive. Its
operations have to conform to a large number of regulations concerning
financial, environmental, and social matters, and have also to withstand
intense scrutiny from media and civil society. This creates an environment
wheremuch of its supplies are of a potentially strategic and critical importance
and the use of untested local suppliers carries risks. It makes no difference to
regulatory authorities or to the media if a faulty installation was due to errors
on the part of a supplier or the extractive company itself—and rightly so.
The local suppliers may, however, experience the consequent demands placed
on them as very challenging.
In response to this situation, and since it is usually in the extractive com-
pany’s own interest to build close relationships with local suppliers, many
companies use supplier development schemes. These can range from provid-
ing occasional on-the-job training to highly structured and standardized
schemes that are applied in many of the company’s areas of operations. Larger
companies are clearly better placed to develop and implement such schemes,
but cooperation among companies, for instance, under the auspices of a
Chamber of Mines, can do much to facilitate the participation of smaller oil
and mining companies.
Companies may also go beyond supplier development and accord local
suppliers various forms of preferential treatment, including (Esteves et al.
2013a):
 assigning higher preference weightings to local businesses in competitive
bidding processes
 sole-sourcing arrangements with local suppliers
 price matching—that is, allowing local suppliers to match the price of
other suppliers
 breaking large contracts into smaller ones (unbundling) to create oppor-
tunities for smaller local suppliers
 requiring outside suppliers to subcontract locally or enter joint ventures
with local suppliers.
24.4 Policies for Influencing Supply Chains
24.4.1 Trade-offs and Constraints
Broadly, governments have two ways of increasing the contribution of the
extractive industry to expanding the local industrial base (Esteves et al.
2013a):
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
514
 By maximizing revenue from extractive activities and investing this rev-
enue in infrastructure and other policy initiatives that can support the
development of the industrial base.
 By maximizing local content, where the host government requires the
share of local content to be greater thanwhat would otherwise be the case.
The aim of imposing local content measures is to make it easier for local
businesses to supply international oil, gas, and mining firms and their large
contractors, and benefit from training and transfer of technology.
For companies, however, local content requirements may have an adverse
impact on their cost structure and so affect their profitability, thereby
reducing the tax base for the government. This would happen if locally
available goods and services were not priced competitively when compared
with the companies’ traditional suppliers. For governments, a balance
between the two strategies requires taking into account the fact that while
the fiscal instruments typically provide revenues at the national level, local
content policies can respond to the interests of local communities, thereby
enabling companies to secure a social licence to operate and contribute to
economic diversification (Esteves et al. 2013a).
There are numerous definitions of what is a local company. For example, a
company may be considered local if it falls within any of the following
categories (Paul and Pierre 2010):7
 local registration: legal entity is registered under local law
 local ownership: a certain percentage of the company is owned by citizens
of the country or by existing locally owned and registered entities
 local workforce: a majority of the company’s workforce, whether directly
employed or on contract, are citizens of the country
 local value added: a specific percentage of goods/services is produced
within the country.
The last definition would seem to be the one most closely aligned with the
objectives of local content policies. It is, however, sometimes difficult to apply
in practice and governments may settle for a local content definition that is
easier to measure.8 When quantitative targets are used, governments may
7 In most cases, ‘local’ actually means national. Nwapi (2015a: 187) criticizes this ‘centralist’
approach and argues that: ‘Given that revenues from extractive resources are managed by national
governments in most jurisdictions, LCRs [local content requirements] can provide a mechanism to
meet the demands of subnational stakeholders, such as local governments and communities.’
8 The difference between different measures can be striking. In the case of Zambia, it has been
estimated that although the majority of goods are procured from Zambian suppliers, less than
1 per cent of the goods procured by the mining sector are actually manufactured in Zambia
(Chamber of Mines of Zambia and ICMM 2014: 66; Kasanga 2012: 6).
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also be lobbied by extractive industry companies to apply a measure that
makes it easier to meet the target.
Governments may aim to promote backward linkages through regulation.
However, countries that are members of theWorld Trade Organization (WTO)
are, in principle, constrained in terms of the requirements they can impose
with respect to local content.9 In particular, as noted by Cordes et al. (2016:
78), ‘members of the WTO are bound by the national treatment obligation
(NTO) clause under which foreign companies cannot be forced to buy goods
from local suppliers or hire suppliers of certain services if a better alternative in
terms of price or quality exists abroad’. Many low-income countries (LICs) are
or have been subject to exemptions from the WTO rules and several of the
relevant agreements provide for some flexibility in the application for lower-
income countries, including during transition periods following WTO acces-
sion. Currently, 31 LICs are able under the WTO rules to introduce measures
that deviate from the NTO clause for a defined period of time on the grounds
of their ‘individual development, financial, or trade needs, or their adminis-
trative and institutional capabilities’. Out of this group, only Angola has
introduced explicit local content requirements (Esteves et al. 2013a).
In addition to WTO rules, international investment agreements can also
limit the possibility to legislate in favour of local content. Some agreements
go further than theWTO provisions and prohibit all types of measures related
to local content and performance requirements in general:10
So far only two local content cases related to Trade Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs) have been brought under the dispute settlement mechanism. None of
them concerned the extractive sector. Possibly, governments are reluctant to
challenge tools that they themselves have used or continue to use. Or investors
may not find that the WTO dispute mechanism responds to their concerns,
particularly as it does not confer monetary compensation and therefore may not
repair losses due to contract cancellation or penalties incurred. Most disputes
regarding local content requirements in extractives have been brought by invest-
ors against host countries under dispute mechanisms of bilateral investment
treaties. (Ramdoo 2015: 9)
24.4.2 Government Policies
Governments use a wide range of instruments and policies to promote local
content, from coercive regulations with quantitative targets to efforts aimed at
9 For an overview of international regulations concerning local content, see Ramdoo (2015).
10 Performance requirements are measures in law, regulation, or contract that require investors
to meet specified goals when entering, operating, or expanding in, or leaving, a host country.
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enhancing the enabling environment, including through technology transfer
and skills upgrading.
24.4.2.1 QUANTITATIVE TARGETING
Among countries using quantitative targeting, targets may be more or less
detailed. In some cases, fairly ‘blunt’ industry-wide requirements are applied:
Kazakhstan requiresmining investors to negotiate a binding agreement with
the government establishing a certain percentage of local content. The
Kazakh Government’s Decree No. 367/2010 (Government of Kazakhstan
2010) formalized the measurement of local content in goods, works, and
services, using the ‘Uniform Method of Kazakh Content Calculation’ (the
‘Uniform Method’). Subsoil users are required to provide a 20 per cent
discount to Kazakh manufacturers (Östensson et al. 2014: 70).11 Failure to
meet the targets can be punished with the loss of the licence. The results of
the policy are mixed. During the period from 2010 to 2012, for example,
local content in goods was between 13 and 14 per cent, which is not
significantly more than in other countries at a similar income level, while
in services it rose from 81.5 to 92.1 (Esteves et al. 2013b).
Ghana applies different rules for oil and non-fuel mining. The local content
policy on mining in Ghana was the product of a dialogue between the indus-
try through the Ghana Chamber of Mines and the regulatory authority.
According to Amoako-Tuffour et al. (2015):
Both mineral title holders and mining support providers must meet the
following requirements:
a) a procurement plan, covering five years, has to be submitted by
companies
b) the procurement plan has to specify procurement and use of local prod-
ucts to the extent possible
c) the procurement plan is guided by a procurement list, developed by the
Minerals Commission and to be revised annually
d) mining businesses with approved procurement and localization plans
submit an annual report to the Minerals Commission demonstrating
their level of compliance.
The regulations concerning oil are more ambitious. Operators, contractors,
and sub-contractors must comply with specified minimum local content
levels for goods and services, and companies have to submit plans to increase
11 Following its joining theWTO in November 2015, Kazakhstan has committed to passing laws
and taking measures to review and amend all requirements that are inconsistent with WTO by the
end of the transitional period (2021) (World Trade Organization undated).
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domestic content over time. All operators must, as far as possible, use goods
and services produced or provided in Ghana by Ghanaian companies, even if
their prices are higher by up to 10 per cent (AFDB and BMGF 2015).
In Nigeria, the Local Content Act (LCA) of 2010 provides for categories of
activities to be locally procured, with targets ranging from 45 to 100 per cent
for the majority of service categories. For instance, reservoir services as they
relate to well and drilling shall have 75 per cent local content level; while 4D
seismic data processing services shall have 55 per cent local content level
(Nwapi 2015b). ‘Where bids are within 1 per cent of each other, the bid
containing the highest level of Nigeria content should be selected provided it
is at least 5 per cent higher than its closest competitor in terms of its Nigerian
content’ (AFDB and BMGF 2015: 28). Companies may be subject to penalties
for non-compliance, such as cancellation of projects and fines equivalent to 5
per cent of project value. The average local content based on the proportion of
the value of contracts awarded to Nigerian companies is estimated to be 70 to
85 per cent. However, the proportion of contract sums spent on Nigerian-
made goods is only 12 to 18 per cent (AFDB and BMGF 2015: Annex A). One of
the reasons for the relatively disappointing results may be the corruption
vulnerabilities that are inbuilt in the LCA (Nwapi 2015b):
In 2007, the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) of Brazil enacted Local Content
Certification rules. These rules set up a methodology to calculate the percentage of
local content in goods and services acquired in Brazil and provided procedures for
the accreditation of independent companies to certify the percentages.
A certifying entity is responsible for measuring the local content found in goods
and services acquired/contracted by concessionaires in connection with their
exploration and production activities in the country. (Galante 2013: 2)
The Brazilian regulations have undoubtedly resulted in Petrobras relying on
Brazilian suppliers to a larger extent than would otherwise have been the case.
They have also resulted in considerable improvements in the technical cap-
acities of these suppliers. However, the recent revelations of corrupt practices
in the awarding of contracts have highlighted the risks associated with strong
local content regulations.Where contracts are awarded on other grounds than
price and quality, parties to a transaction may be tempted to manipulate the
system. It now appears likely that local content rules will be either eliminated
or at least given reduced importance when awarding contracts in the future
(Reuters 2016).
24.4.2.2 NON-COERCIVE APPROACHES AND THE ENABLING
ENVIRONMENT
Several countries pursue policies that focus less on quantitative targets and
more on promoting technology transfer and skills improvement. Creating an
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enabling environment through the removal of constraints can be a part of this
strategy. To this end, some countries have adopted policies aimed at directly
increasing the participation of local workers and suppliers without establish-
ing legally binding national local content legislation and regulations.
Enforcement in these cases relies on mechanisms that range from specific
commitments in production-sharing agreements to general agreements on
the need to support local content that may not impose restrictions on
companies. These types of policies can be initiated not only by governments
but also by extractive companies, local and regional organizations, and
NGOs, including at the community level.
A report for the World Bank on Central Asia prepared by Ana Mari Esteves
and colleagues (World Bank 2014) provided several examples of policies to
help improve access to opportunities to local suppliers. These examples
included the following:
 ensuring ‘full, fair, and reasonable’ access to opportunities for local sup-
pliers initiated by national or subnational governments (such as The
Australian Industry Participation National Framework)
 compiling a list of ‘capable’ local suppliers by local government agencies
(see for instance the supplier registry system developed by the Industrial
Association of Antofagasta and mining companies in Chile)
 harmonizing supplier requirements and encouraging the implementa-
tion of certification systems for local suppliers by local government agen-
cies or mining companies (such as in the Atacama mining cluster, Chile).
(World Bank 2014: 16)
Such initiatives can be readily implemented because they do not depend on
regulations and they can be adapted to the needs of the local economy and the
mining companies. However, their effectiveness depends on the existence of
competitive local suppliers, and compliance cannot be legally enforced
(World Bank 2014: 16).
Chile’s mining sector framework does not require any formal commitments
to increasing local procurement. However, there is a strong culture of public–
private collaboration in supporting supplier development and local procure-
ment. Examples include the Mining Skills Council (CCM), in which all min-
ing enterprises provide information on their needs in relation to skilled
manpower. Programmes launched in the 1990s included support to large
mining companies for spending on training and integration of local suppliers
and assisting SMEs in meeting qualification needs, including through tech-
nical consultancy sub-contracting exchange, management training, market-
ing, and export assistance. In 2009 the Enhancing Competitiveness Program
(PMC) was launched. Activities include training, tender preparation, and
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Local Content, Supply Chains, and Shared Infrastructure
519
innovation and research capacity support. The Centro de Entrenamiento
Industrial y Minero (Industrial andMining Training Centre, CEIM) has played
an important role in improving the capabilities of suppliers. CEIM was estab-
lished by the Escondida mine in 1999, with the aim of supporting mining
clusters within Chile’s Region II (Antofagasta), thereby allowing suppliers to
benefit from economies of scale and network externalities (Haglund et al.
2014b).
Norway has a highly skilled and internationally competitive petroleum-
related service and supply industry, developed over more than forty years of
petroleum activities. Several regulations were passed in the 1980s and
1990s to support the development of this industry, including requirements
for a local content plan to be submitted to the Ministry of Petroleum and
Energy for approval before the grant of licence, and provision of training
and hiring a certain number of Norwegian personnel. Operators were also
required to conclude agreements with the Norwegian Ministry of Petrol-
eum and Energy under which at least 50 per cent of research and develop-
ment in connection with petroleum activities had to be performed in
Norway (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2016). International
oil companies are required to announce their tender schedule and the list
of companies to be invited. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is able to
add Norwegian-based firms to the list. General estimates put the level of
local content in terms of investment for the exploration and development
of the fields at between 50 per cent and 60 per cent (measured by value
added) and for maintenance and operations it stands at about 80 per cent
(AFDB and BMGF 2015).
24.5 Infrastructure
Mining usually requires very substantial investments in infrastructure such as
road or rail transport channels—far more typically than is required for oil or
gas exploration and production. Offshore oil and gas activities are of course
the least demanding in this respect. In particular, most large mines require
important investments in infrastructure to enable inputs andmachinery to be
brought in and finished products to be transported out.
Infrastructure that is built for extractive industries can often be used by
local populations and other economic activities and can thereby help to
position a region for more rapid economic development and diversification.
There are many examples of regions experiencing periods of rapid economic
growth due to the infrastructure improvements associated with mining
investment (see Box 24.1).
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Success stories can be replicated elsewhere if mine-related infrastructure is
planned and built while taking other economic activities and local opportun-
ities into account. Accordingly, the concept of a ‘mineral resource corridor’
has attracted increasing attention (World Bank 2012).
The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), which was officially launched
in 1996, is probably the most well-known and successful example of resource
corridor development: the MDC represents the shortest road and rail connec-
tion between the north-eastern part of South Africa and Botswana and the
port in Maputo, Mozambique.
The main infrastructure investments of the MDC include the construction
of railway links and a single toll road, rehabilitation of Maputo Port, construc-
tion of telecommunication and electricity links, and a one-stop border facility.
A number of industries have been established along the corridor, including:
 the world’s third largest aluminium plant, the MOZAL plant developed
near Maputo
 the Pande/Temane gas field, with a US$1.4 billion pipeline to South Africa
 the Beluluane Industrial Park (BIP), a 600 hectare industrial free zone next
to the MOZAL plant. (World Bank 2012: 21)
Despite the fact that the MDC is widely regarded as a success, there have been
setbacks relating to the functioning of the corridor. These include delayed
provision of rail services, lack of community engagement, environmental
issues, legal matters, governance issues, and investments. Furthermore, the
goal of establishing an efficient, one-stop border post between South Africa
and Mozambique has not yet been fully realized (World Bank 2012: 22).
The idea of resource corridors has attracted considerable positive attention,
not least because of the simplicity and apparent logic of the concept. As often
Box 24.1 EFFECT OF INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENT: FUNGURUME
In Fungurume, Katanga, Democratic Republic of the Congo, population tripled within a
few years to more than 100,000. This was the result mainly of Tenke FungurumeMining,
a mining company that operates a copper mine close to the town, improving the road to
the provincial capital, thereby cutting the driving time from two days to four hours, and
building a new market. The improved road made it possible for traders from other parts
of the province to reach Fungurume, thus increasing local supplies of consumer goods.
It also provided local farmers with an outlet for their produce, allowing them to earn cash
income. As a result, local incomes improved, the local food price inflation that is often
associated with large mining projects has been kept in check, seasonal food price
variations declined in amplitude, and the nutritional status of the population improved.
Source: Östensson and Roe 2013
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with simple concepts, however, the devil is in the detail and in the practical
implementation. Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are central to the resource
corridor concept since it requires both the government’s capability of estab-
lishing an appropriate regulatory framework and its convening power, and the
financial resources of the private sector. As pointed out by the International
Finance Corporation (IFC 2013), there are, however, very few examples of
successful greenfield multi-client/multi-user mining-related infrastructure
PPPs in the world—and none of them are in sub-Saharan Africa. This dearth
of examples suggests that it is difficult to arrange financing. Given the reliance
onproject cashflow for repayment, thehigher the complexity of the shared-use
structure, the less bankable it will be. This means that largermining companies
will most likely have to serve as anchor clients to these projects. It also means
that multi-user demands might have to be initially or permanently restricted
to secure,first and foremost, the deliveryof an efficientmining transport system
at the lowest possible cost to its anchor user/client (IFC 2013: 2–3).
Finally, it should be noted that resource corridors may have trade-diverting
effects. Mine-related infrastructure typically connects mines directly to the
coast. As found by Bonfatti and Poelhekke (2015), such infrastructure may
bias a country’s transport costs in favour of overseas trade, to the detriment of
trade with neighbours and regional integration. Coastal destinations with
more mine to coast infrastructure import relatively less from neighbours,
and this effect is stronger when the infrastructure overlaps with routes used
to import from overseas. The effect is, however, reversed for landlocked des-
tinations, where the mine to coast infrastructure will have to cut through at
least one neighbour to reach the coast (Bonfatti and Poelhekke 2015: 1).
24.6 Conclusions
In many countries, efforts to leverage greater development from extractive
industry investments have in recent years partly focused on raising local
content. The industry is usually prepared to participate in such efforts,
provided that their impact on costs is limited. In the short term, however,
the scope for increasing local content in low-income and mainly agrarian
countries may be constrained by the low capacity of potential suppliers,
low skill endowments, and a number of other factors constituting the
general business environment. A number of extractive industry companies
have introduced supplier development programmes that attempt to reduce
these constraints and skill gaps. Such measures have had their successes.
They are mainly effective in the long term, underlining the need to manage
expectations and for local communities to be engaged in the process in order
to avoid disappointments.
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Governments have adopted varying approaches to local content policies.
Some have prescribed ambitious quantitative targets for local content—targets
that have often been met. The apparent success of these policies, does not,
however, allow one to conclude that they have resulted in the actual accumula-
tion of skills and improved diversification of the host country or local economy.
First, success is often measured in terms of local content provision by firms
that are locally owned or registered, rather than in terms of local value added.
It is not clear that the policies have actually raised the proportion of locally
produced supplies above what would have been achieved in the absence of
targets. Second, quantitative targets carry risks of capture by local elites and
corruption. The Petrobras scandal in particular should make all governments
that consider the introduction of quantitative targets think twice.
Moreover, the international regulatory landscape is evolving in a direction
that is not favourable to quantitative local content targeting. While many
developing countries benefit from the exemptions from WTO disciplines
accorded to LDCs, these exemptions will expire in a few years. Bilateral invest-
ment agreements often also prohibit or limit assertive local content policies.
Finally, rigid local content policies carry an economic cost and may reduce
other income. For example, they may raise project costs by significant
amounts and so undermine project economics, thereby both diminishing
the country’s standing as an investment destination and reducing govern-
ment revenue from taxes.
A more constructive non-mandated approach is exemplified by Chile and
Norway, where policies have focused on improving skills and raising the
capacity of domestic industry to qualify as suppliers to the extractive industry.
While these policies have certainly resulted in additional costs for the extract-
ive companies, they have been acceptable to the industry because they have
held out a reasonable hope that local suppliers will eventually become fully
qualified partners. By focusing on building capacity, much of which can be
applied outside the extractive sector, these policies also appear to provide
additional resilience to the national industrial fabric, rather than locking
local companies into a perpetual dependence on the extractive industry.
Since the shortcomings that constrain the building of backward linkages are
usually readily apparent, it would seem reasonable to direct political attention
to solving the problems directly and alleviating the shortcomings, thus creat-
ing an enabling environment that permits the supplying industry to develop
its full potential.
Extractive industries often require significant investment in infrastructure.
This infrastructure could be used by local populations and other economic
activities and it would seem that this could help to stimulate rapid economic
development and diversification. While the potential is certainly significant,
the practical implementation has proved more complicated and considerable
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work needs to be done on PPPs for infrastructure investments since necessary
requirements for success include both the government’s capability of estab-
lishing an appropriate regulatory framework and its convening power, and the
financial resources of the private sector.
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The Possibilities and the Realities
Olle Östensson and Anton Löf
25.1 Introduction
The possibilities of downstream integration in extractive industries have trad-
itionally been given close attention by policy makers and many governments
have made downstream processing an objective of mineral and energy policy.
For instance, according to the African Mining Vision: ‘The principal resource
endowment opportunities are . . .downstream value addition: The use of the
locational advantage (CIF-FOB) of producing crude resources to establish
resource-processing industries (beneficiation) that could then provide the
feedstock for manufacturing and industrialisation’ (African Union 2009: 13).1
This chapter will discuss the practical possibilities of achieving increased
downstream processing and the policies used. It will argue that governments
need to be cautious about elevating downstream processing to a priority
objective. It will also attempt to show, by way of examples, how attempts to
‘correct’ market outcomes may carry high costs for the economy.
Section 25.2 will briefly discuss possible alternative explanations for the
perceived lack of downstream integration in the extractive industries in
lower income countries. Section 25.3 will provide a description of the eco-
nomics and geography of downstream processing, using examples from three
industries: aluminium, copper, and iron ore/steel. Section 25.4 will be devoted
to a critical review of policies commonly pursued to promote downstream
processing and of practical experiences in a few countries where downstream
1 A longer version of this chapter, containingmore detailed data, has been published as aWIDER
Working Paper (Östensson and Löf 2017).
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integration has been accorded a high priority. Finally, Section 25.5 will
attempt to draw some general conclusions about the kind of policies that
could prove successful.
25.2 Explanations for the Lack of Downstream Integration
in Extractive Industries
If all locations were equally attractive from other points of view, one would
expect downstream processing to take place close to the site of the extraction,
simply because processing often involves a reduction in volume, which would
tend to reduce transport costs. Since this is clearly not always the case, the
reasons for the location of processing activities in other sites have to be
explained.
25.2.1 Declining Terms of Trade and Unequal Market Power
Much of the intellectual foundation for the emphasis given to downstream
processing and one of the most important possible reasons for the location of
processing activities away from primary production was provided more than
half a century ago by Hans Singer (1950) and Raúl Prebisch (1950) in the form
of the Singer–Prebisch hypothesis. According to this argument, in a world
system in which poorer nations specialize in primary products, such as raw
minerals and agricultural products that are then shipped to industrialized
nations that, in turn, make advanced products to be sold to poorer nations,
the major benefits of international trade will go to the wealthy nations,
resulting in declining terms of trade for the poorer countries.
The Singer–Prebisch hypothesis attributes the lack of downstreamprocessing
in developing countries to the differences in market power between primary
producers and producers of processed products. It assumes that developed
countries have the power to influence location choices and retain processing
capacity in their countries, through trade policy and by other means. Until the
1990s, this view of the world economy did not appear to be in obvious conflict
with the observable facts. However, this description no longer appears valid.
Price developments for energy and metal commodities since 1960 do not
provide unambiguous support for the Singer–Prebisch hypothesis after the
year 2000.
There are a number of potential explanations for the absence of downstream
processing. Policy measures to support downstream integration would need
to be designed on the basis of an understanding of which of these explanations
is most relevant to the particular case at hand.




Tariff escalation (higher import duties on semi-processed products than on
raw materials, and higher still on finished products, (WTO n.d.a)) is relevant
in situations where the domestic market is not sufficiently large to accommo-
date the output of downstream processing plants and part or all of the pro-
duction has to be exported. However, tariffs have declined and tariff escalation
is less significant, particularly if concessions within regional or bilateral trade
agreements, several of which provide for free access to developed country
markets, are taken into account. The large expansion of manufacturing
exports from China and other emerging economies could hardly have taken
place under the tariffs that were in force in the 1970s or 1980s.
We have compared import tariffs for unprocessed and semi-fabricated metal
products, for some selected metals (bauxite/aluminium, copper, and iron ore/
steel) and countries and regions (China, the European Union, India, Japan,
and the United States).2 It appears that tariff escalation is significant, although
absolute tariffs are relatively low, with averages for semi-fabricated products
being well below 10 per cent.
Some qualifications have to be presented, however. First, simple averages of
tariffs do not tell the whole story. Products (within a category such as copper)
that are deemed to be strategic may be subject to much higher tariffs, thereby
effectively reducing imports. However, in the case of metals, the existence of
‘tariff peaks’ is relatively limited. Table 25.1 shows the range of applied import
tariffs for the countries studied. The highest tariffs are still relatively low and
would seem unlikely to be prohibitive.
Second, it is important to recall that tariffs are levied on the gross
value rather than the value-added. If, say, the tariff on copper concentrates
is zero and the tariff on refined copper is 5 per cent while the price of
copper concentrates is US$5,000 per metric tonne and that of refined copper
US$5,500, the tariff on refined copper is US$275. This corresponds to
Table 25.1. Import tariff range, selected metals and countries, %
Iron and steel (HS72) Copper (HS74) Aluminium (HS76)
China 1–10 0–15 0–10
India 5–10 5–10 2.5–7.5
European Union 0–2.2 0–5.2 0–8.8
Japan 0–2 0–3 0–7.5
United States 0 0–3 1.3–5.7
Source: based on tariff data in WTO (n.d.b).
2 The countries selected are the ones accounting for most of the world imports of the
commodities concerned. Detailed results can be found in Östensson and Löf (2017).
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55 per cent of the price difference between the two products and in all
likelihood to a significantly higher proportion of the value-added, since
some inputs will be necessary in the refining. The effective rate of protection
provided by the seemingly relatively low tariff would thus in reality be
very high.
Third, transportation costs have to be taken into account. These can be
considerable and can outweigh the effects of tariff protection. If the difference
in transport cost between the refined and the unrefined commodity to a given
market is high, it may still make sense to produce the refined commodity and
pay the higher tariff.
In conclusion, tariff escalation could be a significant obstacle to down-
stream processing when exporting to some markets. However, in several
cases, the higher tariff on the more processed product may be more than
outweighed by the difference in transport costs. Moreover, while access to
large developing country markets such as China or India may be hampered by
high tariffs on processed products, many developing countries now enjoy
tariff-free access to developed country markets (and often to the Chinese
market) under various bilateral and regional trade agreements.
25.2.3 Economies of Scale
Many production processes in the extractive industries have significant econ-
omies of scale. For instance, an oil refinery needs a capacity of 200,000 to
250,000 barrels per day to be profitable (Institute for Energy Research 2005).
A new alumina plant would not be economic unless it produced at least
1 million tonnes per year. As these examples show, processing the output
from a relatively small mine or oil field locally may not always be competitive.
Accordingly, downstream processing may have to wait until production has
reached required levels or may necessitate the pooling of output from several
mines or oil wells, which may be difficult to realize.
25.2.4 Availability of Inputs
It is not enough to have the basic raw material. Many processes also require
specialized inputs. For instance, aluminium smelters need access to low-cost
electric power in order to be competitive. Access to low-cost energy is usually
the main hurdle. It is maybe illustrative that a legal requirement to process
copper concentrate in the Democratic Republic of Congo was delayed after
copper producers demonstrated that there was not enough electric power
available to smelt and refine the copper mined in the country (Creamer
Media 2016a).
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25.2.5 Size of Domestic Market
International markets for energy and minerals are highly competitive and
it is difficult to compete without relying on a domestic market where
locational advantages in the form of lower transport costs yield higher
margins. However, the domestic market for processed energy and mineral
products in many developing countries is far too small to provide such a
cushion. For instance, while a country may produce enough crude oil to
supply a refinery of economic size, local demand for products such as
petrol or fuel oil has to be large enough so that most of the production
does not need to be exported.
25.2.6 Closeness to Market
Industrial users of raw materials expect speedy delivery. Many downstream
products such as semi-fabricates of steel and nonferrous metals are produced
in a wide range of qualities and are used by a variety of industries; it is
necessary to be able to supply the needed quality to the customer at short
notice, which means that geographic closeness to the market gives a competi-
tive advantage. Accordingly, facilities for producing items such as semi-
manufactured copper products tend to be located close to their customers.
Producers located far away are at a distinct disadvantage. It is no coincidence
that semi-manufacturing of nonferrous products has migrated from Europe
and North America to East Asia at the same rate as has the production of
manufactured products, as illustrated by statistics of metals use.3
25.2.7 Business Environment
Raw materials are only one ingredient in the production of processed prod-
ucts. Availability of skilled labour, logistics, and financial services is also
important. Moreover, the attractiveness of the investment regime needs to
be taken into account.Whilemines have to be located where there aremineral
deposits, processing capacity can, in principle, be located anywhere. There-
fore, while the quality of a deposit may compensate for unattractive (from the
investor’s point of view) aspects of the host country’s investment regime,
these aspects may swing a decision of where to locate processing capacity in
favour of a ‘safer’ site out of the country.
3 Metals use is usually measured as unwrought metal used in semi-fabricated products. Statistics
producers, such as the international metal study groups, use this convention.




Downstream processing often has an inbuilt advantage of lower transport
costs when exporting compared to the export of the unprocessed commodity.
However, most other factors such as economies of scale, unavailability of
inputs, limited size of the domestic market, distance to export markets, and
lack of a favourable business climate may outweigh this advantage. Trade
barriers such as tariffs appear to play a limited role, particularly when taking
into account the preferences now accorded to developing countries under
various trade agreements.
25.3 Economics and Geography of Downstream Processing:
Some Empirical Data
25.3.1 Extent of Vertical Integration in Selected Mineral Industries
An indication of the viability of efforts to achieve greater downstream pro-
cessing should be provided by the extent to which the industry is in fact
vertically integrated. Vertical integration would seem to hold advantages if
it is high. Accordingly, in order to shed some light on this issue, we look at
two aspects of downstream processing. First, we consider whether the degree
of vertical integration is higher in developed countries, as predicted by the
Singer–Prebisch hypothesis, which would support the case for promotion of
downstream processing. Second, we look at the size and variations in pro-
cessing margins, in order to determine if they are very large compared to the
price of the unprocessed commodity and if they are stable enough not to
pose unacceptable risks to possible public investment, directly or indirectly,
in downstream processing.
The share of output at the unprocessed stage that is processed into
the following stage in the country of mine production was calculated for three
minerals: bauxite/alumina/aluminium, copper, and iron ore/steel, the share
being measured both for world totals and for significant producing countries.4
Table 25.2 summarizes the results of the analysis and shows trends over the
2000–14 period. It is interesting to note that vertical integration has decreased
for all the first steps of the supply chain: bauxite to alumina, copper ore to
smelted copper, and iron ore to steel, while the next step shows either
increased or stable vertical integration over the period studied. Partly, this is
due to the rise of China as a consumer of raw materials and the country’s
investments in downstream processing. The other main reason is the location
4 Östensson and Löf (2017) contains detailed data, including on vertical integrationmeasured at
the corporate level.
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of demand for the processed products, such as steel, which determines where
the final step in the processing chain is located. If there are advantages to
vertical integration, they may be more important going backward from the
final stage than going forward from the first stage.
25.3.2 Processing Margins
The commercial viability of any processing industry depends on the process-
ing margin: that is, the difference between the prices of the raw material and
the processed product. Marginsmay be inflated bymonopoly positions. But in
a globalized world with low tariff barriers it is difficult to maintain processing
margins containing a large element of monopoly rent. It is difficult to estab-
lish the existence of such rents without detailed calculations on the basis of
production cost data, which are subject to influences that vary from one plant
to another. It is, however, possible to assess if margins are stable or subject
to large fluctuations. In that case, it would be reasonable to conclude that
investment in downstream processing is associated with large risks. Table 25.3
summarizes data for bauxite/aluminium, copper, and iron ore/steel. For all
minerals, the treatment charge, whether explicit or implicit, is seen to be on a
decreasing trend as a portion of the price at the following processing stage.
Moreover, for both copper and iron ore, the standard deviation is high and
increasing, with increased uncertainty and higher risk as a result.
Total processing charges for converting copper concentrate to refined copper
(TC/RC)5 have on average been relatively low over an extended period, both
Table 25.2. Vertical integration, less processed raw material transformed into more










2000–14 2000–14 2000–14 2000–14 2000–14
Average over
period
61.8% 57.5% 60.6% 92.1% 45.6%
High/low 67.5/54.4% 69.0/50.4% 66.3/54.9% 93.8/90.9% 52.6/32.5%
Trend over period decreasing increasing decreasing stable decreasing
Standard deviation
over period
4.7% 7.5% 2.8% 0.8% 5.9%
Source: authors’ calculations based on data from Raw Materials Data (n.d.) (bauxite, alumina, and aluminium); USGS
(2014) (copper ore, smelted copper, and refined copper); World Steel Association (2015), UNCTAD (2015) (iron ore
and steel).
5 TC stands for ‘treatment charges’ and refers to the charge for smelting copper concentrate to
blister copper. RC stands for ‘refining charges’ and refers to the charge for refining blister copper to
copper cathodes. While blister copper is traded, the bulk of international copper metal trade is in
the form of copper cathodes.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
Downstream Activities
533
in absolute dollar terms and also as a proportion of the refined copper price.
However, the share of the charges as a proportion of the refined copper price
shows violent fluctuations. This implies that the returns from downstream
processing of copper are highly uneven.
A comparison of the prices of bauxite, alumina, and aluminium over time
shows that the bauxite price as a portion of the alumina price fluctuates more
than the alumina price as a portion of the aluminium price. Bauxite prices
show some larger amplitude fluctuations, but even those are fairly limited
compared to copper and iron ore. Alumina and aluminium prices follow
each other fairly well. This would seem to imply that the risk associated
with additional processing in the bauxite/alumina/aluminium industry is
relatively low.
Both iron ore and rebar6 prices showed large amplitude fluctuations. How-
ever, unlike in the case of copper, the variations over time in the implicit
‘processing charge’—that is, the difference between rebar and iron ore prices—
and in the iron ore price itself, are of roughly similar magnitude. Accordingly,
the additional processing would not appear to increase the price risk.
25.3.3 Some Conclusions
The degree of vertical integration varies within the extractive industry and
between the threemetals studied. In all three cases vertical integration appears
to be mainly driven by production economics resulting from technology and
transport costs and less by corporate strategies or trade policies. For the
Table 25.3. Processing margins, cost of turning less processed material into next stage as %









Aug 2010–15 Aug 2010–15 2000–15 2007–15
Average over period 80.5% 82.8% 9.3% 70.5%
High/low 85.6/73.2% 86.5/79.7% 29.5/0.3% 83.0/55.7%
Trend over period decreasing decreasing decreasing decreasing
Standard deviation
over period
2.9% 1.6% 7.6% 7.9%
Sources: authors’ calculations based on data from London Metal Exchange (n.d.) (copper); S&P Global (n.d.a), Metal
Bulletin (n.d.) (bauxite to alumina); London Metal Exchange (n.d.), Metal Bulletin (n.d.) (alumna to aluminium);
UNCTAD (2015), S&P Global (n.d.b and n.d.c.) (iron ore to rebars).
6 The price of rebars (also known as reinforcing rods, used with concrete in construction) is
used since this is the most basic and lowest priced form of commonly traded steel. Import prices for
the Middle East were used since they are broadly based and can be taken as roughly representative
of the prices paid by most developing countries for imported steel.
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bauxite/alumina/aluminium complex, access to low-cost energy is a major
determining factor, along with an advantage for aluminium smelters that
are located close to markets. For copper, the transport cost for copper concen-
trate has meant that copper is often smelted and refined close to the mine,
except where economies of scale, access to low-cost energy, and the surge in
Chinese demand has generated a trade in concentrate and, to some extent, in
smelted blister copper. Finally, in the case of iron ore, developments over the
past two decades have been completely dominated by the expansion of steel
use in China, which has provided Chinese steel mills with a competitive
advantage based on location. It should be noted, however, that even discount-
ing the influence of China, a very high proportion of iron ore production has
traditionally been exported because the steel markets of most large iron ore
producing countries are too small to accommodate processing of more than a
share of the iron ore output. It is notable that the degree of downstream
processing is relatively low in high-income countries where producers would
be expected to be able to exert some influence over markets: for instance,
Australia in bauxite and iron ore, Chile in copper, and Sweden in iron ore. It
would certainly be technically feasible for these countries to increase down-
stream processing. The fact that they have not done so would appear to argue
that the attraction of downstream integration is not self-evident.
Based on the evidence of price series, processing margins do not appear to
have followed anyparticular trend in the past twodecades. The surge inChinese
processing of all three metals could have been expected to change price behav-
iour. But this has not happened. Longer price series would have allowed more
definite conclusions on this point, but they are unfortunately not available.
The time series used are probably in any case sufficiently long to reflect accur-
ately the effects of the Chinese expansion of processing. There is considerable
variation in the processing margins over time. In cases where the raw material
accounts for a large portion of the total production cost and its price is subject
to large fluctuations, downstream processing is exposed to considerable risk.
This is the case in particular for processing of bauxite, copper concentrate, and
iron ore, but less so for the processing of alumina. The risk of periodically seeing
margins squeezed dramatically should give pause to any company or indeed
government that might consider investing in processing capacity.
25.4 Review of Policies
25.4.1 Policy Objectives and Means
Government policies aimed at increasing downstream processing are rarely
introduced with reference to clearly defined and quantifiable objectives.
Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish three broad categories of objectives:
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1. Employment. It is sometimes argued that increased downstream integra-
tion will add a significant number of employment opportunities,
although most downstream processing is capital intensive.7
2. Economic diversification and skills development. While the number of jobs
created in downstream industries may be relatively small, incentives to
create such industries could be justified if they made the economy more
diversified, or if the general skill levels were raised.
3. Appropriation of rent. If there aremonopoly rents in processing it would be
reasonable for the government to try to correct the situation in order
both to raise economic efficiency and to increase government revenue.
As already mentioned, specific policy measures to support downstream
integration would need to be designed on the basis of an understanding as
to which of the three objectives above might be achieved by using any
government intervention that is contemplated.
As concerns employment, a WIDER Working Paper on local content
(Östensson 2017) argues that measures aimed at strengthening backward link-
ages (e.g. via higher levels of local content) may yield significant results in
terms of employment generation and that many of these jobs are likely to be
associated with portable skills. It is difficult to see how downstream processing
could have a comparable impact, since most mineral or energy processing
facilities are highly capital intensive and require little of the low-skilled labour
in, for example, construction and services that is needed in mining itself or in
supplier industries. The higher-skilled jobs in downstream processing are
often relatively specialized and skills are thus not easily portable.
The existence, actual or potential, of local markets for extractive industry
products would be a positive factor for downstream processing since the
development of such markets would reduce dependence on raw material
exports and may result in greater economic resilience. However, the mere
existence of such markets is not a guarantee that they will benefit fully from
the availability of the raw material since the processor may be in a monopoly
position with price-setting power.8
The existence of large rents that can be appropriated would appear to be a
valid reason for promoting downstream processing. However, as discussed in
Section 25.3.2, the rents in downstream processing appear to be limited and
7 Later processing stages may be more labour intensive, but it is difficult to argue that a country
needs to have all the intermediate stages in order to arrive at this later, more labour-demanding
stage. For an informative analysis of trade patterns for copper contained in semi-fabricated and
finished goods, see Tercero et al. (2016).
8 As the African Mining Vision expresses it: ‘TNCs, who often prefer to . . .only make the semi-
processed resource available to the local market at a monopoly price (import parity price = the
alternative imported price of the resource (CIF) in a particular country), if they have a monopoly or
oligopoly position in the country concerned’ (African Union 2009: 14).
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precarious, with large fluctuations over time. Accordingly, policies based on
the perceived existence of such rents and aimed at promoting downstream
processing could carry large risks: risks to the financial solidity of the resource
company and, in the case of positive tax incentives or government subsidies, a
risk of wasting taxpayers’ money.
Governments typically attempt to influence downstream processing deci-
sions in one or more of three ways:
 consultation with investors aimed at identifying and remedying obstacles
to downstream integration
 economic incentives
 bans on the export of unprocessed products.
Government measures may be contained in legislation or may form part of
agreements negotiatedwith investors.While agreements are almost universally
used in the oil and gas sector to define rights and obligations of government
and companies, they are less common and often more restricted in scope
for non-fuel minerals, where conditions are instead usually defined in law.
Nevertheless, even where taxation is defined in law, many countries use Min-
eral Development Agreements to define other obligations of investors. These
obligations may cover various aspects of the investment, including employ-
ment, local content, and downstream processing. Targets may be defined, or a
process for achieving unquantified objectives set out. Consultation processes
whereplans areworked out and agreed are common in the cases of employment
and local content, but less so when it comes to downstream processing. Where
the legislation and any agreements are silent on downstream processing, it is of
course still possible for the government to try to persuade the investing com-
pany to integrate forward. Any government has a number of instruments at
its disposal that can be used to influence companies’ behaviour in this regard.
Economic incentives to influence companies’ decisions with respect to
downstream processing are relatively common, particularly in the form of
taxes on the export of unprocessed materials.9
Positive incentives, for instance, in the form of tax credits for downstream
processing, have been discussed, but no current examples are known to the
authors.
Another positive incentive is duty exemption on imported inputs, which is
used both at the primary and downstream processing stage bymany countries.
Export bans on unprocessed products are uncommon, but there are a few
examples. The most recent example is the ban that was introduced in Indo-
nesia in 2014, which is discussed in Section 25.4.2.
9 See Price and Nance (2009) for a number of examples.
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25.4.2 Indonesia’s Unprocessed Mineral Exports Ban
The example of downstream processing policies that has attracted most atten-
tion in recent years is the Indonesian export ban on unprocessed minerals.
This ban took effect in January 2014. It applies to both metal-based and non-
metal-based components of unprocessed minerals and specifies certain min-
imum levels of processing that are required to avoid the ban. The nominal
intention of this intervention is to help preserve the country’s supplies of the
affected resources (Nathan Associates 2013). While mineral ore exports such
as nickel and bauxite were banned outright, exports of mineral concentrates—
including copper, iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, and ilmenite—are permit-
ted for a period of three years, during which export taxes are levied at rising
rates (Bloomberg 2014).
In order to back up the bans, positive incentives have also been provided for
companies that invest in processing facilities.10
These measures have had a dramatic impact on Indonesia’s mineral exports.
The value of unprocessed exports of bauxite, copper, and nickel fell from
US$7 billion in 2013 to just under US$2.9 billion in 2014 (UNCTADstat
n.d.). The fact that the rules were introduced at a time of falling prices and
widespread excess capacity for the minerals concerned has exacerbated these
impacts. Some modifications of the rules have already been negotiated with
companies. Meanwhile, a number of projects to build processing plants have
been announced and a few have started construction.
It is too early to definitively assess the Indonesian experience since 2014. An
estimate made for USAid before the rules came into effect found that the
economic losses would be very large. In aggregate, accumulated net welfare
losses would amount to somewhere between $34 billion and $33 billion in
2020 (Nathan Associates 2013: 2). In the light of the implementation of the
legislation and market developments since early 2014, these initial estimates
today appear too optimistic. While it is possible that some of the processing
capacity now being built will be profitable, this may be due only to the very
generous incentives provided.
25.4.3 Export Taxes on Iron Ore in India
Indian policy with respect to iron ore mining is a good illustration of the
difficulties of achieving a balance between the interests of primary producers
and processors by using regulations.
In 2011 and 2012, the courts bannedmining in the Indian provinces of Goa
and Karnataka because of mining outside concession areas and breaches of
10 See Bellefleur (2014) for details.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
538
environmental regulations. The ban has since been lifted, but there is still a
cap on production (Creamer Media 2012b), resulting in reduced domestic
supplies.
Iron ore consumption by the Indian steel industry is dominated by lumps
and sinter, with most fines that are not suitable for sintering being exported
since they cannot be directly used for iron making in the absence of sufficient
capacities for agglomeration through pelletizing (Creamer Media 2012a).
Most steel producers are equipped to use iron ore pellets from fines as feed-
stock but do not have pellet-making facilities at their plants (Creamer Media
2012c). As a consequence, the fines have been left in dumps or, when possible,
the material has been exported. In order to assure the domestic steel industry
of iron ore supplies, railway freight rates are no less than 3.6 times higher for
iron ore for exporters than for ore for domestic use (Creamer Media 2015).
A levy on outward shipments of fines was first imposed in December 2009
at 5 per cent. A 15 per cent export tax on lumps followed in April 2010.
A uniform rate of 20 per cent was imposed on both lumps and fines in
March 2011 and was increased to 30 per cent in December the same year
(Creamer Media 2015). The tax was lowered to 10 per cent for lower grade ores
in 2016 (Creamer Media 2016b). Royalties on iron ore were raised from 10 to
15 per cent in August 2014 (Creamer Media 2014b). Pelletizing provided a
possible way to exploit lower-grade fines since there was no export tax on
pellets. However, a tax of 5 per cent was introduced in January 2014 in
response to pressure by the steel industry (Creamer Media 2014a, 2014d).
Capacity utilization in pelletizing fell to 50 per cent later the same year
(Creamer Media 2014c).
The combined result of these various policy interventions can be seen in
Figure 25.1. The peak in export and production in around 2008 to 2009 was
partly the result of companies exporting from stockpiles of fines. However,
once the most easily accessible stockpiles had been exhausted and prices
fell following the financial crisis, this activity came to an end. A couple of
years later, the court-ordered mine closures strongly influenced the figures.
Nevertheless, production and exports would have been expected to recover
once mines could be re-opened. This did not happen, due to the policies
pursued. Consequently, and remarkably, from being the world’s third-largest
iron ore exporter, India became a net importer of iron ore in 2015.
25.4.4 Processing of Copper in Zambia
Zambia levies an export tax on copper concentrate. The tax is intended to
promote the smelting and refining of copper concentrate from mines in the
country. The tax is 10 per cent of the sales value, which corresponds to about
US$470 per tonne of contained copper at mid-2016 prices. The treatment
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charge: that is, the cost of smelting concentrate in Zambia to produce blister
copper (see footnote 5)—is US$70–75 per tonne of concentrate, while the cost
of transporting the concentrate from the mine to an overseas smelter is about
US$200 per tonne (corresponding to about US$600 per tonne of contained
copper) depending on the route taken (Muller 2013).11
Because the cost of transporting concentrate is three times as high as that of
transporting blister copper, mining companies would be better off processing
the copper even in the absence of the export tax. The smelting charge has to
be paid in any case and it does not matter to the miner if it is paid to a smelter
in Zambia or overseas. Thus, the export tax does not affect the actions of
mining companies. On the other hand, the tax deters investors who for one
reason or another are not in a position to smelt concentrates: for example, if a
mine produces concentrate that for mineralogical reasons cannot be smelted
in existing smelters. Because of the export tax, most such mining projects will
not be economically viable in Zambia.
Would this conclusion hold if the smelting charge were to change? As was
noted in Section 25.3.2, smelting charges have trended downwards for a long
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Figure 25.1. Iron ore and steel in India 1993–2015, million tonnes
Source: authors’ calculations based on UNCTAD (2013, 2015), TEX Report (2016).
11 This section is partly based on Chamber of Mines of Zambia and ICMM (2014: Annex I).
Copper prices and smelting charges have been updated to, respectively, February 2016 and the
average for the 2000–15 period.
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have introduced legislation similar to the Zambian export taxes, leading toover-
investment in smelting capacity and downward pressure on smelting charges.
Moreover, smelters that were originally built to process ore frommines that are
now closed often continue operating since the original capital investment has
been paid back and running costs can be covered. There are several such
smelters in the world.
As for processing the refined copper that is now produced in Zambia, a
World Bank study (World Bank 2011) does not hold out much hope. The
total market for all copper and copper alloy semis in sub-Saharan Africa
(excluding South Africa, which is self-sufficient) can be estimated at around
10,000 tonnes per year, which corresponds to a tiny portion of Zambian
refined copper output of over 700,000 tonnes per year. Given the location of
Zambia, the principal exit shipment ports, and the main shipping routes, the
markets outside Africa that could be best served from Zambia are the Middle
East and Southeast Asia. The Asian market is, however, well served by sub-
stantial large-scale local capacity.
Accordingly, market prospects do not appear to justify further industrial
scale copper and copper alloy semi-manufacturing capability in Zambia in
spite of regular political pressures to do just that.
25.4.5 Exports or Local Use of Natural Gas in Tanzania
Tanzania has been producing natural gas from its Songo Songo fields on the
Indian Ocean since 2004. This gas provides about 50 per cent of Tanzania’s
electricity generation, with the remainder used for industrial purposes (AfDB
and BMGF 2015). However, more recent discoveries have radically changed
the prospects for gas in Tanzania. In the past decade, there has been very
large exploration activity in the concessions so far granted by the Tanzanian
Petroleum Development Corporation. These have already resulted in vast
commercial finds that are only now beginning to be developed.
The gas can be used in three ways: (i) natural gas can be exported to earn
foreign exchange revenue; (ii) it can be used to generate energy (electricity) in
the domestic economy; and (iii) it can be used to produce a number of
products, including fertilizer, compressed natural gas, and petrochemicals.
The choice between the different uses for the natural gas is partly a technical
one that will be dictated by project economics. Mainly, however, the choice is
a political one. A large portion of the gas in the largest deep water wells will in
any case have to be exported, both because the volumes are too large to
realistically be absorbed by the national economy and because producing
companies will have to export very large volumes to justify their investment
in extraction and liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants. A large share of the
export revenues will strengthen the government budget. It has been estimated
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that the additional income will amount to US$1.4 billion per year on average
over the first ten years of production, corresponding to 1.9 per cent of gross
domestic product and 9 per cent of government tax revenue from all sources
(AfDB and BMGF 2015: 31). There is, however, potential for the contribution
to growth to be significantly larger. The Tanzanian economy is capable of
delivering at least some of the goods and services needed for gas exploration
and extraction and for LNG production. The government has launched an
ambitious local content policy which, if successful, should raise the propor-
tion of nationally sourced goods and services significantly (United Republic of
Tanzania 2014).
With respect to the possibility of improving access to electrical power, it
should be noted that at present only 24 per cent of the Tanzanian population
are connected with electricity services. Using the natural gas for this purpose
would mean that the national energy supply company will be able to further
reduce its dependence on expensive imported feed stocks of diesel, and also
reduce further its use of ageing and unreliable hydro plants. In addition, it
would be possible to reduce power tariffs, thereby improving living standards
and the competitiveness of domestic industry.
A range of processed products can also be produced from the gas and
especially from the large deepwater resources if these are developed. Their
economic feasibility differs, however. Certain processes for downstream prod-
ucts have considerable economies of scale and for this reason a large part of
the production would have to be exported if production was to be on a
commercially viable scale. Moreover, several of the uses would require a
considerably lower cost of input than, for instance, would LNG production.12
A domestic fertilizer facility could make a significant potential contribu-
tion to Tanzania’s large agricultural sector which at present has a low rate of
fertilizer use as well as an expensive subsidy policy to help farmers. A large
ammonia/urea plant could be competitive if it could be supplied with gas at
US$5–6 per mmBtu: a figure that is more demanding than the US$7–8
supply price needed for a viable LNG export activity. The full capacity output
would be significantly higher than the anticipated future demands in East
Africa as a whole. So the investment could only be justified if Tanzania
had real prospects of also finding large export markets outside the region
(Roe 2016).
A competitive methanol plant would consume even more than a fertilizer
plant and it would probably need a gas supply price as low as US$4–5. The
domestic market is very small, methanol being usedmainly as a feedstock into
12 The following assessment of the feasibility of different types of downstream processes is based
on BG Tanzania (2013).
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chemical industries. Hence a very large export market would also need to be
found to justify such a large capital outlay (Roe 2016).
Converting gas to liquid fuels would be an even more challenging
investment for the country. A facility to produce naphtha and high quality
diesel would only work competitively if it could acquire gas at a price of around
US$3–4 mmBtu. Although this type of project would have some attraction in
being able to save Tanzania’s large petroleum import bill, the investment
needed to achieve this saving would be very large (Roe 2016).
The Tanzanian government has made it clear that it assigns a high priority
to downstream processing of natural gas. However, the difficulties of these
ambitions are evident. In addition, investors have expressed some concern
that the ‘domestic market obligation’ should not be so large that it threatens
the viability of projects.
In conclusion, the case of Tanzania’s natural gas illustrates the complex
weighing of alternatives that has to take place in order to satisfy several
different objectives at the same time.
25.5 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to provide some basic information and analyses
that could inform policy choices concerning downstream processing of both
metals and oil and gas, and to show both the risks of policy decisions that are
oriented towards meeting one single objective as well as the complexities that
need to be taken into account in order to arrive at solutions that are both
practical and sustainable.
Section 25.2 reviewed the reasons why forward vertical integration is not
always an optimal choice for extractive industry companies. While transport
costs often argue in favour of such integration, other technical factors, includ-
ing economies of scale, availability of inputs, size of domestic market, and
distance tomarkets, may outweigh this natural advantage. There appears to be
little support for the argument that differences in market power dictate the
geography of downstream processing. Relatively high tariffs on processed
products appear to play only a limited role.
The review of vertical integration and processing margins in Section 25.3
showed that the degree of vertical integration varies within the extractive
industry. It appears to be mainly driven by production economics resulting
from technology and less by corporate strategies. It is notable that the
degree of downstream processing is relatively low in high-income countries
where producers would be expected to be able to exert some influence over
markets.
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Processing margins tend to fluctuate, in some cases dramatically, which
should give pause to all those companies or countries that consider investing
in processing capacity.
Section 25.4 discussed government policies for downstream processing.
Following a brief description of objectives and instruments, the rest of the
section was devoted to a review of four country cases: India, Indonesia, and
Zambia on non-fuel minerals, and Tanzania for natural gas.
In Zambia, a simple arithmetic example serves to show that the policy
studied—the export tax on copper concentrates—is unnecessary and does
not significantly influence processing decisions. It may, however, preclude
the exploitation of some mineral deposits, thus needlessly limiting mine
production.
In Indonesia, more effort seems to have gone into the formulation of the
policy underlying the ban on exports of unprocessed minerals. However,
the government has decided to provide very generous incentives to investors
in processing capacity, and it is legitimate to ask who pays for the policy: the
investor or the Indonesian taxpayer.
The Indian policy concerning iron ore mining and exports illustrates
the difficulties of satisfying competing industrial interests who all turn to the
government for solutions to their various problems. In trying to help
the Indian steel industry to retain international competitiveness, the
government succeeded in badly damaging a once successful export indus-
try while leaving the steel industry in an uncertain situation with regard to
its raw material supplies.
The Tanzanian example, finally, brings to light an important consideration
that is usually absent from the debate about downstream processing, namely
the domestic market. In Tanzania the choice may be not between exporting
unprocessed or processed products but between satisfying domestic needs—in
this case, rural electrification—ormaximizing export revenues. This illustrates a
basic argument: that downstream processing policies should not be about how
to maximize export revenue but about how to meet the needs of the economy.
In conclusion, it is probably reasonable to point out that the presence of
raw material resources constitutes only one of the factors that need to be
taken into account when taking a decision on the location of a particular
type of plant. Incentives or directives to promote downstream processing
thus represent only one variation on the familiar theme of picking
winners—and one based on a particularly narrow set of criteria. It would
probably be more productive in most country cases to instead emphasize
industrial policies that focus on removing constraints and bottlenecks that
stand in the way of the economy reaching its full potential, including those
relating to skills, credit, energy supply, transport infrastructure, and inappro-
priate regulation.
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Choices for Spending Government Revenue
New African Oil, Gas, and Mining Economies
Sophie Witter and Maja Jakobsen
26.1 Introduction
Extractives projects have the potential to contribute to improved human
development, but this is not guaranteed. It is well understood that translating
natural resources into individuals living longer and healthier lives, gaining a
good education, and having a decent standard of living requires strategic
planning and policy choices based around individual country contexts.1,2
Public spending of government revenues from extractives projects has the
potential to enhance human development either directly or indirectly: a point
that is spelled out fully by Roe and Round (2017). Direct routes include spending
on health, education, or social protection, while indirect routes include spend-
ing on infrastructure or on various measures to enhance economic growth. Both
spending channels being important, the balance of expenditure between the
two depends on the country context and the expected time profile of natural
resource revenues.
This chapter focuses on what it could mean to use natural resource rev-
enues for public spending in social sectors (health, education, and social
1 We use estimates produced by Haglund et al. (2015) showing the likely timing and magnitude
of revenues from new discoveries of oil, gas, or minerals in six African countries, and innovative
research by Barca et al. (2015) and Witter et al. (2015a) exploring the potential of new natural
resource revenues to improve health and education services and social protection. This chapter is
based on research funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation which was released under
Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike International 4.0 terms (CC BY-SA 4.0). The findings
and conclusions contained within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions
or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
2 This section draws heavily on Section 2 of Witter et al. (2015a).
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protection). The case for investing natural resource revenues in social sectors
is strong. It rests on the assumption that these sectors are given a high priority
in national government development plans, especially in lower-income coun-
tries, and this spending has the potential to lead to high economic returns and
the fulfilment of the human rights that are guaranteed by most constitutions.
One of the risks of natural resource revenue flows is their propensity to
distract from results-driven questions (‘What do we want to achieve?’) and
rather to focus on expense-driven questions (‘We have funds, what should we
spend them on?’). Witter et al. (2015a) developed a framework that identifies
the key questions that should inform investment decisions in the social
sectors; they argue that the same framework can be used by governments to
guide policy decisions in this space, irrespective of the price environment—
that is, falling or increasing prices.
In general, decisions regarding social-sector expenditure should be based on
a comprehensive diagnosis of the needs of the sector, which in turn is based
on the development goals of the country. However, decisions regarding the
use of natural resource revenues to invest in national priorities require an
alignment of such investments against a realistic assessment of the scale,
trends, and predictability of revenue flows.
26.2 Estimating Revenues from Extractives Projects in Africa
Extractives revenues depend on international commodity prices, which have
historically been volatile and notoriously hard to predict. For example, the
sharp falls in oil and iron ore prices during the second half of 2014 took most
analysts by surprise.While it is generally considered likely that demand for oil,
gas, metals, and other commodities will continue to increase over the coming
decades due to the growth of emerging markets, there is much greater uncer-
tainty around supply.
As is noted by Roe and Dodd (2017), the past ten to fifteen years have
seen many low- and middle-income countries become more economically
dependent on extractive industries. This tendency seems likely to continue,
despite the recent falls in commodity prices.
A study by Haglund et al. (2015) estimated that in the case of Mozambique,
Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, recent discoveries of
natural resources are likely to be significant. However, they will not have a
transformational impact. Using commodity prices reflecting the 2015 envir-
onment, in absolute terms, extractives revenues in these countries are
projected to range from an annual average of US$144 million in Liberia to
US$2.6 billion in Uganda over the first ten years of production. In relative
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terms, they are projected to range from 1.9 per cent of GDP in Tanzania to
5.7 per cent of GDP in Liberia over the same period.
Furthermore, Haglund et al. (2015) showed that revenues will take time to
materialize in most countries. It can take up to ten years from discovery for
production to start, during which time revenues accruing to the government
are minimal, and then a further seven to twelve years for production to reach
its peak. In most cases, once revenues hit their peak, they will slowly decline
over the next fifty years as resources run out.
Commodity prices have declined further since 2015 (Figure 26.1 shows the
example of the oil price), when the Haglund study was completed, and this
has almost certainly affected the estimated timing and scale of the figures
presented in Haglund et al. (2015). However, the likely timing and broad scale
of revenues from extractives in these countries still provide a solid basis for
discussions about the policy choices facing governments in these and other
natural-resource-rich countries when it comes to public spending on social-
sector activities and investments. In fact, price fluctuations are one of the
challenges of managing extractives revenues.
26.3 Comparison with Spending Gaps and Current Funding
for Social Sectors
A comparison of projected revenues from six countries with new extractive





























































































































Figure 26.1. Europe Brent spot price FOB
Source: US Energy Administration (EIA; http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=
PET&s=RBRTE&f=M).
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gaps for health3 and education4 gives an indication of the potential magni-
tude of what might be contributed by extractives revenues (Witter et al.
2015a). The different scenarios provide evidence that the scale of income
from natural resources across selected African countries is in all cases sufficient
to cover a significant part of the existing financing gaps in health and educa-
tion (see Figure 26.2), but shows that the potential in each country is unique
as both resource revenues and the size of the funding gaps differ.5
Although the revenue estimates have since been downgraded, the overall
picture is still illuminating. With a liquefied natural gas (LNG) price of




















Education funding gap Health funding gap
‘Smoothed’ resource revenue across 30 years (baseline estimate)
Figure 26.2. Health and education funding gaps compared with smoothed natural
resource revenues in six African countries, annual average 2016–25
Note: It appears that health funding gaps are larger than education funding gaps. This is partly due
to the differing methodologies used to calculate gaps, which is related to available data on current
spend and estimated needs for each sector and country. ‘Smoothed’ resource revenues are based on
the assumption that government manages revenues from natural resources to create a smooth
stream of funds (as a share of GDP) over a period of 30 years.
Source: data from Witter et al. (2015a) and Haglund et al. (2015).
3 To estimate gaps for health, projected resource revenues were compared with: (1) national
health expenditures, based on national health expenditure accounts (NHA) data; (2) funding
needs, using international recommendations from McIntyre and Meheus (2014), and estimated
health funding gaps; and (3) other potential innovative health-financing sources. On the
expenditure side, we constructed a financial programming framework for each country that
allowed us to project key economic variables such as growth and domestic revenue, and we used
this to estimate resource availability for health.
4 The estimates of education financing gaps are based on a paper commissioned for the 2010
Education for All Global Monitoring Report (UNESCO 2010). The report calculates education
financing needs based on projections of the number of school-age children; teacher salary and
classroom construction costs; national targets for pupil–teacher and pupil–classroom ratios; and
targets for the proportion of total recurrent costs to be devoted to non-salary spending. The cost of
providing adult literacy programmes was also accounted for. Resources available for education were
estimated on the basis of GDP projections and the ratio of public education spending to GDP.
5 This section is adapted from Section 3 of Witter et al. (2015a).
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revenues smoothed over the next thirty years, Mozambique, for example,
could fund most of its education needs, or around a third of the country’s
need for financing in health, over the next decade. With a crude oil price of
US$60 per barrel, Ghana could meet about a third of its combined health and
education funding needs over the next decade. In the same time period,
Liberia could fill about a third of the combined health and education finan-
cing gap (with an iron ore price of US$90 per dry metric ton).
Variations in oil, LNG, and iron ore prices will most likely impact the
baseline, or mid-point, estimates presented above. Table 26.1 presents an
overview of the variations that could be expected if the baseline price was
shifted by +/– 25 per cent (for details see Haglund et al. 2015). In the low-price
scenario—which is now closer to the realities post-2015—all sample countries
could have natural resource revenues that are sufficient to cover between a
tenth and a fifth of their country’s combined financing gaps in health and
education—assuming that all revenues are allocated to social sectors.
It is important to keep in mind that the needs assessment is high, and is
based on the assumption that spending to cover all needs would be possible
immediately in both sectors. In reality it would take time to increase spending
in both health and education, as absorptive and institutional capacity takes
time to develop (not just training staff and building structures but also devel-
oping stronger systems to manage them).
26.3.1 Opportunities in the Health Sector
Analyses of projected natural resource revenues by country for the next decade
show different profiles (Figure 26.3);6 the timing, magnitude, and relative
Table 26.1. Price variations in smoothed resource revenue projections
in relation to the combined health and education financing gaps
Sample country New natural resource revenues as a share of total financing
gaps in health and education




Sierra Leone 0.0 36.7
Tanzania 5.4 17.4
Uganda 9.2 20.6
Source: data from Witter et al. (2015a) and Haglund et al. (2015).
6 The decline in Liberia’s and Mozambique’s estimated health financing gaps as a share of GDP
reflects the fact that both countries are expected to experience very rapid GDP growth over the next
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External expenditure on health
Innovative funding for health as a % of GDP
Government health expenditure
‘Smoothed’ resource revenues (additional to govt. health expenditure and ext.
health expenditure)
‘Raw’ natural resource revenue (additional to govt. and ext. health expenditure)
Figure 26.3. Natural resources revenues (baseline estimates) compared with health
sector financing gaps—profile over time by country
Note: These graphs do not show the price sensitivity of the revenue predictions from Haglund
et al. (2015). ‘Raw’ resource revenues are based on the assumption that projected revenues are left
unmanaged and allocated directly into the budget available for health and education spending.
Source: authors’ illustration; data from Witter et al. (2015a) and Haglund et al. (2015).
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importance vary across the six countries. In Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,
for example, new resource revenues were already accruing to government in
2015, while inMozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania revenues are not expected
to flow for another four to six years (based on best estimates in 2015).
The graphs shown in Figure 26.3 give a sense of the changing picture in each
country and how resource revenues could contribute to improve health
services:
 In Ghana and Liberia7 health financing could be substantially supported
by natural resource revenues. The scale of revenues in Ghana is already
very high in relation to the various measures of health needs and expend-
itures; however, if the revenues are smoothed over the next thirty years
(as a share of GDP), then just over half of Ghana’s health needs can be
covered in the next decade.
 In Tanzania and Uganda, the health financing gaps are significant and
natural resource revenues are estimated to contribute only partly to those
needs and, most likely, not before the early 2020s. However, smoothing
revenues over the next thirty years (as a share of GDP) shows that both
countries could cover around one-fifth of their health financing needs.
 Mozambique shows a significant dependence on donor funds, which
could in fact not be replaced or supplemented by resource revenues for
the next five–ten years. However, looking at a scenario where revenues are
smoothed over the next thirty years (as a share of GDP) reveals that there
is the potential to cover around half of the funding gap in health over the
next decade.
 Sierra Leone already has revenues flowing today and, if smoothed over the
next thirty years (as a share of GDP), this could close almost half of the
country’s health financing gap.
Price variations will, however, continue to impact the baseline, or mid-
point, estimates presented above and in Figure 26.3. Table 26.2 presents an
overview of the variations that are expected if the baseline price is shifted
by +/– 25 per cent (for details of this analysis see Haglund et al. 2015). In
Tanzania, higher prices result in the possibility that almost a quarter of the
country’s health gap would be closed. By contrast, a lower price scenario in
Sierra Leone could have a devastating impact, leading to cancellation of
projects and a zero health contribution.
decade. Thismeans that, although health financing needs in Liberia andMozambique are expected
to rise in absolute terms over this period, they are likely to fall as a share of GDP.
7 In the projections for natural resource revenues an attempt has been made to take account of
the Ebola crisis in both countries.
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Overall, the importance of new natural resource revenues as a possible
source of funding for health is potentially large in the sample countries.
Other ‘innovative’ sources of funding for health (such as taxes on remittances,
mobile phone levies, and borrowing using domestic bonds for health) would
be much smaller than natural resource revenues—even in the low-price
scenario—in the two countries where we have estimates of such funding
sources (see Figure 26.3).
It is also instructive to compare the projected funding from external donors
for health (see Figure 26.3’s depiction of external expenditure on health) with
the estimated natural resource revenues. Several sample countries cover a
substantial part of their health sector spend using external funding; however,
this is expected to decline in the medium term, creating a gap that natural
resource revenues could close. The magnitude of potential natural resource
revenues compared with donor funding is striking for all sample countries—in
particular, we observe a cross-over pattern, with falling donor support and
rising resources revenues. That said, we need to add a cautionary note and
emphasize that both data series are best guesses, with considerable margins
of error.
If we compare natural resource revenues with current government expend-
iture on the health sector, as opposed to the estimated health needs, which are
much more ambitious, then their potential contribution to improvement in
health services is even clearer.
26.3.2 Opportunities in the Education Sector
Similarly to the analysis of the health sector, the projected natural resource
revenues by country for the next decade show different degrees of potential
Table 26.2. Price variations in revenue projections in
relation to the health financing gap
Sample country Projected natural resources revenues as a
share of the health financing gap




Sierra Leone 0.0 82.7
Tanzania 7.3 23.6
Uganda 14.0 31.3
Source: data from Witter et al. (2015a) and Haglund et al. (2015).
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when compared to education financing gaps—in some cases more significant
than others (Witter et al. 2015a). Table 26.3 shows a comparison between the
projected natural resource revenues from 2016 to 2025 in the six sample
countries and the estimated education financing gap needing to be filled in
order to achieve Education for All goals (i.e. providing schooling to all pre-
primary-, primary- and secondary-aged children).
In Tanzania and Uganda, part of the projected financing gap could be
covered by new natural resource revenues, and these revenues could be
enough to achieve universal pre-primary and primary education in the high-
price scenario. In the low-price scenario (with less available funding), either
the financing gap in pre-primary education or about two-thirds of the finan-
cing gap needing to be filled to achieve universal primary education could be
covered by these revenues. The situation in Sierra Leone is similar, but here a
low-price scenario could mean cancellation of the extractives projects and
thereby removal of any potential funding available for education.
In Ghana, Liberia, and Mozambique the situation looks different. Our mid-
point estimates for the total projected new natural resources revenues in these
three countries would be sufficient for between two-thirds and three-quarters
of the financing gap to be filled, moving close to achieving school attendance
for all pre-primary-, primary-, and lower-secondary-aged children. This would
mean equipping schools with sufficient classrooms, employing one teacher
for every forty-four pupils, and providing the regional standard of learning
materials, as well as covering the costs of achieving universal pre-primary
education, providing subsidies and supplies to target marginalized pupils,
and offering adult literacy programmes.
In the high-price scenario for Ghana, Liberia, and Mozambique, the total
estimated financing gap in education could be closed, and in Liberia and
Table 26.3. Price variations in revenue projections in
relation to the education financing gap
Sample country Projected natural resources revenues as a
share of the education financing gap




Sierra Leone 0.0 65.9
Tanzania 20.3 65.6
Uganda 27.0 60.3
Source: data from Witter et al. (2015a) and Haglund et al. (2015).
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Mozambique there would also be an opportunity to allocate funding to other
areas. If all new natural resources revenues were allocated to education in this
scenario, there would also be funding available to introduce dramatic
improvements to the quality of the education that pupils receive. However,
the low-price scenario shows that in that situation less than half of the
financing gap could be filled.
The current size of funds from private philanthropic organizations for
education further highlights the potential contribution new natural resources
revenues could make towards improvements in education. According to the
Innovative Finance Foundation (2013), to date there has been only limited
financial innovation in the global education arena.
The potential for education sector improvements to be funded by new
resources revenues can be further and more specifically illustrated by examin-
ing recent reforms in comparable African countries (see Figure 26.4). While
the reforms in question were costed for a four- or five-year period, annual
figures are presented for ease of comparison. With varying beneficiary popu-
lations, these comprehensive system-wide reforms targeted both access and
quality outcomes. They included teacher training, textbook development
and/or distribution, information and communications technology strength-





















































































































































































































































































Sector-wide reform Sub-sector reform System efficiency and capacity
Figure 26.4. Examples of annual costs of education sector reforms (US$ million)
Note: (1) all figures in constant 2013 US$ million; (2) costs marked with * are sub-components of
sector- or subsector-wide reforms.
Source: Witter et al. (2015a); data from Namibia—Republic of Namibia (2007); Ethiopia—World
Bank (2013); Niger—World Bank (2014a); Congo—World Bank (2014b); Cape Verde—World Food
Programme (2013).
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The most costly reform shown here—a large-scale programme to improve
the quality of primary and secondary education in Ethiopia, with a population
almost twice as large as the most populous of the sample countries—was
just under US$510 million over five years (World Bank 2013). Costing
approximately 7 per cent of the budget for the entire sector plan, this inter-
vention aims to move from a focus on access towards improving quality
(Federal Ministry of Education 2008, 2010). Its cost could comfortably be
afforded from the projected natural resources revenues for each of the sample
countries, assuming they faced similar costs to Ethiopia’s.
26.3.3 Opportunities in Social Protection
Supply-side barriers in relation to health and education spending have been
addressed above but outcomes will not improve unless certain demand-side
barriers are also addressed. These barriers include poverty, lack of access, and
lack of funds for specific social services. Estimates carried out by Barca et al.
(2015) showed that, if smoothed over thirty years, new natural resources
revenues for the same sample countries were projected to approximate to the
cost of a basic social protection package. Rough estimates and existing
country data show that a basic national social assistance package (providing
cash transfers (CTs) to households in poverty to enable them to access
essential social services) costs between 1 per cent and 5 per cent of GDP,
exact costs depending on the mix and types of scheme adopted and the
demographic profile of the target population (DFID 2011; UNICEF 2009).
Only in a handful of southern African countries, where extensive rights-
based grant systems and social pensions have been developed, does social
assistance expenditure exceed 3 per cent of GDP (Gentilini et al. 2014; World
Bank 2012).8
It is not suggested that it would be realistic to use all future natural resources
revenues for social protection—and governments need to be aware that once
social protection schemes are set up they are politically difficult to reverse if
money becomes tight. However, the comparisons once again provide a useful
order-of-magnitude context. It is not unrealistic to consider spending some
part of new natural resources revenues on social protection programmes
characterized as recurrent public spending over a thirty-year timeframe.
Even where the additional fiscal space generated by natural resources rev-
enues is not sufficient to cover a full social assistance package, social protec-
tion can still be advanced as one possible use of those revenues. Natural
resources revenues could, for example, cover CT start-up costs, while the
8 This sub-section draws on findings from Barca et al. (2015).
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government looks for other solutions—perhaps by saving revenues in a sov-
ereign wealth fund, or investing them in strategies to diversify and grow the
economy—to finance longer-term recurrent costs. One argument for explicitly
linking new natural resources revenues to social protection schemes is that it
gives citizens a direct interest in demanding accountability in respect of how
the revenues are spent. To maximize their potential, CT programmes have
been shown to benefit from close coordination among ministries of finance,
health, education, and social welfare.
26.4 Policy Choices: What to Consider When Spending
Natural Resources in Social Sectors
Witter et al. (2015a) ask the further question of whether the characteristics of
extractives revenues result in unique implications for the prioritization of
social spending. Table 26.4, which summarizes some of their results, shows
that these characteristics may not in fact present significant changes to the
normal decision-making required to effectively allocate public resources to,
and spend them in, social sectors.9
Table 26.4. Revenue characteristics and their implications for social sector spending
Core and likely characteristics of extractives
revenues
Implications for social spending prioritization
1 Of medium-term duration (20–30 years) Investments should create major additional
costs only if projected growth rates suggest
they can be maintained over the longer term
2 Non-renewable The investments should benefit future
generations as well as current generations
3 Of varying scale and time profile, with rapid
scale-up in some cases
They should be capable of rapid introduction,
and acknowledge the risk of potential scale-
back
4 Volatile in amount and hard to predict, as
extraction and world prices will vary over time
and may be affected by shocks
Unless smoothing mechanisms can be found,
the investments should focus on discrete
interventions, such as systems strengthening
and improved value for money, rather than
recurrent costs
5 Associated with weaker accountability to the
local or host nation population
Some part should be focused on local
communities, who have also had the
disadvantages of extraction. Attention should
also be paid to creating transparency and
accountability mechanisms
Source: data from Witter et al. (2015a).
9 This section draws heavily on Section 4 of Witter et al. (2015a).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 24/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
558
Based on these results, a ‘diagnostic framework’ was developed which
brought together what we know about new natural resources revenues, and
also about the needs for funding, the systems constraints, and existing experi-
ences across the social sectors, in order to discuss what approaches are likely to
yield good results in low- and middle-income, often fragile, contexts.
A pre-condition for the application of the framework is that there is a
willingness to invest in health, education, and social protection. Without
this, the framework is redundant. The framework is ideally informed by
existing plans for human development, based on the development goals of
the country.
Decisions regarding the use of natural resource revenues to invest in
national priorities require an alignment of human development investments
against a realistic estimate of the scale, trends, and predictability of natural
resource revenues. The scale of investments that will be made will depend on
the ability to match the costs of investments against the expected revenue
flows. Predictability is less straightforward as volatility is a consequence of the
uncertainty of future resource prices and demand (Stevens et al. 2013).
However, the diagnostics framework is not only about the revenue flows. It
also focuses on three other dimensions: the national context in the social
sectors, the financing context for these sectors, and system diagnosis of social
sectors. All four dimensions need to be analysed when making decisions
regarding the allocation of funds to social sectors. It is important to note
that the diagnostics framework does not provide guidance as to how govern-
ments should allocate funding between sectors—only within each social sector.
The full framework is shown in Table 26.5. In Witter et al. (2015a) the frame-
work is applied for illustrative purposes to Ghana and Sierra Leone.
Current public expenditure in the health and education sectors in the
sample countries is skewed towards recurrent costs (Witter et al. 2015a). This
indicates that natural resource revenues will need to support recurrent
expenditure, as this constitutes the bulk of the sectors’ needs, even if strategies
are used to increase the efficiency of the sectors and to support diverse delivery
systems. For education, the range is from 73 per cent inMozambique to nearly
99 per cent in Sierra Leone, and the bulk of this expenditure is absorbed by
salaries (the only exception being Liberia, where non-salary recurrent costs
are slightly higher as a percentage). For health, the range is wider, going from
37 per cent in Liberia10 to 92 per cent in Ghana.
10 It is possible that the post-conflict setting has generated the relatively higher investment costs
in Liberia, but this does not hold true for its education sector, which should be equally affected.
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Table 26.5. Diagnostics framework—investing natural resource revenues in social sectors
Core question Range of answers Implications




High (more than 60% of public social
sector expenditure).
Can fundmajor new investments and/
or restructuring, as well as core inputs.
Medium (20%–60% of public social
sector expenditure).
Can fund core inputs and system
strengthening.
Low (less than 20% of public social sector
expenditure).
Can fund marginal improvements.
Volatility of
resources.
Government able to smooth out volatility. Can take on expenditures which are
recurrent.
Government not able to remove volatility. Better suited to funding capital




Short-term (5–10 years). Cannot be used for recurrent
expenditures, unless real GDP growth
per capita is assumed to be strong at
the end of the period.







Established, mature health system which
can be accessed by all, within
WHO norms.
Established education system with
universal access to early childhood and
basic education.
Focus on improving quality,
efficiency, and equity, including
through CTs, where relevant.
Health and education infrastructure still
rudimentary or in recovery from wars and
shocks.
Focus on getting full coverage of basic
services—infrastructure development,
increased staffing, equipment, etc.
During recovery focus on
reconstruction and peace-building





There is a medium-term expenditure
framework, national health financing
strategy, or education sector strategic
plan.
Fund priority areas within plan which
are not yet supported by existing
resources.
There is no medium-term expenditure
framework, national health financing
strategy, or education sector strategic
plan.
Conduct assessment, using tools like
OASIS (in health) and Education
Sector Review to establish priorities.
Health and education financing context
Financial
protection.
Financial protection for health care
expenditure is adequate (e.g. less than
20% of total health expenditure is out-of-
pocket).
Mechanisms are in place to offset
household expenditure for the poor (e.g.
household stipends or school grants).
Check for inequities (are all groups
protected or does the average mask
substantial differences?).
Focus on improving quality of care,
efficiency, and equity of access and
utilization. CTs may be needed for
excluded groups.
Financial protection is currently
inadequate.
Fund extension of universal health
and education coverage, e.g. through
increased public budget, funding to
other risk pools, such as social health
insurance and more effective public–
private partnerships (franchising,
social marketing, etc.).






The main other financial sources (e.g.
government funding and external
support) are likely to be maintained and
increased over the period.
Natural resource revenues can be seen
as supplementary, and can focus on
currently neglected areas (e.g.
unfunded areas within the sector
plan).
The main other funding sources are
projected to decline over the period.
Natural resource revenues will need to
substitute for current sources and will
fund some of the existing
commitments.
Earmarking. Within government, there is a willingness
to earmark funds.
Natural resource revenues could be
deposited within a social fund, to be
used for priority areas—especially
those which are harder to get external
support for.
There is no willingness to earmark funds. Each year, the sector needs to present
its case for additional funding.
Bottlenecks in
public finance.
Health and education facilities receive
adequate funding to cover essential salary
and non-salary recurrent costs on a
regular, reliable basis.
Funds can be invested in the existing
system, which is able to channel
resources to front-line providers.
Funds at facility or school level are not
adequate, regular, or reliable.
Consider reforming funding of
facilities (using capitation or
combination of input, output, and
quality measures).




The system is resilient to shocks and
able to adapt to new needs.
Funds should go to improving and
extending the range of services,
rather than to systemic investments.
There is evidence of lack of resilience
and adaptability.
Systemic investments are needed,
including, possibly, re-organization,
which can improve local stewardship
(e.g. decentralization, increased
autonomy), as well as developing
supportive national systems.
Areas of greatest




Adequacy of indicators and
performance of:
– human resources.
– supplies and medicines.
– infrastructure and equipment.
– governance.
– service delivery.
– monitoring and evaluation.
Not all pillars can be supported
simultaneously, so priorities need to
be established using a systems
diagnosis, if not already incorporated





There are effective mechanisms for
local communities to engage with the
health and education systems and to
ensure the systems respond to their
needs.
These mechanisms do not need
additional support but can be used to
monitor the use of natural resource
revenues.
These mechanisms do not exist or are
not effective.
Some part of the natural resource
revenues should be earmarked to




Private for-profit, not-for-profit, and
informal sectors contribute to public
goods, including for poorer
households.
Natural resource revenues can be
focused on funding or extending
public provision.
The non-state sector is not well
aligned with public health and
education policies.
Natural resource revenues can fund
pilots relating to changing incentives
for the non-state sector and testing
new regulatory approaches.
Source: based on Witter et al. (2015a).
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26.4.1 Importance of Addressing Demand-side Barriers
in Conjunction with Supply
CTs can help to tackle demand-side barriers to both health and education
services—that is, to address the reasons why many people do not access those
services (Barca et al. 2015). These barriers include indirect costs associated
with accessing those services: for example, travel to hospital, school books
and uniforms, and the opportunity cost of time not spent working. CTs can
mitigate such costs. A combination of demand-side (CT) and supply-side
(health and education) spending can be especially effective in boosting
human development.11
CTs can be specifically designed to encourage certain behaviours, such as
attending health check-ups or sending children to school. This can be
achieved through explicit conditionality. However, this can be costly to
administer and results have also been achieved through ‘nudges’, such as:
distributing the cash with information suggesting how it could be used;
delivering cash at, for example, the start of the school year, when costs of
uniforms and books arise; delivering the cash into the hands of a female
household member; or even giving the programme a suggestive name, such
as ‘child support grant’.
There is mounting evidence regarding the most effective ways to design CT
programmes that are tailored to each country’s needs and fiscal space. Policy
decisions include: whether to make CTs universal, or widely or narrowly
targeted; the level at which they should be set (often at a meaningful but
modest percentage of household budgets); the frequency of payment, with
evidence pointing to the benefits of predictability; and whether it is possible
to distribute the cash electronically, which has been shown to increase
savings rates.
Introducing CT programmes is also in line with the recommendations set
out by the African Union, which has been advocating the development of
strategies for ‘introducing and extending public-financed, non-contributory
cash transfers’ (African Union 2008). The possibility of supporting existing
policy processes in this way is an argument against distributing new natural
resource revenue using a ‘direct dividend’ model: making payments to the
population at large. This argument is supported by the size of revenues per
capita in many countries (see Box 26.1).
National CT programmes already exist in many African countries, including
some that have made recent natural resource discoveries. Kenya, Mozam-
bique, Ghana, and Uganda are among the countries in which programmes
have already been developed and are in the process of being scaled up.
11 This sub-section draws on material in Barca et al. (2015).




There is a strong case for investing natural resource revenues in social sectors.
 Such investments can create a better educated and healthier workforce
that tends to be more productive; they can help to develop domestic
human capital to sustain and improve growth, through regional and
Box 26.1 DIRECT DIVIDEND TRANSFERS
Why are direct dividend transfers less appealing than supporting existing social protec-
tion systems for Haglund et al.’s (2015) group of sample countries?
 Overall, it would be a missed opportunity not to support existing government initia-
tives and build on the know-how and systems developed in recent years by donors
and governments alike. The existing ‘social contract’, social accountability frameworks
(including grievance mechanisms and links to community committees), and monitor-
ing and evaluation systems developed for the provision of social assistance would
make accountability more effective than the setting-up of a parallel system; it would
also contribute to the long-term sustainability of system investments.
 The size of natural resource revenues projected in Haglund et al. (2015) does not
predict that any of our sample countries will become the next Angola or Gabon,
where distribution of 10 per cent of annual natural resource revenues as direct
dividends could eradicate half or more of their average depth in poverty.12
 A transfer to all citizens, irrespective of their poverty status or category, in our
sample countries would result in very small amounts being distributed per citizen,
drastically limiting transformative impacts and undermining the poverty alleviation
benefits of CTs. Based on the revenue projections in Haglund et al. (2015), we
estimate that between US$13 and US$32 could be distributed to each family per
quarter13 across our sample countries.14
These findings are similar to those reported by Giugale and Nguyen (2014). Assuming
cost-free, perfectly targeted transfers are made by an all-knowing government in order
to close natural resource-rich countries’ poverty gaps, they show that most existing
resource-rich countries would not be able to eradicate poverty even if they used all their
natural resource revenues for this purpose. They conclude that the impact of direct
dividends depends as much on the volume of natural resources as it does on demo-
graphics and the initial position of the national poverty line.
12 As estimated by a recent Centre for Global Development study (Giugale and Nguyen 2014).
13 It should be noted that monthly transfers of existing CTs are also relatively low but could be
significantly increased through natural resource revenues. For example, transfer size in
Mozambique is about US$13 month, and in Uganda it is US$9 per month.
14 Barca et al (2015) calculated a rough estimate of the average direct dividend available to each
five-person family every quarter during the first ten years of production in our sample countries.
They assume that a quarter of the revenues will have to be spent on administration, and after
distribution a third will be collected in tax by the government.
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global competition in industries other than natural resources; they can
lead to a ‘demographic dividend’, facilitating a higher input of workers per
person and increased GDP per head; they can generate knowledge for the
future; they can capture potential temporary macroeconomic external-
ities; they can build social cohesion and politically stable societies; and
they can contribute to sustained and inclusive economic growth.15
 The arguments about the macroeconomic effects of health and educa-
tional spending are important in providing a response to concerns about
the high recurrent cost burden which most social sector programmes
imply. Sustainability will be ensured only if the economic benefits of
social sector investment are realized through effective and equitable allo-
cation and expenditure that ultimately create and help to sustain broader
economic development and progress.
Part of the financing gap in the social sectors in the African countries studied could be
closed by natural resource revenues.
 The scale of projected resources in the sample countries, allowing for
currently unpredictable prices, suggests that a significant contribution
could be made by the expected revenues in augmenting existing sources
and helping to close some of the considerable financing gaps in the effort
to reach universal health care and education. They could also provide a
safety buffer if donor resources, which currently play a significant role,
dwindle as predicted. In the context of an aspiration to achieve universal
coverage for health, education, and social protection, the natural resource
revenues could be a critically important source of financing for core ser-
vices and also for an extension of coverage, quality, and equity—even if
not all revenues are allocated to social sectors.
Many possible interventions are available to start closing the gaps in health and
education services; full financing of health and education gaps is not a necessity and
may cause scale-up problems.
 There is potential for education sector improvements to be funded by new
resource revenues in all sample countries. For example, a large-scale pro-
gramme to improve the quality of primary and secondary education in
Ethiopia, with a population larger than any of the sample countries, has a
cost of just under US$510 million over five years—a cost that could
comfortably be afforded from the projected natural resource revenues
for each one of the countries considered in this chapter.
 However, closing the financing gaps is not the only challenge to improv-
ing health and education. Non-financial constraints to the scale-up of
service provision are at least as important. Programmes need to build
15 This section is based heavily on Section 7 in Witter et al. (2015a).
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wider capacity, encourageharmonizationbetweendonors andgovernment,
bridge institutional divisions in the public sector, and improve collabor-
ation between central and local levels of the health system. Some areas of
these weaknesses can be addressed only gradually over time, such as the
need to train more doctors. The time taken to build capacity can in some
cases dovetail with the development of extractive industries.
 Addressing these structural challenges requires political will, strategic
vision, and some room for manoeuvre, which funding can assist. Social
sector systems are complex, so the outcome of reforms is inherently
largely unpredictable—the scale-up process should therefore be done
iteratively, with constant adjustments over time.
Opportunities and challenges related to the use of natural resource revenues are not
fundamentally dissimilar to those associated with other revenue sources, but the
political economy risks may well be higher.
 The lack of natural accountability to citizens, and the high expectations
which natural resources tend to generate, increase political economy
risks and challenges. In order to manage these risks, it is necessary to
taken into account both the positive and negative lessons learned from
social funds and other channelling mechanisms used to date, whose
documentation also needs to be strengthened.
 There is now quite an extensive body of experience of using social funds.
Such funds can increase the transparency of resource use, but they still
present important challenges in relation to building capacity and avoid-
ing elite capture. In countries struggling with issues of governance, trans-
parency, and participation, there can be a case for new natural resource
revenues being earmarked for specific purposes. However, evidence and
opinions on the impact and efficiency of such instruments aremixed. CTs
are seen as a route to increasing accountability in the use of natural
resource revenues.
A simple diagnostic framework can help to guide social sector investment decisions in
the light of new natural resources revenues.
 This chapter presents a simple framework that can help to guide invest-
ment decisions in health and education in the context of resource rev-
enues via structured questions about natural resource revenues, the socio-
economic context, and the sector constraints and priorities. While the
framework can be applied to both sectors, as many of the challenges and
issues are shared, there are also important differences. In particular, the
range of conditions, interventions, and user groups in health collectively
present a complex landscape for priority-setting in comparison with
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education, where services have a more clearly-defined package and
target group.
Further research, analysis, and policy debate are needed.
 There is a need for more evidence and more systematic documentation of
lessons for spending natural resource revenues in the social sectors, espe-
cially in low- andmiddle-income (and fragile) states. In particular, further
work is needed to adapt our diagnostic framework to the context of
specific countries and to incorporate specific social sector interventions.
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27
Donor-supported Approaches to Improving
Extractives Governance
Lessons from Nigeria
Joanna Buckley, Neil McCulloch, and Nicholas Travis
27.1 Introduction: The Rationale for Donor Engagement
Donor agencies are typically focused on poverty reduction.1 Many poor
countries have significant natural resource endowments. A growing number
of newly resource-rich countries are low-income and lower-middle-income
countries; of the top forty countries with the highest contribution of minerals
to exports, fourteen (35 per cent) are classified as low-income and lower-middle-
income countries. These include Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea,
Sudan, and Nigeria (Dietsche et al. 2013; see also Roe and Dodd, Chapter 2, this
volume). The resulting logic is that if these resources can be harnessed effect-
ively, they represent an opportunity to reduce poverty faster (Africa Progress
Panel 2013). In addition, Africa’s natural resource wealth is largely unexplored,
so its reserves are likely to be heavily underestimated—the importance of
natural resources to Africa’s economy is set to increase (Africa Progress Panel
2013). This presents donors with an opportunity both to reduce poverty
through encouraging the effective use of the natural resources, and also ultim-
ately to reduce aid.2
1 See DFAT (2014), Global Affairs (n.d.), HM Treasury (2015), and NORAD (2011) for statements
of official objectives. In some cases, these objectives also explicitly include contributing towards
domestic national interests.
2 We are grateful for excellent detailed comments and suggestions from Alan Roe and Tony
Addison and the participants of the Extractives for Development workshop in Helsinki in May
2016. Helpful comments were also received from participants at the Thinking and Working
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However, the ‘resource curse’ literature has shown that, in many cases, the
presence of extractive resources is associated with poor economic performance
and poverty (see the review of this evidence in Lahn and Stevens 2017).
Resource-rich countries account for nine of the twelve countries at the bottom
of the UN Human Development Index.3 Extractives can also have a wider,
pervasive impact—for example, by distorting economic and political struc-
tures, and thereby reducing growth (or making it less pro-poor). Corruption in
the sector can lead to increased poverty and conflict (DFID 2008: 29). Stevens
et al. (2013) find that following an extractive-industry-led development path
has often been a factor inhibiting the emergence of independent, strong
institutions. This exacerbates public policy failure, with the corruption asso-
ciated with extractives revenue corroding governance and encouraging high-
level state looting (Global Witness 2010).
The Africa Progress Panel (2013: 71) finds compelling evidence that the
higher the share of GDP accounted for by resource wealth, the less informa-
tion is made available to citizens. As a result, several donors have responded to
the governance challenges posed by natural resources by implementing a
range of projects with business, civil society, and non-governmental organ-
izations (NGOs) focused on greater transparency. Dietsche et al. (2013) sug-
gest that there have been four phases of donor involvement in the extractive
industries over the last three decades: (1) attraction of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) in the late 1980s/early 1990s; (2) rising concerns about the
resource curse in the mid-1990s; (3) ‘good governance’ as the cure in the late
1990s/early 2000s; and (4) cross-sector linkages in the late 2000s. Buur et al.
(2013: 56) put forward a similar typology of involvement: (1) linking FDI to
the liberalization and structural adjustment agendas of the 1980s and 1990s
(reforms which Bourgouin (2011) largely attributes to the World Bank and
IMF); (2) an emphasis on strengthening the regulatory and revenue-
generating framework for the industry, and improvements in public-sector
financial management in the 1990s and 2000s; and (3) a focus on the devel-
opment effects of natural resources in recent years.
This chapter describes how some donors, such as the UK Department for
International Development (DFID), are now experimenting with a new type of
engagement. This approach merges the good governance agenda of the late
1990s/early 2000s, and the ongoing focus on how to avoid the resource curse,
capture developmental benefits, and build robust regulatory frameworks, with
Politically Community of Practice meeting in London in June 2016. All remaining errors are
our own.
3 The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key
dimensions of human development: living a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable, and
having a decent standard of living. For details, see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-
development-index-hdi (accessed 9 January 2017).
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an economic development agenda that seeks to mobilize reform through an
explicitly political focus.
As Dietsche (2017) argues, there is a need to reframe the political economy
of extractive resources away from the negative question ‘How can poor out-
comes be prevented?’ and towards the positive question ‘How can positive
institutional change for better outcomes be brought about?’ This chapter
provides a concrete example of how some donors are attempting to do this.
Politics has typically been seen as an inhibitor, or a constraint that one has to
work around in the implementation of projects. However, the new approach
to ‘thinking and working politically’ represents an attempt to understand, and
where possible address, the political challenges associated with reform in a
more explicit way.4
27.2 The Political Economy of Reform: Thinking
and Working Politically
There is an increasing acceptance by some donors—including the World
Bank, DFID, and the United States Agency for International Development—
that in order to bring about large-scale change it may be necessary to take a
radically different approach to reform.5 Instead of focusing first on the provi-
sion of technical assistance and then negotiating the complex politics of
trying to provide support in an environment that is often not conducive to
reform, the new approach starts with the politics. Two simple propositions
inform ‘thinking and working politically’ programming: first, the need to
work through domestic political processes to achieve sustainable reform;
second, the need for development intervention models that understand
these political processes and intervene in iterative, adaptive, and politically
informed ways. It draws on the ideas of Andrews (2013) about the difficulties
of institutional reformwithout real political commitment to change, as well as
on the methodological insights of Andrews et al. (2012) on solving complex
reform problems through problem-driven iterative adaptation.6
However, although agencies increasingly think politically, many are still
trying to understand how to get better at working politically. As DFID’s chief
economist has stated, ‘politics is too important for development in general to
4 For a summary of this approach, see Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice
(n.d.).
5 Although the approach is, to some degree, contested in all of these agencies, where there are
advocates who have more influence in some sectors and countries than others.
6 In the United States, this approach to engaging with politics in development work typically
comes under the heading of ‘doing development differently’—see http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/
doing-development-differently (accessed 13 January 2017).
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be left to political scientists and governance advisors only—we all need to
think about it whenwe act’.7 Thismeans continuing to think politically, using
political economy analysis (PEA) in order to develop a deep understanding of
local context—mapping out the key actors and institutions, and honestly
assessing their incentives and appetite for reform. It then means moving
beyond the traditional ‘transparency agenda’ towards a more integrated
approach to the politics of reform—creating widespread understanding of
the problems, building the capacity of reformers in government, and negating
entrenched interests, as well as strengthening the capability of civil society
actors to hold institutions and individuals in government to account
(Figure 27.1). This approach recognizes that, as popular expectations about
the benefits of natural resources grow, so do the stakes for governments,
which are under increasing pressure to deliver to their populations. Yet
improved transparency is only one pathway to impact, and does not always
lead to significant reform.8 Transparency is necessary but insufficient in itself
to drive good governance andmore equitable revenue-sharing in the sector—a
point repeatedlymade bymost observers, notably civil society groups (Stevens
et al. 2013).
This intimate understanding of context and commitment to reforming the
entrenched interests of elites is a potentially uncomfortable area for donors.
It requires engagement with local politics, experimentation in order to seek
out different strands of commitment for reform within government and
The potential for sustained reform is
greatest where these three areas overlap.
But political economic analysis is critical to
understanding which issues are viable and
have potential to deliver change
Improving popular
understanding of the
petroleum sector and key
scandals
Targeted technical
assistance to those in
government committed
to reform
Supporting civil society 







Figure 27.1. An integrated approach to supporting reform
Source: OPM (2015); reproduced here with permission.
7 https://twpcommunity.org/what-is-twp/ (accessed 9 January 2017).
8 See Joshi (2013) for a series of articles on the impact of transparency and accountability
initiatives on reform in a variety of sectors.
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outside, and sometimes significant risk. But it can have large and measurable
results.9
Section 27.3 describes a case study of a programme funded by DFID—the
Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER) in Nigeria.10 It
demonstrates that DFID sees politics as central to the delivery of effective
extractives governance programming.
27.3 Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER)
27.3.1 Context
Nigeria’s oil sector is one of the most challenging contexts for governance
reform in the extractives sector anywhere in the world. Bhalla et al. (2016: 17)
recently described the challenge as follows:
Oil is the backbone of the Nigerian economywith oil revenues providing over 90%
of foreign exchange earnings and at least 70% of government revenues. Predatory
elite behaviour aimed at capturing oil rents has defined the character of the
Nigerian state in three principal ways: a weak social contract as the government
relies on lucrative rents rather than taxes for survival; systematic rigging, intimi-
dation, and violence used to win elections and maintain a grip on the oil sector;
and hollow institutions that have little power or capacity to set policy, formulate
laws, or effectively regulate the sector.
Repeated attempts to improve governance in the oil sector have met with
relatively little success. For example, the Petroleum Industry Bill has still not
been passed by parliament, despite being introduced in 2007; repeated high-
level government reports have been ignored or remain unimplemented; and
the Excess Crude Account11 has been steadily eroded, from US$20bn in 2008
to a mere US$2bn in 2014.
It is hard to identify a single area of the oil sector in Nigeria which has not
been distorted by corruption. Corruption exists in the allocation of licences,
which is non-transparent, with licences frequently awarded to politically
connected individuals with no capability to operate fields; it exists in exten-
sive crude oil theft (known in Nigeria as ‘bunkering’), which amounts to
9 For a more detailed discussion of the political economy and governance of the extractives
sector and the application of a more formal institutional economics model to the sector, see
Dietsche (2017).
10 FOSTER is one of a number of DFID-funded governance programmes focused on the
extractives sector employing a PEA driven flexible approach to delivery; others include Ghana
Oil and Gas for Inclusive Growth (GOGIG) and the Kenya Extractives Programme (K-EXPRO).
11 The Excess Crude Account is a Nigerian government account used to save oil revenues above a
base amount derived from a defined benchmark price. The Excess Crude Account was established
in 2004, and its objective is primarily to protect planned budgets against shortfalls due to volatile
crude oil prices.
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around 10 per cent of daily oil production (Katsouris and Sayne 2013); it is
pervasive in the mechanisms used to sell crude oil, for example through the
‘domestic market allocation’ of 445,000 barrels per day to the refineries, which
in fact rarely operate at more than 20 per cent capacity; it exists in the
downstream sector, for example through repeated turnaround maintenance
contracts, which never turn around performance; and it exists along the entire
import value chain for fuel products, from the shady swap agreements used to
purchase product, to the non-transparent allocation of import quotas to mar-
keters, the numerous government institutions involved in approving entry of
product, and the corrupt and inefficient subsidy payment mechanism.
Reform in the sector has been difficult because of the strong incentives of a
range of powerful actors to oppose reform. For example, until recently, the
minister of petroleum was the same individual as the head of the Nigerian
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).12 The NNPC therefore was operat-
ing as a producer and trader of petroleum products—and also as the de facto
regulator of the industry, since the Department of Petroleum Resources
reports to and is subordinate to the minister. Successive ruling political parties
and elites have benefitted enormously from the rents associated with the
capture of Nigeria’s oil resources through control over the NNPC and associ-
ated institutions. Parliamentarians, it is alleged, have tended to follow the
locus of power in order to share some of the rent, and are therefore inclined to
block any attempts at reforms that might threaten the flow of resources.
27.3.2 Programme Design
This complex and highly unconducive environment for reform requires going
beyond the provision of technical assistance to specified ministries or govern-
ment agencies to tackle technical challenges or help build their capacity for
effective management. It also requires going beyond supporting reformers to
build capacity to demand reform. The challenges to reform in this context are
fundamentally political, and many of the actors opposed to reform reside
within government institutions. Hence a technocratic approach of merely
supplying technical expertise to such organizations would be highly unlikely
to be effective. Likewise, a transparency and accountability programme, such
as that provided by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in
several countries including Nigeria, would be unlikely by itself to achieve
traction, due to the lack of incentives for reform and the intentional
12 On 4 July 2016, President Buhari created a separation between the two roles for the first time
in decades. However, the minister remains the chair of the board of the NNPC. http://www.
premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/206412-buhari-removes-kachikwu-as-nnpc-boss-appoints-
new-board-for-corporation.html (accessed 9 January 2017).
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complexity of the rules and regulations governing the industry. To be success-
ful, reform has to bolster both ‘demand’ for reform through support for civil
society (NGOs, think tanks, community-based organizations, and the media)
and the capacity for reform on the ‘supply’ side (government ministries and
agencies, including the tripartite Nigerian EITI).13
In 2011, DFID selected a bid put forward by Oxford Policy Management for
the implementation of FOSTER. Phase 1 of the project ran from 2011 to 2016
with a total value of £14m. The purpose was to reduce the many incentives for
misuse of power and capture of oil revenues in Nigeria. The overall intended
outcome was the enhanced management of Nigeria’s natural resources. This
translated into three output areas: (1) an increase in extractive industries
revenues identified (and returned to the Federation Account); (2) improved
management and accountability of extractive industry resources; and
(3) improved policy outcomes for local communities affected by natural
resource extraction.
Of the GB£14m, over GB£8.5m was used as part of a managed fund set up
with the intention of funding activities on an iterative basis throughout the
project life cycle. The rationale was that the specific pathways through which
change might occur were not known in advance. With a flexible managed
fund, initiatives could be identified as the project went along, and resources
allocated to them. Moreover, the project deliberately took a ‘portfolio’
approach—trying a range of approaches that seemed promising, with the
knowledge that not all would necessarily be successful.
The original vision for the project was broad and intentionally open: to
support policy reforms, strengthen accountability actors and mechanisms,
and increase transparency. The hope was that this would reduce the incen-
tives for the abuse of power and the capture of revenues, which both distort
policy and politics in Nigeria and undermine the potential for oil revenues to
be used to accelerate economic and social development.
The context in which FOSTER operated changed almost immediately after
its launch. President Goodluck Ebele Azikiwe Jonathan was inaugurated
in May 2011. His incoming policy priorities made no mention of reforming
the oil and gas sector (despite referring to the need for public-sector and power
reform). Policy paralysis and uncertainty—and in some cases wilful resistance
to fundamental sector reform—characterized the Jonathan administration
from February 2011 to May 2015. However, because the managed fund could
13 In addition, FOSTER attempted to work with the private sector, including the oil majors.
However, relatively little was done in this area, in part because the behaviour of the oil companies
was determined by the policy environment, making the latter the priority; and also because the
incentives of some private-sector actors were not necessarily aligned with good governance, e.g.
efforts by companies to minimize fiscal obligations.
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be allocated flexibly, the change in circumstances could be accommodated
by switching activities to focus predominantly on the demand side as a trans-
parency and accountability programme. This enabled the programme to play
an important role in building widespread understanding of the failures within
the sector. On the supply side, the programme focused on identifying and
working with ‘pockets of effectiveness’ (see Figure 27.2). This approach, located
as it was in the largely unsympathetic prevailing political context during the
Jonathan administration, mainly secured localized, transactional changes,
with little scope for game-changing, sector-wide, transformational reforms.
But it also helped to build a reputation for the programme as one that could
provide relevant, predominantly local expertise for oil-sector institutions that
are genuinely interested in reform (whilst avoiding wasting resources on tech-
nical assistance for government ministries or agencies where doing so would
not have yielded any results: this would have been the result of a more rigid
programme design).
In February 2015, President Buhari was elected. He assumed office in May
2015 on an explicitly anti-corruption platform, leading to the gradual emer-
gence of a more pro-reform environment that has been evident since July
2015. This resulted in FOSTER being reinterpreted to support sector reforms
from both the supply and demand sides. In mid-2015, as FOSTER entered the
final year of its first project cycle, its patient approach to building relationships
with key reformers was quietly vindicated. A project that had begun in
the margins was invited to provide assistance to the central institution of













but pragmatic view of
reform
Figure 27.2. From pockets of effectiveness to strategic partner
Source: OPM (2016); reproduced here with permission.
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subtly and strategically to where it is today, a niche project advancing
practical institutional reforms of Nigeria’s oil and gas sector (see Figure 27.2).
27.3.3 How FOSTER Worked
From the onset, the test for the project lay in the very conditions that gave rise
to its formulation: making significant progress towards the achievement of
ambitious objectives within the challenging political and institutional con-
text that characterized the country’s oil sector. FOSTER’s response to this was
to pioneer and gradually systemize an approach that was built on three
principles: (1) undertake deep, regular PEA; (2) use this intelligence to nurture
relationships with sympathetic stakeholders, both in government and out-
side, and craft contextually relevant interventions clearly aligned with the
project logframe; (3) work discreetly to minimize risk to DFID, and indeed to
the project itself, given the sensitivities around the sector.
Underlying this picture, four forms of deficit were evident in the public
sector: (1) a transparency deficit in the centralized, government-controlled oil
and gas industry; (2) a monitoring deficit owing to the concentration of power
and fiscal control within the executive, and a corresponding lack of institu-
tional checks and balances; (3) a participation deficit because of fundamen-
tally weak state–civil society relations and a deeply embedded culture of
corruption; and (4) a data deficit whereby data pertaining to oil were often
unreliable, ambiguous, or contradictory.
FOSTER’s response to these conditions was to work opportunistically and
strategically with pro-reform supply- and demand-side forces within the
Nigerian context, seeking out collaboration with ‘pockets of effectiveness’
(Hickey et al. 2015; Leonard 2008)—testing and confirming the hypotheses
and findings from the broader research arena, which suggested that such
locales exist, even in weak-governance environments. In particular, FOSTER’s
theory of change is based on identifying and supporting these pro-reform
pockets of effectiveness among two types of organizations:
 Supply-side institutions such as the Petroleum Unit in the Ministry of
Finance, the Nigerian EITI, the National Oil Spills Detection and Regula-
tory Agency, and the National Assembly’s committees looking at the
Petroleum Industry Bill.
 Demand-side civil society actors from professional bodies, media outlets,
think tanks, and research and advocacy organizations.
There were several aspects of FOSTER’s approach which were very different
from many other donor programmes, and which have been key to FOSTER’s
success:
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27.3.3.1 BEING DRIVEN BY THE PREVAILING POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT
PEA is not a magic bullet. However, FOSTER’s use of frequent (quarterly and
annual) PEAs enabled the work plan for each quarter to be grounded in a
nuanced understanding of the political dynamics and opportunities for
reform.14 Using PEA operationally in a highly politically charged extractives
sector demands an implementation team that can undertake sensitive polit-
ical, technical, and institutional analysis, and can programme accordingly.
Thus, as important as the formal PEA was the fact that the local team were
embedded in a set of networks, so that they understood the changing circum-
stances on a daily basis (see Section 27.3.3.2). The daily ‘informal’ political
thinking and the regular formal PEA were complementary—the former shap-
ing the tactics on a day-by-day basis, while the latter provided amechanism to
stand back from the day-to-day changes and look at the likelihood of success
of interventions from the broader perspective of the interests and power of the
different stakeholders involved.
27.3.3.2 EMPLOYING LOCALLY EMBEDDED ‘DEVELOPMENT
ENTREPRENEURS’
Success in policy reform programmes depends not just on working with local
actors, but also on working with the right local actors: that is, people who
support reform and have the capability and inclination to act. Knowing who
the right counterparts were required local knowledge, and necessitated appoint-
ing staff on the basis of their political networks whilst aiming to ensure that they
themselves were politically neutral and sat outside the vested interests/political
elites resisting change. It also required a certain type of personality and skill set:
individuals who were keen to catalyse, facilitate, and support actions by other
individuals and organizations rather than seizing the limelight for themselves,
but who also had the ability to repeatedly critically appraise what had worked
and what had not, and to adjust accordingly. This type of individual has been
called a ‘development entrepreneur’ (Faustino and Fabella 2011).
The FOSTER team consisted entirely of Nigerian policy entrepreneurs.
Collectively, they had a detailed knowledge of the key actors in the sector.
However, even with this knowledge, identifying the right partners required a
great deal of experimentation. With new partners FOSTER would typically
start with a pilot activity to assess the capacity of the partner. If it went well,
the activity might be scaled up. In this way, over the five-year life of the first
14 The quarterly formal PEA was undertaken by a programme advisor who, because they sat
outside the core team, could provide a fresh perspective on (and a challenge to) the well-connected
and politically savvy teammembers. Their findings were then checked and discussed with the core
team and local partners.
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phase of the project, the FOSTER team built up an excellent appreciation of
which partners were most effective in pursuing which kinds of activities. This
repository of ‘network knowledge’ was intangible, but essential to the success
of the project.
27.3.3.3 USING FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTIVE PROGRAMMING
FOSTER has been successful in large part because it has been able to adapt its
programming to the evolving context it has faced. As noted above, it used
regular PEA to identify opportunities for reform in the ‘pockets of effective-
ness’ on the supply side. But if there were few or no opportunities for effective
programming within government, the design of FOSTER provided it with the
flexibility to move programming from the supply to the demand side, to
advance public understanding and maintain public pressure for reform. Had
its outputs and activities been determined too rigidly at the outset, it would
have been much less able to respond to the changing context, and would
likely have been much less effective.15 Many donor projects specify exactly
what they want to do up front, and then lay out a set of steps necessary to
achieve their goal; they then attempt to work their way through these steps
systematically in order to achieve the goal. However, experience in several
countries suggests that such ‘linear’ projects often run into trouble because the
circumstances and assumptions that gave rise to the original plan often
change (Andrews 2013).
By contrast, the local FOSTER team proactively sought out opportunities for
reform—small projects that might push forward reform in one area (see
Andrews et al. 2012 for a detailed discussion of such problem-driven, iterative
approaches to reform). They were guided in choosing which opportunities to
select by an overarching ‘logframe’: activities had to have some plausible
connection with the overall objectives of the programme. But other than
this overarching guidance, the project teamwere at liberty to be ‘development
entrepreneurs’, in the sense of identifying individuals and organizations that
were interested in pursuing reform initiatives, and boosting their capacity and
knowledge to do so. This flexibility was made possible by ensuring that the
project’s funds were not pre-allocated to particular activities but held in a
flexible £8.5m fund, so that FOSTER staff could act quickly and respond to
reform opportunities as they occurred. Programming through the fund relied
on an explicitly interactive and dynamic approach to conducting analysis,
searching for feasible solutions along the way.
15 The programme was able to do this due to the early adoption in DFID Nigeria of flexible and
adaptive programming. The principles of flexible and adaptive programming have now become
embedded in DFID’s smart rules for better programme delivery (DFID 2016).
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An important element of this way of working was reflecting on failure,
failing fast and learning quickly, and using results processes that encouraged
adaptation. The interplay of political dynamics is complex, and no matter
what local expertise and PEA is conducted, some issues cannot be understood
ex ante. Having systems (e.g. feedback loops, risk management processes) to
‘test the water’ and ‘learn from doing’ is therefore important. Interventions
that made sense in Month 1 may no longer make sense in Month 6, and may
need to be closed down to avoid waste of resources. Linked to this was the
need for results frameworks to be broad and non-prescriptive, whilst keeping
long-term outcomes in sight. To ensure accountability (and for the funder
to be able to distinguish between an ‘adaptive’ programme and an underper-
forming programme), a results framework can instead focus on how well
the programme is analysing, learning, and adapting from successes and fail-
ures. To that end, forms of ongoing action research may replace traditional
mid-/end-programme evaluation.
27.3.3.4 EMBRACING RISK . . .BUT ALSO MANAGING IT
FOSTER took a very different approach to risk from many other aid projects.
Traditional aid projects manage risk by trying to think of all the ways in which
an activity might fail, and then putting in place measures to minimize the
likelihood of failure and mitigate its impact. Whilst FOSTER did this too for
individual activities, it deliberately adopted a ‘portfolio approach’ to risk man-
agement. The attitude was that, as with financial investments, it did not know
in advance which activities were going to be successful and which were not.
Consequently, FOSTER deliberately selected a wide range of different types of
activities, anticipating that the overall portfolio of activities would be success-
ful in pursuing reforms, while accepting in advance that some individual
activities would not. However, this approach poses a challenge to traditional
forms of aid management. Normally, all individual activities are expected to
succeed, and the implementer is criticized if they do not. Hence, although a
portfolio approach to risk may be much more sensible in highly uncertain
environments, it requires amuch higher appetite for risk by funders, and better
tools for assessing whether failure is caused by external or internal factors.16
27.3.3.5 OPERATING ‘UNDER THE RADAR’
External aid was used to facilitate the process of reform through partnerships,
not to ‘buy’ short-term reform. Sometimes donor projects push a particular
16 It is also important to note that risk can become very personal in sensitive sectors such as the
extractives sector. Making fraudulent or inefficient behaviour public poses personal risks for the
partners that expose such malfeasance, and potentially also for project staff who support them.
Implementers must therefore take their duty of care seriously.
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reform agenda. However, in Nigeria, externally promoted reforms are often
not appreciated—all the more so when they threaten powerful interests.
Rather, the reform actors that have the credibility and access to influence
policy are almost entirely local. As a result, the project explicitly chose to
identify and support the agendas of local actors—whether in civil society,
parliament, or the media—rather than promote its own agenda. In this
sense it operated ‘under the radar’: there was no FOSTER logo, and no external
promotion of the project. Rather, it worked with local actors to strengthen
their capability to press for change. Sometimes this was done by providing a
small grant for a programme of work, at other times it might consist of
providing technical assistance or training—but always in support of a work
programme with complete ownership by the local partner.
27.3.3.6 TAKING AN ‘ARM’S LENGTH’ APPROACH TO AID
Working in the way described above necessitates developing deep relation-
ships and networks in a country, as well as the flexibility to exit relationships
when reform is not achieved or more effective avenues are identified. This
requires trust on the part of the donor. There needs to be sufficient distance
from the donor to allow the implementer the flexibility and independence to
invest and adapt accordingly, and to create relationships with those who
might not be willing to engage directly with a donor (characterized by Booth
(2013) as an ‘arm’s length approach to aid’). On the other hand, the donor
needs to be comfortable with the relationships being formed and activities
being undertaken, and to be able to articulate this internally. To that end,
ongoing dialogue between implementer and funder to develop trust is import-
ant, alongside the ability to communicate the results of working in this
fashion in a clear manner.
27.3.4 What Has Been Achieved?
The FOSTER programme has had a significant impact in promoting transpar-
ency and accountability in the management of Nigeria’s natural resources,
especially in the oil sector. In particular, it has made an important contribu-
tion in four main areas: the nature of the public debate; the legal framework;
revenue savings; and the institutionalization of transparency and account-
ability in the sector. We discuss each in turn.
27.3.4.1 RAISING THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AND CALIBRE
OF PUBLIC DEBATE ON OIL AND GAS POLICY
FOSTER’s work with a wide range of civil society and media actors has signifi-
cantly raised the level of understanding about how the oil sector works, and
the policies and practices that give rise to corruption and inefficiency. This
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work has included the creation of online platforms that provide a mechanism
for holding government accountable (e.g. an online tool for tracking illegal
gas flaring), as well as a deepening of the understanding and capability of the
media to report on oil sector issues by training investigative journalists.
27.3.4.2 ACHIEVING SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT ABOUT WHAT
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SECTOR SHOULD BE
FOSTER invested significant effort in working with legislators and journalists
in order to broaden understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the
various drafts of the Petroleum Industry Bill. This has led to a better under-
standing among all the key stakeholders of the key principles that should
underpin legislation in the sector. However, notwithstanding FOSTER’s sup-
port, the Petroleum Industry Bill did not pass in both the House and the
Senate.17 At face value, therefore, this is an example of a failure. But it also
illustrates how measuring success is difficult, because the ideas and associated
legal texts discussed during the first phase of FOSTER are forming the basis of
renewed attempts to craft framing legislation for the sector under the current
administration. The passage of the Petroleum Industry Governance Bill—the
first component of a set of smaller packages of legislation—in the Senate in
May 2017 demonstrates progress; hence it may be too early to determine
whether this support has been successful or not.
27.3.4.3 MAKING LARGE REVENUE SAVINGS FOR THE GOVERNMENT
OF NIGERIA
FOSTER has been responsible for the identification and remediation of well
over £400m for the government of Nigeria (and possiblymuchmore). This has
come from multiple sources including: large savings from support to the
Ministry of Finance to ensure the proper audit of fuel subsidy payments;
exposure of evidence of the inefficient and corrupt system of oil swaps,
leading to the scrapping of the system and its replacement with a more open
and transparent mechanism for oil sales; and improvement of the template
used to track revenue from oil proceeds, preventing diversion of funds to
other uses.
27.3.4.4 INSTITUTIONALIZING TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Through FOSTER’s long-term support, the Nigerian EITI has developed to
become an effective institution for the promotion of transparency and
accountability in the sector (and is widely regarded as one of the best EITI
17 It passed in the House, but not the Senate, prior to the end of the Jonathan administration.
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institutions globally). FOSTER has helped to build the capacity of the National
Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency to tackle oil spills and improve the
joint investigative visit process. Moreover, FOSTER’s recent support for the
NNPC has facilitated a sea change in the latter’s approach to transparency and
accountability, supporting the NNPC to publish its annual report for the first
time in over a decade, and strengthening its capability to reform refineries and
tackle fuel subsidies.
However, perhaps of most interest is the fact that FOSTER is providing
valuable insights about how the international community can engage in
efforts to promote reform in the extractive industries sector in challenging
contexts (Booth 2016). This is reflected in the design of the second phase of
FOSTER, which started in June 2016, and which has explicitly adopted many
lessons from the first phase of the project—but also in the adoption of
many of the elements of flexible, adaptive, politically savvy programming
into the guidance provided by several donors active in the sector (Whaites
et al. 2015).
27.4 Challenges in Applying the Approach, and Lessons
for Donors
27.4.1 Challenges in Applying the Approach
Models such as FOSTER will not be applicable in every instance of extractive
governance programming. Nor are they a quick approach to enabling change.
There are also inherent tensions in the approach for development practi-
tioners, donors, and stakeholders engaging in reform. We conclude by outlin-
ing some of these tensions and the lessons for future donor engagement.
27.4.1.1 DISRUPTING THE STATUS QUO CAN CREATE CONFLICT
FOSTER overtly aims to disrupt the status quo. This means changing power
dynamics, subverting corrupt interests, and aiming to identify reformers who
can work against entrenched interests. Working effectively in fragile and
conflict-affected situations, such as Nigeria in particular, requires an awareness
that interventions shape—and in turn are shaped by—the context within
which they take place. Although actors have long been aware of the con-
straints imposed by conflict on the ability to achieve results, there has been
a more limited focus on the wider ‘obstacles’ of fragility and conflict, and on
the need to mainstream such concerns throughout projects. There is increas-
ing institutional recognition within DFID that conflict sensitivity and ‘do no
harm’ approaches are critical in situations where open violence is present, or is
a very real threat, and that they can be useful in situations where there are
high levels of political tension and/or an unpredictable and constantly
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changing political context. An awareness that their own interventions impact
on conflict dynamics has led donors and NGOs to develop a range of conflict
sensitivity tools that facilitate an understanding of these issues. These tools
provide a series of structured questions to prompt reflection on the two-way
interaction between intervention and conflict. As DFID notes, ‘Where inter-
national actors fail to invest in good political and conflict analysis, actions can
result in more harm than good’ (DFID 2010: 8).
27.4.1.2 SPENDING TIME AND MONEY BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS VS
SHOWING HOW SUCH AN APPROACH IS EFFECTIVE
In order to be successful, it is essential to be politically informed and skilled in
order to negotiate, and to identify reformers and opportunities. However, this
entails a large sunk cost in the form of the time that is needed to build
alliances, identify or establish possible pockets of effectiveness, and build
relationships with key reformers who are willing to trust you with industry
information that can be used to press for reform from both within and outside
of government. While this is being done, evidence of effectiveness will be
minimal. The work is unproven up to the point at which the build-up of small-
scale nudges for information and entry points for reform turns into a flash
flood of change. This presents a major challenge for showing effectiveness,
particularly in the early stages of the project.
27.4.1.3 WORKING ON SUPPLY AND DEMAND AT THE SAME TIME
Part of the success of FOSTER arises because it is able to support reformers in
government, while at the same time supporting pressure for reform from
outside of government. However, there is an inevitable tension associated
with working on supply and demand sides at the same time, since if govern-
ment counterparts discover that the programme is also supporting advocacy
initiatives by elements outside of government, this can erode their trust in the
programme (and even spill over into problems for the relationship between
the funder and the government). The more the programme is successful in
working at the heart of government, the more this becomes an issue, particu-
larly if demand-side partners are saying highly critical things about the gov-
ernment. This tension can be managed by creating a ‘Chinese wall’within the
programme between the supply- and demand-side work, and by ensuring
good communication between the management of the programme and the
partner organizations. FOSTER has gained from combining work on the sup-
ply and demand sides because this allows information-sharing and coordin-
ation between components that is not possible if they are separate. However,
in some circumstances it may be necessary to separate such programmes to
ensure that those working with government are not ‘compromised’ by advo-
cacy initiatives funded by the same programme.
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27.4.1.4 ACTING POLITICALLY VS MAINTAINING DONOR POLITICAL
RELATIONS
Programmes such as FOSTER explicitly attempt to engage in areas that are
politically sensitive. They do not do so in a party political sense, but by choosing
particular champions and partners, they are implicitly supporting the reform
agendas of those actors. While aid is and always has been political,18 if those
opposed to reform become aware that a foreign donor is supporting their
opponents, this can create problems for the diplomatic relationship between
the two countries. Aid is only one part, and sometimes only a small part, of the
diplomatic relationship between two countries, and so in such situations the
Foreign Office of the donor country may put pressure on the donor agency to
withdraw or modify activities to ensure no damage is done to broader diplo-
matic relationships. Conversely, there may be certain initiatives which are seen
by the donor country as an important part of the relationshipwith the recipient
country and which they wish to see continue, even if PEA or other analysis
indicates that they are less directly targeted towards reform. Such tensions can
bemanaged by good communication between the donor—whowill be aware of
the wider interests of its government—and the programme implementer, as
well as substantial trust between the donor and the implementer that activities
are not going to create significant problems for the donor.
27.4.1.5 ADHERENCE TO DONOR PROGRAMMING INCENTIVES VS
USING PEA AND FLEXIBLE PROGRAMMING
PEA is valuable when linked to forward programming, but there will be times
when the PEA indicates that there is no space for reform at the present time.
However, donors and implementers alike face pressure to spend programming
funds: donors are typically incentivized to fully spend their budgets; imple-
menting organizations may have a milestone-based contract tied to the dis-
bursement of funds. Similarly, implementing organizations are frequently
required by donors to meet their forecasted spend with limited or no variance.
Not meeting this results in a perception by the donor of poor management on
the part of the implementer, even if the mismatch results from a strategic
choice not to implement activities which are no longer thought to be valu-
able. Implementing flexible and adaptive programming therefore requires a
change in donor thinking and procedures about what constitutes good plan-
ning and financial management.
18 See the excellent history of the politics of and in aid by Carothers and de Gramont (2013).
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27.4.2 Lessons for Donors
To conclude, we draw out some lessons from FOSTER regarding the ways in
which external donors can support improvements in the governance of the
extractives sector.
Perhaps the most important lesson is that it is possible. There is an under-
standable degree of scepticism, both within the development community and
outside it, about whether donors can have any significant influence on polit-
ically sensitive governance reforms such as those relating to the extractives
sector. The experience of FOSTER suggests that it is possible to have an impact,
but that doing so requires a rather different approach from that taken in
traditional aid programmes. In particular, it requires a programme that ‘thinks
and acts politically’, drawing on local knowledge to navigate the complexities
of reform, with the flexibility to adapt its approach accordingly.
However, adopting this approach has risks. Most obviously, not every activ-
ity will be successful. The portfolio approach adopted by FOSTER deliberately
experiments, trying a wide range of activities with different partners with the
intention that they will collectively promote change. But it is almost certain
that some of these activities will not be successful. Moreover, it is not even
guaranteed that clusters of activities will collectively be successful, as the
example of the Petroleum Industry Bill in Nigeria showed. Moreover, this
approach requires care to ensure that such activities do not pose reputational
risks for the donor.
Making such programmes effective therefore appears to require four things:
 Local knowledge and leadership. This entails not only a robust set of ana-
lytical frameworks, including PEA, to continuously understand the latest
developments, but also a politically savvy local team with the autonomy
to propose the key areas and approaches for intervention.
 Acceptance of risk by the donor. A key challenge here is to find the right
mechanism to ensure accountability for taxpayer funds, whilst providing
the necessary flexibility and autonomy for implementation teams on the
ground. ‘Arm’s length’ arrangements, in which the implementing organ-
ization is accountable to the donor while the local team is held account-
able to the implementer, appear to be an effective way of managing
these risks.
 More flexible management processes. The existence of an un-earmarked
managed fund has been important for both programmes, allowing rele-
vant initiatives to be defined as the programme goes along. But better
systems are needed to manage the conflict between the donors’ desire for
complete, timely, and accurate fund disbursement and the variable needs
and opportunities for reform.
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 Better evidence about what works, what doesn’t, and why. One of the
challenges of an approach that consists of multiple, non-predetermined
initiatives implemented by a variety of partners is that it is hard to
evaluate impact. New monitoring, evaluation, and learning frameworks
are needed for such programmes that focus not only on which types of
initiatives are more effective in which contexts, but also on embedding
continuous critical reflection into programme management so that les-
sons can be fed back immediately into practice.
Fundamentally, what is needed is a shift in mindset, from being an imple-
menter of a project to being an enabler of reform. Long-term reform in
politically sensitive sectors comes from the collective action of local coali-
tions, both within and outside of government. External programmes that
attempt to provide a technical ‘fix’ for a sector are likely to fail. Donors
therefore need to be more modest and more realistic about what can be
influenced, and to become enablers of change—facilitating local actors to
take advantage of windows of opportunity. The experience of FOSTER is
that, where this approach is taken, donors can play a useful role in supporting
significant improvements in the governance of the extractives sector.
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A central difficulty for almost all extractives activity is that, although the total
benefits may be large, these benefits accrue predominantly at the national
level and are typically concentrated in the hands of those in power and in
capital cities. At the same time, the disruptions in terms of population
movements, noise, air and water pollution, and so on are invariably highly
localized close to the resource. Local benefits in terms of new employment
opportunities frequently disappoint in terms of their magnitude. It has been
recognized for many years, at least by those inside the industry, that these
imbalances need to be addressed through active local policies and pro-
grammes. Increasingly, this corporate response is matched by complemen-
tary responses (either specific mandated requirements or discretionary
approaches) by host governments.
Over the past decade, there has been an intensification of the efforts of
extractives companies to demonstrate their positive contribution to their host
communities. This is particularly strong in the remote and underdeveloped
areas where many extractives projects are located. Often, an extractives project
may be the major, if not the only, economic driver in a region. One action by
the industry and by financial institutions has been the development of various
international standards and recommendedpractices (Dodd et al. 2015: 15–17).1
1 The IFC Performance Standards are the most commonly referred to standards for private-sector
programmes. For guidance, in the mining sector there is the ICMM Community Development Toolkit
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At the leading edge of this movement towards universal standards and guide-
lines has been the role of international finance institutions, such as the IFC and
the Equator Principles banks, in insisting upon environmental as well as social
responsibility as preconditions to project financing, the varying success levels
of which are discussed in Bell (2017). The concepts of corporate social respon-
sibility (CSR) and the social licence to operate (SLO) have gained great currency
in recent years and combine to make it almost essential for major projects to
manage the social and economic impacts of their developments, ideally leading
to an improvement of the standard of living of local communities. In cases
where economic and physical displacement or resettlement occur, inter-
national standards require that those displaced must regain at least the same
standard of living as they had prior to disruption by the project—preferably an
improved standard. With the recent addition of human rights and business
requirements, a greater focus on the local and regional contributions of extrac-
tives projects has emerged.
One area of community engagement that is still deemed controversial by
some extractives companies is the issue of free prior informed consent (FPIC)
by communities, especially indigenous peoples. Bell (2017) discusses the
question of community consent, and the international NGO Oxfam recently
prepared a community consent index that analyses corporate commitment to
FPIC (Oxfam 2015). This found that no oil and gas companies had made a
public commitment to considering the FPIC of indigenous communities,
although a growing number of mining companies had made such commit-
ments: fourteen in 2015, compared with five in 2012, when Oxfam prepared
the first consent index. Commitments to seeking FPIC from all communities,
not just indigenous ones, is still a step too far for the industry, according to
Oxfam, although many companies have made commitments to actively seek-
ing community support and agreement before embarking upon operations
(Oxfam 2015: 15–20).
The role of host governments in enabling positive local impacts of extrac-
tives projects is important. The contribution that can be made by civil-society
organizations (CSOs) is also important. The ability of companies to align their
efforts with both these key stakeholder groups is essential, as the harnessing of
extractives revenues for local development is very much the product of com-
bined and concerted efforts. Such cooperation is discussed in this chapter, and
is analysed comprehensively in McPhail (2017), which focuses on multi-
stakeholder processes.
Another trend that may bring benefits to local communities is the recent
focus on the negotiation of formal agreements between companies and
(ICMM 2012), and for oil and gas, IPIECA’s Guide to Successful, Sustainable Social Investment (IPIECA
2008). For further information see Dodd et al. (2015: 15–17).
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project-affected communities. Otto’s 2017 working paper on model commu-
nity development agreements discusses this in depth (Otto 2017; see also Otto
2012 and Rio Tinto 2016). The primary aim of this chapter is to identify the
optimal approach for companies to take in encouraging sustainable local
development among host communities, with a secondary focus on the
importance of alignment with other actors.
28.1.2 Structure
The chapter considers both the conceptual and the practical possibilities for
the improved management of extractives resources so as to generate positive
and sustainable economic and social outcomes for local populations. The
conceptual dimensions of these topics are presented via a review of the key
recent literature, with a view to determining where gaps have been identified
in corporate performance. The practical aspects that give life to the scholar-
ship are presented in the form of a long-term case study of the community
development programmes of a mining project in Tanzania, with briefer
references to other relevant case studies. Additional contextual information
was obtained from an unpublished survey of key stakeholders with insights
into industry experiences ‘at the coal face’, which focused on the constraints
posed to local development in mining areas (ICMM 2015). This survey was
conducted by the author in 2015 for the International Council on Mining
and Metals (ICMM) for the information of its members, and is included here
by kind permission of ICMM.2
The chapter considers the sustainability of local community development
programmes: that is, their capacity to endure. There is a focus on community
participation—that is, the ability of the intended beneficiaries of programmes
to influence their design and implementation—and an assessment of whether
this is a major success factor in programmes that have worked. In order to
demonstrate what participation means in practice, I draw upon my own
intermittent close observation of the community development programmes
of a gold mine in Tanzania over a period of fifteen years.
The chapter discusses a number of aspects of community development
activities by extractives companies, in both conceptual and practical terms.
For example, the degree of autonomy that specific extractives projects have to
interact directly with their host communities and local governments in order
to be responsive to their needs is considered, as social investment programmes
have a tendency to be driven from corporate headquarters, thus minimizing
the importance of local content. The degree of inclusiveness of community
2 Most of the discussion of the survey is contained in Appendix A of Macdonald (2017a).
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development programmes in general—that is, whether a wide range of com-
munity members are able to participate—is also assessed.
In short, this chapter concentrates on the local and regional (provincial)
aspects of the community development programmes of extractives projects
in developing economies. It seeks to show how carefully crafted, locally
appropriate programmes—especially those led and initiated by the local
community members themselves—can make a positive contribution to
improving the lives of host communities. The role that can be played by
extractives companies is analysed, as well as the best approaches for aligning
with other major players.
28.2 The Conceptual Dimensions
The literature over the past decade on local and community development
associated with extractive industries projects has followed a trajectory from
discussions on CSR up to, more recently, a focus on SLO. In most analyses of
community development practices at the local level, writers have identified a
lack of participation by local communities and their representatives as an
obstacle to success. Alignment of development stakeholders, such as compan-
ies, local government, and civil society, is also considered, as are matters of
resourcing. The most relevant articles are discussed below: that is, those
whose primary focus is on ‘participation’. This is now receiving renewed
attention, having had a long history in the development field, where it
predated both the CSR and SLO concepts. Although participation in com-
munity development has been the subject of much debate in development
analysis for over forty years, it has only emerged in the extractives sector over
the last few years: the probable reason for its rise to prominence in the
current literature. The new interest of international donor agencies in
engaging in programmes in the extractives sector may also be a catalyst for
this renewed attention to participation.
As far back as 1969, Arnstein described a ‘ladder of citizen participation’
in which the eight rungs representing forms of ‘participation’ range from
manipulation at the bottom to citizen control at the top, with consultation
sitting in the middle (Arnstein 1969: 217). Somewhat more recent is Pretty’s
1990s typology of participation, which ranges from ‘passive participation’—in
which people are told what will happen by external professionals who have
already decided what must be done (not really participation at all, not even
consultation)—to ‘self-mobilization’, in which people take initiatives inde-
pendent of external institutions (Pretty et al. 1995: 61). Sustainable community
development needs to be based upon the greatest possible participation of the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
594
intended beneficiaries—actual participation and planning collaboration—and
this is where much of the current literature is focused.3
28.2.1 Literature Review
In their introduction to a special volume of the Community Development
Journal (CDJ) focusing on the extractive industries, community development,
and livelihood change in developing countries, Maconachie and Hilson
(2013) emphasize the frequent disconnect between local needs and corporate
programmes. The CDJ volume contains case studies from many parts of the
world, but common themes emerge from the discussion on the deficiencies of
many corporate efforts. The editors note that:
Considerable concerns have been raised by a number of scholars who have high-
lighted how extractive industries companies often implement community devel-
opment programmes with little knowledge or understanding of the socio-cultural
contexts of the people’s lives in which they operate. In extreme cases, an over-
emphasis on meeting global performance standards has led to inappropriate and
ill-conceived development outcomes at the local level, which have resulted in
further fragmentation and inequality. (Maconachie and Hilson 2013: 351)
Thus, although much scholarship has discussed the increase of CSR activities
worldwide, and the increase of corporate attention and expenditure being
accorded to CSR performance, there is insufficient evidence that this is
actually bringing benefits to the communities living near extractives projects.
Indeed, Maconachie and Hilson (2013: 353) caution that even when citizens
are deliberately invited to participate in ‘the community development pro-
grammes sponsored by mining or oil and gas companies, the inclusion of
local actors in decision-making cannot be assumed’. This observation sends
up a flag that mere statements of participation, predicated upon efforts to
invite local stakeholders to engage in corporate-sponsored activities, do not
guarantee genuine opportunities for community members to steer their
own path.
In the CDJ special volume, Banks et al. (2013) explore community develop-
ment in the localities surrounding four large mines in Papua New Guinea
(PNG), and conclude that two principal kinds of local community develop-
ment emerge from the presence of major mining projects in remote and
underdeveloped areas: immanent and intentional. The concept of ‘immanent’
development is that it takes place neither through the direct intervention of
theminemanagementnor as the result of an explicit development programme,
3 For a discussion of the development participation debate, see Cornwall (2009) and Cornwall
and Pratt (2003).
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but builds on the indirect economic growth associated with increased local
employment, procurement, and royalties and taxes that accrue to the local
area. These can be considerable in PNG, where customary landowners are
legally acknowledged as having minerals rights. According to Banks et al.
(2013), immanent growth makes up the major part of local and community
development. The other form of community development they describe as
‘intentional’, using the term CCD, or corporate community development.
This comprises the programmes and initiatives undertaken by the mining
companies in pursuit of their CSR objectives. The authors view these pro-
grammes as conservative, often disconnected from the needs and wants of the
intended beneficiaries, and hence less successful in terms of human develop-
ment than actions taken independently by local people. They make a case for
improving the outcomes of intentional CCD programmes in the following
ways:
Corporations should also seek higher levels of community participation in project
identification, design, monitoring, and evaluation connected with their
CCD. Much of the community input into CCD was weak (and seemed particularly
so for higher level CSR-type activities), and there was typically little or no moni-
toring or evaluation of the development or livelihood outcomes of CCD activities.
(Banks et al. 2013: 497)
Banks and his colleagues observe that much CSR in PNG was top-down,
driven by global corporate imperatives, with little connection to the situation
and needs of local communities in the mining areas. They note that it could
be harder for community development departments and community mem-
bers to obtain funding from the companies for locally driven initiatives than
it was to gain grants for global corporate programmes such as HIV/AIDS
projects. They advise that locally responsive, community-led programmes,
especially when integrated with other local activities and developments,
were more likely to produce sustainable benefits for the livelihoods of local
communities.
In their study of the CSR performance of mining companies in Argentina,
Mutti et al. (2012) take a strongly critical stance, accusing companies of
undermining local capacity for self-management. They state that:
CSR is perceived as patronising and paternalistic, when companies undermine
knowledge and skills of local communities to identify their own needs and prior-
ities. This leads to a lack of adaptation to local conditions, as companies appear to
enforce their own vision of community ‘good’. Mining companies are perceived as
inflexible to engage with stakeholders, and incorporate community views in
design of community development solutions [sic]. In terms of performance, the
general view is that CSR does not have a substantial impact on poverty reduction
or environmental management, and therefore, CSR outcomes have a negligible
contribution to a society’s welfare. (Mutti et al. 2012: 221)
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They draw the conclusion that CSR programmes that are designed to suit the
company, at corporate headquarters, rather than utilizing community input,
are essentially a failure in terms of human development. Once again, the lack
of community participation destroys the good intentions of the programmes.
In their study of the Bolivian context, Campero and Barton (2015) explain
that the purpose of SLO is to:
Generate a binding participation of the community, resulting in the construction
of mutual agreements between community, firm, local, and/or central govern-
ment, and which define the basis on which actions will be taken to promote
sustainable local development. (Campero and Barton 2015: 174)
However, the reality they describe is a situation in which firms are volun-
tarily entering into activities designed to earn them an SLO, but only in a
limited manner, as there is no compulsion for them to do so or regulation
about how they do it. The limitations are primarily connected to a lack of
inclusivity, as civil society actors likely to be antagonistic are often left out,
as are many state actors, especially at the regional and local levels, in order to
try to minimize costs and the demands that might otherwise be placed upon
the company. The result is that there are insufficient levels of ‘community
participation in decision-making that affects local development’, resulting in
conflict and ‘a persistence of weak local development trajectories within
these communities’ (Campero and Barton 2015: 168). Several stakeholders
interviewed in the study commented that they recognized the need for
greater inclusion, which they termed as going ‘with God and the Devil’,
meaning engaging with difficult as well as amenable stakeholders. They also
conclude that it was important to include local government representatives
and officials, as well as regional ones where possible. One of the notable
elements of this study is that it focuses firmly upon inclusion and participa-
tion as essential ingredients of the SLO.
Harvey and Bice (2014) advocate an approach to SLO that requires:
‘collaborative moderation’––defined here as working directly with project-affected
stakeholders to achieve accommodation and agreement on issues that are of
priority in the local context, as opposed to attempts to respond to an array of
deemed universal issues set by regulators and exogenous agencies.
(Harvey and Bice 2014: 328)
They go further in recommending activities that align with the shared value
concept made popular in 2011 by Harvard’s Porter and Kramer, at least in its
development of local economic clusters. The key point Harvey and Bice make
for the enhancement of local development is that the emphasis should be on
collaboration and mutuality, not on programmes designed externally to solve
problems deemed to be universal. Although not explicitly using the term
‘participation’, that is precisely what they describe.
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Maconachie (2014), in discussing youth participation in mining company
programmes aimed at livelihood improvement in Sierra Leone, finds it ‘useful
to make a distinction between autonomous forms of community-led devel-
opment “from below” and corporate controlled development “from above”’
(Maconachie 2014: 281). This distinction echoes that of Banks et al. (2013),
noted above, who refer to ‘immanent’ and ‘intentional’ community develop-
ment. Maconachie is very critical of what he describes as decontextualized
‘blueprint CSR schemes’ and finds that programmes not designed organically
with grassroots participation will be unlikely to meet local needs.
Keenan and Kemp (2014), in researching the role of gender in the process
of negotiating agreements between companies and communities, discovered
that women were more likely to engage in processes that were participatory,
open, and transparent. This ties in with recent business scholarship encour-
aging diversity as beneficial to improved outcomes in most business and
community processes. Thus, a participatory approach to community devel-
opment programme design in the extractives sector is also likely to be more
gender-balanced, a goal that is being embraced by an increasing number of
extractives companies.4 The importance of gender balance in participation
is also highlighted by Aaron (2012) in his examination of the changing
models of community development adopted by Shell and Chevron in the
Niger Delta in the form of a Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU)
signed in 2006. He concludes that, to a large extent, success had been achieved
in attaining enhanced participation and ownership of projects. He then
points out, however, that it was only men who had participated, in spite
of measures in the agreement specifying that a certain number of women
had to be involved. In Aaron’s view, this suggests that ‘while the GMoU
model has opened up space for popular participation at the grassroots level,
the problem of voicelessness of marginalized groups, such as women, has
not been adequately addressed or addressed at all’ (Aaron 2012: 270). For a
discussion of recent developments in gender and the extractives sector, see
Macdonald (2017b).
In an article centred on the local-level development practices of mining
companies, Kemp (2010: 199) states that ‘many mining companies now use
the language of community development and participation as part of sustain-
able development (SD) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks’.
And yet she found limited evidence of actual community participation on the
ground, as companies remained reluctant to cede control over programmes.
She also made the important point that ‘participatory development requires
engagement with individuals, families, households and small groups rather
4 e.g. see Kemp et al. (2009).
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than only engaging at the level of the “community”’ (Kemp 2010: 208). This
is necessary to avoid exacerbating structural disadvantages within communi-
ties by excluding certain sectors, especially the vulnerable and minorities. In
her examination of community regeneration projects in the east Kent coal-
fields of the United Kingdom, Doering (2014) reinforces the importance of not
assuming who or what is the ‘community’ or excluding from the participatory
process individuals and groups that do not fit the paradigm of ‘community’ in
the eyes of the company. This links back to the importance of engaging with
‘both God and the Devil’, as described by Mutti et al. (2012).
Khadiagala (2015: 37) exhorts African governments ‘to promote wider par-
ticipation in natural resource governance’, which he sees as part of a move-
ment towards greater transparency and inclusivity in all aspects of governance
but as acutely needed in the natural resources sector, where increasing rev-
enues are flowing in but not necessarily being equitably allocated. He advo-
cates the decentralization of mining revenues and the training of local
governments to enable them to manage those revenues, or their share of
them,more effectively. Although his argument is generally pitched at a higher
level than the community, his statement that ‘the incorporation of diverse
voices in political and economic processes is the next battle in broadening
participation’ (Khadiagala 2015: 39–40) is valid in the community context.
Suopajärvi et al. (2016) talk about the importance of ‘fate control’ or the
ability for communities affected by mining in northern Europe (northern
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia) to guide their own destiny. In their
view, the social aspects tend to be left out of discussions of sustainability in
favour of economic and environmental aspects; if they are mentioned, it is
usually only in terms of impacts or SLO. They state that ‘local people need a
platform [from which] to be heard during the whole lifecycle of the mine and
to be involved in decisions that have impacts on the local communities and
different stakeholders’ (Suopajärvi et al. 2016: 66) in order for there to be
sustainability of local communities. They are talking about not only the
right of community members to be heard throughout the life of a mine but
also their right to be involved in making decisions that affect them, a good
description of participatory development planning. Although they find that
modern mining company management recognizes these matters, Suopajärvi
et al. (2016: 67) urge that special attention be paid to ‘the local people’s
empowerment when extracting natural resources in the North’.
In an article about a Chinese state-backed mining project in Myanmar—a
kind of project structure not often featured in the literature—Tang-Lee (2016:
29) emphasizes the importance of the ‘empowerment of communities to
participate in development decision-making, given the structured power
asymmetry between the mine company and local communities’. She sees
public participation as a way of achieving a more equitable distribution of
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both power and project benefits. Unfortunately, the hierarchical structure of
both the Chinese company and the Myanmar ruling establishment has
worked against allowing broad-based participation, resulting in tokenistic
efforts primarily aimed at placating communities. Nonetheless, she sees that
the company is trying to work towards more sustainable community engage-
ment and urges it to continue to do so in line with broader industry practices.
Van Alstine and Afiotis (2013) present a case study of the Kansanshi copper
mine in Zambia, in which they discovered an extremely centralized decision-
making process. They report that local government councillors were told by
the mine that discussions had been held between the company and the
government at national level, so there was no space or need for their involve-
ment. This had contributed to antagonism between the mine and the local
council. The authors advise that ‘factoring in local governments could
immensely enhance the understanding of the manner in which the liveli-
hoods of mine-affected communities could be improved’ (Van Alstine and
Afiotis 2013: 371). They also highlight human resource deficiencies in the
community engagement staffing of mining companies, especially among
mid-tiers and juniors. These limited resources prevented companies from
being able ‘to effectively engage with community and sustainable develop-
ment issues’ (Van Alstine and Afiotis 2013: 370).
In the Ugandan oil sector, Van Alstine et al. (2014) describe a situation
where local government is left out of the planning process associated with
the use of resource revenues, which is highly centralized ‘despite the rhetoric
of participation’. They observe that a lack of information and investment
provided to local officials and communities resulted in their inability ‘to take
an active role in oil matters’ (Van Alstine et al. 2014: 56). In their view, civil
society should engage with the industry to improve the alignment of their
CSR plans with national and district development plans and enhance their
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. They outline roles for increased
participation by donors and civil society, who should ‘target research-led
engagement that will help overcome these growing information, monitoring,
and participation gaps within local government’ (Van Alstine et al. 2014: 57).
28.2.2 Conclusion
Extractive industry companies have moved a long way forward in recent
years in accepting that they need to have CSR and must strive to earn and
maintain an SLO. In order for the substantial investments in social pro-
grammes being disbursed by companies to have a reasonable chance of
success and survival, corporates need to understand better the importance
of locally designed and managed programmes, with community members at
their core. Otherwise, there is a real danger that programmes will not be
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sustainable, or even appreciated locally, and that company efforts will be
seen as corporate window-dressing for the global audience, particularly by the
people who are supposed to benefit from the social investment programmes—
local communities.
28.3 The Practical Aspects
28.3.1 Industry Efforts to Improve Local Community
Development Performance
Although the literature is critical of company performance, the mining and
oil and gas industries, particularly through industry bodies such as ICMM
and IPIECA, have made considerable efforts to foster improved community
development performance among their member companies, and there are
examples of projects that have achieved good results. Both these organiza-
tions, plus international bodies such as the World Bank and the IFC, have
issued guidance publications on a range of community relations topics,
including working with indigenous peoples and protecting human rights.
ICMM and IPIECA have both produced a large number of toolkits and guides
that give practical advice about how to enhance company–community rela-
tionships, leading to sustainable development outcomes. These are freely
available from their respective websites. IPIECA’s Guide to Successful, Sustain-
able Social Investment for the Oil and Gas Industry advises that programmes
developed in a participatory way are more likely to be sustainable (IPIECA
2008: 24–5). The ICMM Community Development Toolkit (ICMM 2012), first
issued in 2005 and revised in 2012, also emphasizes participatory planning
as a foundation for successful community development programmes, among
many other useful tools and methods. Although there has been no formal
monitoring of which companies use which processes in their community
programmes, ICMM has found over the years that many companies have
incorporated aspects of the Toolkit into their procedures and found the
guidance useful.
In a review of the mining industry’s contribution to social development
internationally, ICMM (2014) found that for local community investments
to succeed, there was a need for company activities to align with local gov-
ernments and civil society organizations and that the capacity of local
institutions varied greatly from country to country (ICMM 2014). Thus the
challenges of working with local stakeholders on community development
programmes could also vary greatly in different contexts and this could affect
the potential for successful collaboration. Nonetheless, some of the case stud-
ies revealed that companies can and do work in a participatory manner with
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local communities, with beneficial results. See ICMM (2011) for a good
example in the Lao PDR.
Another example of successful participatory planning in the oil and gas
sector is that of the BP Tangguh LNG project in West Papua, Indonesia.
Community Action Plans, developed through participatory processes, were
adopted by project-affected villages and functioned as the basis for commu-
nity development planning supported by the project for ten years (2004–14),
as agreed to in the official Indonesian environmental permit (known as
AMDAL). From 2015, BP has reoriented the process in the Tangguh Sustain-
able Development Program, with a broader focus on indigenous peoples in
the wider Bintuni and Berau Bays area, rather than just the nearer villages,
while maintaining an emphasis on community participation (BP 2015: 56–7).
The new programme is also aimed at supporting the Indonesian government’s
increased involvement in participatory planning in the project area through
several initiatives, working towards greater control by community and gov-
ernment and enhanced sustainability (BP 2015: 50–1).
These examples, although they may not yet represent the majority of
community development programmes in the extractives sector, nonetheless
demonstrate that when companies work in a participatory manner with
local communities, there are positive effects that contribute to programme
sustainability.
In an unpublished stakeholder survey in 2015,5 ICMM discovered that
companies needed to dedicate sufficient human resources to building and
maintaining broad-based relationships with local communities in order to
foster the genuine participation that can lead to sustainable local community
development programmes (ICMM 2015). Such an approach builds solid rela-
tionships between companies and communities, and enhances the under-
standing of cultural contexts by corporate community relations personnel
and others in the company, thereby leading to greater chances for genuine
community participation and effective sustainable community development.
Without this understanding, the durability of development programmes is
likely to be compromised.
28.3.2 Practical Participation
There ismuch talk about participation, but little reflection uponwhat itmeans.
It does not mean seeking agreement from communities to programmes or
projects designedelsewhere, nordoes itmean recruitingparticipants (confusing
terminology) for programmes or projects conceived by others. Those may be
5 See Appendix A of Macdonald (2017a).
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appropriate actions to undertake for various activities but, when discussing the
participation of local community members in deciding upon their own devel-
opment priorities and plans, thought should be given to the fact that motiv-
ation to become involved must be allowed to emerge from the communities
themselves.
Professor Glynn Cochrane, who established Rio Tinto’s community rela-
tions system in 1995, has commented that ‘in order to help the poor, it is
necessary to know what they want and the extent to which they can
help themselves with their own knowledge and social capital’ (Cochrane
2009: 12). He noted further that offering poor people pre-designed projects
and programmes to alleviate their poverty ‘overlook[s] the fact that poor
people have ideas, knowledge, and aspirations; that they wish to be treated
with respect and as potential partners in any plans for them’ (Cochrane
2009: 3), as he had observed in several decades of involvement in mining
sector community development programmes. If they are to succeed in the
long term, projects need to be chosen, designed, managed, and imple-
mented by the beneficiaries themselves, with all necessary support from
partners and donors.
Of course, if people neighbouring an extractives project are poor and have
little infrastructure available, then it may seem easy to see what they appar-
ently need—schools, roads, clinics, economic opportunities, etc. That is not
the point. The point is that, in order for them to become economically
empowered and self-motivated about their future development, they need to
be enabled to plan and chart their own destiny, with the help and support of
companies and other development agents. There are numerous examples
demonstrating that what people assess as their own needs may be quite
different from what ‘experts’ say they need. A particularly striking example
of ‘expert ignorance’ is discussed in Box 28.1. This results in the failure of
projects, which rarely receive community support once any initial grants,
funds, or gifts from the project promoters are finished. The way to promote
the sustainability of social investments is to empower people by giving them
the choice of what projects they want to pursue, and the dignity and auton-
omy to make their own decisions. This is the essence of participation.
In a widely respected handbook on corporate community engagement,
Zandvliet and Anderson (2009) advise the following:
Company-aided community projects should always connect to and support com-
munities . . . to reach their long-term aspirations. Independent outside NGOs or
facilitators . . . can conduct assessments by using a participatory rural appraisal
(PRA) to determine the aspirations of the community and to prioritize these
based on available resources. . . . communities often prioritize training and
strengthening of soft skills if they know a company is prepared to support them
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over a longer period of time. Some companies assist local communities . . . in
designing a longer-term development plan [which] can also help the community
to solicit support from donors other than the company.
(Zandvliet and Anderson 2009: 148)
This is exactly what is described in the case study below.
28.3.3 Participatory Planning in Action: Tanzanian Examples
By utilizing participatory planning methods to design social investment pro-
grammes in collaboration with local communities, extractives companies and
development partners such as governments and donor agencies have a better
chance of their investments becoming of sustainable value. This has also been
recognized by progressive governments such as Tanzania’s, which introduced
a participatory planning process for three-year rolling development plans at
village level in 2002, called Obstacles and Opportunities for Development
(O&OD). See Fjelstad et al. (2010), JICA (2008), and SNV (2008) for research
on this programme.
28.3.3.1 CASE STUDY: PARTICIPATORY PLANNING
IN NZEGA DISTRICT, TANZANIA
An Australian mining company, Resolute Mining Limited, was the first com-
pany to open a modern gold mine in Tanzania.6 Resolute started producing
gold in 1998 at its Golden Pride Mine in Nzega District, Tabora Region, in
western Tanzania. In 2000, the company took an innovative decision to try to
encourage local communities to empower themselves and take responsibility
for their own development plans. Resolute elected to use PRA methods to
establish the foundations of its community development programme and
Box 28.1 THE FAILURE OF NON-PARTICIPATORY PROJECTS
The mismatch of ‘expert’ good intentions and the needs and priorities of local people
has been clearly illustrated by Ernesto Sirolli, originally in his book Ripples from the
Zambezi (Sirolli 1999) and more recently in a very engaging TED talk (Sirolli 2012). In
these works, Sirolli recounts the series of project failures experienced by him and his
Italian development colleagues in Zambia. They failed primarily because they did not
consult the local people but tried to introduce projects that the community knew were
not feasible. Few development practitioners have been so frank in their admission and
analysis of their own mistakes, which makes Sirolli’s work remarkable and valuable for
understanding the need for participation for project success.
6 An early version of this case study appeared in ICMM (2012: 170) and an abbreviated version
was included in Macdonald et al. (2015).
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engaged two experienced Tanzanian facilitators to conduct a participatory
planning exercise in the four villages closest to the mine’s perimeter. The
objective of the programme was to encourage the communities to develop
their own Community Action Plans (CAPs), which the company could then
work with and support.
This was the first time that Nzega community members had been asked
what their development priorities were. Note that the Tanzanian govern-
ment’s O&OD programme had not commenced at this stage and had still
not reached Nzega by 2008, so this was a new process for the district and
village officials, as well as the community ( JICA 2008). Resolute expanded the
participatory planning process to cover a wider area and had underwritten
community planning processes in twenty-nine villages by the end of 2006
(Mavura 2007). When communities had completed their CAPs, the mine’s
Community Development team worked with community leaders to select
projects to cooperate on, in collaboration and alignment with local govern-
ment development plans.
The company assessed that over time it had been involved with some
activities that were successful, and others that were less so, stating: ‘It is
difficult to be prescriptive about what you should or should not do’
(Sullivan 2014: 27). This is especially the case when enabling communities
to decide upon their own priorities, and supporting activities selected by
communities. However, in choosing to work with communities in a partici-
patory manner and supporting their priority projects, as long as these are in
keeping with the company’s parameters for community investment, com-
panies are guaranteed the support and involvement of community members.
It is important to remember that throughout the world there is a high level of
early failure among small businesses and ventures, so a certain level of
project failure is not a reason for abandoning grassroots participatory pro-
jects and opting for large-scale ‘expert-designed’ projects instead. What is
essential is that community entrepreneurs and local leaders learn from those
mistakes so that they have a greater chance of subsequent success. This is
true capacity-building.
The use of PRA in Resolute’s community development programmes at
its Golden Pride Mine in Tanzania, over a fifteen-year period, demonstrates
that this approach can be undertaken in a low-key, cost-effective, and sustain-
able manner. The PRA approach allows people to build their capacity by
making their own choices and learning through their own successes and
failures. PRA methods specifically include women and a wide spectrum of
society, to ensure that projects are broadly based and widely supported.
Although there has not been a published study evaluating the outcomes of
the Golden Pride participatory planning programme, the company in 2012
was awarded a Tanzanian Presidential Award for Empowerment Programs for
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Communities—recognition by the government of its efforts in community
empowerment (Resolute 2013).
The mine ceased production in February 2014 and completed planned
closure arrangements and handover to the Tanzanian government in Novem-
ber 2015. This process was guided by a Statutory Mine Closure Plan agreed
between the Tanzanian government and Golden Pride Mine management in
2011. It included community development commitments aimed at fostering
alternative income generation and specifically mentioned that PRA was the
basis of its planning process. Some examples of long-running community
development programmes are the use of maize milling machines by small
business operators near the mine site. This has improved the income-earning
capacity for local farmers, as has an expanding project in pig husbandry
that has improved the local livestock supply. The closure process incorpor-
ated the handing-over of social infrastructure—including a maternity ward
at the local hospital, a medical laboratory at a health centre, and a number
of school buildings—to the government, under the auspices of the National
Closure Committee. The town water treatment plant was also part of the
handover, as was the filling of the mine pit with water suitable for crop
irrigation and livestock watering (Resolute 2014). Clearly, the ongoing
management and maintenance of this infrastructure will need to be coord-
inated by government agencies, but the mine’s management was hopeful
that the years of community and local government capacity-building that
they have supported through their participatory planning processes will
lead to ongoing success.
28.3.3.2 BUZWAGI GOLD MINE
Another Tanzanian mining sector example is that of African Barrick Gold
(now Acacia Mining), which worked with the Kahama District administra-
tion in 2010 by supporting the O&OD process in the three villages most
affected by its Buzwagi Gold Mine, sponsoring additional training in partici-
patory rural appraisal (PRA) techniques by Professor Francis Lelo, an expert
from Kenya. The mine then worked with local government to align the
mine’s community development programmes with village development pri-
orities.7 This raises another common theme of good local community devel-
opment planning—the need to align programmes with existing schemes
wherever possible.
7 Interview with Ms Eliza Bwana, District Executive Director, Kahama, 29 June 2012.




Participatory planning, in which community groups determine their own
development priorities and design their own community development pro-
jects, is an approach to social investment that is more likely to lead to sus-
tainable, community-supported initiatives than projects designed by external
experts. Extractives companies can work with their host communities to
facilitate the participatory planning process, if needed, and should then
cooperate with communities and local governments to work out the intersec-
tions between the varying priorities of the different stakeholder groups. The
areas where the interests overlap will be the most fruitful ones for develop-
ment cooperation. Some national governments, such as Tanzania’s, have their
own participatory planning processes in place (O&OD), so companies can
work with local government and communities to discover areas of mutual
interest for social and economic investment.
28.4 Conclusions
This chapter makes a case for elevating the status of communities and local
governments in the development planning processes associated with extrac-
tives projects. This study finds that growing levels of corporate expenditure do
not usually improve conditions for community members on the ground,
largely because most programmes are designed without their involvement,
and often do not reflect their needs and priorities.
In addition to identifying a need to increase human resources to enable
greater interaction between companies and their local stakeholders, observers
advise that expanded efforts to enhance alignment between companies and
governments are essential. The decentralization of extractives revenues is also
seen as a key step in increasing the capacity of local governments and com-
munities to benefit from the resources sector.
Donor agencies could play a greater role in bringing their expertise in
participatory planning, monitoring, and evaluation into the extractives
arena. This could contribute much to improved outcomes for the neighbours
of resource extraction projects. Although there is no doubt that extractives
companies continue to devote resources to the human development of the
countries in which their projects are located, a realignment that directs more
attention to building relationships and inclusive planning processes at the
grassroots level could make these corporate investments more effective. In
that way, in the terminology of Banks et al. (2013), ‘intentional’ development
could come closer to ‘immanent’ development in improving the lives of those
affected by extractives projects.
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Approaches to Supporting Local
and Community Development
The View from Zambia
Angel Mondoloka
29.1 Introduction
Mining is the largest sector of the Zambian economy and accounts for
75 per cent of exports and 10 per cent of total private-sector employment.
As has been the case elsewhere in the world, however, the relationship
between mining companies and their host communities has been fractious.
In Zambia, that relationship has evolved at a rapid pace but with no clear
consensus on the path towards sustainability.1
The end of the so-called super-cycle in 2015 resulted in massive job losses
and significant reductions in social investments by the mining companies.
In September 2015, for example, the Carlisa Investments-owned Mopani
Copper Mines (MCM) informed the government that it intended to lay off
more than 3,800 workers because of lower metal prices and high production
costs due, in part, to electricity shortages. The challenges to the sustainabil-
ity of the Zambian mining industry include this notable dependence on
foreign investments and markets and the overall national context of poverty.
1 I wish to acknowledge the contributions of the ILO and WWF to the social and economic
development discourse in Zambia. I also express my gratitude to the many individuals and
organizations that made this chapter possible through the valuable time, information, and
insights they shared with me. This input and support was drawn from the relevant government
departments and agencies, mining industry personnel responsible for CSER programming, civil
society organizations, and leaders and members of the mining host communities discussed in the
chapter. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this chapter are mine and do
not necessarily reflect the views of any of the parties mentioned above.
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In 2011, the World Bank upgraded Zambia to lower-middle-income status but
the country’s social indicators continue to be unsatisfactory. The country’s
dire socio-economic situation is evidenced, in part, by a high HIV/AIDS preva-
lence of 11.6 per cent among adults aged 15 to 49 years,2 54.4 per cent of
Zambians living below the poverty line (with 40.8 per cent living in extreme
poverty),3 high infant mortality at 45 deaths per 1,000 live births4 (2015 MDG
target: 35.7), an under-five mortality rate of 75 per 1,000 live births (2015
MDG target: 63.6), and a high maternal mortality ratio of 210 per 100,000 live
births (2015 MDG target: 162.3). The adverse social and human development
context is also underlined by rapid population growth, high rates of urbaniza-
tion and unemployment, and low and uneven incomes, with high income
inequality. Zambia’s Gini coefficient of 69 per cent5 compares with an average
of 45 per cent for sub-Saharan Africa.
On the environment front, the country has shortcomings that are exacer-
bated by pollution arising from mining activity:
Decades of copper, cobalt, zinc, and lead mining have left many areas of the
country contaminated with poisonous substances. Impacts include air pollution
from the fumes, gases, and dust; soil contamination from hazardous effluents;
water (surface and ground) pollution from effluents, waterways from mines,
plants, and dumps; destruction of vegetation and wildlife habitat due to
subsistence; deforestation, fumes, and direct health hazards. (Smit 2013: 251)
Zambian copper ore bodies mostly consist of sulphides, consequent to which
the copper extraction process produces sulphur dioxide fumes, which cause
respiratory and other health problems in people. In addition, the acid rain
that results from these toxic fumes causes the acidification of surrounding
soils and loss of vegetative cover.
29.1.1 Historical Context of Social Responsibility in Zambian Mining
Zambia’s history of mining dates back to the 1920s, when the country then
known as Northern Rhodesia was still a British colony. The mining industry
has been the main engine of the country’s socio-economic development
through a combination of tax contributions and the delivery of social services
to its host communities. However, changes in ownership and governance of
the industry over the years, together with the cyclicality of commodity prices
on the global markets, have had implications for the nature, scale, and scope
of the social services delivered by the industry.
2 ICAP at Columbia University (2016). 3 CSO (2016).
4 2015 (CSO, MOH, ICF 2014). 5 CSO (2016).
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29.1.1.1 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE
PRIVATIZATION
Prior to independence and the 1969 nationalization of the industry involving
the transfer of 51 per cent of all existing mines to the state, the mines in
Zambia were owned by the Anglo American Corporation (AAC) and Roan
Selection Trust (RST). These two private companies provided housing, educa-
tion, health, recreation, waste management, and water and sanitation services
as part of a comprehensive employment package for their workers. Fraser and
Lungu (2007: 8) note that as early as 1929 the private mining companies had
become responsible for a wide range of social and medical facilities for both
their workers and managers. These included sanitary and orderly housing
compounds for employees; food rations such as maize-meal, millet, rice,
beans, meat, and fresh vegetables; hospitals, with competent medical person-
nel at all mining settlements; as well as recreation clubs offering many sport-
ing and entertainment activities.
Post-nationalization, the government continued this social welfare pro-
gramme and began to expand and leverage it for reasons of political expedi-
ency. In 1982, the two nationalized companies were combined to form Zambia
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) which, in effect, became a conduit for
this expanded state largesse under the guise of corporate social responsibility
(CSR). As Fraser and Lungu (2007) explain in greater detail, ZCCM literally
operated ‘a cradle-to-grave’ welfare policy, even subsidizing burial arrange-
ments for the dead. In this respect ZCCM’s actions reflected the development
philosophy of the post-colonial Zambia, and were even more generous in
scope than those seen during the colonial period—offering things such as
free education for miners’ children, alongside subsidized housing and food,
electricity, water, and transport. Further, as Fraser and Lungu also explain in
some detail, the mines extended these social supports to the whole
communities in which they had a presence. ZCCM’s activities included
the maintenance of local roads, refuse collections, and catering facilities.
The company also supported shops, farms to supply food to the mine areas,
other industrial activities, youth training and development schemes, and
women’s clubs for home-crafts. Additionally, in mining areas and towns such
as Nchanga and Konkola, by the time of privatization, ZCCM had effectively
replaced government as the operator of hospital facilities with one or two
hospitals at each of its operating divisions; see Fraser and Lungu (2007: 8).
Following the oil crises of 1974 and 1979, Zambia fell into a crippling debt
crisis while the country’s terms of trade began a declining trend as copper
prices collapsed for the next two decades, at the end of which Zambia was
ranked among the poorest countries in the world. Predictably, this placed a
severe strain on social services provision by ZCCM, which nonetheless con-
tinued to be treated as a ‘cash cow’ by the government.
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29.1.1.2 THE ZCCM PRIVATIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
FOR CSR
The coming of multi-party democracy to Zambia in 1991 gave birth to an
increasingly active and competitive political arena with a multiplicity of
political parties. Economic liberalization, meanwhile, introduced new players
and services in industries such as telecommunications, which has achieved
one of the highest rates of mobile phone penetration in Africa in recent years.
The previous UNIP (United National Independence Party) government had
drawnmuch of its patronage and power from the country’s state-owned indus-
trial base, of which the largest and most strategic enterprise was ZCCM. Thus,
an aggressive privatization campaign was initiated in 1992 to sell 280 state-
owned companies, including the mines. Between 1997 and 2000, ZCCM was
split into seven units and sold.
The final andmost important stage of privatization was the negotiation and
signing of the, now superseded, Development Agreements with each of the
companies. ‘These secret documents established the terms under which the
mines were sold, and the rights and responsibilities of the Zambian state and
the newmining companies. The original agreements were negotiated between
1997 and 2000’ (Fraser and Lungu 2007: 15). Among the key provisions in
the Development Agreements were those on taxation and the environment.
To promote greenfield investments and reinvestment during the decline in
copper prices at the time, corporate income tax rates were substantially
reduced and sales tax was replaced by value added tax (VAT).
On the environment front, during the ZCCM era, the government had set
limits, with corresponding penalties, on the amount of pollution the mines
could discharge into the rivers and atmosphere. The Development Agree-
ments contained significant exemptions from these provisions as long as
the private companies did not exceed the limits that had been set for
ZCCM. The exemptions were granted subject to the company’s submission,
to the Environmental Council of Zambia (ECZ),6 of an Environmental
Management Plan (EMP) whose implementation would be subject to self-
reporting, by the company, and monitoring by ECZ.
Although there was a widely held assumption that the Development Agree-
ments did not bind the private mining companies to continuing ZCCM’s
legacy of corporate social and environmental responsibility, it was found, for
example, that Mopani Copper Mines’ Development Agreement included the
following clause:
GRZ wishes to ensure that the continued development and exploitation of the
commercial deposits of copper and cobalt ore . . . together with the development
6 Now the Zambia Environmental Management Agency (ZEMA).
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and operation of the smelter, refinery, concentrators, and cobalt plant will secure
the maximum benefit for, and adequately contribute to the advancement and
the social and economic welfare of, the people of Zambia, including the people
in the vicinity of the Contract Area in a manner consistent with their needs and
the protection of the environment and, at the same time, secure an appropriate
return on investment for the company. (Fraser and Lungu 2007: 16)
Therefore, it is probable that the Development Agreements did attempt to
transfer ZCCM’s corporate, social, and environmental responsibility (CSER)
legacy to the new owners and that any gaps noted have been due to failures in
implementation and regulation.
29.1.1.3 CSER SHORTCOMINGS FOLLOWING PRIVATIZATION
In 2001, Patricia Feeney, then with Oxfam, observed that the 1995
privatisation of Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which was actively
encouraged by the donor community as ameans of reducing corruption, inefficiency,
and waste, was supposed to bring new investment to the Copperbelt, reinvigorating
the local economy and restoring its severely degraded and contaminated envir-
onment. In reality, despite all the talk about corporate social responsibility, the
new mine owners have shown themselves remarkably reluctant to assist cash-
strapped local councils [to] improve social service provision. They are even less
inclined to shoulder some of the burden of cleaning up ZCCM’s environmental
legacy. (Feeney 2001)
Just over a decade later, in 2013, in what she termed ‘yet another example of
the resource curse’, Zarina Geloo echoed this observation and commented
that despite Zambia’s copper industry doing extremely well—and the country
now being the third largest copper producer in the world, with record produc-
tion of over 700,000 tons in 2011—the promise that the industry would
provide a huge boost to the government’s tax revenues while ‘pumping
huge amounts into local communities, thanks to the law that five percent
of mining revenue must be ploughed back into them’, had, in fact, not
materialized:
Outside the fences and fortified walls of themines, communities continue to suffer
from acute poverty and a miserable quality of life––with little access to basic
services and even less hope. Firstly, the government has not enforced the five
percent rule. Instead, mines have only been made to undertake some kind of
corporate social responsibility scheme––usually building a few schools and
clinics or digging some boreholes. Seldom is there any genuine consultation
with the people in the communities. And very rarely do these gestures foster any
long-term change. (Geloo 2013)
Geloo noted further that many workers were retrenched when the mines were
privatized. On the ongoing decent work deficit in the industry, she noted that
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many of the current employees in the industry were low-skilled casual labourers,
who were often paid below the minimum wage and were not entitled to
accommodation, health care, or education allowances.
Due to the aggressive urbanization associated with mining communities,
combined with the lack of technical and financial capacity among the local
authorities in these areas, uncontrolled illegal settlements have mushroomed
with little or no water, sanitation, or other services. Correspondingly, high
unemployment rates in these areas have created soaring rates of crime and
various forms of institutional and petty corruption. The reality on the ground
in the Copperbelt has belied the general expectation that private investment
in the mining sector would translate into job creation for workers and a bigger
market for locally produced goods and services. There are grave concerns
about the conduct of the mining companies with respect to the labour, health
and safety, and environmental laws of the country.
Among the environmental impacts suffered by mining communities are
large amounts of toxic sulphur dioxide fumes that are emitted into the air by
mine smelters, resulting in serious respiratory and eye problems, which have
reportedly caused some deaths. These toxic fumes also cause ‘sulphuric’ acid
rain, which has rendered the soil infertile over vast areas of the country, with
adverse consequences for smallholder farmers and other agricultural activity.
Another environmental impact has been the contamination of water bodies
(such as the Kafue River) andwetlands due to the discharge of toxic waste from
the mines’ operations. Without external assistance from organizations such as
the Southern Africa ResourceWatch (SARW), the communities that host these
mining operations have generally been powerless to engage the mining com-
panies and other stakeholders in viable debate in order to achieve equitable
outcomes. This lack of negotiating power and effective stakeholdership—
‘abjection’7 in the terminology of James Ferguson (1999: 236)—on the part
of themining communities hasmade the resource curse a painful and inescap-
able reality for them.
There has also been a history of strained relationships with the Zambian
government, which is on record as having accused foreign-owned mining
businesses of not contributing sufficiently to socio-economic development
in Zambia by expatriating the lion’s share of their profits, failing to give
business to local companies, and flouting tax regimes. For their part, the
mining companies have blamed the government for creating volatility in
the business environment by unilaterally decreeing minimumwage increases,
7 ‘Abjection can be understood as the process by which mineworkers have been “thrown aside,
expelled or discarded” during the economic liberalisation and privatisation of the Copperbelt,
leading to a sense of “debasement and humiliation” ’ (Ferguson 1999: 236).
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introducing ad hoc statutory instruments to regulate exports, and, allegedly at
one stage, openly encouraging industrial action among mine workers.
Meanwhile, foreign investors and workers have on different occasions been
embroiled in a protracted industrial conflict involving illegal strikes and
increasingly militant rhetoric from labour and business leaders. There have
also been isolated incidents of violence, resulting in deaths of both workers
and management representatives, as described in Section 29.1.1.4. Foreign
investors widely complain about low labour productivity and the high
cost of labour and other operating costs, while workers stress poor working
conditions and occupational health and safety concerns. The backdrop of
strained industrial relations, mine accidents, incidences of worker abuse, and
environmental damage resulting from mine companies’ operations has
increasingly turned public opinion against foreign direct investors in the
industry. The sub-regional debate on resource nationalism is also contributing
to the challenges to the sustainability, broadly defined, of mining in Zambia.
29.1.1.4 CHINA’S MINING FOOTPRINT IN ZAMBIA
China entered Zambia’s copper mining industry with the 1998 acquisition of
the Chambishi copper mine by China Nonferrous Metal Mining Corporation
(CNMC) on behalf of its subsidiary Non-Ferrous Company Africa (NFCA).
To date, China’s mining firms have invested more than US$1 billion in
Zambia’s copper sector. Politically, China’s engagement with Zambia has
become an increasingly contentious issue, with claims that Chinese invest-
ments are exploitative and that the Chinese mistreat Zambian workers. The
following incidents are illustrative:
 The largest health and safety incident since privatization occurred at
BGRIMM Explosive (Zambia), a subsidiary of NFCA, when its explosives
manufacturing plant in Chambishi was levelled in an explosion that took
the lives of around fifty Zambian workers in April 2005 (Fraser and Larmer
2010: 96).
 In 2010, Chinese executives opened fire on workers protesting against
poor pay and conditions at the Collum coal mine in Sinazongwe district,
in the Southern province. Eleven miners were reportedly hospitalized
with wounds.
 In late 2011, Human Rights Watch issued a scathing report on Zambia’s
copper industry that accused Chinese firms of a number of abuses, includ-
ing forcing workers to work 12-to-18-hour shifts (Zambian law limits
shifts to eight hours) and endangeringminers’ health and safety by failing
to replace damaged equipment and providing inadequate ventilation
underground.
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 In 2012, a Chinese national was killed during a riot by Zambianworkers at
Maamba Coal Mine about 250 km from Lusaka. This was consequent to
failure by the mine’s Chinese owners to pay the, then just implemented,
minimum wage of K1,000 for general workers.
In response, the Chinese—who have been lauded by African leaders for their
‘no strings attached’ approach to aid and investment on the continent—have
worked tirelessly to strengthen their relationships with the government regard-
less of party affiliation.
29.1.1.5 THE AUDITOR GENERAL’S 2014 REPORT ON
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
In response to the failure of the mining industry to achieve socially and
environmentally sustainable mining practices, the Zambian government’s
Office of the Auditor General (OAG) undertook an audit of the environmental
practices of mining companies in Zambia in 2014, together with an assess-
ment of the government’s regulatory capacity (OAG 2014). The factors motiv-
ating the audit also included public interest concerns raised by several
stakeholders, who cited issues such as lack of integrated mining policies,
failure to disclose Developmental Agreements, failure by themines tomitigate
the effects of environmental degradation, and unfair resettlements. The main
audit findings included the following:
a) Mining companies are not complying with the environmental rules,
laws, regulations, and licensing conditions set by government;
b) Measures put in place by government to ensure that the environmental
degradation caused by mining activities is adequately managed (or miti-
gated) are not working effectively; and (consequently),
c) government’s national development priority—as set out in the National
Policy on Environment—of balancing economic growth with environmen-
tal protection, to improve the overall quality of life of the people of
Zambia, is not being achieved (OAG 2014).
29.1.2 The Zambian Policy Context
The Zambian government’s Vision 2030 document expresses the national
aspiration to become ‘A Prosperous Middle-Income Nation by 2030’. The
strategic roadmap towards this goal is provided by the government’s system
of five-year plans, of which the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP)
2011–15 was superseded by the Seventh National Development Plan (7NDP)
2016–20. In August 2013, the government had issued the Revised
Sixth National Development Plan 2013–16 (R-SNDP) with the theme
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Extractive Industries
618
‘People-Centred Development’ to focus on inclusive growth, rural develop-
ment, and job creation in the light of the government’s ‘realisation that
economic growth alone does not inherently contribute to improvements in
human development and poverty reduction’.8 Specific R-SNDP objectives
included increased investment in capital projects and programmes in agricul-
ture, infrastructure development, human resource development (focusing on
education and skills development), quality health services, water and sanita-
tion, and energy. Through R-SNDP, the government also aimed to accelerate
its implementation of the decentralization policy (GRZ 2013).
29.2 Mining Impacts and CSER
Mondoloka (2017: Figure 1) illustrates the multidimensional nature of
mining’s social, economic, environmental, and other impacts at the local,
regional, and national levels. CSER is a way for mining businesses to ensure
their active compliance with the spirit of laws, ethical standards, and inter-
national norms in order to enhance the social and environmental sustainabil-
ity of their operations. Part of the challenge in Zambia has been the lack of a
consensus on CSER and, correspondingly, the lack of a legislative framework
for it. In consequence, Zambia navigates CSER through a smorgasbord of
legislative and regulatory frameworks that are focused on labour and enter-
prise development issues. The government’s contention has been that actions
that are legal obligations cannot be considered to be CSER and has, corres-
pondingly, resisted calls to legislate CSER and make it a legally binding
requirement.
Social responsibility, as defined by ISO 26000, is the responsibility of an
organization for the impacts of its decisions and activities on society and the
environment through transparent and ethical behaviour that: (i) contributes
to sustainable development, including the health and welfare of society;
(ii) takes into account the expectations of stakeholders; (iii) is in compliance
with applicable law and consistent with international norms of behaviour;
and (iv) is integrated throughout the organization and practised in its rela-
tionships. Sustainable development is about meeting the needs of society
while living within the planet’s ecological limits and without jeopardizing
the ability of future generations to meet their needs (World Commission on
Environment and Development 1987). In its Community Development Toolkit,
the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM 2012: 15) defines
community development as ‘the process of increasing the strength and
8 Hon. Alexander Chikwanda, Minister of Finance, in a speech at the National Stakeholders
Meeting on the Revised Sixth National Development Plan 2013–2016, 22 August 2013.
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effectiveness of communities, improving people’s quality of life, and enabling
people to participate in decision-making to achieve greater long-term control
over their lives’.
29.2.1 The Growing Prominence of CSER in Zambia
As noted earlier, democratization and economic liberalization heightened the
public’s general awareness of the political, economic, and social issues affect-
ing them. This resulted in a more activist stance by the general public towards
the mining companies. Thus, the democratization of information in Zambia,
through the political process and the encroachment of technology, has con-
tributed to increased public awareness of the issues and helped create the
demand for more sustainable practices and win–win outcomes. In the mean-
time, there has been a growing recognition among corporate leaders in the
industry of the increasing significance of the environmental, social, and
economic challenges facing, or being created by, mining operations. This
has been partly influenced by the mines’ exposure to the international capital
markets, where precedents and best practices are set in the context of more
advanced legal and regulatory frameworks shaped by heightened sensibilities
towards the social and environmental sustainability of economic activity.
In view of the significance of its mining footprint in Zambia, it is instructive
to note that China’s government has taken steps in recent years to promote
the social and environmental sustainability of Chinese investments both at
home and abroad. The previously noted ‘no strings attached’ approach, with
its reliance on the acquiescence of political and economic elites, has proved
increasingly unsustainable owing to the rise of the grassroots activism noted
earlier.9 In particular, the Chinese government has been encouraging Chinese
companies in Africa to adopt more sustainable practices out of concern over
the potentially adverse impacts of negative media reports (Russell 2007).
A salient example of this trend is the promulgation, by the Chinese govern-
ment through the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals and
Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC 2014), of its Chinese Guidelines
for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investment (Chinese Mining Guide-
lines for short) in Beijing on 24October 2014. The guidelines represent the first
industry-specific guidance on social responsibility for the Chinese mining
industry. CCCMC is a subordinate unit of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce.
It represents a membership of more than six thousand companies, the major-
ity of which are Chinese mining companies investing abroad and trading
9 Chinese mining companies have notably also exhibited better corporate citizenship in
jurisdictions, such as South Africa, that have high standards of governance than in other African
states where laws and enforcement mechanisms are comparatively weak.
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mineral, metal, and hydrocarbon products. The guidelines require Chinese
mining companies to integrate social and environmental considerations into
their investment decision-making and operations abroad. Their development
was informed by a large body of internationally recognized social and envir-
onmental responsibility standards.
In the light of the above imperatives, among others, CSER has taken on a
new prominence for business owners and managers out of concern for how
sustainability issues affect their social licence to operate (SLO) and, hence, the
bottom line. In this context, mining companies in Zambia are increasingly
looking beyond their traditional business models to integrate social and eco-
nomic development imperatives into their business strategies and operations.
29.2.2 The Lingering Crisis of Expectations Following
the Privatization of ZCCM
The ZCCM era, which lasted from the 1970s until the commencement of
privatization in the mid-1990s, was a golden era for government largesse
disguised as CSR. ZCCM paid no taxes but built the infrastructure, and
provided practically all the social services, that were, ordinarily, the respon-
sibility of the local authorities in the mining areas. The result has been a
lingering confusion in the minds of the public as to the nature of CSER and
the respective responsibilities of the government, on the one hand, and the
mining companies, on the other. Mining companies in Zambia are, there-
fore, faced with a massive expectations gap, which is worsened by the
government’s continuing failure to undertake the necessary development
projects and deliver corresponding social services in mining communities.
29.3 Case Studies in Zambia’s Mining Communities
This section narrates the CSER approaches adopted by two multinational
mining corporations and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of
their approaches. Kansanshi Mining Plc is a subsidiary of First Quantum
Minerals Ltd (FQM). Nonferrous Company Africa Mining Plc (NFCA) is a
subsidiary of CNMC.10
FQM’s sustainability strategy is underlined by a commitment to progress
towards sustainable development through economically viable investments,
10 Mondoloka (2017) discusses these two companies, together with the CSER approaches of an
additional three companies: Kalumbila Minerals Ltd, Lumwana Mining Company, and China
Luanshya Mine (CLM). These are subsidiaries of FQM, Barrick Gold, and CNMC, in that order.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 23/8/2018, SPi
Supporting Local and Community Development: Zambia
621
technically appropriate operations, environmentally sound practices, and
socially responsible actions. The company has been relatively successful in
mainstreaming its processes for operating its sustainability programmes
internally and across its community footprint.
The vision of Barrick Gold, the Canadian mining conglomerate, is ‘the
generation of wealth through responsible mining—wealth for our owners,
our people, and the countries and communities with which we partner’
(Barrick Gold Corporation 2016). Its statement on sustainability reads in part:
As a company and as individuals, we must guide our conduct by the highest
standards of honesty, integrity, and ethical behaviour. At Barrick, we are
committed to building, operating, and closing our mines in a safe and
responsible manner. To do this, we put a priority on developing long-term and
mutually beneficial relationships with host governments and communities while
working to minimize and mitigate the social and environmental impacts of our
activities. (Barrick Gold Corporation 2016)
CNMC issued its first country-level Social Responsibility Report for Zambia in 2011,
covering its nine subsidiaries in the country. The report asserted its compliance
with the CSR Guidelines for State-owned Enterprises issued by the Chinese gov-
ernment’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
(SASAC) of the State Council. The report was also prepared in consultation
with ISO 26000 and the Sustainability Reporting Guidelines of the Global Report-
ing Initiative (GRI). As part of the report, the ‘CSR Declaration by CNMC
Enterprises in Zambia’ reads in part:
We are committed to creating a model of ‘China and Zambia Cooperate for
Common Development’ . . .We promise to operate in a responsible manner, and
fully implement the sustainable development strategy during our strategic
planning, decision making, and daily operation. Operating in a transparent way:
regularly making public our status quo, planning, and measures in sustainable
development; improving communication channels and dialog mechanism; and
accepting the supervision by stakeholders on our own initiative. (CNMC 2011: 12)
29.3.1 FQM’s Kansanshi Mining
Kansanshi Mining began its operations 8 km to the north of Solwezi in 2005.
It is capable of producing 340,000 tonnes of copper and over 120,000 ounces
of gold per year. Kapijimpanga and Kimasala Wards are in proximity to
Kansanshi Mine. They have populations of 16,747 people (3,353 households)
and 36,287 (7,167 households), respectively (CSO 2010). Solwezi, historically
a farming community, is the capital of the North-Western province of Zambia
and is a growingmining investment area. The town has never had good roads or
other infrastructure and is now suffering from problems caused by ultra-rapid
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urbanization. The rapid influx of jobseekers, for example, has outstripped the
supply of housing.
29.3.1.1 KANSANSHI MINING’S CSER INTERVENTIONS
In addition to investments in social services, such as health and education,
Kansanshi Mining has implemented a number of sustainability programmes
designed to: (i) mitigate the displacement of indigenous populations;
(ii) strengthen employability, entrepreneurship, and agriculture-based liveli-
hoods in the area; (iii) prevent, mitigate, andmonitor environmental impacts;
and (iv) conserve local wildlife.
To mitigate the geographical and socio-economic displacement that
resulted from the creation of its Tailings Storage Facility, the company allo-
cated land within the existingmining licence area to 267 affected households.
A Resettlement Working Group (RWG) was formed to agree, through public
consultations, on a framework for compensation. The RWG also ensured that
information was disseminated back to the other project-affected households.
In the area of skills development for employment and entrepreneurship, the
company entered an agreement with the Solwezi Trades Training Institute
(SOTTI) in 2011 and invested US$1.4 million in the Kwambula Learnership
Programme aimed at providing participants with the opportunity to get a
valid craft qualification and, with it, a better chance at getting a good job
with the mine or with other employers.
On the agriculture front, the company is running a very successful pro-
gramme to train local subsistence farmers in conservation farming. The com-
pany’s target is to train 2,000 farmers from the surrounding rural area, of
whom more than 300 have already been trained. Yield increases of up to
eight times have been reported by the farmers, and the costs of training are
covered in full by the company. This is a promising opportunity for income,
food, and nutritional security for the local community through profitable
participation in non-core and non-mining value chains.
In the realm of environmental management, the company commissioned
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) of various projects, including the
New Sulphide Storage Facility, the 12 mtpa11 Copper Oxide Ore Treatment
Facility Upgrade, the No. 5 Sulphuric Acid Plant, the Proposed Copper Smelter,
and the Kansanshi Mine Decommissioning and Closure Plan. In addition, the
mine’s operations are subject to regular environmental monitoring to measure
ambient air anddust andnoise levelswithinandnear to themine. Theminehas
also developed procedures based on the ISO 14001 Environmental Manage-
ment System (EMS) for the transportation, handling, and storage of acids, mill
11 million tonnes per annum.
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reagents, andother hazardousmaterials. Beingupstreamof Solwezi townon the
Solwezi river, the main source of water supply in Solwezi district, the mine has
been careful to ensure its compliance with Zambian and international effluent
discharge standards.
As part of its non-mining value chain community development interven-
tions, the company has implemented an important wildlife conservation
programme. The Game Management Area (GMA) within the Kansanshi min-
ing concession has substantial stocks of animals. The company has rolled out
a successful anti-poaching programme, with a full-time anti-poaching unit
and a community-based wildlife conservation officer, who conducts informa-
tion sessions with inhabitants of surrounding villages to encourage a culture
of nature conservation.
29.3.1.2 PERSPECTIVES AND REACTIONS OF THE SOLWEZI
COMMUNITY
While it is clear that the mine has brought new life to Solwezi town, the local
community’s feelings towards Kansanshi Mining Plc have ranged from
ambivalence to outright hostility. Although the mine has created jobs and
business opportunities, unemployment remains high, due partly to the influx
of jobseekers and vendors from other towns and partly to the high illiteracy
levels in the community. Youths bear the brunt of this impact, which has led
to delinquent behaviour such as alcohol and drug abuse, and there has not
been adequate investment in corresponding social programmes to address
these problems. Another source of disquiet for the community is the continu-
ing deficiency in social services owing to the shortage of schools, health
facilities, and water and sanitation infrastructure. The community is also
unhappy about the dust pollution caused by the mine’s activities.
29.3.2 Nonferrous Company Africa Mining
China’sNonferrousCompanyAfricaMiningPlc (NFCA) tookover theChambishi
mine in 1998 and it became operational five years later. NFCA is owned by
CNMC and Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings
(ZCCM-IH). NFCA’s underground mine produces 6,500 tonnes of copper ore
per day, on average. Additional mining activity at the West Ore Body com-
menced in 2011 and has since been producing some 1 million tonnes per
annum. In 2012, NFCA began work on the South-East Ore Body (SEOB),
whose capacity is up to 3.3 million tonnes of copper ore per annum.
29.3.2.1 NFCA’S CSER INTERVENTIONS
With the exception of its scholarship programme, NFCA’s social responsibility
interventions have tended to be philanthropic (i.e. ‘give a man a fish’), rather
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than community empowerment-driven (i.e. ‘teach a man to fish’), as illustrated
by the examples in this section. In 2008, NFCA donated fourteen butterfly
sewing machines and K10,000 for a chicken project to benefit the widows of
former miners in Chambishi. This was in addition to anti-malarial indoor
spraying activities, on behalf of the Ministry of Health’s Kalulushi District
Health Management Team (DHMT), at a cost of K18,000. In each of the
following three years, the company repeated the spraying exercise, at a cost
of K30,000. The company donated K10,000 to the Zambia Table Tennis Asso-
ciation (ZTTA) and also undertook some road rehabilitation work in Cham-
bishi and Kalulushi districts at a cost of US$275,168. In 2010, NFCA donated
K500,000 to the Kalulushi Municipal Council for development projects. This
social responsibility engagement continued in 2011, when the company
made donations to the Nkana Golf Club Tournament, undertook indoor
spraying, continued its road rehabilitation work in Kalulushi and Chambishi,
procured handheld radios for the provincial headquarters of the Zambia
Police in Ndola, and sponsored eighteen students to attend the Copperbelt
University (CBU).
In 2012, NFCA purchased an ambulance, a motorbike, and healthcare
equipment for K465,000. The company also constructed a classroom block
at Chambishi secondary school, at a cost of US$100,000, to increase its seating
capacity. NFCA also donated K50,000 to the Zambia Open Golf Tournament
Organizing Committee to help it launch the tournament. In the area of
infrastructure, the company donated road rehabilitation equipment to the
Kalulushi Municipal Council (KMC) worth K696,000. The company’s philan-
thropy continued into 2013, when it donated K12,897 for a bus shelter and a
car park in Kitwe. It also sponsored the Zambia Open Golf Tournament at a
cost of K270,000. In Kalulushi andMufulira, the company built a security wall
at a total cost of K210,157. It also donated a 140GMotor Grader caterpillar for
road rehabilitation to the KMC, at a cost of K730,800.
NFCA is committed to undertaking ecologically safe and environmentally
friendly operations. This is partially evidenced by its participation in World
Environment Day (5 June) activities each year since 2005. The company
promotes awareness of and education in ecological protection and environ-
mental sustainability through various activities.
29.3.2.2 PERSPECTIVES AND REACTIONS OF THE
CHAMBISHI COMMUNITY
Despite the company’s CSER efforts as noted above, residents of the Cham-
bishi, Musakashi, and Lukoshi townships, which are nearest to the mine’s
operations, report that their communities do not benefit adequately from the
mine’s activities. Meanwhile, farmers in the area complain that the company
has, on occasion, disrupted their livelihoods. In one instance, sixty-seven
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farmers from the Lukoshi area alleged that the company had destroyed their
farms and crops. Community representatives have also expressed strong reser-
vations about the company’s CSER practices and claim that the company’s
focus is on the politically visible urban areas and that it does nothing to
prevent or mitigate the pollution and environmental damage it causes in the
immediate surroundings.
29.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Mining
Companies’ Approaches
In each of the mining company CSER case studies profiled above, there is a
clear divergence between the mining companies’ self-assessments and the
perceptions of the mines’ host communities and other observers. While
each of the mining companies rates its CSER engagement favourably, a com-
monly held view within the communities is that themining companies’CSER
activities are mere window-dressing and that they do not deliver any real, or
lasting, benefits on the ground. This asymmetry of perceptions may be rooted
in elements of paternalism on the part of the mining companies, and unreal-
istic expectations resulting from the ZCCM legacy on the part of the host
communities. There is also an element of misunderstanding about the role of
local government in the area of social services provision in mining areas.
Nevertheless, the mismatch in perceptions begs the questions:
 Are the mining companies ‘doing the right things’?
 Or are they ‘doing things right’ and, in effect, merely ‘rearranging the
deck chairs on the Titanic’?
To the extent that they are focusedon ‘doing things right’,mining companies
will rate their own CSER interventions very highly. Their well-intentioned,
well-crafted, and well-implemented interventions may, however, suffer the
serious limitation of lack of congruence with the needs and priorities of the
mines’ stakeholders (primarily their host communities) due to the failure to
consult with them at the design stage, and a corresponding failure to secure the
stakeholders’ contributions to, and participation in, the implementation and
evaluation stages. Themismatch in perceptions is also partly fed byweaknesses
in structures and processes for community consultation, on the one hand, and
in monitoring and reporting of services delivery, on the other.
As illustrated above,both theWestern- andChinese-ownedmining companies
in Zambia aspire to the highest international standards of CSER best practice. In
particular, the CSER interventions of theWestern-owned Kansanshi Mining Plc,
Kalumbila Minerals Ltd, and Lumwana Mining Company have the advantage
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of being driven by clearly articulated, and well-disseminated, sustainability
strategies. Each of these mines has a well-staffed sustainability unit that reports
to an influentialmid-level executive. They are also relatively transparent in their
dealings with stakeholders, subject to the limitations of language and literacy in
their host communities. In terms of governance, these companies are answer-
able to the global capitalmarkets, influenced by powerful institutional investors
and their socially and environmentally conscious investment mandates. The
‘power of the purse’ wielded by these institutional investors means that the
mining companies are more likely to be responsive to their demands for sus-
tainable mining practices and community engagement.
In contrast, as noted earlier, CNMC and its subsidiaries are answerable to
the Chinese government. China has had a history of unwavering commit-
ment to investment in Zambia’s mining industry despite the rise and fall of
commodity prices on the global markets and the vicissitudes of the political
environment in the country. As a result, the Zambian government appears
to have applied little pressure on the Chinese copper mining companies to
meet national and international labour standards and generally accepted
CSER norms. Moreover, Chinese-owned mining companies in Zambia have
been relatively free of the fear of divestment by their government. This is
added to the fact that it is only within the past five years that the Chinese
government has begun to place the spotlight on social and environmental
sustainability in its outbound mining investments. Perhaps it is because of
the twin factors of assured funding by the Chinese government and lax
supervision by the Zambian government that CNMC and other Chinese
mining companies have had a relatively weak CSER record, denoted by
interventions that fall towards the altruistic, ‘window-dressing’ end of the
spectrum as opposed to the community-led, -owned, and -hosted interven-
tions that characterize substantive social and environmental responsibility.
With the possible exception of NFCA and Chambeshi Copper Mines (CCS),
another CNMC subsidiary, the corporate culture of Chinese mining companies
is generally more opaque to their host communities and other external stake-
holders out of the belief that their accountability ends at the highest levels of
government. These companies run the risk, therefore, of further alienating
their communities through their apparent lack of accountability to their
stakeholders.
Another aspect of the agency problem for both the Western- and Chinese-
owned mining companies in Zambia relative to their ownership is that of
the information asymmetries imposed by the geographical remoteness of their
operations from their sources of finance. From an institutional perspective, this
is exacerbated by the Zambian government’s lack of a CSER regulatory frame-
work, and its capacity limitations as noted in Section 29.1.1 above, which force
its regulatory agencies to rely on self-reporting by the mining companies.
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29.4.1 Key Shortcomings in CSER Approaches
At the tactical level, and to varying extents, the key shortcomings in mining
companies’ CSER approaches in Zambia include:
 Weaknesses in stakeholder coordination andmanagement and the appar-
ent failure to ensure community participation in the design, implemen-
tation, and monitoring of interventions.
 Adoption of a paternalistic, top-down, approach to programme design
and implementation, which has tended to alienate the host communities
while failing to address their needs and priorities.
 Failure to consult the local authority councillors within their host com-
munities about their CSER objectives, strategies, and programmes. Being
the gatekeepers to the host communities, the councillors are, potentially,
sources of great intelligence about the needs, local politics, and institu-
tional make-up of the host communities.
 Failure to mitigate the barriers imposed by the literacy and capacity
limitations within the host communities.
 Failure to develop a sufficient understanding of the power structures and
vested interests embedded within their host communities in order to
create the appropriate incentive structures
 Non-implementation of mutually acceptable communication channels
between the mines and their host communities to help engender trans-
parency, trust, and goodwill.
 Absence of accountability mechanisms involving community-based
monitoring and evaluation to promote transparency, community owner-
ship, and buy-in.
Partly due to these deficiencies, mining companies have generally been
unable to maximize the involvement of their host communities in their
mining and non-mining value chains through employment, entrepreneur-
ship, and participation in social services delivery.
29.4.2 Tripartite Dialogue and Other Success Factors for CSER
Among the key success factors for CSER engagement and implementation is
the existence of a tripartite dialogue involving the mining companies, their
host communities, and government. The approach to this tripartite dialogue
should be underpinned by the inculcation by themining companies of a sense
of shared responsibility in the counterparties. CSOs have a unique opportun-
ity to act as trusted brokers between the three parties owing to their strategic
positioning in the dialogue space between them (as depicted in Mondoloka
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2017: Figure 2). Corresponding to the multilevel and multidimensional
impacts of mining (Mondoloka 2017: Figure 1), the involvement of a broad
cross-section of CSOs is required. In themajority of cases, however, CSOs have
failed to achieve the unity of purpose or to establish the common platforms
required to enable them to fulfil this role.
An important limitation on the local government side is the tendency to
view CSER as a replacement for the government’s development program-
ming responsibilities. The mining companies are lobbying strongly and
promoting awareness of the local governments’ responsibility to use tax
revenues received from them for tangible development purposes. In this
regard, CSER on the part of the mining companies should be seen as com-
plementary to, and not a substitute for, the government’s development
responsibility and efforts.
CSER programming should include a requirement for monetary, or in-kind,
contributions by host communities to minimize the sense of entitlement and
to promote community ownership and stewardship.
29.5 Conclusions and Recommendations
An important gap in the Zambian mining context is the government’s laissez-
faire posture towards CSER on the grounds that it cannot be legislated. This
has resulted in the inconsistent CSER practices and virtual lack of account-
ability that have been noted. This contrasts with international trends that are
seeing sub-Saharan countries, such as Ghana, Tanzania, and Mozambique,
take measures to introduce national CSER policies aimed at ensuring that
organizations promote the welfare of their host communities.
29.5.1 The International Drive to Integrate CSER in Business Strategies
There is growing international recognition that, to be sustainable, CSER
must be part of business strategy and that it must be aligned with the
development priorities of its host country or community. An important
development noted with respect to Chinese mining investment in Zambia
has been the adoption of a CSER-friendly posture buttressed by requirements
for compliance by Chinese mining companies through the government’s
controlling interests or through membership of the CCCMC. As noted in the
cases of CLM and NFCA above, there is still a gap between the Chinese
government’s CSER aspirations and actual conduct on the ground by Chin-
ese mining companies. Enhanced cooperation between the governments of
China and Zambia aimed at strengthening the latter’s regulatory capacity
will help to tie these loose ends.
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29.5.2 Towards a Community Self-help Approach
Paternalism on the part of the mining companies needs to give way to
partnership—a transition that is predicated on mining companies reposition-
ing themselves as equal participants with their host communities in the quest
for win–win development outcomes. To this end, mining communities need
to demonstrate a capacity for self-governance that should better enable them
to enter into a partnership with the mining companies. Subject to some
notable implementation issues, Senior ChiefMukumbi’s Chiefdom in Lumwana
provides a useful example of this self-mobilization, self-organization, and self-
management (MOM)12 model of community engagement with mining
companies.
Mondoloka (2017: Figure 3) depicts some of the community governance
structures that have been established to help manage the interface between
the mining company Barrick Lumwana and the community, with the over-
all objective of enabling a win–win outcome for the mine and its host
community. The Lumwana Community Development Forum (LCDF) pro-
vides overall development coordination for the community. The board of
LCDF represents a broad cross-section of stakeholder interests and includes
representation from the Musele and Mumena Royal Establishments, Barrick
Lumwana’s Sustainability Department, the Zambia Development Agency
(ZDA), the area Councillor, Extension Officers from the Ministry of Agricul-
ture and Livestock (MAL), the Ministry of Community Development,
Mother and Child Health (MCDMCH), the Ministry of Youth and Sport
(MYS), and the Lumwana Community Business Association (LCBA), as well
as Community Liaisons.
The structural arrangement is sound, in principle, but there are some issues
that have limited its effectiveness in practice. These are summarized in terms
of the gaps in economic opportunities and social services for host communi-
ties arising from shortcomings in mining companies’ CSER interventions
(Mondoloka 2017: Figure 4). Figure 29.1 provides a suggested framework for
mediating the relationship between mining companies, their host communi-
ties, and other key stakeholders.
For the mining community, expected outcomes of the MOM approach
include enhanced negotiating power vis-à-vis other stakeholders—principally,
the mining companies—and, hence, more equitable participation in the eco-
nomic fortunes of the community. One aspect of this socio-economic inclu-
sion is that the default consensus among all the stakeholders should be some
form of right of first refusal for the community with respect to employment
12 Author’s characterization.
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and entrepreneurship opportunities with themining company andwith other
large business concerns operating within the community. This is consistent
with the spirit of the ILO’s Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO 2006).
The underlying principle for all interventions in mining communities must
be ‘community ownership’, which should translate into ‘community members
solving community problems using community resources’. By extension, this
includes the principle that market-based solutions to community problems
should, in the first instance, be provided by local entrepreneurs, employing
local labour and using other resources sourced, as far as possible, from within
the community. This lends itself to a bottom-up approach to mining company
engagement, which should be mainstreamed across all mining communities.
Mondoloka (2017) cites the case of Youth Alliance for Development (YAD), a
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Terms of reference to be strong on ensuring and facilitating dialogue between the principal
stakeholders; 
Fixed-term performance-based contract of 2 to 3 years’ duration to ensure results and quality;
Use of government-allocated constituency development funds (CDFs) to be influenced and
reported on by liaison function to promote accountability, economy, and development
effectiveness.
Clearing house for proposed development interventions to ensure maximum development
impact;
Treated as an equal
partner/stakeholder and
empowered to deliver solutions
and profitable services to the
mining company, and to similarly
meet other needs within the
community
Figure 29.1. A suggested framework for mediating between the mining company, the
community, and other key stakeholders
Source: author’s construction.
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Approaches to Supporting Local
and Community Development
Brazil and the Vale SA Model of Corporate Interaction
Liesel Mack Filgueiras, Andreia Rabetim, and Isabel Aché Pillar
30.1 Vale SA: An Overview
According to a Vale SA1 fact sheet (Vale 2017), Vale is one of the largest mining
companies and one of the largest publicly traded companies in the world.2
Vale has a market capitalization of around US$36 billion, with approximately
270,000 shareholders from all continents. It is the world’s largest producer of
iron ore and iron ore pellets, and of nickel. Vale also produces manganese ore,
ferroalloys, metallurgical and thermal coal, copper, platinum group metals,
gold, silver, cobalt, potash, phosphates, and other fertilizer nutrients. The
company’s global financial position is summarized in Figures 30.1 and 30.2.
Vale’s mission is ‘to transform natural resources into prosperity and sustain-
able development’, and its corporate vision is ‘to be the number one global
natural resources company in creating long-term value through excellence
and passion for people and the planet’ (Vale 2016a).
The company’s business strategy is to invest in world-class assets, with long
life, low cost, expandability, and high-quality output, capable of creating value
through the cycles. Focusingoncost effectiveness, Vale seeks a leanorganization,
1 SA = ‘Sociedade Anônima’, or ‘share company’.
2 Vale shares are traded on the New York Stock Exchange/NYSE (VALE and VALE.P), the BM&F
BOVESPA (Vale3 and Vale5), the Euronext Paris (Vale3 and Vale5), and the Stock Exchange
of Hong Kong Limited (codes 6210 and 6230). Average daily trading value was approximately
US$320 million in the third quarter of 2015 (3Q15). Vale is an investment-grade company, rated
BBB by Standard & Poor’s, Baa2 by Moody, BBB+ by Fitch, and BBB (high) by Dominion Bond
Rating Service (Vale 2017).
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with teamwork and accountability, excellence in project execution, and firm
commitment to transparency and shareholder value creation. Health and safety,
investment in human capital, a positive work environment, and sustainability
are also considered critical to Vale’s long-term competitiveness.
All of Vale’s activities are guided by management policies of transparency,
respect for shareholders’ rights, protection of the environment, employee
development, and improving the quality of life in the communities in which
the company operates.
In the last decade, Vale’s community development approach has been
evolving, especially in terms of contributing to local development in the
regions where it has operations. This chapter shares some of the results of
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Figure 30.1. Vale’s financial highlights
Source: Vale (2015), reproduced with permission.
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Coal Manganese and ferroalloys
Figure 30.2. Vale’s gross revenues
Source: Vale (2015), reproduced with permission.
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30.2 Vale’s Social Investment Evolution
Vale Foundation was established in 1968. When privatized in 1997, Vale
focused its Foundation as the main channel for implementing the company’s
social and community development agendas. Vale Foundation is a non-profit
organization, financially maintained by Vale. Like many other companies
worldwide, Vale focused the efforts of its Foundation along two main the-
matic lines of social investment: education and culture. It invested in projects
developed by NGOs and specialized companies throughout Brazil. This con-
tinued until 2006, after which a process of internationalization of the com-
pany began; there were, subsequently, social programmes managed locally in
all of the countries in which Vale had operations.
However, following an in-depth strategic analysis of the Foundation’s work
in 2004, it was clear that the model as used to that date was not the most
effective one. There were up to 150 projects managed by the Vale Foundation
by 2000 and the results of many of these were unclear. They were not driven
by territorial and local development demands, and were isolated and inde-
pendent efforts. It was also noted that the company was fundamentally
dependent on land; that some of its commercial operations had very long-
term horizons (up to 100/150 years); that its procedures had the potential to
generate both significant positive but also significant negative social, eco-
nomic, and environmental impacts; and, therefore, that the territorial dimen-
sion of sustainability was critical for the company.
Hence, in 2006, Vale Foundation refocused its mission to contribute to the
local development of the specific regions where Vale had its operations, by
more strategically aligning its work with the nature of the company and also
with the relevant specific opportunities and challenges that the mining activ-
ity opened up for the various territories of operation.
The first thing that was clear was that the Foundation needed to better
understand the socio-economic dynamics of the regions where Vale operated
in order to be able to contribute effectively to their local development. So
we began to partner actively with specialized institutions and to prepare
integrated socio-economic diagnoses of all the regions in Brazil (and later
worldwide) where we had operations. That work sought to understand what
were the cumulative impacts that Vale’s projects and operations had in the
mining-affectedmunicipalities3 andwhat, in turn, were the possible impacts of
the municipalities on Vale’s operations. We studied the history of the for-
mation of each of the municipalities, and then identified the main economic
drivers and analysed demographic projections, considering both natural
3 The municipality is the level of public administration in Brazil below the federal and state
levels.
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growth (births and deaths) and anticipated migration inflows. We also
gathered detailed information on public services and infrastructure deficits
(current and future), taxes (current and future), land ownership regulation,
and so on. We ended up with a very good, comprehensive picture of what
were the pre-existing deficits of the municipalities (financial and otherwise);
what were the probable pressures that new Vale projects would bring to the
region; and, also, the taxes that would be generated and whether the scale
would balance itself.
We found that most municipalities—specifically the mining ones that were
studied—could have positive balances, in due course, if mining operations
reached their planned outputs and the tax resources were adequately applied
in infrastructure and public services. Nevertheless, the timing was invariably a
challenge. Some impacts would happen before the royalties on production4
reached the full amount. In other cases, the royalties would be so significant
that the execution of all the various affordable projects would be a challenge.
We also learned that there were resources available prospectively to munici-
palities from various federal government programmes, but that the town hall
was often not able to access these due to a lack of either technical capacity or
proper information. It was clear that capacity-building, planning, and govern-
ance (including cross-sector governance) were needed for our host municipal-
ities as well as for some other agencies of government.
Currently, Vale Foundation’s mission is to contribute to integrated eco-
nomic, environmental, and social development in the regions where Vale
operates, strengthening human capital in communities and respecting local
cultural identities (Vale Foundation n.d.). Figure 30.3 illustrates the model of
sustainable development which we follow. The Foundation’s investments
are addressed mainly to education, health, and income-generation/inclusive
businesses initiatives in Brazil.
30.3 Public–Private Social Partnership
As a result of these diagnostic insights, we began to develop the concept of the
public–private social partnership (PPSP). The starting point for elaborating
the concept was Vale Foundation’s practical experience, in particular the
liaison work it carried out with many federal government ministries and
4 Compensação Financeira pela Exploração de Recursos Minerais (CFEM: Financial
Compensation for the Exploitation of Mineral Resources), the mining royalty in Brazil, is
collected by the National Department of Mineral Production (DNPM) and then re-allocated to
those states and municipalities where mine production has taken place. Eighty-seven per cent of
royalties is captured by the municipal and state governments (OPM, ICMM, and IBRAM 2012).
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departments with the aim of supporting municipalities to raise funds, espe-
cially for deficit reduction in relation to urban infrastructure.
When the Brazilian government launched the Growth Acceleration Pro-
gram (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento; Federal Government of
Brazil 2007), a national economic policy that invested billions in infrastruc-
tural works, in 2007, Vale Foundation saw an opportunity to support the
municipalities where Vale operates by elaborating engineering projects in
order to allow the municipalities to apply and compete more effectively for
federal funds. Since most of these remotes cities have fragile infrastructure,
Vale Foundation funds the elaboration of technical projects mainly in connec-
tionwith housing, sewage, drainage, and pavements. Canaã dos Carajás was one
of themunicipalities that had its projects approved by the federal government as
a result. This has involved fundraising of R$19million (US$5million) to finance
water system works.
From this experience, Vale Foundation gained a clearer understanding of
the public policy framework in Brazil and how to advocate for people to
achieve better access to public services. Therefore, the next step was to establish
Technical Cooperation Agreements between Vale Foundation and Brazilian
ministries, such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Cities, seeking to
discuss, plan, and execute programmes of private social investment as aligned as
possible with public policies. Concerning these Agreements, there is no transfer
of resources between the parties; the main objective is the integration of efforts












Figure 30.3. Sustainable development evolution
Source: authors’ illustration.
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One of the consequences of these partnerships was the establishment of the
first model of the Public Children’s Safe House (Conselho Tutelar) in Canaã
in accordance with the Brazilian Human Rights Ministry standards. Initially,
the new model was to be set up only in cities with more than five hundred
thousand people that were to host large-scale projects such as venues for the
Olympics and the World Cup. However, the dynamics of the fast growth of
Canaã and its social figures showed the importance, indeed the necessity, of
such a social facility for strengthening the local Child Protection Safety Net.
As background to this discussion on PPSP, it is also important to consider
the Brazilian historical context. After a military dictatorship lasting for almost
two decades (1964–85), the 1989 presidential election was the first since 1960
in which Brazilian citizens were able to vote for the president. Based on the
1988 Constitution, a variety of policies and regulations began to be estab-
lished. This makes many of the urban planning frameworks a quite recent
development in Brazil. The Ministry of Cities—with responsible for housing,
land regularization, and sewage—for instance, was created only in 2003.
Moreover, until the 1940s, only 30 per cent of the Brazilian population were
urban. By the 1990s, about 75 per cent were already living in urban areas.
Nevertheless, this population growth in urban areas was not matched in the
same proportion by the provision of public services and infrastructure.
In July 2012, based on Vale Foundation’s experience after 2006, it was
decided to create a working group5 composed of organizations and experts
with vast experience in the areas of sustainable development, urban planning,
corporate social investment, and relationships with government, to discuss
the concept of PPSP.
Based on the discussions of this working group, a reference text was devel-
oped. The PPSP as operated thereafter by Vale Foundation can be summarized
as follows. It is a strategy for building a series of inter-sectoral alliances aimed
at promoting the sustainable development of territories where the company
has large-scale enterprises, through joint efforts, and by mobilizing the
resources and knowledge of civil society, governments, and businesses for
integrated long-term strategic planning, around a common agenda that
includes promoting actions that contribute to:
 the promotion of quality of life and human development
 the strengthening of inter-sectoral and public policy
5 Members of the PPSP working group: Accenture, MIF (Multilateral Investment Fund of the IDB,
the Inter-American Development Bank, IBAM (Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration),
IBRAD (Brazilian Institute of Development Administration), Eupolis Lombardia, Unesco, an expert
in monitoring social projects from BNDES (National Bank for Economic and Social Development),
and a professor from Dom Cabral Foundation.
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 the expansion of democratic participation and the perspective of citizen
inclusion
 the effectiveness of private-sector social investments
 the collective construction of the figure of the citizen as simultan-
eously a beneficiary and co-participant in the process of territorial
development.
Vale Foundation’s PPSP is required to seek strategies that strengthen the
opportunities generated by large mining projects, such as those strategies
that can help in: (i) promoting diversification of economic activities;
(ii) supporting the qualifications and awareness of civil society, companies,
and government regarding the management of territorial development;
(iii) strengthening capacity-building and sharing resources and knowledge to
achieve the goals defined in the public sphere.
The implementation of the PPSP in the individual territories of Brazil and
other countries also requires a political consensus that enables the various
initiatives that are proposed to take full advantage of both the management
tools (diagnostics, plans, laws, regulations, legal apparatus, websites, etc.) and
the institutional arrangements (chambers, trade associations, councils, boards,
forums, development agencies) already existing. When gaps are spotted in
either of these two areas (management capacity or institutional systems),
investment in the capacity-building of local actors and the development
of strengthened management tools can be sponsored, but always with a
focus on the need to sustain the partnership for sustainable development
of the territory, and in a long-term systemic view.
A process of political consensus demands that the parties involved all make
commitments and thereby establish their respective roles and responsibilities.
From the perspective of a PPSP linked to a large enterprise such as Vale, the
opportunities that are to be promoted and the impacts that are to be minim-
ized have to be discussed jointly by the various agents. Thus, we seek to avoid
the logic and the potential pitfalls that still prevail in cases where each party
assumes a liability in isolation and without the need to interact with others.
Specific examples of how particular PPSP projects work in practice are pre-
sented later in this chapter.
The work grounded in the PPSP approach may seem like a very laborious
way to proceed, as it demands consensus between the parties and the
supremacy of the common good over individual vision. In practice, it is
often hard and slow work to achieve consensus. However, we have found
that it is the best way to develop actions that will enjoy durability and
performance characteristics that can contribute to strengthening public
policies and the empowerment of local actors. In due course it can, thereby,
help to reduce dependence on the mining company—often the primary
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vector of development for remote municipalities. With this approach, the
company itself seeks to promote a qualitative leap, moving from more
isolated practice to a joint effort with other actors and players in the terri-
tory, integrating networking sites with other spheres, public, private, com-
munity, and social.
There is an important and perhaps unique philosophy underlying the
approach of PPSP as practised by Vale Foundation. The approach recognizes
that the area of ‘public’ policy extends beyond the government’s own actions
to involve the engagement of all actors. This helps to generate a different form
of social control that enables the continuous improvement of policies and
actions developed by communities. PSPP’s vision in this sense is based on this
concept of the ‘public arena’, which understands that citizenship is not
restricted merely to the scope of the state, and that ‘public life’ is not just
made up of government acts, but also of the acts of groups, institutions, and
individuals who all aim to meet social goals.
In other words, the process of building the PPSP system has required a new
attitude of governments, enterprises, and society. It is based explicitly on open
dialogue to help build a vision of the common good, which is achievable
through an integrated and coordinated set of efforts for the generation of local
opportunities and the best application of private social investments and
governmental resources.
30.4 Southeast Pará (Geography, Economy, Vale’s Presence)
Vale is present in the State of Pará. Located in the north of Brazil, Pará is the
second largest state by area (it is the size of Spain and France combined).
However, it is also one of the country’s least developed states, ranking
twenty-second out of twenty-six states in Brazil in GDP per capita terms.
Comprised of 144 municipalities (elected local governments), it has a popu-
lation of 8.2 million people (IBGE 2016), making it sparsely distributed but
with many inhabitants concentrated in and around the capital, Belém.
A study conducted in 2011 by OPM, the ICMM, and the Brazilian Mining
Association, entitled ‘The Mining Sector in Brazil: Building Institutions for
Sustainable Development’ (OPM, ICMM, and IBRAM 2012), provides a good
summary of the history of Pará. In terms of development, both economic and
social, the north of Brazil has struggled for decades to achieve the same level as
the south. Historical and violent conflicts over land between large ranchers,
smallholders, small-scale miners, and the indigenous populations of the
region have been a major problem since the 1960s. These difficulties have
been created mostly by land redistribution and new settlement by farmers,
cattle ranchers, and logging companies, and also by the notorious gold rush in
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Serra Pelada in the 1980s.6 Today, the state still faces serious problems of
infrastructure deficits, including in water supply, sewage and waste collection,
lighting, paving and drainage, road networks, and public transportation. Also,
Pará suffers from very large deficiencies in schooling and vocational training.
Also according to OPM, ICM, and IBRAM (2012), the mesoregion of South-
east Pará contains thirty-nine municipalities, separated in the analysis into
six ‘mining municipalities’ with large-scale mining operations (Canaã dos
Carajás, Curionópolis, Marabá, Ourilândia do Norte, Parauapebas, and Para-
gominas) and the other ‘non-mining municipalities’.
30.5 The PPSP in Southeast Pará: The Canaã dos Carajás Case
In order to illustrate how the PPSP methodology has been implemented, it is
helpful to discuss examples from Canaã dos Carajás, a city in Southeast Pará
where Vale’s largest project, the Carajás S11D Iron Project (Vale 2012), is being
implemented.
Around US$16 billion is being invested—$6.8 billion of which is the esti-
mated capital expenditure involved in installing the newmine and processing
plant, and the remainder of which is for logistics and infrastructure. Vale is
investing heavily to upgrade the Carajás railroad, with some 504 km of track
related to expansion and 226 km related to remodelling the existing cap-
acity. This railroad runs all the way from the iron ore mine to the company’s
export terminal in the Atlantic port in the state of Maranhão. S11D, when
fully operational, will supply 90 million metric tons of iron ore per year.
It began operating in 2016 (Vale 2016c). Figure 30.4 is a map for the location
of Carajás S11D Project and Carajas Railway (expansion and remodelling of
existing line).
Canaã dos Carajás separated itself from the city of Marabá in 1994. Before
that, it was just a small agricultural settlement, with logging and agricultural
activities as its key economic drivers. The first mining cycle happenedwith the
opening of the Sossego mine (for copper extraction) in 2000. In 2001, the city
had a total GDP of only R$17 million (US$4.8 m). By 2014, that figure had
jumped to R$3 billion (US$857 m), while the city’s population had increased
more than three times (from 10,000 to 32,000) over the same period.
The fact that Canaã was established as a municipality only recently, in the
1990s, means that it had the daunting challenge of structuring itself as a city at
6 For a time, the village of Serra Pelada was thought to be the largest gold mine in the world in
terms of numbers engaged. Because of the chaotic nature of the operation, estimating the number
of miners accurately was difficult, but it was thought to be at least 80,000 people at its peak. Today
the Serra Pelada mine is abandoned and the giant open pit that was created by hand has filled with
water, creating a lake.
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the same time that it was starting to receive a very large inflow of mining
investments. This was also a challenge for Vale. In addition to meeting all its
legal obligations, including the environmental and social requirements
needed to obtain and preserve its licence to operate, especially considering
the size and dimension of the investment, Vale also recognized the vital need
for active collaboration with the various stakeholders involved: territorial
development cannot be achieved in isolation. The establishment of a PPSP
in Canaã dos Carajás a couple of years ago, through the Vale Foundation, was
the result of a learning curve spanning more than a decade in which Vale had
participated along with the other parties. This represents an important step
towards a governance system for the new municipality wherein government,
companies, and civil society have agreed to share responsibilities.
As mentioned in Section 30.2, the robust socio-economic integrated studies
and diagnostics have enabled the Vale teams to identify deficits (e.g. in
administrative capacities) and associated opportunities for local development




















Figure 30.4. Carajás mining complex (Pará and Maranhão States)
Source: Vale (2012), reproduced here with permission.
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having those estimated figures has allowed Vale and its Foundation to work in
partnership with the town hall, local communities, and the federal govern-
ment to strengthen a wide range of public policies in order to contribute to the
promotion of better-quality education, ill-health prevention and health pro-
motion, inclusive sanitation, and efficient urban mobility; the fostering of
local economic activities; and the strengthening of networks for social pro-
motion and protection.
The PPSP meant reshaping the relationship between Vale Foundation and
the municipal and federal governments. In the partnerships implemented in
Canaã, the town hall began to participate in discussions to build content and
results, adopting the attitude of co-participant, and not that of a mere bene-
ficiary of a social project, goingmuch further thanmaking availablemunicipal
data and human resources. Moreover, almost all activities under the umbrella
of the PPSP are undertaken in partnership with organizations with specialized
knowledge, such as NGOs and universities, and also local organizations.
Another point that should be highlighted is the fact that, in Canaã, issues
are being addressed in an integrated way. For instance, the campaign for traffic
safety in the city was possible through the joint effort of the municipal
secretariats of transit, education, and sports, in partnership with Vale Foun-
dation, Vale, Vale’s suppliers, local businesses, and UNESCO.
30.5.1 A Few of the Main Results of the Cross-sector Partnerships
by 2014/15
A central contribution has been the support to and review of the city’s Master
Plan,7 which provides a broad understanding of the city and its growing areas,
and specifies guidelines for how the municipality should be developed in
future in an organized manner. This work includes an ongoing discussion
about the possibility of creating a fund through which to apply and manage
the locally received royalties from mining activities.
At the next level, the drafting of Municipal Plans for health, education,
sewage, and urban mobility provides crucial inputs to the structural improve-
ment of overall public services provision. Canaã was one the first municipal-
ities among 144 in the state of Pará to have an Urban Mobility Plan.
With the Urban Mobility Plan as a starting point, the following measures
were adopted: educational mobility campaigns and improvement of infra-
structure services to reduce traffic accidents (a major element of total spending
on health in the municipality); construction of bike routes to encourage
7 This and related plans discussed in this section are unpublished documents developed with the
city hall for use by the Mayor and public technicians.
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alternative forms of transportation, especially cycling; and the integration of
municipal records on health, traffic, and public safety.
This innovative Urban Mobility Plan was intended to benefit the whole
population of Canaã dos Carajás (33,632 inhabitants). By 2015, its implemen-
tation had included the training of thirty-five educational professionals to
enable them to cover traffic and public safety in elementary schools and also
some broader educational campaigns for traffic and public safety, with 14,000
people engaged at local schools and churches and in the public sector, as well
as 2,000 drivers and pedestrians and forty-five motorcycle riders. In the north
of Brazil as a whole there is a precarious situation in terms of sewage and
treated water access: almost 70 per cent of households have no sewage system
or septic tanks and 45 per cent have no water supply system. Among the
activities addressed by the PPSP, ninety technicians and community leaders
from Southeast Pará were trained in the policy and management of basic
sanitation by Vale Foundation, UNESCO, and the Ministry of Cities, resulting
in community engagement and a participatory role in the prioritization of
neighbourhoods based on health indicators. Currently, as a result, the muni-
cipality has predefined goals and greater social control in the implementation
and provision of these services.
A sanitation plan is being implemented based on the Environmental Salu-
briousness Index (Índice de Salubridade Ambiental). Linking data on sanita-
tion services with characteristics of population density and its relationship to
health, the index generates indicators that show the intra-municipal inequal-
ities, considering all components of basic sanitation: water supply, urban
cleaning and solid waste management, and urban drainage and management
of rainwater. In addition to providing a technical tool to prioritize integrated
investment in Canaã’s most populous neighbourhoods with the more precar-
ious sanitation services, the index methodology also provides a reference for
social participation in public policy and social control. It was created by the
Vale Foundation and UNESCO and is available for use in other municipalities.
At the moment, the town hall disposal of waste in landfill sites amounts to
about 90.37 tons/day, being 75.37 tons/day of domestic and commercial
waste and 15 tons/day of construction waste, which means a per capita
value of 1.71 kg/inhabitant/day—more than twice the rate recommended by
the WHO of 0.8 kg/inhabitant/day. These data indicate that the useful life
cycle of the landfill sites is at risk of saturation within a shorter time than
should be expected. Vale supported the transformation of the old dump into a
landfill. It was also necessary to improve waste management by seeking to
reduce the volume of waste and to stimulate recycling activities. Vale Foun-
dation provided support in drafting the Integrated Management Municipal
Plan for Solid Waste, such as specialized technical assistance and training
activities that included building the Plan for Selective Collection in a
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participatory manner with the Cooperative of Waste Collectors of Canaã dos
Carajás. Today, the Cooperative has guidelines to improve their ownmanage-
ment skills and add value to recycled materials.
Since 2013, the Vale Foundation has also developed health actions in Canaã,
based on two major fronts—‘Supporting the Public Management’ and ‘Mobil-
ization and Community Engagement’—emphasizing the strengthening of
technical capacity of health services. Concerning the latter, this led to the
creation of a group of Young Health Promoters through a process of training
young people on issues related to health and citizenship. Over a period of two
years, the young people involved developed many educational activities con-
cerning health in their neighbourhoods in a way that was integrated with the
Municipal Health Secretariat’s calendar, as well as actively participating in
forums and promoting the occupation of public spaces. Among the results of
the establishment of the Young Health Promoters group have been the par-
ticipation of two youngsters from Canaã dos Carajás as representatives of the
rural areas of Brazil at the 2nd Pan-American Forum of Children and Adoles-
cents (held in 2014 in the Brazilian capital, Brasília) and a digital mapping
project that revealed a broader picture of the local context, especially in
relation to health, education, environment, social protection, and leisure
spaces in three communities of Canaã dos Carajás. This material served as
the basis for discussions about the challenges and availability of local resources
and also for guiding the drawing up of Vale’s Community Action Plan.
One of the developments of the youth mobilization and its partnership
with the town hall was the implementation of the national programme
Health in Schools (Programa Saúde na Escola—PSE) in all thirteen health
units of Canaã. PSE is an inter-sectoral policy for health and education estab-
lished in 2007, aimed at children, teenagers, and adults enrolled at public
schools, to promote health and comprehensive education.
Furthermore, through co-operation between the Vale Foundation and the
Health Secretariat of Canaã, actions were established to increase the technical
capacities of health services. Among the results achieved was the development
of professionals in basic care with 288 hours of training through the years of
2014 and 2015 on issues related to health promotion, healthy food habits, and
disease prevention—of Hansen’s Disease,8 among others. With an emphasis
on building their capacity to diagnose and treat Hansen’s Disease, the profes-
sionals examined and accompanied patients on treatment programmes and
examined 174 children aged from seven to thirteen, identifying seven new
cases of the disease. In Canaã dos Carajás forty-five people were examined and
fourteen new cases were identified.
8 Hansen’s Disease is another term for leprosy.
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Moreover, all Basic Health Units of Canaã were equipped, reaching a total of
around 350 pieces of equipment, in order to improve the ambience/environ-
ment of the healthcare facilities, and to stimulate the continuous professional
development of those working there. As a result, appointment times were
reduced and the execution of collective activities for the community in health
education grew. According to the Brazilian Health System, in 2013 the city
had primary healthcare coverage of 76 per cent (SUS 2015). In 2015, through
this PPSP, that percentage jumped to over 90 per cent, well above the national
average of 60 per cent (SUS 2016).
A further challenge faced by the municipal management was that of struc-
turing the public school system. With the commitment of many local actors,
in 2013 the Pact for the Improvement of Public Education of Canaã dos
Carajás (Pacto pela Melhoria da Educação Pública de Canaã) was established.
The results included: reform of twenty schools and training of 400 educational
professionals covering 12,000 public school students; greater appreciation of
reading through reading groups (rodas de conversa), with the participation of
five authors of children’s and young people’s literature, more than 150
teachers, and 500 students; goal-setting by classrooms; establishment of plan-
ning and evaluation routines; and increased participation of parents and
families in the school environment.
As a result of dialogue with the Ministry of Education, the municipality
raised about R$3.6 million (US$1m) from the federal government for con-
struction of day-care facilities for children. Thanks to the efforts of the PPSP,
Canaã analysed examination results for 2013, undertook a gap analysis, and
established an action plan to address the gaps identified. By 2014, it had
already improved its results (compared with 2013) in the National Literacy
Assessment (Avaliação Nacional da Alfabetização), a national test that assesses
the level and quality of literacy across Brazilian public schools—in nineteen
out of twenty aspects, scores were above state averages (Instituto Nacional de
Estudos e Pesquisa Educacionais Anísio Teixeira 2015).
According to the results of the Educational Assessment System of the
State of Pará released in April 2016, it was possible to observe increases of
30.6 per cent in proficiency in Portuguese and 27 per cent in proficiency in
mathematics in the early years of elementary school between 2014 and 2015.
For the final years of elementary school, the increase in proficiency was
50.2 per cent in Portuguese and 60.2 per cent in mathematics (Secretaria de
Estado de Educação do Pará 2016a, 2016b).
In Canaã the challenge is now to keep continuously improving its results.
However, the city’s experience was selected to be presented at the 24th Inter-
national Congress of Educating Cities, which took place in Rosario, Argentina,
in June 2016. The event is one of the most important in the world education
calendar. Only twenty-three Brazilianmunicipalities took part in the Congress,
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with Canaã dos Carajás being the only representative of the North region of
the country.
A final example of the support resulting from the PPSP relates to business
development. In addition to the employment generated in Canaã dos Carajás
(12,000 people employed in the S11D implementation phase and Sossego
Copper mine operation; Vale 2016b), Vale Foundation has invested in local
vocational and entrepreneurship support, with technical assistance to 110
small businesspeople and support to six local businesses. During the last two
years, the average income growth for the six businesses in question was
238 per cent. These results already achieved are part of the Foundation’s
programme to contribute to increasing non-mining income and generating
jobs. Local economic activities such as services, food production, and clothes-
making have been supported through training, technical, and management
advice; mentoring; direct investment (seed money); and monitoring of pro-
jects. Collective businesses or individual entrepreneurs can also be supported.
One of the businesses supported that can be highlighted is the Apiculture [bee-
keeping] Association of Canaã, which has seen a significant increase in the
number of its members since the beginning of the Association’s participation
in the income-generation and job programme: a jump from twenty-five
people to sixty-two.
30.6 Challenges Faced and Critical Success Factors
for the PPSP Approach
The establishment of Vale’s private social investment model and a system of
governance that fosters co-responsibility and co-management as a way to
achieve long-term territorial development has resulted from three main fac-
tors. The first is the trajectory of the Vale Foundation itself and the lessons
learned, both successes and failures, from the implementation of its previous
projects in several municipalities. The second is the peculiar characteristics of
mining activity—and especially its dependence on particular (often less-
developed) territories combined with the unusually long-term maturity of its
investments. The third is the challenge faced by the Brazilian government in
providing quality public services to its citizens in remote areas (such as South-
east Pará), in order to comply with the rules established in the Federal Con-
stitution and given the inherent limitations of themore remotemunicipalities
in accessing existing public policies at federal level. The prevailing Brazilian
political-administrative division is quite relevant to the context of social
investment, to the extent that the Constitution of 1988 took responsibility
away from the states and delegated it to municipalities for some powers that
are often beyond the municipalities’ budget and/or implementation capacity.
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During the process of construction and implementation of the PPSP model
by Vale, the main challenges were related to the understanding of how to
make the engagement between the public and private sectors work in practice.
In Brazil, the culture of inter-sectoral integration and collective construction is
quite recent. Thus, there is still very active discussion about the appropriate
roles and responsibilities of each party, recognizing that the company (Vale)
cannot and should not replace the state’s role but has to be committed to
efforts to implement public policies. Another lesson learned was about the
need to balance expectations in relation to the results of the partnership, as
the two parties (the state agencies and the company) tend to have different
timings and as there was little or no previous experience of this sort of model:
it was a pioneering move in Brazil.
The pilot initiative took place in Canaã dos Carajás, as already discussed.
It is important to highlight that many important social projects are moving
forward well in Canaã mainly as a result of three factors: there is a positive
environment in which to establish partnerships;9 Vale has been willing to
develop and integrate its social investment activities in a multidisciplinary
way; and there is solid alignment between the company and its Foundation.
This alignment is important to allow both institutions to take advantage of
the synergies. It makes them more effective in their social investment and in
the generation of shared value to local communities.
This alignment between the company and its Foundation is evidenced by
a trend derived from the survey ‘Benchmarking Corporate Social Investment
(BISC)’,10 carried out annually by Comunitas.11 According to BISC 2015, in
2013 more than half of the funds of institutes and foundations were allo-
cated in a way that was aligned to the core business of the company. From
2013 to 2014, this share increased by 10 per cent (from 53 to 63 per cent)
(Comunitas 2016).
In the case of mining, such internal integration is even more necessary
since the implementation of mining projects impacts so forcefully on the
9 This is helped by the relative newness of the municipality and the related absence of any
strong vested interests.
10 Established in 2008, this is an annual study on the current scenario and trends of corporate
social investment. Inspired by the methodology of the American-based Committee Encouraging
Corporate Philanthropy (CECP), the survey seeks to measure all financial resources, goods, and
services applied by private companies in projects and activities of social interest, including: support
to social, environmental, and cultural projects; construction of social infrastructure, including that
resulting from the installation and operation of enterprises; and permanent or eventual support to
formally constituted organizations.
11 Comunitas is a Brazilian CSO of public interest created in 2000, dedicated to the promotion of
social development in Brazil, through the engagement of several sectors of society, stimulating and
fostering collective actions with one common purpose: to reduce social inequalities in order to
promote sustainable development in the country. Supporting the organization are a number of
large corporations and their leaders, who are actively engaged in defining and implementing the
organization’s programmes.
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socio-economic dynamics of the cities in which they take place—especially
those, such as Canaã, that start off as very small. Therefore, social investments
focusing on contributing to local development and strengthening public
services are vital for the sustainability of both the mining operations and
the territories.
Finally, there is still plenty of room for improvement, especially in two
respects: improved monitoring and impact assessment of the component
activities; and the fostering of the establishment of more partnerships. In
the case of partnerships, on the one hand, the unfavourable current global
economic situation, especially the significant drop in the price of commod-
ities, particularly iron ore, is affecting the amount of resources allocated to
social actions. But on the other hand, the logic of partnerships has never
been stronger.
Also according to BISC, there has been a drop in the volume of funds
invested by a group of 336 organizations, including companies, foundations,
and conglomerates, in Brazil: in 2013 the BISC companies invested R$2 billion
in the social arena, which represents a decrease of 25 per cent compared to
2012. In 2014, despite investments having increased by 11 per cent compared
to 2013, this increase was not enough to recover losses sustained in 2012–13.
On the other hand, the logic of partnerships strengthened. In addition, in the
BISC 2014, 100 per cent of the organizations surveyed indicated that the
identification of public problems required collective action.
Canaã leads the rankings of the Municipal Development Index developed
by the Federation of the Industries of the State of Rio de Janeiro (Índice FIRJAN
de Desenvolvimento Municipal—IFDM/FIRJAN) in the state of Pará (Canaã
dos Carajás—Pará 2016; Jardim 2016). In the overall index ranking, Canaã is
also further ahead than other Brazilian capitals such as Aracaju, Porto Velho,
Salvador, Maceio, Manaus, and Macapa, and Belém, the state capital. This
index can be considered a reference in terms of monitoring Brazilian socio-
economic developments since 2005.12 In 2013, the year onwhich the research
was based, Canaã achieved a 0.7351 rate, a 25 per cent increase since 2005, on
a scale from 0 to 1 inwhich the closer a city is to 1, the greater the development
of the city. The municipality also showed an improvement in all three aspects.
Although this chapter has described a specifically Brazilian local experience,
this methodology of implementing corporate social investment might be
replicated in other country contexts since the basic premises are cross-sector
governance and combined efforts, avoiding the overlap of roles and responsi-
bilities. Obviously cultural differences, the level of maturity of organizations,
and the institutional environment in which they operate may require
12 The IFDM takes into account three aspects—employment and income, education, and
health—based on official data from the Ministries of Health, Education, and Labour.
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adjustments of the partnership framework to particular country circum-
stances. However, the basic guidelines of PSPP can be followed elsewhere.
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31
Capturing Economic and Social Benefits
at the Community Level
Opportunities and Obstacles for Civil Society
Keith Slack
31.1 Introduction
Civil society has a critical role to play in helping local communities capture
the benefits produced by extractive industries (EI) and avoiding or mitigat-
ing the social and environmental damage these industries can cause. Pay-
ment disclosure data is a potentially powerful tool for civil society to hold
governments accountable for pro-development expenditure of extractive
revenues. Yet analysts have argued that transparency alone does not equate
to accountability. In many contexts political dynamics present serious
challenges to achieving greater accountability, even with greater public
availability of revenue data. In this chapter I will examine these dynamics
and the role of civil society in promoting benefit capture from the extract-
ive industries at the local level as well as the promise (and limitations) of
increased revenue data disclosure to support that role. I will look at two
cases in particular, Ghana and Peru, which offer important lessons on the
opportunities and obstacles for civil society engagement with the extract-
ive industries. I will conclude by offering some proposals for strengthening
this role.1
1 Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Oxfam
America or Oxfam International.
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31.2 Role of Civil Society in Communities Affected
by the Extractive Industries
The term ‘civil society’ is used in various ways. For the purposes of this
chapter I will use the World Bank’s definition, which includes not only
advocacy- and service-oriented NGOs but also indigenous peoples’ federations,
trade unions, and religious institutions (World Bank 2013). Civil society organ-
izations (CSOs) have played a variety of roles in extractive-industries-affected
communities. They might generally be described as ‘watchdogs’ that monitor
and document the various and often-negative impacts that extractive indus-
tries projects have on human rights and the environment in these commu-
nities. In a number of contexts, particularly in Latin America, CSOs have
helped to organize community opposition to extractive industries projects
through local campaigns that are often supported at the national and global
levels. CSOs have also helped communities to directly negotiate with com-
panies to resolve human rights and environmental problems (Rees et al.
2012). This has in some cases involved bringing legal action against a
company or utilizing global accountability frameworks and bodies, such as
the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises, and the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman of
the World Bank Group’s IFC.
Globally, the normative framework around the extractive industries
has seen dramatic changes over the past twenty years, in large part due
to pressure from CSOs. To name two examples, payment disclosure and
free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) for indigenous peoples are now
part of the policies of extractive corporations and international financial
institutions. The EITI is a well-established global norm-setting enterprise
that has been supplemented in recent years by the adoption of manda-
tory extractive industries payment disclosure laws in the United States
(through the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act) and European Union (European Accounting Directive). The IFC,
which finances extractive industries projects, has adopted both payment
disclosure and FPIC in the performance standards its clients are obliged to
implement. Likewise, the ICMM, an association of large global mining
companies, has also adopted a policy on indigenous peoples that requires
respect for FPIC.
There is significant heterogeneity among CSOs involved in the extractive
industries space. Some focus primarily on environmental issues, while others
are more concerned with human rights impacts. Some espouse a strongly
oppositional position in relation to the extractive industries. Others are more
interested in promoting reform of the sector through policy dialogue and legis-
lative advocacywork. Corporate-backedNGOs (or ‘BONGOs’: business-oriented
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NGOs) have appeared in some locations to do community development work
on behalf of an extractive industries company.
As the extractive industries sector in developing countries has expanded
and evolved over the past twenty years, so too have the interests and sophis-
tication of CSOs involved in the space. After focusing initially on human
rights and environmental impacts, CSOs have more recently begun to take
on difficult technical issues such as the distribution and management of
extractive industries revenues, contract analysis, and taxation. Global NGOs
such as Oxfam and the NRGI have hired lawyers, tax experts, and other
technical specialists to help advance policy reform work in these areas.
Payment disclosure is a critical component for this ‘second-order’ set of
extractive industries accountability issues in which CSOs engage. In Section
31.3 I will examine the potential utility of this information for efforts to
promote greater capture of the benefits produced by extractive industries at
the local level. I will also frame a discussion of the political obstacles that may
undermine the effectiveness of this tool, as well as broader policy reform efforts
in this sector.
31.3 Origins of the Extractives Revenue Transparency
Movement
The global movement for greater revenue transparency in the extractives
sector began in 2000 with the launch of British NGO Global Witness’s report
on Angola’s oil sector (GlobalWitness 2000). The report described in detail the
kleptocracy of the Dos Santos regime and its theft of billions of dollars in oil
revenue. The report also laid out the complicity of foreign oil companies—
notably BP—in this theft. The report included a recommendation that oil
companies operating in Angola, including BP, publicly disclose payments as
a way for outside actors, including global and Angolan civil society, to hold
the government accountable for the use of those revenues. The report brought
swift condemnation of GlobalWitness by the Angolan government. However,
the report also captured the attention of billionaire financier George Soros,
who had founded the Open Society Institute (OSI). Soros believed that pay-
ment disclosure—which was consistent with his ‘open society’ concept—
could be a tool to address problems of corruption and mismanagement in
resource sectors globally (Soros 2005).
With support from Soros, Global Witness and other global NGOs estab-
lished a global campaign to promote extractives payment disclosure. The
campaign adopted the name ‘Publish What You Pay’ (PWYP) and drew
participants from a broad sector of civil society across the globe. National
and regional chapters of the campaign were set up with funding from Soros
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and other donors. Building on Global Witness’s experience working on BP
in Angola, the campaign initially focused on pressuring the UK government
to require payment disclosure by British companies. In response to this
pressure, the government of UK Prime Minister Tony Blair proposed the
creation of the EITI, which was formally announced at the World Summit
on Sustainable Development (Rio+10) conference in Johannesburg in September
2002. The EITI was to be a voluntary initiative in which governments, com-
panies, and NGOs would work together to promote greater revenue transpar-
ency in the extractive sectors. The initiative was immediately criticized by
some NGOs for its voluntary nature, and for promoting only aggregated data
disclosure rather than disclosure on the more granular, project-by-project
basis that NGOs had called for. Despite the criticism, most NGOs working in
the extractive industries space decided to stay engaged with the initiative, and
some—including Oxfam, Global Witness, and PWYP itself—accepted seats on
the board of the initiative.
To address the weaknesses of EITI, NGOs continued to push for mandatory
disclosure regulations. The US coalition of PWYP, led by Oxfam, Revenue
Watch Institute (an organization spun off from OSI and now known as the
NRGI), and Global Witness, made the furthest progress. Working with a
securities lawyer, the coalition developed a proposal for US legislation that
would require all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange to dis-
close to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) all payments made to
governments in countries where they were operating. This information was to
be included as part of the standard disclosures required by the SEC. In 2008, at
the behest of the coalition, US Senator Charles Schumer and Representative
Barney Frank introduced the Extractive Industries Transparency Disclosure
Act, which amended the Securities Exchange Act to establish this require-
ment. The bill made little progress during that year but was reintroduced in
2009 by Senators Ben Cardin and Richard Lugar as the Energy Security
Through Transparency Act.
In early 2010, the PWYP-United States coalition saw an opportunity with
the introduction of legislation to reform the financial sector following the
2008 financial crisis. The coalition worked closely with Representative
Frank, then chairman of the House Financial Services Committee and lead
sponsor of the financial reform legislation. Frank agreed to support the
extractives transparency legislation as part of the overall financial reform
package. Following extensive congressional debate and manoeuvring, the
extractives transparency language was added to the bill and approved by
the House–Senate conference committee in July 2010. The language
appeared as Section 1504 of the 2,300-page bill. The overall financial sector
reform bill, including the extractives language, was signed by US President
Barack Obama on 21 July 2010.
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Following the passage of the legislation, the American Petroleum Institute
(API), representing the interests of major oil companies, sued the SEC to block
implementation of Section 1504, arguing inter alia that the disclosure require-
ment constituted ‘compelled speech’ and as such was a violation of its right to
free speech under the US Constitution. The US District Court for the District
of Columbia, which heard the case, sided with the API and compelled the SEC
to remake the rule that would govern the implementation of the 1504 legis-
lation. Various suits and countersuits have followed, with Oxfam America
leading the legal effort on behalf of civil society to push for publication and
implementation of the rule. The SEC published a new rule in June 2016,
which was generally well received by transparency advocates as it maintained
most of the key provisions of the original rule.
The passage of Section 1504 had an immediate knock-on effect in Europe,
where the European Union began to consider similar revenue disclosure
requirements, which were adopted in 2014. Similar disclosure requirements
have been adopted in Canada and proposed in South Africa and Australia, all
key jurisdictions for the raising of capital for extractives companies. Regret-
tably, one of the first acts of the Trump administration in February 2017 was
to sign legislation vacating the SEC’s rule for implementing Section 1504.
Although a major setback for extractives transparency proponents, however,
the action only requires the SEC to publish a new version of the rule, and does
not alter the underlying legislation. Moreover, it does not affect disclosure
requirements established in other jurisdictions.
At the heart of the effort to promote extractive industries payment disclos-
ure was a simple idea: that the disclosure of revenue payment information can
be a tool for holding governments accountable for where those revenues go.
Sunlight, as former US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously said,
can be the best disinfectant (Brandeis 1913). The ‘sunlight’ of revenue trans-
parency can ‘disinfect’ the corruption, mismanagement, and waste that too
often characterizes extractive industries revenues. Getting information into
the hands of activists, journalists, and ordinary citizens helps to level the
playing field with powerful government and corporate actors. It can create
popular pressure to address corruption or the misallocation of revenues.
In this sense, the ‘theory of change’ behind extractive payment disclosure is
in line with broader current theory about transparency and data disclosure.
We live in an era of ‘big data’ that holds, according to some proponents, the
potential to be a ‘game changer’ in terms of empowering people to demand
better performance from governments, corporations, and other social actors.
Data and disclosure can help to rectify asymmetries of information between
governing and governed that will ultimately produce broad social benefits.
Moreover, resource-rich countries have been empirically found to be less
transparent than their non-resource-rich analogues (Williams 2010).
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There is some evidence in the extractive sector that greater transparency
has indeed begun to produce some of these benefits. In Nigeria, for example,
the EITI process revealed US$2.6 billion in missing oil revenues and a failure
of oil companies to pay US$9.9 billion in royalties (De Sa 2013). There are
some other notable positive examples outside the extractive industries sector.
CSOs in Ghana have effectively used information and social accountability
to drive improvements in government-provided health and agricultural
programmes (Dogbe and Kwabena-Adade 2012). Similarly, in Uganda, a
government-sponsored newspaper campaign using data on monthly educa-
tion funding transferred to local districts led to improved enrolment and test
scores (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).
More broadly, however, the literature suggests that information disclosure
and transparency have had at best limited or mixed effects on social account-
ability efforts in developing countries. Some studies have found that voting
patterns in developing countries can be influenced by information (Pande
2011), and that transparency can have a generally positive effect in promoting
accountability (Kosack and Fung 2014). Sovacool et al. (2016), however, have
found that EITI implementation has had no effect on a country’s governance
performance, although they acknowledge that it may be too soon in the
history of EITI to draw definitive conclusions. Mejia-Acosta (2013) points
out that there is ‘no conclusive evidence’ to show that transparency-to-
accountability initiatives (such as EITI) have contributed to better develop-
ment outcomes from extractive industries, and that the causal links between
transparency and accountability in the extractive industries sector have not
been mapped out.
The effectiveness of transparency is also said to depend significantly on
the particular political context in which the transparency data are intro-
duced. Transparency cannot be used, in this analysis, to ‘shame the shame-
less’ (Fox 2007) and is unlikely to have much impact in autocratic regimes
(Frynas 2010).
There is even some analysis to suggest that transparency and information
disclosure can actually have a negative impact on social accountability efforts
by inter alia creating ‘resignation’ rather than ‘indignation’ at the degree of
governmental corruption revealed by the disclosures (Bauhr and Grimes
2014). Transparency can also lead to an increase in corruption, as it can be
used tobetter identifywhichofficials need tobebribed (Kolstad andWiig 2009).
As noted at the outset of this discussion, there is a general view among
practitioners and academics that transparency alone does not equate to
accountability. Simply disclosing information will not produce the desired
positive effect for social accountability that one would want to see. Political
structures and imperatives can thwart the ability of civil society to make a
meaningful impact on how extractive industries revenues are managed
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(Collier 2010; Fuhr 2015; Keefer and Khemani 2004; Khemani 2007; Robinson
et al. 2006). These political obstacles are in some cases deeply engrained in the
political culture and history of particular countries. They also relate to the
nature of extractive industries themselves, which require a greater degree of
governmental intervention than other industrial sectors. Taken together,
these obstacles can defeat even the best-designed policies and the strongest
transparency regimes. To make large and powerful sectors such as extractive
industries accountable at the local level requires addressing—or at least
managing—these issues in some way. I will discuss these obstacles in more
detail in Section 31.4.
31.4 The Politics of Extractive Industries Revenue Distribution
Ensuring that the benefits of extractive industries are captured at the local
level requires an understanding of the inherently political nature of the
management of these industries. Because of the direct role that governments
must necessarily play in engaging with extractive industries at all stages,
opportunities for political manipulation are rife. This begins with the conces-
sioning process, in which extractive industries companies must purchase a
permit to do exploration in a particular area. The permit is granted by the
relevant government authority, often with no public consultation or other
form of oversight.
Some countries require the redistribution of extractive revenues to affected
communities to promote local development and compensate for damages
caused by extractive industries activities. Examples include Peru, the Domin-
ican Republic, Ghana, DRC, and Burkina Faso. The full amount of revenue
owed to local governments is rarely transferred to them, however. This can
be due to bureaucratic inertia as well as political bias against redistribution
held by central government elites who distrust local government officials.
In Ghana, a study by the African Centre for Energy Policy (ACEP) found that
political considerations, rather than efficiency or value for money, appear to
have influenced the expenditure of oil revenues on infrastructure projects,
resulting in only partially funded and incomplete road projects (ACEP 2013).
Politically motivated expenditure is of course not unique to the employ-
ment of extractive industries revenues. It undoubtedly affects governance at
least to some degree in all countries. Political ‘short-termism’—focusing on
immediate short-term results rather than longer-term development plans—is
also a common problem. Politicians are rewarded not for their long-term
vision for development in a community, but for what they can deliver to
the population today. This is a particularly concerning problem in the extract-
ive industries context because of the non-renewable nature of the extracted
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resources. In most cases, communities will only have a limited time to benefit
from those resources.
Development planning in rural areas of many developing countries where
extractive industries operations take place is often weak. Central governments
often demonstrate little interest in promoting such development, because
their own political and economic interests are centred in the capital city.
Communities in extractive-affected areas are thus doubly marginalized by
(i) suffering the impacts of extractive activity and (ii) lacking the political
clout to force national elites to address their problems and take action to
ensure that benefits are effectively redistributed.
Extractive companies themselves contribute, wittingly or not, to the short-
term political time horizons that exist in local communities. Companies’
commitments to a community usually exist only as long as their commercial
interest. Whether a community actually improves its development prospects as
a result of a company’s presence can be immaterial to the company’s business
interests. This is not to suggest that companies are not genuinely interested
in communities’welfare. Some extractive industries companies have worked to
make positive contributions to local communities through the establishment
of community foundations and training programmes, and the construction of
infrastructure. But few of these kinds of investment continue after a project
closes down, or even necessarily after one company sells the project to another.
The company’s interests are thus also short-term (even if, as in some cases, they
have a presence in the community for fifty years or more).
In light of these challenges of political structures and incentives, it is not
easy to envision ways for civil society to overcome them. A key dilemma is for
CSOs to engage with these political dynamics without also themselves becom-
ing political (in the sense of politically ‘partisan’). The answers may also lie in
increasing civic education about what good development and good govern-
ance look like. This could help to create demand for better long-term devel-
opment planning, and for politicians who will articulate a vision for achieving
it. Transparency and information disclosure, despite the limitations described
above, could be a useful tool for strengthening this education process.
In Sections 31.5 and 31.6 I will examine in more detail how these conflicting
political imperatives play out in two specific cases: Peru and Ghana.
31.5 Ghana
Until recently Ghana enjoyed a reputation as an African ‘success’ story. Since
undergoing structural adjustment in the 1980s, it has had good rates of
economic growth and achieved lower-middle income status. It has signifi-
cantly reduced poverty and improved access to education. The country is
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generally seen as stable and relatively non-corrupt, certainly in comparison
with the ‘sorry mess’ that is its neighbour Nigeria (Burgis 2015).
Ghana is also a leading minerals producer: the second-largest gold producer
in Africa after South Africa, and as of 2011 a mid-level oil producer. Natural
resources produced US$1.2 billion in revenues for the government in 2015,
according to the EITI. Despite this wealth and Ghana’s generally positive
reputation for fiscal governance, there is a sense among observers inside and
outside the country that it has not benefitted as much as it could have from its
resource wealth, particularly from more than a hundred years of industrial
mining activity. The social and environmental impacts of large-scale mining
have been severe, and poverty remains high in mining-affected areas. Indeed,
Ghana’s star has dimmed over the last two years in the face of the collapse in
oil prices, which forced the country to seek an IMF bailout to cover the
government’s borrowing against oil futures (Matthews 2016).
If one looks more closely at the Ghana case, one sees in its governance
structures and practices a number of the entrenched political dynamics that
militate against good resource revenue management at both the national and
local levels. These dynamics are not unique to Ghana, but the country offers a
particularly stark example, given its resource wealth and otherwise positive
governance reputation. These will be discussed in some detail below.
Formally, the Ghanaian parliament has responsibility for approving
budgets and, importantly, approving contracts between oil and mining com-
panies and the government. In theory this role presents a potentially strong
avenue for accountable management of the extractive sectors. In practice,
however, the parliament is dominated by the executive branch, which con-
trols candidate lists and awards loyal members of parliament with ministerial
positions and all the financial benefits and trappings those entail (Oxfam
America 2016a).
Ghana’s annual national budgeting process is largely a paper exercise.
There are significant discrepancies between approved budgets and actual
expenditures due to ‘off-budget’ expenditures that the executive branch
makes after the formal annual budget has been approved. The role of mem-
bers of parliament and the ability of civil society to influence the budget
development process are limited (Oxfam America 2016a). The dominance of
the executive branch over parliament in budgeting and other matters leads
Ayeeet al. (2011: 15) to state simply that ‘in practice, the parliament in Ghana
is not an autonomous organ of the state’.
Evenmore starkly, members of parliament are often appointed to the boards
of the local subsidiary of a mining company operating in their district. This
has served to undermine the oversight function of parliament on mining
activities and has strengthened members’ support of the companies (Ayee
et al. 2011).
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At the local level, Ghana is governed by district assemblies (DAs), institutions
that represent the most local-level governance entity in the country. These
units were created as part of a decentralization process established with the
return to democracy in 1993 following two decades of military rule. In theory,
the DAs could be an effective unit of local-level governance and accountability
of extractive industries. In reality, however, little progress has been made in
giving the DAs real power and authority, and the president himself appoints
one third of the DAs’ membership, thus ensuring party loyalty to the presi-
dent (Ayee et al. 2011). Moreover, Standing and Hilson (2013) describe a
widespread perception of corruption in the assemblies among Ghanaians
and development agencies.
Compounding the difficulties of effective oversight and governance of
extractive industries at the local level is the presence of traditional authorities
or chiefs. Local governance in Ghana is effectively a hybrid of traditional
chieftaincy rule and a modern bureaucratic state system. Under the Ghanaian
constitution, chiefs control local landownership and receive a direct disburse-
ment of 20 per cent of mining royalties. Thus the chiefs have a direct financial
interest in mining activities, even though ostensibly their role as traditional
leaders should require them to look after the interests of their entire commu-
nity. These funds are used for ‘expenditures other than those that benefit the
local communities involved’ (ICMM 2007: 77). This conflict of interest has led
chiefs in some cases to sell land to mining companies without the consent
(or even knowledge) of the occupants. This has contributed to conflict and
protest in some mining communities (Standing and Hilson 2013).
The accountability problems that Ghana experienced in managing its min-
ing wealth led to a series of efforts to try to avoid such problems with the
advent of the country’s oil sector, which officially came online in 2011. Most
notable among these was the creation of the Public Interest Accountability
Committee (PIAC), which was included in the Petroleum Revenue Manage-
ment Act passed in 2011. The mission of the PIAC is to oversee government
management and expenditure of oil revenues. Its membership is comprised of
representatives of Ghanaian civil society, trade unions, traditional leaders,
and business groups. In principle, the creation of the PIAC was a major step
forwards in resource revenue accountability. In practice, however, the PIAC
has not been able to do its job effectively, as it has been starved of resources by
the parliament. Some analysts have suggested that the Ghanaian executive
only accepted the creation of the PIAC due to donor pressure on ‘good
governance’ reforms, and from the beginning was not committed to its suc-
cess (Oppong 2016).2
2 See also the analysis of the macroeconomic problems that have resulted in Bawumia (2017).
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Despite the deeply engrained political and structural impediments, the
cause of accountable resource revenue management at the local level in
Ghana is not lost. Ghana is possessed of a vociferous and capable civil society,
consisting of a broad range of organizations with expertise in community
development, environment, human rights, and fiscal governance, among
other issues. Civil society played an important role in getting Ghana to join
the EITI and in the creation of the PIAC. In 2013, CSOs led a successful
popular campaign with the title ‘Oil for Agriculture’, which convinced the
Ghanaian government to commit 15 per cent of oil revenues to small-scale
agriculture (Offenheiser 2014).
In the Shama district in Ghana’s Western Region, the Ghanaian NGO
Friends of the Nation has led innovative work in partnership with the DA to
support participatory budgeting and public oversight of expenditure of oil
revenues. Friends of the Nation has helped to organize various social account-
ability mechanisms, including a ‘people’s forum’ and town hall meetings
with members of the DA to discuss budget and expenditure issues and
development of district development plans. These efforts have resulted in
increased expenditure on community development projects, a generally
harmonious relationship with and favourable attitude towards the DAs of
community members, and, according to one member of the DA, an
increased willingness on the part of local citizens to pay their taxes to the
DA, given that they believe that they have a meaningful voice in how their
taxes are spent (Friends of the Nation 2016).
Whether these bright spots of civil society engagement in Ghana on extract-
ive industries fiscal governance are enough to significantly reshape the
broader political dynamics surrounding these issues is an open question.
Given its vibrant civil society, relatively subdued ethnic politics, lack of vio-
lent conflict, and open political system, Ghana would seem to stand a better
chance than most resource-dependent developing countries. Ghanaian civil
society may also be better placed than most to take advantage of the revenue
disclosure data that will begin to become available. Nevertheless, the challenges
even in Ghana remain steep. The experience of another resource-dependent
country, Peru, offers another perspective on these challenges—one in which
high levels of transparency have not been enough to overcome political obs-
tacles to better deployment of natural resource revenues at the local level.
31.6 Peru
Peru is an advanced minerals producer and middle-income country. Like
Ghana, it has an active civil society engaging on extractive industries issues
from a variety of angles, including human rights, indigenous rights,
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environment, and fiscal governance. Also like Ghana, the country has struggled
to translate its oil and mineral wealth into local-level development. The per-
ceived lack of benefits to local communities from extractive industries projects
has driven a cycle of violent conflict around extractive projects that has
affected the country over the past fifteen years. The province of Cajamarca,
home to Latin America’s largest goldmine and the recipient of US$700million
in mining revenues between 2010 and 2015, is now Peru’s poorest province
(INEI 2015).
The conflicts within Peru’s extractive sector have occurred despite a rela-
tively high degree of formal transparency in the sector. TheMinistry of Energy
and Mines publishes mining project revenue data on its website. The country
has been compliant with the EITI since 2012. It scores 75 out of 100 on the
Open Budget Index, equal to the United Kingdom and above Germany (Open
Budget Index 2015).
Under Peru’s canon minero legal framework, 50 per cent of mining revenues
are to be transferred back to mining production areas. While this is potentially
a very significant source of funding for local-level development, expenditure
at that level has been problematic due to a lack of local government capacity,
poor development planning, and political incentives for short-term spending
(Arellano-Yanguas and Mejia-Acosta 2014).
Like Ghana, Peru has a dominant executive and a weak legislative branch
that exercises little effective oversight over the executive. The government
lacks the capacity and political will to effectively audit extractive industries
companies. The tax authority is unable to assess critical data such as produc-
tion volumes, costs, and transaction prices (Oxfam America 2016b).
Peru’s legislative weaknesses stem from the era of former President
Alberto Fujimori, who gutted the authority of congress and established a
patronage system in which members of congress depend on the executive
for their seats. The auditing function of congress has become a ‘political
game’ rather than being designed to hold the executive accountable for the
appropriate management of the country’s resources. Lack of public faith in
political parties has made them largely transient entities that are unable
to build the political will or public support to take on corruption and
mismanagement. Analysts also describe a ‘revolving door’ between extract-
ive companies and the government, such that government officials, some
of whom have had oversight responsibility for the extractive industries
sector, leave to take jobs with extractive industries companies (Oxfam
America 2016b).
Peru’s media are also heavily concentrated in the hands of a small elite. This
is another legacy of Fujimori, who sought control of the media in order to
eliminate them as an obstacle to his agenda, which was later revealed to be
deeply corrupt and for which he was ultimately jailed (Durand 2016).
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Participatory budgeting is widely practised in Peru. Yet the costs of individual
participation in budgeting processes can be high. The World Bank (2010) has
estimated the costs of participation for a rural Peruvian in an entire year of
participatory budgeting at US$195, or 95 per cent of a monthly salary at
minimum wage. McNulty (2012) has documented the limitations of the
participatory budgeting process, including little engagement by women
and women’s organizations, complex technical rules, and a lack of formal
sanction for politicians who do not carry out the participatory process in the
spirit of the law.
The Ministry of Economy and Finance plays a particularly dominant role
in the country’s fiscal governance, including with regard to EI. This ministry
largely controls the national budgeting process. It also makes key decisions
about the distribution of mining revenue under the canon minero, and can
block the transfer of revenue to local governments. The congress is left ‘acting
like a beggar’ vis-à-vis the executive branch, and has no effective control over
it on fiscal issues (Mauro 2014).
The breakdown in formal accountability for the use of mining revenues is
perhaps seen most starkly in the province of Ancash, home to Peru’s largest
mine, Antamina. Instead of funding local development priorities, mining
revenues have helped to fuel rampant corruption and the creation of what
has been called a ‘mafia mini-state’, characterized by intimidation of the local
media and judiciary, and contract murders of political foes of the provincial
governor (Bajak 2014a; The Economist 2014). The district of San Marcos
receives US$50 million per year in mining royalties, but there are no paved
roads and no hospital (Bajak 2014b). Ancash is not an isolated case: in 2014,
twenty two out of twenty-five regional presidents were under federal investi-
gation for corruption. By the end of 2014, three were in jail, two had resigned,
and one was barred from holding public office (Oxfam America 2016b).
As noted above, Peru does get high marks by some transparency standards.
Yet the implementation of this transparency is problematic. The country’s law
on access to information is often not complied with by public institutions
(for which there is no effective sanction) and is ignored by private companies.
There are also questions about the validity of the information that is disclosed
by the government through various portals (Oxfam America 2016b).
Despite the deep challenges presented by Peru’s rampant corruption, execu-
tive dominance, and weak formal accountability structures, CSOs have made
some advances in promoting greater accountability of extractives revenue
management. These include identifying discrepancies in the transfer of
canon minero revenues and highlighting problems with the execution of
projects carried out with canon funds. The disclosure of additional revenue
data through mechanisms such as Dodd–Frank 1504 may further strengthen
these efforts.
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The Peruvian research organization Propuesta Ciudadana has done an
analysis of two cases of local governance that perhaps hold interesting lessons
for other countries. In Arequipa in southern Peru, they found that the pres-
ence of a regional president who was personally committed to open govern-
ance and transparency was an important factor inmore effectivemanagement
of mining revenues in the region. In the northern Peruvian department of San
Martin, Propuesta’s research concluded that the relatively strong governance
performance of the regional government was at least in part connected to
investment in governance support by the US Agency for International Devel-
opment, which was channelled as a result of US interests in fighting coca
production in that part of Peru (Grupo Propuesta Ciudadana 2015).
The cases of Ghana and Peru demonstrate the deeply entrenched challenges
of political economy to the effective deployment of extractive industries
revenues at the local and national levels. These challenges reflect the history
and structures of the respective states and their surrounding political cultures.
They also reflect internal power dynamics that link to the nature of extractive
industries themselves and their geographies (as described above). Addressing
these challenges goes beyond the extractive industries, of course, but in coun-
tries like Peru and Ghana that are dependent on these industries the path to
effective state functioning necessarily runs through them. In Section 31.7
I will address how CSOs (and others) can apply knowledge of these political
contexts to promoting greater accountability of the extractive sectors for local
development.
31.7 Strengthening the Role of Civil Society
in Capturing Local Benefits
Ensuring that extractive industries projects produce benefits at the local level
for the communities on which these operations impact most directly is one of
the most difficult questions in the broader field of extractives’ role in devel-
opment. There are few positive examples globally; success stories in poorly
governed developing countries are even scarcer. As noted earlier, this has to do
with a number of factors, including the destructive nature of the industries
themselves, the mechanisms by which they generate wealth and concentrate
it in relatively few hands, governance weakness across the entire production
chain, corporate time horizons, and large information asymmetries among
key stakeholder groups (governments, companies, and communities.) The
deeply political nature of decision-making around these industries, in which
poor and politically marginalized communities lose out to elite interests and
intra-national power dynamics, also work to limit the benefits that commu-
nities obtain.
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Transparency and social accountability are in theory a mechanism to push
back against these dynamics and empower affected communities to reclaim a
fairer share of the benefits derived from resources taken from their lands.
However, as described above, transparency does not automatically equate
to accountability. The barriers to participation in social accountability ini-
tiatives, especially in developing countries, can be high, including time
taken away from work and family, and the understandability of the infor-
mation itself. There is also evidence to suggest that there is a gender bias in
such initiatives that impedes the effective participation of women (Bradshaw
et al. 2016).
The solutions to these problems will undoubtedly vary significantly accord-
ing to each case. Getting governments to care about their populations
and make decisions in their best interests rather than on parochial political
concerns is perhaps the defining problem of political development. It is
also key to ensuring that extractive industries provide more benefits to local
communities. I propose four broad areas of action that, if focused on in
the right contexts, could potentially produce momentum for achieving posi-
tive change. These are: (i) strengthening civil society’s technical capacity;
(ii) providing civic education; (iii) focusing on countries with a minimum
level of governance capacity; (iv) identifying and promoting learning from
legitimately positive examples. I will take each of these in turn.
31.7.1 Strengthening Technical Capacity
As we saw earlier, a wide variety of types of organization engaging with
extractive industries come under the general rubric of ‘civil society’. They
vary in their focus and objectives. Standing and Hilson (2013) note that in
Ghana urban-based and professionalized NGOs funded by foreign donors do
not necessarily represent the interests of affected communities, although they
may claim to do so. This is also an issue in other EI-dependent countries such
as Peru.
Notwithstanding these caveats, civil society has played a key role in driving
change in the extractive industries sector (as seen in the Peru and Ghana
cases). However, in many cases they face serious limitations of resources
and technical capacity. This is particularly the case with regard to their ability
to analyse technical data, including the terms of production contracts,
national and local municipal budgets, and environmental impact assess-
ments. In recent years, working with the support of some global NGOs and
technical experts, local CSOs have been able to engage on these issues and
produce alternative technical analyses that have helped to reframe public
debate on extractive industries governance issues (Cordaid et al. 2016;
Moran 2001).
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The ability of CSOs to prepare these kinds of analysis should be strengthened
and made more sustainable. At present, much CSO technical analysis is pro-
vided by non-indigenous experts, who do not necessarily build local capacity.
The creation of an independent technical support funding mechanism to
support the production of technical analyses—and to build local capacity—
would be an important innovation that could help to address the asymmetries
that so deeply characterize the extractive industries sector. This would include
analysing and employing revenue disclosure data. The goal could be the
development of a global cadre of independent, national technical extractive
industries experts, with some means of remuneration to sustain their work
and avoid the temptation of deploying their technical skills for well-paying
extractive industries companies.
Technical data analysis skills within local CSOs will also become even more
important as more revenue disclosure data become available. Also important
are political analysis skills that will enable CSOs to identify opportunities for
utilizing the data to drive policy change processes that might ultimately result
in more benefits being delivered to local communities. Similarly, engaging
with the local media and building their capacity to understand and report on
these issues is also essential for generating informed public opinion and
mobilizing it to promote change.
31.7.2 Providing Civic Education
Governance is poor in most developing countries. Governments fail to pro-
vide basic public services such as security, infrastructure, healthcare, and
education. Likewise, populations may be conditioned to expect poor perform-
ance from government, and may not be fully aware of what they have a right
to expect from their governments in terms of service delivery. This can create a
vicious circle in which poor services lead to lowered expectations, which
create more poor services as such services become the norm. Breaking out of
this cycle requires education and information about community rights and
what good governance performance can and should look like.
Even taking into account the limitations of transparency described above,
transparency can be an important complementary tool alongside education.
Armed with (i) an awareness of what good governance is and (ii) information
to help demand better performance, citizens can press their governments
for better delivery. To be effective, data yielded by transparency initiatives
must be plugged into a deliberate influencing strategy and approach. Data
alone will not be sufficient to produce the desired outcome of greater account-
ability and delivery of services. CSOs and donors could better coordinate
around promising cases that have realistic possibilities of converting into
success stories.
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31.7.3 Focusing on Appropriate Countries
In selecting such contexts, it is important to recognize that for some countries,
it may simply be too politically difficult to try to fix the problems of the
mismanagement of EI. A minimum threshold level of governance is likely
required for transparency and other interventions to have positive prospects.
This observation is consistent with one of the key recommendations of the
World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review, which called for ‘explicit core and
sectoral governance requirements’ to be met before the World Bank Group
invested in an extractive project (Extractive Industries Review 2003). It is also
consistent with observations that transparency is unlikely to havemuch effect
in autocratic regimes.
It may be better for donors and CSOs to focus their efforts in countries with
the best chances of progress. This does not mean ‘writing off ’ some countries
permanently. It would mean, however, not attempting to address resource
mismanagement issues in countries where the current political contexts are
such that they likely pose insurmountable obstacles to success. As described
above, Peru and Ghana, although facing significant governance challenges,
are democratic and possess vibrant civil societies. These conditions would
suggest that addressing the problems of persistent rural poverty and poor
service delivery should not be beyond the grasp of Peruvian and Ghanaian
society. In such contexts, civic education focusing on the ‘demand’ side of
good governance and what citizens have a right to expect (as described earlier)
could potentially bear fruit.
31.7.4 Promoting Positive Examples
If Peru and Ghana were ultimately to become examples of good resource
governance, it would be critically important to ensure that those lessons
were widely shared and adapted as appropriate to other contexts. In general,
the power of positive examples should be better harnessed to demonstrate
what is possible in addressing the political aspects of resource governance.
Currently there are few positive examples of effective national-level natural
resource management in developing countries beyond the oft-cited cases of
Chile and Botswana. Relatively little effort has been made to unpack these
cases and examine what lessons might (or might not) apply to other countries
seeking to implement effective national natural resource revenue manage-
ment policies. It would be useful to expand the universe of positive examples
to find elements of effective resource revenue management at the national
level that could be highlighted and studied more thoroughly.
Clearly, the simple existence of a handful of positive examples alone will
not be enough to override the political forces that militate against the effective
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use of resource revenues in developing countries. The learning from these
examples needs to be analysed and adapted, where feasible, to other contexts.
At present, however, too little is known about what can work in governance-
challenged resource states (Ross 2014). Greater coordination among donors
could also be beneficial in this realm. Rather than dispersing their efforts
across a wide range of countries, it could make sense for the bilateral and
multilateral donors referenced above to coordinate their extractive industries
and development initiatives more to focus in on a select group of promising
cases. Donor countries could also do more to make their own extractive
industries companies more transparent and accountable. This is particularly
true for countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and China,
which have significant extractive industries interests in developing countries.
31.8 Conclusions
Resource-rich developing countries are at an important ‘moment of truth’.
Over the past twenty years a massive amount of analysis has been done on the
‘resource curse’ and the development of policy tools and recommendations to
address it. Transparency is one such tool although, as discussed, it is far from
being a magic bullet for natural resource management issues. Despite the
volume of analysis and the tools developed, resource-rich countries generally
did not use the recent commodities price boom (2002–13) to their full advan-
tage to reduce poverty and diversify their economies. Added to this, we are
now amidst a commodities price downturn that analysts believe may be long
term. This is combined with a renewed push to phase out the use of fossil fuels
in order to stave off the worst effects of climate change. While undoubtedly in
the best interests of the planet, such a phasing-out will have significant
development repercussions for countries that depend on the export of oil,
gas, and coal (Caney 2016).
The scenario described above is not necessarily encouraging for resource-
dependent countries, or for civil society efforts to try to ensure that local
communities capture more of the benefits produced by EI. On a more positive
note, however, the years of analysis have identified how governments can ‘get
it right’ with regard to the management of their extractive sectors. This
provides the basis for civil society and others to engage with governments
and companies to try to ensure that this happens. Whether governments will
choose to do the right things (about which they can no longer plead ignor-
ance) comes down now to questions of politics. Civil society will ultimately
succeed or fail in driving better development outcomes from extractive indus-
tries investments to the extent to which it can effectively engage with, and in
some cases overcome, these political dynamics.
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How Do We Legislate for Improved
Community Development?
James M. Otto
32.1 Challenges of Non-renewable Resources-led
Development
It is the nature of non-renewable natural resources that an extractive minerals
project has a finite lifespan and that once theminerals have been depleted, the
project will cease operation. Governments have choices in deciding what they
want to achieve from the extraction of minerals during a project’s life and
have a variety of regulatory and other tools by which to achieve their object-
ives. Historically, the primary objective of many governments was to obtain
fiscal revenues from an extractive project and to use larger projects as a means
to build infrastructure that will benefit society. More recently, governments
are additionally looking to achieve benefits for local communities both in
the near term while operations are ongoing but also on a sustainable basis.
According to MMSD:
At the local level, sustainable development is about meeting locally defined
social, environmental, and economic goals over the long term. Interactions
between the mine and community should add to the physical, financial,
human, and information resources available—not detract from them. The chal-
lenge is to ensure that the effects of interactions are regarded as positive by
those affected locally as well as by the promoters of the project, and that
communities develop in ways that are consistent with their own vision. This
may be realized through, for example, the provision of social services, income,
or skills development. (MMSD 2002: 198)
Many large projects implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) pro-
grammes which often include benefits for nearby communities. In some
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cases, such programmes can include binding contracts with communities or
more informal written approaches, such as a non-enforceable memorandum
of understanding. Increasingly, governments are mandating in legislation
that extractive industry projects must have programmes for community devel-
opment rather than relying on voluntary efforts.
One means that regulators have to achieve benefits at the community level
is to require extractive companies to enter into community development
agreements (CDAs). Not all governments that require community develop-
ment programmes require CDAs; however, CDAs can be a useful approach
that provides both the project and the community with a mutually agreed
means to define the attributes of project-assisted development in a way that
can help to manage expectations. This chapter looks at one aspect of CDAs—
the legislation that can be used to regulate CDA requirements. The concept of
a CDA, a contract between an economic enterprise and a community, can be
applied to both themining and oil and gas sectors, but at the present time, the
use of CDAs for mining projects is becoming commonplace although they are
rarely used in the petroleum sector. Here, the emphasis is on mining-sector
CDA legislation.
The term ‘community development agreement’ is sometimes used in a
broad sense but for the purposes of this chapter, a CDA is narrowly defined
as ‘a legally binding contract between the holder of an authorization granting
the rights to extract minerals, and a community (or communities) that will be
affected by the exercise of those rights, that addresses matters concerning
community development’.
32.2 Respective Roles of Government and Investors
in Community Development
The respective roles of government and extractive companies with regard to
community development are complex and vary considerably from nation to
nation and from project to project. There is a history of mines contributing
to community development in ways ranging from the building of company
towns, to guaranteeing infrastructure bonds, to paying locally imposed
property taxes, to building schools and health clinics, to providing financing
and training for local enterprises, and to supporting local sourcing of
goods, services, and employees. There has long been a dialogue within the
political science field about whether community development should be
government- or private-sector-led.1 At the heart of the argument is the issue
1 For an introduction to mining and its growing role in local and sustainable development, and
its potential negative impacts, the author recommends Evans et al. (2001), Richards (2009),
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of sustainability: the miner will eventually depart when the mine closes but
the government will remain and thus their respective planning horizons
and long-term objectives may be quite different. Also, miners are expert at
mining, while governments are experienced in developing health, education,
and community infrastructure. Historically, miners have tended to regard
local communities from the viewpoint of how the community can serve
the mine—for example, as a source of employees and housing—rather than
how the mine can serve the community, sometimes resulting in non-
sustainable enclave-type development. Regardless of the academic argument
about whether community development should be government- or miner-
led, in practice, most communities do not care, as long as beneficial devel-
opment takes place:
Few areas present a greater challenge than the relationship between mining com-
panies and local communities. . . .Widespread community demands for relevant,
direct, and sustained benefits frommineral wealth are a relatively recent phenom-
enon, so frequently neither government institutions nor companies or commu-
nities themselves have been properly equipped to respond to them. In areas of
weak governance, communities often turn to the operating companies, which
have found themselves providing development services to obtain or to maintain
their social licence to operate. A new relationship is beginning to emerge, based on
recognition of the rights of communities and the need for community participa-
tion in decision-making. Moreover, new initiatives seek to avoid the company
assuming the role and responsibilities of government, but rather focus on improv-
ing the capacity of local government and other local institutions to deliver mine-
derived benefits over the long term. (MMSD 2002: xix)
The legal system can be used to define the respective roles of extractive
companies in the community development process. Requiring CDAs in fragile
states may have particular significance. If the central government is unable or
unwilling to fund development at the community level, a CDA may provide
development opportunities otherwise unobtainable. A challenge in drafting
CDA legislation is how to balance the respective development roles of gov-
ernment and the miner. Ideally, development efforts under a CDA will act to
complement government-led development, not displace it.
32.3 Voluntary vs Mandatory Approaches
If a government desires that mining companies play a role in community
development, it may decide to allow that role to be defined voluntarily by the
Crowson (2003, 2007), and the various publications of the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable
Development (MMSD) project (IIED n.d.).
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miner or may impose mandatory requirements. In the last two decades there
have been many mining projects worldwide that have been unable to move
from discovery to development because of community opposition. Often-
times, even if a project is built, it may attract the future ire of communities if
their current and evolving expectations are not met. This has led many of the
world’s mining companies to place an increased emphasis on CSR pro-
grammes including community development. Additionally, mining-sector
organizations such as the ICMM have done work to help define community
development good practice. In 2003, the council committed its members to a
sustainable development framework of ten principles including ‘9. Contribute
to the social, economic, and institutional development of the communities in
which we operate’.2
In support of this commitment the organization has since prepared a num-
ber of supporting ‘tools’ for optional use by its members including: Commu-
nity Development Toolkit (ICMM 2005, 2012) and Partnerships for
Development Toolkit (ICMM2011). The first of these is discussed and assessed
in detail in Macdonald (2017).
Relying on companies to voluntarily assist in community development is
risky—not all firms are good corporate citizens and not all are competent to
know how to offer such assistance. For this and other reasons, an increasing
number of governments are now mandating the use of CDAs or other com-
munity development tools in their mining legislation rather than relying
simply on voluntary approaches.While many companies baulk at the concept
of increased regulation rather than being able to achieve desired outcomes
according to their ownmeans, most would agree that CDAs, whether required
by legislation or not, can be a useful tool to manage community expectations.
The use of community development statutory requirements does not preclude
voluntary programmes—they are not mutually exclusive. Hybrid approaches
combining mandated elements and voluntary activities are not uncommon.3
In nations where the mining or environmental law requires community
development, that requirement can form the core of or complement a CSR
programme. Likewise, law-drafters can utilize concepts originating in volun-
tary initiatives. For example, when drafting the model CDA regulations pub-
lished by theWorld Bank (Otto 2010), the author took into account the ICMM
Community Development Toolkit and examined many existing ‘voluntary’
CDAs. An attribute of a good law is being able to achieve a degree of consensus
between policy makers, regulators, beneficiaries, and those that will be regu-
lated on issues such as objectives, processes, and good practice.
2 See ICMM (n.d.) for the full set of sustainable development principles.
3 A good example is Brazil with the situation there being described in some detail in ICMM
(2013).
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32.3.1 Legal Mandates: Acts of Law and State Mining Agreements
Governments have two main ways in which to legally impose community
development requirements on the private sector—state agreements and stat-
utes. A state agreement is a contractual agreement between the owner of the
rights of extraction and the government and sets out the mutually agreed
obligations and rights of the parties. During the post-colonial era up through
the 1990s, such agreements for individual large projects were commonplace
throughout the developing world, but in recent times, their use has been
reduced as laws relating to mining (mining law, environmental law, labour
law, income tax law, etc.) generally have improved, thereby negating the need
for project-specific agreements. Provisions in agreements can find their way
into statutes over time. For example, Guinea developed a model mining
agreement in 2006 that contained extensive CDA provisions. It introduced a
new mining law in 2011 containing similar CDA requirements, obviating the
need to address that subject in future agreements (AMLA n.d.a). Like in Guinea,
other nations have now addressed community development requirements in
their mining laws. According to Schott et al. (2015):4 ‘Since the mid-1980s
thirty-two countries have adopted community development provisions in min-
ing codes, with nine countries currently in the process’ (Schott et al. 2015).
Table 32.1 lists countries whose mining law (or model agreement) requires
some sort of community development action. The list includes a wide variety
of community development related requirements, not all of which include a
CDA as defined for the purposes of this chapter. For readers interested in a
short description of the specific community development requirement in
most of the jurisdictions listed in the table, the author recommends Penagos
et al. (2014). For the African nations listed in Table 32.1, their mining laws,
including the community development requirements, are accessible through
the African Mining Legislation Atlas (AMLA n.d.b).
32.3.2 World Bank Model CDA Regulations and Later Improvements
Given the growing interest in CDAs and their application to extractive
projects, in 2010 the World Bank launched a multi-year specialized research
project intended to investigate the nature and usage of CDAs and to provide
associated information and guidance to governments, industry, communi-
ties, and other concerned stakeholders. The work was conducted in several
stages. In the initial stage, a review was done of existing CDA agreements
and community development extractive industries initiatives worldwide.
A conceptual framework was developed to identify key building blocks to
4 Based largely on work by Dupuy (2014).
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enable extractive-led community development and that framework was then
used to draft preliminary model CDA regulations and guidelines suitable for
use with a mining law. The second phase of the project involved extensive
consultations with a broad spectrum of stakeholders including reviews of
the draft regulations and guidelines. Following this preliminary work, field
research was commissioned to assess the community development practice in
selected countries and to further evaluate the results of the preliminary phases.
Finally, research was done on the processes and frameworks used to negotiate,
structure, and implement CDAs. The project culminated with the publication
of a major multi-volume sourcebook on CDAs (World Bank 2012).5 For readers
who are interested in CDAs, the sourcebook remains one of the most compre-
hensive sources of information and case studies on the subject.
After publication of the World Bank’s CDA sourcebook, the author of this
chapter undertook a number of assignments to assist nations to draft or
amend their mining laws. Based on the author’s subsequent experience in
drafting mining laws and regulations for nations in the African, Asian, and
Pacific regions, including provisions mandating CDAs, he updated and
Table 32.1. Countries where community development is
required by law or agreement
Country Country
Afghanistan
Autonomous Region of Bougainville
Burkina Faso (pending)








































Source: derived from Dupuy (2014), Penagos et al. (2014), and various CDA-
related projects executed by the author.
5 The author of this chapter was lead author of the World Bank model CDA regulations (Otto
2010).
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improved the model CDA mining regulations, and they have been published
by the United Nations.6 The model provisions include both articles for use in
the primary mining law as well as detailed regulations. While the model
provisions provide a ‘good practice’ basis for legislating CDAs, they are
intended only as a starting point for policy makers and legislators. The devel-
opment of actual mining law provisions and regulations must be crafted to
meet unique jurisdictional needs and requirements.
32.4 Legislated Requirements
32.4.1 What Is a CDA?
There aremany forms of agreements that aim to provide a formal or semi-formal
linkage between an extractive industry project and nearby communities. Such
agreements go by many names such as: impact and benefit agreements; access
and benefits agreements; indigenous land use agreements; partnering agree-
ments; contracts with the community; landowner agreements; shared respon-
sibilities agreements; community joint venture agreements; empowerment
agreements; benefits sharing agreements, and so forth. Some of these agree-
ments are intended as an informal, non-binding means by which the signator-
ies mutually express their views on certain topics, such as in a memorandum of
understanding. Others take the form of a legally binding contract or even a
treaty. Today, the use of various forms of agreements between extractive com-
panies and communities is becoming widespread, but CDA use is not yet
considered standard practice in many nations. However, in some nations,
such as Canada, their use is nearly universal for large extractive projects.7
Some agreements are held confidentially, but many are available on publicly
accessible databases.8 As was indicated at the beginning, for the purposes of this
chapter regarding CDA legislation, a CDA means a legally binding contract
between the holder of an authorization granting the rights to extract minerals
and a community (or communities) that will be affected by the exercise of those
rights that addresses matters concerning community development.
6 The model CDA mining law articles and regulations may be accessed in the annex section of
Otto (2017).
7 In Canada, the use of ‘impacts and benefits agreements’ between aboriginal groups and
companies that extract minerals from their lands is widespread, and although such agreements
are not required by statute, they are common, with over 180 in use in 2012. Miningfacts.org (2012)
defines an impact and benefits agreement as ‘a formal contract outlining the impacts of the project,
the commitment and responsibilities of both parties, and how the associated Aboriginal
community will share in benefits of the operation through employment and economic
development’. Sosa and Keenan (2001) provide a good overview of impact and benefits
agreements in Canada.
8 See for example the Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements Project collection
(ATNS n.d.).
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One of the advantages of a legislated approach to CDA requirements, versus
just allowing a miner to determine whether one is required and what
it should contain, is that it avoids problems that arise when every mine
is handled on an ad hoc basis. For example, over the past decade in the
Solomon Islands, companies exploring for gold, nickel, and other minerals
began entering into ad hoc land access agreements, which differed greatly.
When it became known to communities that some agreements were substan-
tially more beneficial than others, the viability of some agreements became
questionable and pressure was brought on politicians and local leaders to
ensure that all communities got a fair deal. As a result, the government
requested assistance to draft a standardized model land access agreement
that would be suitable for introduction as a requirement under its mining
regulations. O’Faircheallaigh has observed:
Agreements between commercial developers and local communities are becom-
ing more common in virtually all parts of the world, from inner city America to
remote mining regions. The need for such ‘community development agree-
ments’ (CDAs) is especially acute in mining, where environmental and social
costs are often borne by communities while project benefits accrue in national
capitals and global financial centres, leading to conflict between local people and
miners. (O’Faircheallaigh 2012: 222)
It is important not to confuse community development requirements, CDA or
otherwise, with impact compensation—these are two separate concepts. Most
mining laws require that if a mine causes damage to personal or community
property or property rights, the owner of that property or right must be
compensated by the miner. Compensation payments are different from an
investment by the miner in community development. A compensation pay-
ment is usually a one-time payment for a real property loss, while CDA funding
requirements can be ongoing and seek to achieve development objectives (for
example, human capital enhancement, microbusiness creation, etc.).
32.4.2 Parties to a CDA
If a CDA is required by law, who should be a party to the agreement? Obvi-
ously, the community and the company holding the extraction rights should
be parties, but what is the role of district, provincial, and national govern-
ment? In many situations, it makes sense for the community’s local govern-
ment (for example, an elected city council, tribal elders, or mayor’s office) to
be a party to the agreement, but where such a government is absent or not
respected or accepted by the community, it can be a challenge to identify who
is best positioned to represent the community. This is a challenge for policy
makers and law-drafters particularly in nations that have a combination of
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elected and traditional leaders. One approach is to require in the law that a
CDA be ratified by the community according to such process and in such
manner as is customary for such community to make decisions on matters
affecting the community as a whole. This approach allows flexibility from one
locale to another. In a legislated approach, it can be made clear who the CDA
parties are, avoiding the uncertainty that may arise where a purely miner-led
voluntary approach is allowed.
The role of higher levels of government can be to act as the regulator of the
CDA mandate rather than be a party to it. For example, a ministry of mines
can be given the role of: ensuring that all miners who are required to have
CDAs do indeed have them; ensuring that a CDA addresses all mandatory
subject matter; monitoring a CDA to make sure it is being implemented;
taking appropriate actions (such as levying fines or suspension or cancellation
of rights) if implementation is not proceeding as required, and so forth. The
responsible ministry can also act as a repository of CDAs, provide information
about CDA requirements tailored for use by communities (such as maintain-
ing a website), and make compliance reports available to the public.
32.4.3 Participatory Processes: Meeting the Needs
of Disparate Communities
The process by which CDAs are negotiated and agreed can be complicated. One
of the benefits of a legislated CDA approach is that a clear but flexible roadmap
can be provided to guide the parties with regard to the CDAnegotiation process.
This can be particularly helpful when there are a number of communities
involved that may have distinct cultural differences and varying expectations.
The use of sociologists, mediators, and others who specialize in local-level
negotiations can be an important part of the CDA process.9 An agreement
that constitutes a great fit for one communitymay be inappropriate for another.
There is a real possibility that a community may not want a mine nearby,
especially if mine development requires a resettlement process. Its future
vision may emphasize preservation of the status quo or slow improvements
that will not endanger social value systems. Evans has summarized the differ-
ing objectives that sometimes occur between well-intentioned miners and
local communities:
Today, mining companies are clamoring to take the lead in defining sustainability,
offering schools, and hospitals and jobs in return for the mineral wealth, sup-
posedly extracted with minimal long-term environmental harm. However, for
9 Gibson andO’Faircheallaigh (2010) offer CDA negotiations advice, including whom to include
in negotiation processes, in the form of a detailed negotiations toolkit.
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communities facing the bulldozer, the concept of and the reality of ‘sustainable
mining’ is not necessarily the same. (Evans et al. 2001: 250)
In most nations, minerals belong to the state and it is often in the state’s
interest to see its mineral resources developed for the good of all its citizens,
even if a local community opposes mining. Participatory processes where a
community is hostile to a mine can thwart the dialogue necessary to create a
CDA. A mining law that requires CDAs needs to address this situation, either
by embracing the concept of prior informed consent or by providing an
exemption from a CDA requirement in certain situations.
32.4.4 Community Contract Negotiating Capacity
As defined in this chapter, a CDA is a legally binding contract. A basic prin-
ciple underlying contract law is that a contract is a legally binding agreement
between two or more competent and consenting parties. Gibson and
O’Faircheallaigh have discerned:
Once a decision to negotiate is made, a community and its leaders need to
undertake a hard-headed assessment of their position in relation to the company,
the government authorities that will approve or reject the project, and the wider
economic and political context. (Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh 2010: 11)
However, many communities lack the capacity and competency effectively to
negotiate or understand the ramifications of terms in a community develop-
ment agreement. Lacking such capacity, they are vulnerable to agreeing to
terms that may not be in their long-term best interest. Over time, a lop-sided
agreement risks becoming obsolete when the community realizes that the
agreement is suboptimal. For this reason, some CDA legislation requires
that CDAs address key mandatory issues and that the community either
be provided with experienced counsel or be assisted to develop its own nego-
tiating capacity. For example Section 123 (10) of the mining law of the
Autonomous Region of Bougainville requires:
If in the opinion of the Secretary a qualified community that is entitled to a commu-
nity development agreement lacks the capacity to effectively negotiate a community
development agreement, the holder of a large-scale mining lease shall assist to build
that capacity including the provision of such funds to the qualified community for
capacity-building and preparation as are reasonable in the circumstances.10
If CDAs are created in an unregulated environment, there can be a greater
likelihood that a community may not have the capacity and competence
protection that the Bougainville legislation provides.
10 Bougainville Mining Act 2015, Section 123(10).
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In some cases, NGOs may be able to play an important advisory role where
such legal protection is unavailable. For example, in Ghana, NGOs were made
part of the group that negotiated the CDAs for the Ahafo gold project.11 In a
case-study-based analysis of CDAs, Brereton et al. (2011: 15) note that ‘the
success of a CDA relies heavily on all parties having the capacity to participate
constructively in the agreement making process, support the agreement over
time and deliver on their respective commitments’.
32.5 Mining Act and Mining Regulations Provisions
In this section, the core issues that underlie a CDA requirement in a mining
act and the associated regulations are introduced. Such core issues also can
apply to a petroleum law but few nations have moved to apply CDA require-
ments to oil and gas projects. It is typical in mining acts that CDA-related
provisions are few, short, and to the point with details instead provided in the
mining act regulations. In addition to the general examples provided in this
section, detailed and comprehensive CDA model mining act provisions and
regulations recommended by this author may be accessed in the annex of
Otto (2017).
32.5.1 Which Operations Require CDAs?
The mining industry is comprised of many types and sizes of projects and not
all operations are amenable to CDA requirements. For example, imposing
CDA requirements on an artisanal miner or a small quarry would not be
practical. This is also true for operations that will have a short duration or
that will generate onlyminimal revenues. It is therefore necessary for amining
law to define the types and scale of operations that will be subject to CDA
requirements. Generally, CDAs make sense where the scale and duration of a
project have the potential to make a substantial contribution to local sustain-
able development without imperilling the economic viability of the project.
One approach is to determinewhether CDA requirementsmake sense on a case-
by-case basis. However, an approach that relies on administrative discretion to
make such a determination poses risks for the project investor, government,
and the affected communities. Other approaches can provide greater certainty.
If the mining law makes provision for several types of mining authoriza-
tions, the CDA requirement can be applied to specified licence types, such as a
large-scale mining licence, or alternatively, some licence types can be
exempted (artisanal mining licence, quarry licence, etc.). The following
11 For case studies of CDA processes and participants see Sarkar et al. (2010).
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example illustrating a linkage between licence type and a CDA requirement is
from South Sudan:
68. Community Development Agreements
(1) A Large-Scale Mining Licence Title Holder shall
. . .
(b) enter into Community Development Agreements with such communi-
ties in cooperation with relevant government authorities.12
Another similar approach is to require CDAs if certain scale-of-operations
criteria are exceeded. An example of this approach is found in the Sierra
Leone mining act:
139. Where community development agreement is required.
(1) The holder of a small-scale or large-scale mining licence is required to
have and implement a community development agreement with the pri-
mary host community if its approved mining operation will or does exceed
any of the following limits:
(a) in the case of extraction of minerals from primarily alluvial deposits,
where annual throughput is more than one million cubic metres per year;
(b) underground mining operations, where annual combined run-of mine
ore and waste production is more than one hundred thousand tonnes per
year (waste material not exiting mine mouth to be excluded);
(c) in the case of open-cast mining operations extracting minerals from
primarily non-alluvial deposits, where annual combined run-of mine ore,
rock, waste and overburden production is more than two hundred and fifty
thousand tonnes per year; or
(d) where the licence holder employs or contracts more than one hundred
employees or workers at the mine site on a typical working day (including
all shifts).13
32.5.2 Which Communities Qualify for a CDA?
If a mining law requires that a miner enter into community development agree-
ments it is important to definewhat constitutes a community for the purposes of
such a requirement. For the purposes of CDAs, ‘community’ can generally be
considered ‘a particular area or place considered together with its inhabitants’.14
12 Section 68, Mining Act, 2012 (South Sudan).
13 Section 139, The Mines and Minerals Act, No.12 of 2009 (Sierra Leone).
14 This is one of several definitions for the word ‘community’ offered by Oxford Dictionaries,
at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/community (accessed
15 April 2016).
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However, in order to be practical, this broad definition needs to be refined.
For example, the area around a mine may be populated by numerous clans
or small family units each of which may consider themselves a commu-
nity. To require a separate agreement with every clan or family would
place an undue burden on both the miner and the regulator. Addition-
ally, since being party to a CDA implies the receipt of benefits, every
community would like to qualify for an agreement, even if located far
from the project. If the number of communities is too large, the benefits
may be too diluted to achieve meaningful sustainable development. This
then leads to the concept of ‘qualified community’ where the law defines
the term using parameters that limit the sphere of beneficiaries.
Some governments may desire to focus the community development agree-
ment effort on a single qualified community that can act as a regional facilities
hub for other neighbouring communities. By concentrating expenditure on a
single ‘host’ community, it may be possible to build infrastructure, such as a
hospital, that would not be possible if the available CDA resources were
disbursed among several or many communities. This single host community
approach was embodied in the Sierra Leone mining act:
139. Where community development agreement is required.
(1) The holder of a small-scale or large-scale mining licence is required to
have and implement a community development agreement with the pri-
mary host community . . .
(2) The primary host community is the single community of persons mutu-
ally agreed by the holder of the small-scale or large-scale mining licence and
the local council, but if there is no community of persons residing within
thirty kilometres of any boundary defining the large-scale mining licence
area, the primary host community shall be the local council.
(3) If the holder of the small-scale or large-scale mining licence and local
council cannot agree on which community is the primary host community,
the licence-holder may notify the Minister requesting clarification, and the
Minister shall notify the licence holder and local council within sixty
calendar days from the date of such notice, specifying which community
is the primary host community.15
Similar single host community provisions are provided in the 2011Mozambique
model mining agreement,16 the Nigerian mining regulations,17 and the mining
15 Section 139, The Mines and Minerals Act, No.12 of 2009 (Sierra Leone).
16 Section 19.2, unpublished 2011 Mozambique Model Mining Agreement.
17 Section 193(5), Nigerian Minerals and Mining Regulations, S.I. 47 of 2011.
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regulations of Yemen.18 One of the challenges of the primary host community
approach is that other communities nearby may feel slighted, resulting in
possible hostile attitudes. To alleviate this, broader poverty reduction initiatives
that encompass communities that do not have a CDAmay be useful. A possible
problem with a mandated primary host community requirement is that once a
company has met its statutory CDA requirement, it may have little incentive to
work further afield with other communities.
While some governments focus CDA resources on a single qualified com-
munity, others take amore egalitarian approach and a project may be required
to enter into CDAs with all communities that meet prescribed criteria. This
approach has merit in that it can avoid situations where one community is
perceived to receive benefits to the detriment of other communities, perhaps
setting the stage for a hostile situation. The following example is from the
mining law of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea:
2. INTERPRETATION.
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears:
‘Qualified Community’means any community of more than 1,000 persons
who by tradition or by circumstances constitute a social community that
usually reside within:
(a) a large-scale mining lease area and any associated lease for mining
purposes area; or
(b) fifteen (15) kilometres of any boundary defining a large-scale mining
lease; or
(c) an area-of-influence, identified in an environmental impact assessment
prepared as a requirement under the PNG Environment Act 2000, that will
be affected in a major way by large-scale mining lease operations; or
(d) a village or township that will house more than ten (10) per cent of the
workers employed or contracted by a large-scale mining lease holder, and
which is thus eligible to enter into a community development agreement
with the holder of a large-scale mining lease;
. . .
123. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
(5) Subject to Subsection (6), the holder of a large-scale mining lease is
required to have and implement community development agreements
with all qualified communities that are willing to enter into a community
development agreement.19
18 Article 73, Executive Regulation of Law No. (22) for the year 2010 regarding Mines and
Quarries (Yemen).
19 Sections 2 and 123, Bougainville Mining Act, 2014 (Autonomous Region of Bougainville,
Papua New Guinea).
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Where a mining law seeks to provide an egalitarian approach, it may strive to
provide CDA benefits to a wide number of small disparate groups by requiring
such ‘sub-communities’ to aggregate into amoremanageable ‘qualified commu-
nity’ that is then the party to theCDA. Since the benefits that derive fromaCDA
can be substantial, there is a strong incentive for smaller communities to join
together to form a community that qualifies for a CDA. The following example
is also from the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea:
91. INTERPRETATION FOR THIS PART.
In this Part, words and expressions shall have the meanings ascribed to
them in the Act and as follows:
. . .
‘Sub-Community’ means any social community of less than 1,000 persons
that otherwise meets the definition of a qualified community.
92. IDENTIFICATION OF QUALIFIED COMMUNITIES.
. . .
(3) Sub-communities may join to form a Qualified Community and any
such joining shall be recorded in a registry of sub-communities comprising
the Qualified Community.
(4) Sub-communities do not qualify for a community development
agreement.20
32.5.3 Mandatory CDA Obligations under the Mining Act
In this author’s opinion, when drafting CDA requirements for amining law, at
least four core obligations should be addressed for projects that are required to
have CDAs:
 theproject has a development obligationwith regard to certain communities
 the project’s development activities must be agreed in its CDAs
 the agreed CDA activities must be implemented
 the activities must be periodically reported so that the regulator can verify
that the CDA is being implemented.
Below are sample clauses extracted from the model mining act CDA article
recommended by the author in Otto (2017) that address these obligations:
The holder of a large-scale mining licence must assist in the development of
qualified communities affected by its operations to promote sustainable
20 Sections 91 and 92, Mining Regulations, 2015 (Autonomous Region of Bougainville, Papua
New Guinea).
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development, enhance the general welfare and the quality of life of the
inhabitants andmust recognize and respect the rights, customs, and traditions
of local communities.
The holder of a large-scalemining licence is required to have and implement
community development agreements with all communities that meet the
definition of a qualified community that are willing to enter into a commu-
nity development agreement.
The holder of a large-scale mining licence is required to reasonably comply
with its approved community development agreements.
The holder of a large-scale mining licence must:
(a) expend on community development no less than [x per cent] of its
annual gross sales revenues, in such manner, at such time and on such
activities as are prescribed; and
(b) submit annually, at such time and in such form and manner as are
prescribed, a community development expenditure report;
(c) submit semi-annually, at such time and in such form and manner as are
prescribed, a community development agreement report for each commu-
nity development agreement associated with its mining licence; and
(d) periodically, as is prescribed, update its community development
agreement(s).
The requirement in the last example clause also requires the licence holder to
annually expend a minimum amount on community development (includ-
ing but not limited to expenditure on CDA activities) based on a specified
percentage of its gross revenue. In this author’s experience, this is an import-
ant option for policy makers to consider. By providing a sure and unambigu-
ous income stream, there is a much higher prospect that CDA activities will be
implemented, and also that the beneficiary communities will have a better
understanding of funding levels, thus acting as a way to manage expectations.
Such a provision also aids CDA negotiations because the funding requirement
is set out in the law and is not open to negotiation. In discussions with
industry, the author learned that many mines voluntarily expend around
2 per cent of gross revenues on CSR programmes, but the amount is highly
variable from project to project. Thus, a statutory requirement for CDA-related
expenditure of around 2 per cent would probably not be considered as unrea-
sonable by many mining companies.
As a further aid to CDA negotiations, the author also recommends that
mining law regulations be adopted to statutorily set out topics that a CDA
must address. In practice, such regulations provide a blueprint for negoti-
ations and protect the interests of communities by ensuring that key subject
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matter is covered. Themodel regulations provided in Otto (2017) contain a list
of mandatory topics that a CDAmust cover. One of the key topics addressed in
the regulations is a requirement for a CDA to contain a ‘development plan’
jointly prepared by theminer and the community which forms the core of the
CDA. The model regulations articles that related to a development plan were
inspired by the findings of a major study of mining and its role in sustainable
development undertaken by the Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Develop-
ment Project (MMSD 2002: xxviii):
The CSDP [community sustainable development plan] should be based on the
community’s concept of how the mine can best contribute to achieving its
social, environmental, and economic goals. The plan should provide the fun-
damental framework for relationships among the company, the community,
and the government (and any other parties) through the project life and into
post-closure. It should identify the specific actions needed and the respective
roles and responsibilities to achieve the agreed-upon vision. It could also create
some obligations, on all sides, for taking those steps. Independent mechanisms for
monitoring and evaluation, including clear and agreed indicators of performance,
need to be included. The plan will need to evolve and be amended over the life of
the project to reflect changing priorities and capacities. (MMSD 2002: xxviii)
While the model regulations in Otto (2017) set out a list of mandatory topics
that must be addressed in a CDA, they do not specify how each of the topics is
to be resolved. For example, the regulations require that a CDA must contain
grievance and dispute resolution provisions but do not say what they are—
that is for the miner and the community to negotiate and agree. In this way,
each agreement is different, recognizing that every community and project
will have their own unique needs and attributes. It is important to distinguish
between obligations imposed under themining law and those that arise under
the terms of a negotiated CDA: the former are statutory obligations and the
latter, contractual obligations.
32.5.4 Enforcement, Offences, and Penalties
A mining law that requires the use of CDAs and that imposes related obliga-
tions often contains provisions to enforce compliance. Failure to comply with
a statutory obligation is deemed an offence and a substantial fine may result
for non-compliance. Additionally, linking non-compliance to an administra-
tive action, such as suspension or cancellation of the extractive right, is a
valuable enforcement tool for regulators. For obligations arising under the
CDA, in contrast to those arising under the mining law, the parties to the
agreement have recourse to the appropriate court or other dispute resolution
methods set out in the agreement.
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32.5.5 Applicability to Pre-existing Mining Rights
One of the challenges in drafting a mining law that requires CDAs is how to
handle pre-existing projects and arrangements. Should all such projects be
exempt? How should pre-existing arrangements between a mine and commu-
nity be addressed? One approach is to allow such projects a defined time
period in which to obtain required CDAs that meet new statutory require-
ments. The author has drafted the following example of such an approach:
‘the holder of an authorization to conduct large-scale mining operations that
currently is in force but that was granted prior to the adoption of this Act is
required to comply with this article and must be in compliance with this
article no later than two years from the effective date of this Act’.
Another approach, which the author of this chapter does not advocate, is
for a new mining law to remain silent on the transition issue. In this latter
approach (taken by Nigeria and Sierra Leone in their most recent mining laws)
all miners of a certain scale must have CDAs, but no time period for effecting
the requirement by pre-existing operations is stated; in effect, upon the day
that the law becomes effective they are liable to have CDAs. It is then left to
the regulator to determine when to commence an enforcement action. This
approach allows a great deal of flexibility, but some regulators may be hesitant
to commence enforcement.
It is a fundamental nature of a new law that the ‘rules of the game’ change,
otherwise why not just keep the existing law? When a country imposes CDA
requirements in a new law, the policy principle driving those requirements is
that the nation has certain expectations with regard to community develop-
ment thatmust bemet according to the new system, not the old one. Thus, if a
miner has a pre-existing approach to community development it must ensure
that its approach conforms to the new law.
32.5.6 Legal Effect of a CDA
Ashasbeenmentionedearlier in this chapter, there aremany formsof agreements
between extractive firms and communities. A law requiring CDAs should clearly
define the legal nature of required CDAs. A CDA, as defined in this chapter, is a
legally binding contract and is enforceable by recourse to the appropriate court.
32.5.7 Effect of Transfer of the Underlying Exploration/Mining Right
Extractive industry projects typically go through several phases including
exploration, development, extraction, rehabilitation, and post-closure. For
many projects, ownership of the respective rights granted during the various
phases may change. This is particularly true of the transition from the
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exploration phase to the development phase. A key part of a law addressing
CDAs is to define at what phase such agreements are required and to require
that a CDA entered into by a company will be honoured by a successor
company. Many laws that require CDAs impose the requirement at the devel-
opment stage. Requiring a CDA at the exploration stage is impractical because
the nature and location of the resource will at that stage be unknown.
32.6 Conclusions
The use of CDA legislation to achieve community-level benefits is just one
option for governments. Some governments may place no direct emphasis
on community development with the expectation that a community that is
located in close proximity to a mine will benefit from project-related employ-
ment and other linked opportunities. Many extractive companies have
CSR programmes that may be directed, at least in part, toward community
development. Other nations prefer that, instead of benefits flowing to a
community via a direct link between the project and the community, the
community will be a recipient instead of a portion of the fiscal revenues
generated by the project.21 The widespread use of CDA legislation is a rela-
tively new phenomenon and the efficacy of CDAs as a means to achieve
community-level benefits is still to be determined. However, when compared
to approaches that rely entirely on voluntary actions by companies/projects,
statutorily mandated CDAs greatly reduce the risk that sustainable commu-
nity development will not take place. If the CDA legislation is robust, such as
the model legislation appearing in Otto (2010) and Otto (2017), it can
provide a clear roadmap for mandatory processes, approvals, monitoring,
and enforcement, all of which are lacking in an unregulated approach to
mine-assisted community development. Some of the advantages of a regu-
lated CDA approach versus a mining law that is silent about community
development include:
 the different roles and responsibilities of the miner, communities, and
government can be made clear
 communities that are qualified for development assistance are identifiable
 qualified communities will have awritten and enforceable contractwith the
miner that identifies their rights and obligations regarding development
21 Examples of where a portion of a project’s fiscal revenues are allocated by law, rather than
through the budgeting process, back to local communities: property taxes in the United States; a
statutory portion of income tax in Peru; a statutory portion of royalty in Brazil.
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 the expectations of the community can be aligned to a practical level of
funding
 miners will know the minimum level of annual development funding
that they must provide
 CDAminimum content guidance can ensure that key issues are addressed
 formal grievance and dispute resolution approaches can be established
 the probability of development implementation is high because non-
compliance can result in fines, penalties, or possible cancellation of the
right to mine in addition to civil action arising through the application of
contract law.
One of the downsides of a regulated CDA requirement is that it can impose
an administrative burden on the regulatory agency. It may be necessary to hire
officers and provide them with appropriate training and resources.
While a CDA—either one required by law or one entered into voluntarily—
is no guarantee that the boom and bust cycle that communities experience
when a mine closes will be avoided; if the agreement includes objectives that
address sustainable development, it can be hoped that mine closure will have
a lesser impact than had the CDA not been in place. Miners have always had
the option to assist in community development. The question for government
is whether it is satisfied with allowing miners to offer development assistance
on an ad hoc basis or whether that assistance should be required by law and
regulated.
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Tony Addison and Alan Roe
33.1 Challenges
The extractive industries have invariably occupied a somewhat uncomfortable
position in development debate and practice: they might be likened to a rich
but somewhat bossy relative who must be invited to the family parties but
whom no one really wants to talk to. The very word ‘extraction’ conjures up
images of forceful (and painful) removal. Themedia image is frequently one of
despoiling nature, sometimes abusing and destroying the environment,
including the resources (water, forests, soils etc.) essential to human life. Nor
does mining infrastructure offer the same attractive photo opportunities for
local politicians or for visiting ministers from aid-donor countries as do
schools and clinics. In some cases there can be an imbalance of power between
large extractives companies and host governments (as well as local communi-
ties)—and corruption and non-transparency are still to be found.
Donor assessments of private-sector development opportunities have often
given only grudging acknowledgement (and sometimes none) to the role of
extractives sectors in attracting investment, creating economic growth, and
generating export earnings: even in some country cases where mining is
demonstrably the largest private-sector activity. Within donor agencies and
development banks, there has been a tendency to keep departments dealing
with the extractives sector (e.g. providing finance to encourage investments) at
arm’s length from themore ‘mainstream’work in economic policy and poverty
reduction. Some agenciesfind it uncomfortable to liaisewith large companies in
the design and implementation of community projects in some poorer econ-
omies even when they are prepared to spend large amounts on these.
Yet human history, together with the growth in living standards
down the centuries, are associated with the creation of new and better
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tools, derived ultimately from the planet’s renewable and non-renewable
resources: this has included metals and fossil fuels. From the Stone Age
through the Bronze and Iron ages and up to today’s world of advanced
material sciences, human civilizations have extracted and refined metals,
materials, and various fuels. In the past two decades, this has continued to
be the case but now with a significant shift of emphasis. Specifically, most of
those involved in some way with the extractive sectors—either as producers,
regulators, or commentators—are far more concerned than ever before to
reduce the environmental footprint. The task has much more clearly become
one of using resource wealth well, for purposes of sustainable and inclusive
development. That is an easy objective to articulate but a far more difficult
one to accomplish. The world faces an immense challenge: how to sustain
the expansion of living standards and reduce poverty—which will continue
to involve a huge use of natural resources—while simultaneously avoiding
calamitous climate change.
The demands on human ingenuity to create new solutions are unprece-
dented. The new technologies and ways of organizing societies that make up
the low-carbon future require another leap forward in knowledge. But they
also require metals, materials, and fuels—in large amounts. The extractives
sector is central to creating an environmentally sustainable future of continu-
ing and rising prosperity. Within the extractives sector, fossil fuels will even-
tually retire—but only after several more decades. Yet as this happens, the
need for themetals andmaterials to construct renewable energy systems, zero-
carbon buildings and new forms of transportation will grow. More recycling
can meet some of the extra demand, but the challenge for the extractives
sector is to ramp up production while reducing its own emissions and local
environmental impact. The sector will be further encouraged to green itself by
the demands of manufacturers to ensure environmentally and socially sound
supply chains, in turn encouraged by increased consumer knowledge and
concern, as well as socially responsible investors. Producing countries will
need to adjust to the economic impact of the resulting shifts in markets
implied by the transition to a low-carbon future.
This book seeks to demonstrate that no serious development scholar or practi-
tioner can today ignore the role of extractive industries in the big debates about
sustainable development (see Message 1 of Chapter 1). These industries have
become far more significant to the economies of low-income countries (LICs)
and many middle-income countries (MICs) over the past two decades (Roe
and Dodd, Chapter 2, this volume). For reasons discussed in the book, this is
only partially a consequence of the super-cycle in commodity prices during
that period. The economic significance of the extractives sector is likely
to increase substantially further for countries with resources vital to the
technologies needed for the low-carbon future (Addison, Chapter 22, this
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volume). Those countries with oil and gas will see continued demand in the
immediate and medium-term future, as natural gas will most likely constitute
an ‘energy bridge’—as it replaces coal—to a renewable energy future (and
the transition from the internal combustion engine to electrically powered
vehicles is still in its infancy). But the slippage in oil and gas prices in recent
years from their historic highs of a decade ago, and the resulting pressures on
the public finances of some oil and gas economies, are an early-warning signal
to national leaders of the need to adjust and create new economic activities.
Time is not on the side of fossil-fuel exporters.
Another theme of this book is the changing nature of the extractives
industry itself and attitudes and policies towards it—especially the large
improvements in practice seen since the turn of the millennium. Despite
this, amongst development specialists, both practitioners and researchers,
attitudes towards extractives still easily slip into a ‘them and us’ dichotomy.
Mining and oil and gas companies (the ‘them’) are often characterized as
exploitative and wholly disrespectful of local tax and other laws, environ-
mental and other regulations—thereby causing harm to the communities,
governments, and nations (the ‘us’).1 This is one strong manifestation of the
general ambivalence towards the private sector, and especially a distrust of large
businesses, that has permeated much development debate down the years.
Consequently, development debates have arguably devoted too little atten-
tion to the role of large private companies, both domestic and foreign, and
their potential to generate growth and jobs. Yet, extractive sectors that work
for development almost always require very large-scale private investment,
and the kinds of technical and commercial knowledge provided only by large-
scale mining and oil and gas companies. The resulting revenues generated by
their activities will often far exceed inflows of foreign aid, while the stimulus
of the extractives sector to the economy can (if managed well) deliver thou-
sands of new jobs.2
But what might replace the ‘them and us’ mentality when we do decide to
engagemore actively with the extractives sectors and bring themmore centrally
into the development debate? The answer given in this book is that we should
recognize more explicitly the wide variation in behaviours across both host
governments and extractive companies (a variation discussed as well as illus-
trated schematically in Figure 1.2 in the introductory chapter). Some govern-
ments do have strong institutions favourable to delivering national benefits
1 The ‘us’ in this dichotomy is invariably characterized as having positive motives, contrary to
Message 6 in the introductory chapter, which reminds us that some governments can be ineffective
and divisive, with some local elites showing little concern for the interests of the nation or those of
communities.
2 Foreign aid has a vital role to play in development, and our argument here does not imply that
foreign direct investment (FDI) is a substitute for aid.
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from extractives development, while others are run for the benefit of wealthy
elites (with little concern for the broader local society), just as there are differen-
tiated companies: some good and socially responsible and some rogues.
We therefore need to be more aware of differentiation across host govern-
ments as well as across extractives companies. Many top-down policy initia-
tives, from both national and international programmes, are likely to fail if
they do not first assess, diagnose, and factor in the large differences that do
exist in the real world! This point has been underplayed in research on
extractives. Econometric methods have helped to identify some broad pat-
terns in the relationship between resource wealth and economic performance,
but given the number of individual country outliers from most regression
results, it is unhelpful to generalize—and worse still derive policy—from
econometric studies alone (concluding, for instance, that resource wealth is
inevitably disastrous and advising unhelpfully that it should invariably be
‘kept in the ground’). Equally, care must be exercised in generalizing from
country experiences by, for example, majoring on failing states and down-
playing the situation in better-performing countries. International policy
prescriptions can easily fall into the trap of ‘one-size-fits-all’ recommenda-
tions. It is unhelpful, for example, to suggest that all resource-rich LICs and
MICs should establish a sovereignwealth fund: some LICs andMICsmay have
plentiful high-return domestic opportunities that can productively absorb the
available funds.
It is also important to acknowledge that the numerous national and inter-
national initiatives of the past two decades—one of many examples discussed
in the book being the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—
have already improved the general performance quality of many host govern-
ments and many extractives companies (in terms of the positioning repre-
sented stylistically in Figure 1.2 in the introductory chapter), notwithstanding
some regression in a few cases. We now see more reasonably enlightened
companies working with reasonably effective and inclusive governments
(i.e. at or near Zone B in Figure 1.2) than was evident twenty years ago. Future
policy reforms and international initiatives must continue that process;
more countries and companies can then achieve compliance with the high
standards proposed by, for example, the NRGI benchmarks and the IFC and
the ICMM corporate performance standards.
This book has explored in detail what good policy and practice looks like, in
its many dimensions (macroeconomic, environmental, taxation, local con-
tent, downstream planning, community development, gender equality, etc.).
It could be argued that in many of these areas we know what ‘good policy’
looks like. However, while much improvement is evident it remains crucial to:
(i) recognize the continuing failings of actual practice in specific cases (both
governments and companies); (ii) advance a learning process based in part
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on the experiences of better-performing countries and companies, in order
to help others move into compliance with best practice; and (iii) continue
to look for innovative ways of facilitating that process, especially in the
most difficult situations where there is some hope of progress but where
standard prescriptions have so far proven less than effective (especially
Zones A and D, in Figure 1.2 in the introductory chapter). But these tasks
require policy analysts more explicitly to recognize difference: that is, to
assess the very substantial variations in behaviours between different host
governments and different extractive companies, and to tailor their recom-
mendations accordingly.
33.2 Articulating and Implementing a Vision
A key theme of this book is that the many dimensions of extractives policy
analysed in the individual specialized chapters should not be seen—as they all
too often are—as separate distinct areas of policy to be contained within their
own technical silos. On the contrary, for real progress inmaking extractives an
effective development driver, these policies need to be part of an integrated and
comprehensive package. By welding the component policies together around a
strongly maintained and coordinated vision, a country is far more likely to
turn the promise of extractives into a genuinely better, more sustainable, and
more inclusive economic future for its citizens. That is the reason why this
book, in addition to its specialist policy chapters, devotes significant space to
four main overarching and linking themes.
First, the book makes a strong case for what can be called an ‘all of government
approach’ (especially in Chapter 17 by Kathryn McPhail). Many LICs and MICs
have recently articulated ‘vision statements’ for their long-term futures. Yet in
practice we rarely see a strongly coordinated approach to the management of
extractive resources that gives credible substance to such statements. Indeed,
individual ministries and agencies frequently find it extremely difficult to
cooperate and co-ordinate over extractives activity, and often take their own
individual paths. Opportunities are then missed, especially in maximizing
economic benefits (such as local economic development linked to extractive
operations).
Second (especially in Chapter 6 by Evelyn Dietsche), it tries to unbundle a
great many ideas around the concept of ‘institutions’. While there is now an
almost universal consensus that the building of ‘good institutions’ is essential
if extractives are to play an effective role in converting resource wealth into
sustainable and effective development, the complex nature of this process,
and the true underlying meaning of the term ‘institutions’ (and its compo-
nent elements), are far less commonly spelled out.
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Third, the book seeks to broaden significantly the traditional set of ideas
about the impact of extractive industries on their host economies. Specifically,
Chapter 18 by Anthony Hodge articulates the case for developing systematic
methods to define, evaluate, and monitor the sector’s contribution to human,
economic, and ecosystem well-being over the entire project and product life
cycle: the author adopts the label ‘contribution analysis’ for this. Such analysis
involves a more demanding test than the one used in most current practices
of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) because it explicitly combines a compre-
hensive picture of the various impacts (thereby fitting well with the all-of-
government approach); combines economic and non-economic impacts;
provides a greater opportunity for the perspectives of all interest groups to be
properly heard; and takes a long-term (life-cycle) perspective on extractive
activity. The practical application of such an approach might be demanding
relative to the capacities available to many host countries. However, the
examples provided by Hodge do indicate that elements of the approach are
certainly practical in at least some contexts (and capacities to deliver more
should be built). Above all, because the contributions of extractives to both
human and ecosystem well-being are so significant and controversial, these
contributions need to be both identified, and more actively tracked over time.
Fourth, the book also seeks to fill something of a gap in the available
literature by showing how extractive industries can fit within the frameworks
of some at least of the new industrial economics debates (in Chapter 7 on this
topic by Evelyn Dietsche).3 In this area of debate our earlier comment about
the uncomfortable positioning of extractives in the development storybook is
particularly pertinent. Many who write on the topic do so without engaging
significantly (if at all) with the role of mining and oil and gas. In some
manifestations of the literature these extractive sectors are definitely seen as
inimical to the longer-term productivity gains needed to drive economic
growth: manufacturing by contrast, with its potential for hosting large prod-
uctivity improvements, is seen as the sine qua non of the necessary policy
direction. This book recognizes explicitly that diversification must be at the
centre of any long-term strategy for the use of a non-renewable resource
(Message 4 from Chapter 1). However, the time horizon that defines ‘long term’
can often be very long indeed, providing innumerable opportunities to use a
large extractive resource boom to help catalyse a whole range of non-extractive
activity for the future.
Chapter 7 notes several of the key characteristics of manufacturing, notably
in the East Asian model that has made this sector the central focus of many of
the recommendations from the new industrial economics literature. Butmost
3 Or the new ‘structural’ economics as it is referred to in some parts of the literature.
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of these characteristics are arguably also present in the extractive industries,
including: (i) they are export-led and so do not face significant demand con-
straints from small domestic markets; (ii) they address the foreign-exchange
problem of countries that might otherwise have been limited by that con-
straint; (iii) they provide a convenient basis for learning-by-doing and the
absorption of new technologies from abroad, which are critical elements for
discovery and learning andproductivity gains; (iv) they provide relatively easily
taxable revenues and so help to boost public spending capacity; and (v) being
centred on a discrete number of enterprise units, they provide for a relatively
natural system of accountability for those revenues, as compared to the prob-
lem of taxing a huge and dispersed set of, say, agriculture-based businesses.
So, the challenge we present to the development community is to consider
these positive characteristics of extractives alongside the various negative char-
acteristics (that are much more familiar from the huge resource-curse litera-
ture) before leaping to any final judgement about the extractive industries and
their role in development. This is an agnostic position on our part. We have
no illusions that in some extractive-dependent LICs and MICs (especially
those in Zones C and D of our Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1) there is any early
prospect of a pro-active and successful industrial policy based on the extract-
ive resources of those countries. But inmany other countries—especially those
with a very long time horizon until resource depletion—there is an evident
potential for a pro-active policy approach. This can encourage, for example,
commercially logical local content, viable downstream activities, and more
effective programmes for small- and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs)—all
acting asmajor catalysts for successful economic diversification. Themain and
truly demanding challenge for host governments in this context is to some-
how create a governance framework for a long-term industrial strategy and the
appropriate policy interventions to support that strategy over periods of time
spanning far more than one electoral cycle. But to be provocative one might
even argue that to forgo this future potential—because of inadequate analysis
and the failure to adopt the necessary promotional policies (including those
that have succeeded in other countries)—could be as costly to the host econ-
omy as would the squandering of the government revenues from extractives
through white elephant investment projects and widespread rent-seeking!
33.3 Final Words
Many of the issues covered by this book will be familiar to specialists who
major on the development dimensions of the extractive industries. Still, it is
impossible to be a specialist in every aspect of what is a large and fast-moving
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field, and so we trust that specialists will find much that is thought-provoking
in the book.
The book should also be of considerable interest to the larger number of
parties (in government, academia, NGOs, and donor agencies) who have
some contact with, or a degree of interest in, specific narrow issues around
the topic but who might benefit from the analysis, insights, and suggestions
on a broad range of component issues that extend well beyond those in their
immediate fields of vision. For that audience, we hope that our aspiration to
provide a well-informed and comprehensive coverage of the complex and
extensive range of component issues that connect the extractive sectors with
the broader development agenda will enhance their understanding of the
subject and possibly provoke some marginal adjustments of their own main-
tained positions.
A book such as this, written by some thirty or more experienced and
independent specialists, could easily have just covered a multitude of dispar-
ate and disconnected topics and still perhaps have been classed as ‘compre-
hensive’. But from the start of this UNU-WIDER initiative, the objective has
always been to achieve ‘comprehensiveness’ in a different sense.4 Specifically,
the aim has been to deliver a structured flow of the materials across the book’s
eight parts—the many different angles, ideas, and policy positions of the
contributors—then link them together coherently. But that structuring pro-
cess did not start out, and does not finish, with any ‘maintained hypothesis’
about the benefits or failings of extractives as a contributor to the develop-
ment process. The book certainly does not seek to present a rose-tinted view of
the development benefits of extractives, and nor does it subscribe to the most
negative manifestations of the resource-curse thesis. Rather, the editors and
the contributors hope that the book will encourage its readers to explore the
complexity of the real world of extractives and development, to take away an
increased awareness of the huge potential for goodmanagement of the extrac-
tives sector to improve the lives of millions of people, and to be more fully
apprised of the policies and actions, national and global, necessary to achieve
this. It is a demanding task and we in the development community can do it
much better than we have in the past!
4 This book is part of the UNU-WIDER project Extractives for Development. Further papers
together with blogs and links to video interviews with many of the authors can be found at:
https://www.wider.unu.edu.
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